Co vs. Republic

Strict compliance with the publication requirement of Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 — three publications in the Official Gazette — is jurisdictional in naturalization proceedings, and a single publication does not confer jurisdiction upon the court to hear and decide the petition.

Celestino Co y Quing Reyes, an alien resident of the Philippines, filed a petition for naturalization before the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act No. 473, governs the admission of aliens to Philippine citizenship and prescribes, among other mandatory requisites, the manner and frequency of publication of the petition. Section 9 of that law requires the clerk of court to publish the petition "once a week for three consecutive weeks" in the Official Gazette and in one newspaper of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides. At the time the petition was filed, the Official Gazette was being published monthly rather than weekly, a circumstance that bore directly on the feasibility of literal compliance with the statutory command.

Celestino Co y Quing Reyes, an alien residing in the Philippines, filed a petition for naturalization before the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking admission as a citizen of the Philippines. Pursuant to Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, the petition was required to be published "once a week for three consecutive weeks" in the Official Gazette and in one newspaper of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides. The notice of hearing was published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, but only once in the Official Gazette. At the time the petition was filed, the Official Gazette was being published monthly rather than weekly, making literal weekly publication impossible.

The Provincial Fiscal appeared at the trial and interposed opposition to the application. The record is silent as to how the opposition was prejudiced by the non-publication of the petition in two additional issues of the Official Gazette. The lower court nonetheless granted the petition for naturalization, finding that the petitioner possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law.

The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, maintaining that the lower court erred in hearing the case and granting the petition despite the undisputed fact that the petition was published in the Official Gazette only once instead of three times as required by Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. The appellee countered that the sufficiency of the publication was not questioned below and could not be raised for the first time on appeal, that the duty to publish was imposed on the clerk of court rather than the petitioner, and that non-compliance was not a fatal defect absent a showing of actual prejudice.

• Waiver of Defect: Appellee alleged that the sufficiency of the publication was not questioned in the lower court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• Clerk's Duty, Not Petitioner's: Appellee maintained that the duty to publish the petition is imposed by law upon the clerk of court, not upon the petitioner, and that any deficiency should not be attributed to the petitioner.
• No Prejudice Shown: Appellee argued that non-compliance with Section 9 is not a fatal defect unless it is actually established that it prejudices the opposition to the application.
• Impossible Compliance: Appellee contended that because the Official Gazette was then published monthly rather than weekly, the petitioner could not actually comply with the requirement of weekly publication, and having published the notice once, he should be given the benefit of having followed the law.

• Failure to Comply with Requisites: Appellant maintained that the petitioner-appellee failed to comply with all the requisites prescribed by law to acquire Philippine citizenship.
• Lack of Qualifications: Appellant argued that the petitioner-appellee does not possess all the qualifications prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law.
• Erroneous Grant: Appellant asserted that the lower court erred in granting Philippine citizenship to the petitioner-appellee.
• Strict Compliance Required: Appellant, through the Solicitor General, argued that the publication requirement must be strictly observed because the grant of citizenship is a mere privilege and strict compliance with the law on the part of the applicant is essential.

• Jurisdictional Effect of Publication: Whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the naturalization proceeding when the petition was published only once in the Official Gazette instead of three times as required by Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
• Waiver and Substantial Compliance: Whether the defect in publication may be waived or deemed substantially complied with, given that it was not raised below, that the duty to publish rests on the clerk of court, and that no prejudice to the opposition was shown.
• Impossibility of Compliance: Whether the monthly publication schedule of the Official Gazette excuses compliance with the statutory requirement of publication "once a week for three consecutive weeks."

• Jurisdictional Effect of Publication: No. A single publication in the Official Gazette is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court to hear and decide the naturalization petition; Section 9 requires three publications, and non-compliance is a fatal jurisdictional defect.
• Waiver and Substantial Compliance: No. The publication requirement is jurisdictional in a proceeding in rem that binds the whole world; failure to raise the issue below does not cure the defect, and the identity of the party responsible for the omission is immaterial.
• Impossibility of Compliance: No. Although weekly publication was impossible because the Official Gazette was published monthly, the notice could have been published three times consecutively in three consecutive monthly issues; the true intent of the law is that the notice be published three times.

• Jurisdictional Effect of Publication: Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 requires that the petition be published "once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette." This provision demands compliance with three requirements: (1) the publication must be weekly; (2) it must be made three times; and (3) these must be consecutive. The Court had squarely construed and applied this provision in Ong Son Cui vs. Republic of the Philippines, where it held that a single publication in the Official Gazette is "clearly incomplete and therefore insufficient to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo to try the case and grant the petition." Naturalization proceedings are in rem, affecting the personal status of the petitioner and binding upon "all the world." In a proceeding in rem, the whole world is in legal contemplation a party; since personal service of summons upon every person is impossible, publication as provided by law is the substitute. Without such publication, the court has no jurisdiction over all parties concerned, and any decision rendered is a nullity. The publication requirement is therefore not a mere procedural formality but the very foundation of the court's authority to decide the case.

• Waiver and Substantial Compliance: The appellee's contention that the defect was not raised below and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal was rejected. Because a naturalization decision is a judgment in rem, it is binding upon all the world, and public interest demands that courts refrain from performing invalid acts. Non-compliance with the publication requirement affects the jurisdiction of the court and "impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case," regardless of whether the clerk of court or the petitioner is to blame. The principle of implied waiver of defenses under Section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not apply to naturalization proceedings except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient — and it was neither practicable nor convenient to do so here. The Court cited American jurisprudence for the proposition that substituted service by publication requires strict and literal compliance with statutory provisions, and that actual knowledge of the proceeding does not render service effectual if the process was not served in accordance with the requirements of the statute.

• Impossibility of Compliance: The appellee argued that because the Official Gazette was published monthly, not weekly, the petitioner could not actually comply with the law, and having published the notice once, he should be given the benefit of substantial compliance. The Court acknowledged that weekly publication was impossible but held that the notice could have been published three times consecutively, albeit not weekly, in three consecutive monthly issues of the Official Gazette. The true intent of the law is that the notice be published three times, and a single publication does not satisfy that intent. The Court found no valid reason to depart from its prior ruling in Ong Son Cui, which had addressed the same issue.

• Strict Construction of Naturalization Laws — Naturalization laws "should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant for citizenship." The grant of citizenship is a mere privilege, and strict compliance with the law on the part of the applicant is essential. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications of the statutory terms; their duty is to rigidly enforce the legislative will. This principle has been consistently applied by the Philippine Supreme Court in interpreting naturalization laws.

• Jurisdictional Nature of Publication in Naturalization Proceedings — Naturalization proceedings are in rem, binding upon the whole world. Publication of the petition as provided by law is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over all parties concerned. Non-compliance with the statutory publication requirements affects the jurisdiction of the court and constitutes a fatal defect, impairing the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case. This defect cannot be cured by waiver, is not dependent on a showing of actual prejudice, and is immaterial to whether the clerk of court or the petitioner is responsible for the omission.

• Three Requisites of Publication Under Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 473 — The publication requirement demands compliance with three conditions: (1) the publication must be weekly; (2) it must be made three times; and (3) these must be consecutive. Where literal weekly publication is impossible due to the monthly publication schedule of the Official Gazette, the second and third conditions must still be satisfied by publishing the notice in three consecutive monthly issues.

• "non-compliance with the requirements thereof, relative to the publication of the petition, affects the jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, for it impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the publication requirement is jurisdictional, not merely procedural, and its non-observance is a fatal defect that cannot be attributed to the party responsible for the omission.

• "naturalization laws 'should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against applicant for citizenship'" — This is the canonical formulation of the strict construction doctrine for naturalization statutes, drawn from Corpus Juris Secundum and adopted by the Philippine Supreme Court as its governing criterion.

• "A single publication therefore of the notice where the law requires 3 is an incomplete publication, and an incomplete publication is not a valid publication. The grant of citizenship is only a mere privilege, and a strict compliance with law on the part of the applicant is essential." — This quotation, drawn from the Solicitor General's brief as quoted in Ong Son Cui vs. Republic of the Philippines and reaffirmed in the present case, states the rationale for requiring triple publication and the privilege-based standard of strict compliance.

• Ong Son Cui vs. Republic of the Philippines, 101 Phil. 649 — Controlling precedent directly on point. The Court had previously held that a single publication in the Official Gazette is insufficient to confer jurisdiction and that strict compliance with the three-publication requirement is mandatory. The present case reaffirmed and applied this ruling.
• Pardo vs. Republic, 85 Phil. 323 — Cited as part of the line of cases establishing the Court's criterion of strict construction of naturalization laws in favor of the government and against the applicant.
• Bautista vs. Republic of the Philippines, 87 Phil. 818 — Cited both as supporting strict construction and for the proposition, quoted from U.S. vs. Gingsberg, that courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications to the statutory terms for naturalization.
• Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, et al., 77 Phil. 1012 — Cited in the dissenting opinion for the proposition that the purpose of the publication requirement is to inform officers and the public of the filing of the petition so that derogatory information may be furnished to the Solicitor General or provincial fiscal.

• Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) — Requires the clerk of court to publish the petition for naturalization "once a week for three consecutive weeks" in the Official Gazette and in one newspaper of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides. The Court held that this provision imposes three mandatory conditions — weekly publication, three publications, and consecutiveness — and that non-compliance is a jurisdictional defect. Although weekly publication was impossible due to the monthly schedule of the Official Gazette, the requirement of three consecutive publications could still be satisfied by publishing in three consecutive monthly issues.
• Section 10, Rule 9, Rules of Court — Governs implied waiver of defenses not pleaded in the answer or motion to dismiss. The Court held that this provision does not apply to naturalization proceedings except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient, and that it was neither practicable nor convenient to apply it in this case.
• Article 1183, New Civil Code — Provides that an obligation based on an impossible condition is void. Cited by the dissenting opinion to argue that the weekly publication condition, having become impossible of compliance, should be dispensed with.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concurred in the majority opinion.

• Paras, C. J. — The Chief Justice dissented, arguing that when one of the conditions imposed by the statute became impossible of compliance without the fault of the appellee — because the Official Gazette had shifted from a thrice-weekly to a monthly publication schedule — such condition ceases to be mandatory and should be dispensed with. He invoked Article 1183 of the New Civil Code, which provides that an obligation based on an impossible condition is void, and cited statutory construction principles holding that a statute should be interpreted in a way that makes it practically workable. He noted that at the time Commonwealth Act No. 473 was enacted, the Official Gazette was published three times a week, so the legislature clearly intended weekly publication; when the Government changed the publication schedule to monthly, the impossibility was not attributable to the petitioner. He further argued that the purpose of the publication requirement — to inform officers and the public so that derogatory information might be furnished — had been accomplished by the single publication in the Official Gazette and the three publications in a newspaper of general circulation, and that the record was silent as to any prejudice suffered by the opposition from the missing two publications. Montemayor, J., concurred in the dissent.