Co vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products

The one-year period within which to revive a provisionally dismissed criminal case under Section 8, Rule 117 is reckoned from the date the offended party's private counsel received the order of provisional dismissal, and a "year" means twelve calendar months as computed under the Administrative Code of 1987, regardless of whether the period includes a leap year.

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, was the private complainant in several B.P. 22 cases filed against petitioner William Co before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City. The cases involved bouncing checks and were subject to the procedural rules on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs the conditions and time limits for reviving provisionally dismissed criminal cases.

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, was the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co. The cases were raffled to MeTC Branch 49 of Caloocan City. Co was arraigned on March 4, 2002. On June 9, 2003, in the absence of Uy and her private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, upon Co's motion that the complainant had not shown any interest in pursuing her complaint. Uy received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day later, on July 3, 2003.

On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases. Judge Belen B. Ortiz of MeTC Branch 49 granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co's motion for reconsideration. When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself per Order dated January 10, 2005, and the cases were re-raffled to MeTC Branch 50. Co then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Caloocan City, which was dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005, with the motion for reconsideration denied on December 16, 2005. Co elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 171096, which was dismissed per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. No motion for reconsideration was filed, and the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.

Before MeTC Branch 50, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006. Uy opposed, contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality in G.R. No. 171096. Nevertheless, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co's motion, and subsequently denied Uy's motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006. Uy then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of RTC Branch 121 annulled and set aside the MeTC Branch 50 Orders and directed the MeTC to proceed with trial. Co's petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was dismissed on April 30, 2008, and his motion for reconsideration was denied on August 1, 2008, giving rise to the present petition.

• Right to Speedy Trial as Ground for Final Dismissal: Co argued that the June 9, 2003 provisional dismissal should be deemed a final dismissal because his right to speedy trial was violated, citing the period from arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003 as a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay exceeding the 180-day trial period under R.A. 8493 and Rule 119.
• Loss of Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy: Because the dismissal was allegedly final, Co contended that the MeTC lost jurisdiction over the cases and could not reacquire it by mere motion, as revival would put him in double jeopardy.
• Reckoning Period from Issuance of Order: Assuming the cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co posited that the dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party.
• Both Filing and Order Must Be Within One Year: Co insisted that both the filing of the motion to revive and the court's order granting revival must occur within the one-year period.
• Leap Year Computation: Co asserted that even if the one-year period started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the order, the motion was filed one day late because 2004 was a leap year, making the period 366 days rather than 365.

• Res Judicata: Uy opposed the motion for permanent dismissal, contending that it raised the same issues already resolved with finality by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 171096.

• Res Judicata: Whether the prior dismissal in G.R. No. 171096, which became final and executory, bars the present petition on the ground of res judicata.
• Right to Speedy Trial: Whether the delay from arraignment to initial trial constituted a violation of Co's right to speedy trial warranting final dismissal of the criminal cases.
• Requisites of Provisional Dismissal: Whether the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 were satisfied, particularly the prior notice requirement to the offended party.
• Reckoning Period for Permanent Dismissal: Whether the one-year period for revival is reckoned from the issuance of the order of provisional dismissal or from notice to the offended party's counsel.
• Timeliness of Revival Order: Whether both the filing of the motion to revive and the court's order granting revival must be made within the one-year period.
• Leap Year Effect: Whether the fact that 2004 was a leap year affects the timeliness of the motion to revive filed on July 2, 2004.

• Res Judicata: Yes. The prior dismissal in G.R. No. 171096, having become final and executory on March 20, 2006, constitutes res judicata between the parties, as the issues raised therein are identical to those in the present petition.
• Right to Speedy Trial: No. Co failed to show that the alleged delay was attended with malice or made without justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution; mere mathematical reckoning of time does not suffice to establish a violation of the right to speedy trial.
• Requisites of Provisional Dismissal: No. There was no prior notice to the offended party of the motion for provisional dismissal at least three days before the hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15, as the motion was made only in open court.
• Reckoning Period for Permanent Dismissal: The one-year period is reckoned from the date the offended party's private counsel received the order of provisional dismissal, not from the date of issuance of the order.
• Timeliness of Revival Order: No. The Rules do not require that the court's order granting revival be issued within the one-year period; only the filing of the motion to revive need be timely.
• Leap Year Effect: No. A year is equivalent to twelve calendar months regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year, pursuant to Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.

• Res Judicata: The issues raised in the present petition were the same as those in G.R. No. 171096, which was dismissed per Resolution dated February 13, 2006 and became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While the first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, the Court stated therein that the petition lacked sufficient showing that the respondent court had committed any reversible error. Upon finality of that resolution, the same already constitutes res judicata between the parties. On this ground alone, the present petition should have been dismissed outright.

• Right to Speedy Trial: "Speedy trial" is a relative term and a flexible concept. In determining whether the accused's right was violated, the delay must be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings, balancing the following factors: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Co failed to present evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay was attended with malice or made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. Mere mathematical reckoning of time does not suffice, as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings. While the accused's right to speedy trial is recognized, the State cannot be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals; only unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time offend that right.

• Requisites of Provisional Dismissal: The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal; or both move for it; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal. In this case, there was no notice of any motion for provisional dismissal served on the private complainant at least three days before the hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15. The motion was made only in open court. The importance of prior notice was explained in People vs. Lacson: it enables the offended party to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including collusion between the prosecution and the accused, attempts to make witnesses unavailable, or prejudice to the offended party's rights.

• Reckoning Period for Permanent Dismissal: There is no jurisprudential support for Co's supposition that the dismissal became permanent one year after issuance of the order rather than after notice to the offended party. While the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after issuance thereof, the provision should be construed to mean one year after service of the order on the public prosecutor, who cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless served with a copy. Moreover, where the offended party is represented by private counsel, the better rule is that the reckoning period should commence from the time such private counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13, which provides that if a party has appeared by counsel, service shall be made upon the latter. Since Uy's private counsel received the order on July 3, 2003, the one-year period ran from that date.

• Timeliness of Revival Order: The contention that both the filing of the motion to revive and the court order reviving the case must be made within the one-year period is unsustainable, as such interpretation is not found in the Rules. To require otherwise would put the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may not comply due to clogged dockets, administrative duties, or even ill-will. The filing of the motion to revive within the one-year period is sufficient.

• Leap Year Effect: The fact that 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential. A year is equivalent to twelve calendar months regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. Under Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, "year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months. A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. Applying this provision, the one-year period reckoned from July 2, 2003 (when Uy received the order) consisted of twelve calendar months ending on July 2, 2004. Even granting that the reckoning period should be from Uy's receipt on July 2, 2003, the motion filed on that same date was timely. Moreover, since the private counsel received the order on July 3, 2003, the period extended to July 2, 2004, making the motion timely filed.

• Res Judicata in Criminal Procedure — A prior final dismissal of a petition involving the same issues between the same parties constitutes res judicata, barring relitigation of those issues in a subsequent petition. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that G.R. No. 171096, which became final and executory on March 20, 2006, resolved the same issues raised in the present petition, warranting outright dismissal on this ground alone.

• Right to Speedy Trial — Four-Factor Test — The right to speedy trial is a relative and flexible concept. In determining whether the right was violated, courts must balance: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason for the delay; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by the delay. Mere mathematical reckoning of time is insufficient; the realities of everyday life and the facts peculiar to each case must be considered. Only unjustified postponements that prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time offend the right.

• Requisites of Provisional Dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 — The essential requisites are: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal; or both move for it; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal. These are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of Section 8.

• Reckoning Period for Revival of Provisionally Dismissed Cases — Where the offended party is represented by private counsel, the one-year period for revival is reckoned from the date such private counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal, not from the date of issuance of the order. This is consistent with Section 2, Rule 13, which provides that service upon a party represented by counsel shall be made upon the counsel.

• Legal Definition of "Year" — Under Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, a "year" is understood to be twelve calendar months, regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. The number of days is irrelevant to the computation.

• "While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial." — This passage articulates the balance between the accused's constitutional right and the State's interest in prosecution, defining the threshold for a speedy trial violation.

• "Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived." — This passage establishes the controlling interpretation of Section 8, Rule 117, shifting the reckoning point from issuance to service of the order, ensuring due process.

• "if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal." — This passage extends the reckoning rule to private counsel, aligning provisional dismissal procedure with general rules on service of notices under Rule 13.

• "A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year." — This passage resolves the leap-year argument by adopting the Administrative Code's definition of a year as twelve calendar months, rendering the number of days irrelevant.

• People vs. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317 (2003) — Controlling precedent on the requisites of provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 and the importance of prior notice to the offended party. Followed and applied to hold that the lack of prior notice to Uy vitiated the provisional dismissal procedure.
• Jacob vs. Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010 — Cited for the principle that "speedy trial" is a relative and flexible concept, and that delay must be evaluated in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
• Tan vs. People of the Philippines, 604 Phil. 68 (2009) — Cited for the four-factor test in determining violations of the right to speedy trial: duration, reason, assertion of the right, and prejudice.
• Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 558 Phil. 182 (2007) — Controlling precedent on the legal definition of "year" as twelve calendar months under the Administrative Code of 1987, followed and applied to reject the leap-year argument.
• Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010 — Cited as reiterating the Primetown ruling on the calendar-month computation of a year.
• Spouses Aguilar vs. Manila Banking Corporation, 533 Phil. 645 (2006) — Cited for the duty of counsel to advise clients on the merit or lack of merit of their case and to resist the whims and caprices of clients, tempering their propensity to litigate.

• Section 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs provisional dismissal of criminal cases. The first paragraph sets the conditions: provisional dismissal requires the express consent of the accused and notice to the offended party. The second paragraph provides the time-bar: for offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years, the provisional dismissal becomes permanent one year after issuance of the order without revival. Applied to determine whether the dismissal was valid and whether the revival was timely.
• Section 4, Rule 15, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires that written motions be set for hearing and that notice thereof be served on the other party at least three days before the hearing. Applied to hold that no proper notice of the motion for provisional dismissal was served on the private complainant.
• Section 2, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that if a party has appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be made upon the latter. Applied to justify reckoning the one-year revival period from the date the private counsel received the order of provisional dismissal.
• Section 6, Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) — Mandates that the entire trial period shall not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. Cited by petitioner but found inapplicable absent a showing of unjustified delay.
• Section 2, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires continuous trial until terminated, with the entire trial period not exceeding 180 days. Cited by petitioner but found inapplicable for the same reason.
• Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I, Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) — Defines legal periods: "year" means twelve calendar months; "month" means thirty days unless referring to a specific calendar month. Applied to compute the one-year revival period and reject the leap-year argument.
• Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility — Enjoins lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Found to have been contravened by petitioner's counsel.
• Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits lawyers from unduly delaying a case or misusing court processes. Found to have been contravened by petitioner's counsel.

Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen concurred with the decision. No separate concurring opinions were noted.