Claverias vs. Quingco

Laches may bar a registered co-owner's action for annulment of title and reconveyance even though prescription does not, where the adverse possessor's predecessor held the property for 36 years and the claimant delayed assertion of her rights and failed to prosecute prior actions. The Court also held that Exhibits "17" and "18" were inadmissible and that the alleged sales could not convey petitioner's share, but laches foreclosed relief.

Lot No. 737 of the Himamaylan Cadastre was originally registered in the names of Teodora Claverias and her brother Federico, with their mother Sinforosa Flores holding a usufructuary right. The property later became registered in the names of Adoracion Quingco and then Ernesto Tongson. The governing backdrop included the Civil Code of Spain on intestate succession and usufruct, the Torrens system under the Land Registration Act, and the Rules of Court on the best evidence rule.

Lot No. 737 of the Himamaylan Cadastre, located at Himamaylan, Negros Occidental and involving more than fifteen hectares, was originally decreed and registered in the names of Teodora Claverias and her brother Federico. Petitioner alleged that the owner's copy of the original certificate of title was lost during the last world war; that after the war, private respondent Adoracion Quingco, taking advantage of the plaintiffs' illiteracy, had the original title reconstructed in the names of Teodora and her deceased brother; that Quingco thereafter, through fraud, caused the cancellation of that title and obtained a new certificate in her own name; and that Quingco, in connivance with private respondent Ernesto Tongson, executed a fictitious and simulated deed of sale of Lot No. 737 in favor of Tongson, by virtue of which a new transfer certificate of title was issued in Tongson's name. Petitioner further alleged that Tongson, through force and intimidation, succeeded in evicting her and her mother from the premises they had been occupying, and that she learned of these fraudulent transactions only in 1968 upon verification with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City.

Private respondents, in their Amended Answer, alleged that Lot No. 737 was twice sold to their predecessors-in-interest by Sinforosa. The first sale, which was with petitioner's conformity, was consummated on 22 January 1922 for P300.00; the second sale was executed by Sinforosa and petitioner on 30 June 1930 for P200.00. They alleged that in the settlement of the estate of Eustaquio Quingco, the lot was adjudicated to respondent Adoracion Quingco, who later sold it to respondent Tongson, and that Tongson had a new transfer certificate of title issued in his name. They also alleged that in 1958 Tongson filed an ejectment case against petitioner, who lost; that her appeal to the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental was dismissed on 12 September 1967 for her failure to appear; and that, during the pendency of the ejectment case, she filed an action for recovery of ownership with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which was dismissed on 29 October 1959 for failure to prosecute. Sinforosa died in 1980 during the pendency of Civil Case No. 615.

The trial court, in its 29 October 1984 decision, found that petitioner and her mother had in fact twice sold the property to Venancia Alarcon de Quingco, mother of respondent Adoracion Quingco, as evidenced by Exhibits "17" and "18." It found that OCT No. RO-7111 (17502) was issued on August 6, 1923 in the names of Teodora Claverias and her brother Federico during their minority; that Federico died in his minority and was survived by his mother Sinforosa and sister Teodora; that prior to the issuance of OCT No. RO-7111 (17502), Sinforosa and Teodora executed a deed of absolute sale on January 25, 1922 transferring Lot No. 737 to Venancia Alarcon de Quingco for P300.00 (Exhibit "17"); that after the death of Eustaquio Quingco, his last will and testament was probated in Spec. Proc. No. 4797 and Lot No. 737 was included as part of his testate estate; and that on June 19, 1930, due to the loss of the original deed of sale dated January 25, 1922, another deed of absolute sale was executed by Sinforosa and Teodora, with the marital consent of Teodora's spouse Vicente Lomaques, over the same property in favor of the same buyers (Exhibit "18"). Retired Judge Vidal Vallejera testified on February 7, 1984 as to the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "18." The trial court also found that on March 3, 1958, Adoracion Quingco sold Lot No. 737 for P2,000.00 to Ernesto Tongson, and that TCT No. T-23353 was issued in Tongson's name, cancelling TCT No. T-23275 in Adoracion Quingco's name.

The Court of Appeals, in its 22 July 1986 decision, agreed with the trial court. It gave weight to the notarized documents of absolute sale, Exhibits "17" and "18," and to the testimony of the notary public who notarized one of the deeds. It also found that the alleged trust, whether express or implied, was openly repudiated in 1937 when Lot No. 737 was included in the estate of Eustaquio Quingco in Spec. Proc. No. 4797 and the probate court approved the project of partition adjudicating the lot to Adoracion Quingco, and that petitioner had suffered prior judicial rebuffs in the ejectment case and in her first annulment case filed on April 29, 1959, which was dismissed for repeated failure to appear.

On the evidence, Exhibit "17" was a copy of a deed of sale executed on 25 January 1922 by Sinforosa Flores and containing petitioner's conformity thereto, while Exhibit "18" was a certification issued by Antonio Yacapin, Director of the Bureau of Records and Archives, Manila, dated 24 October 1958, attesting to the correctness of an entry in the notarial register of notary public Vidal P. Vallejera referring to a deed of purchase and sale of Lot No. 737 executed by Sinforosa Flores and Teodora Claverias in favor of Sixto Vallejera for P200.00. The reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-7111 (17502) was issued on 4 March 1958; Tongson bought the property on 3 March 1958; and the reconstituted title was cancelled only on 31 March 1958 upon court order, when TCT No. T-23275 was issued in the name of Adoracion Quingco. Petitioner never possessed Lot No. 737; she attempted to enter a portion in 1958 but was rebuffed by Tongson's ejectment action, which he won, and a writ of execution was issued against her in 1964; her 1959 annulment case was dismissed on 29 October 1959; and she filed the original complaint in Civil Case No. 615 only on 23 October 1972.

• Admission of Exhibits "17" and "18": Petitioner argued that the respondent Court erred in admitting Exhibits "17" and "18" as evidence for private respondents despite her objection.
• Best Evidence Rule: Petitioner maintained that Exhibits "17" and "18," being merely true copies of the alleged originals, were not admissible as evidence under the law.
• Misrepresentation: Petitioner argued that private respondents were guilty of misrepresentation in presenting and offering Exhibits "17" and "18" as certified copies when they were merely true copies.
• Prescription: Petitioner contended that the respondent Court erred in finding that her action to recover possession of the property was barred by prescription.
• Ownership and Sales: Petitioner argued on appeal that the lower court erred in holding that Lot No. 737 was purchased by the grandparents of the appellees spouses Eustaquio Quingco and Venancia Alarcon from the appellants, and that the inclusion of the lot in Eustaquio Quingco's testament and its adjudication to Adoracion Quingco proved ownership.
• Good Faith: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Ernesto Tongson was a buyer in good faith protected by law.
• Prescription or Laches: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in holding that her cause of action to annul Tongson's title and recover possession was barred by prescription or laches.

• Factual Findings Conclusive: Private respondents asserted that the issues in the case are factual and hence the findings of fact of the respondent Court are conclusive.
• Admissibility and Nature of Exhibits: Private respondents claimed that Exhibit "17" is a certified true copy, not merely a true copy, and defended the notarized documents as valid.
• Sales to Predecessors-in-Interest: In their Amended Answer, private respondents alleged that Lot No. 737 was twice sold to their predecessors-in-interest by Sinforosa, the first with petitioner's conformity on 22 January 1922 for P300.00 and the second by Sinforosa and petitioner on 30 June 1930 for P200.00.
• Adjudication and Subsequent Sale: They alleged that the lot was adjudicated to Adoracion Quingco in the settlement of Eustaquio Quingco's estate and that she later sold it to Tongson, who had a new transfer certificate of title issued in his name.
• Prior Litigation: They alleged that Tongson filed an ejectment case against petitioner in 1958, which she lost, and that her appeal was dismissed on 12 September 1967 for failure to appear; that her action for recovery of ownership was dismissed on 29 October 1959 for failure to prosecute.

• Admission of Exhibits "17" and "18": Whether the trial and respondent courts erred in admitting Exhibits "17" and "18" despite petitioner's objection and despite their being copies or certifications rather than the original deeds of sale.
• Validity of the 1922 and 1930 Sales: Whether, granting the admission of Exhibits "17" and "18," the alleged sales of Lot No. 737 by Sinforosa Flores in 1922 and 1930 were valid.
• Effect of Petitioner's "Conforme": Whether petitioner's signature under the word "CONFORMES" on Exhibit "17" operated as a sale or conveyance of her rights in Lot No. 737.
• Good Faith of Respondent Tongson: Whether respondent Ernesto Tongson was a buyer in good faith and for value.
• Prescription and Laches: Whether petitioner's action for annulment of title and reconveyance was barred by prescription and/or laches.
• Implied Trust: Whether petitioner's claim based on an implied or constructive trust had prescribed.

• Admission of Exhibits "17" and "18": Yes, the courts erred. Exhibit "17" was not the best evidence and should have been rejected because the grounds for non-production of the original under Section 3, in relation to Section 5, Rule 130, were not established; Exhibit "18" was merely a certification of a notarial register entry, not a deed of sale.
• Validity of the 1922 and 1930 Sales: No. The 1922 sale by Sinforosa was null and void as to the lot because she was not its owner, and the 1930 sale could not convey petitioner's share.
• Effect of Petitioner's "Conforme": No. The "conforme" meant only conformity to Sinforosa's sale of usufructuary rights; it did not operate as petitioner's sale of her rights or as a mode of acquiring ownership.
• Good Faith of Respondent Tongson: No. Tongson bought on 3 March 1958, before the reconstituted title was issued on 4 March 1958, and he knew or ought to have known that his vendor was not the registered owner.
• Prescription and Laches: Prescription did not bar the action because petitioner was a registered co-owner under Section 46 of the Land Registration Act, but laches did bar it due to 36 years of adverse possession and petitioner's inaction.
• Implied Trust: Yes, the implied-trust claim prescribed in ten years from repudiation.

• Admission of Exhibits "17" and "18": The Court held that Exhibit "17" was a copy of a deed of sale executed on 25 January 1922 by Sinforosa Flores, with petitioner's conformity, while Exhibit "18" was a certification from the Director of the Bureau of Records and Archives dated 24 October 1958 attesting to an entry in the notarial register of notary public Vidal P. Vallejera. Both lower courts admitted and treated them as original documents without ruling on the objection. This was serious error. Under Section 3, Rule 130, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original, except in specified cases. Under Section 5, if the original is unavailable, the offeror must prove its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith. Private respondents failed to present the original and offered no justification; there was doubt as to the deed's existence, no showing of registration, and no entry in the reconstituted OCT. Exhibit "18" was not a deed of sale but a certification of a notarial register entry stating that no copy of the document had been received for file; it could not substitute for the document or prove its contents. The notary public's testimony was insufficient to prove the contents. The trial court also erred in treating the documents as ancient documents; an ancient document is a private document more than thirty years old, produced from natural custody and unblemished by alterations or suspicion, and the requisites presuppose production of the original, which was not done.
• Validity of the 1922 and 1930 Sales: Even assuming Exhibit "17" was properly admitted, the sale by Sinforosa of Lot No. 737 was null and void. Lot No. 737 originally belonged to Sinforosa's husband Cornelio Claverias, who died intestate. His children, petitioner and Federico, inherited under Articles 930 and 932 of the Civil Code of Spain, subject to Sinforosa's usufruct over one-third under Articles 834 and 835. The usufruct covered one-sixth of petitioner's one-half share and one-sixth of Federico's half. OCT No. 17502, reconstituted as OCT No. RO-7111 (17502), was issued on 10 July 1923 in the names of Teodora and Federico, subject to the usufructuary right of Sinforosa during her natural life. Sinforosa could not sell or encumber the lot; she could dispose only of her usufructuary right. When Federico died without issue, Sinforosa inherited his one-half share under Articles 935 and 936. No competent evidence showed Federico's date of death, but he was presumed to have died after the issuance of OCT No. 17502 on 10 July 1923 because his name still appeared as co-owner. Thus, if the 1922 deed was executed, Sinforosa could sell only her usufruct over one-third of the lot, and the sale was void as to the lot because she was not the owner. If the 1930 deed existed, Sinforosa could validly sell only the one-half she inherited from Federico and her usufruct over one-sixth of petitioner's share, not petitioner's share. The Court also found it difficult to accept that the consideration for the entire lot in 1930 was only P200.00 when the usufruct had been sold eight years earlier for P300.00, especially since the second vendee was Sixto Vallejera, not Venancia Alarcon, and there was no competent evidence that Sixto purchased for Venancia or her husband's estate.
• Effect of Petitioner's "Conforme": The lower courts gravely erred in concluding that petitioner also sold her rights in the 25 January 1922 deed. Exhibit "17" itself did not show petitioner as a vendor; only Sinforosa Flores was shown as vendor. Petitioner's participation was limited to affixing her signature below the word "CONFORMES." That "conforme" could mean nothing more than her conformity to the sale of Sinforosa's usufructuary rights. It could not be legally construed as petitioner's sale of her rights in the lot or as her conformity to a sale by Sinforosa, who was not the owner. The "conforme" did not vest ownership on Sinforosa because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
• Good Faith of Respondent Tongson: Contrary to the lower courts, Tongson was not a buyer in good faith. He bought the property on 3 March 1958. Good faith and due diligence required him to demand from the vendor the production of the certificate of title. The vendor was then in possession of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 17502 because it had not yet been reconstituted; the reconstituted title was issued only on 4 March 1958. Therefore, at the time of the alleged purchase, Tongson knew or ought to have known that his vendor was not the registered owner. The entries in the reconstituted OCT also showed that it was cancelled only on 31 March 1958 upon court order, when TCT No. T-23275 was issued in Adoracion Quingco's name.
• Prescription and Laches: Although petitioner owned one-half of Lot No. 737, she never possessed it. She attempted to enter a portion in 1958 but was rebuffed by Tongson's ejectment action, which he won; her appeal was lost and a writ of execution was issued against her in 1964. She also lost her 1959 bid to annul the titles issued to Quingco and Tongson when that case was dismissed on 29 October 1959. Even if Tongson was not a buyer in good faith, the adverse possession of his predecessor-in-interest from 1922 to 1958, totaling 36 years, benefited him for purposes of laches. Petitioner also failed to take further action from the 1959 dismissal until she filed the original complaint on 23 October 1972. Prescription did not operate against her because she was a registered co-owner; under Section 46 of the Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Laches, however, did bar her claim. The Court applied Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia and the elements of laches in Go Chi Gun vs. Co Cho and Miguel vs. Catalino: (1) conduct by the defendant or one under whom he claims giving rise to the situation; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights with knowledge or notice and opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the defendant's part that the complainant would assert the right; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant if relief is granted or the suit is not barred. All elements were present. The Court also cited Heirs of Batiog Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan distinguishing laches from prescription: prescription is statutory and concerned with time, while laches is equitable and concerned with the effect of delay and inequity.
• Implied Trust: The trial court and Court of Appeals correctly applied prescription to petitioner's implied-trust claim. An action based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the date of repudiation of the trust. The alleged trust was repudiated when Lot No. 737 was included in the estate of Eustaquio Quingco in Spec. Proc. No. 4797 and the probate court approved the project of partition adjudicating the lot to Adoracion Quingco. The Court, while sympathetic to petitioner, remained faithful to Miguel vs. Catalino and the maxim that laws assist the vigilant, not the sleepy.

• Best Evidence Rule — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original itself, except under the exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130; if the original is unavailable, Section 5 requires proof of execution or existence and the cause of unavailability without bad faith before secondary evidence may be used. The Court applied this rule to reject Exhibit "17" as a mere copy and Exhibit "18" as a certification of a notarial register entry, because the grounds for non-production of the originals were not established.
• Ancient Documents — An ancient document is a private document more than thirty years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion. The Court held that Exhibits "17" and "18" could not be treated as ancient documents because private respondents did not offer them as private documents, failed to prove the requisites, and did not produce the originals.
• Sale by a Non-Owner or Usufructuary — A person can sell only the rights he or she owns; a usufructuary cannot convey the naked ownership of the property. The Court applied this to hold that Sinforosa's 1922 sale was null and void as to the lot because she was only a usufructuary, and that the 1930 sale could not convey petitioner's share.
• Conforme as Conformity, Not Conveyance — A signature under the word "CONFORMES" signifies conformity to an act but does not itself operate as a sale, conveyance, or mode of acquiring ownership. The Court held that petitioner's "conforme" on Exhibit "17" did not transfer her share in Lot No. 737.
• Buyer in Good Faith — A buyer in good faith must exercise due diligence, including demanding the vendor's certificate of title; knowledge or constructive knowledge that the vendor is not the registered owner negates good faith. The Court found Tongson not a buyer in good faith because he bought on 3 March 1958, before the reconstituted title was issued on 4 March 1958.
• Laches — Laches is the neglect or omission to assert a right, taken with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, which operates as a bar in equity. It is distinct from prescription: prescription is statutory and concerned with time, while laches is equitable and concerned with the effect of delay and inequity. The Court applied laches to bar petitioner's action after 36 years of adverse possession and her failure to prosecute prior claims.
• Elements of Laches — The Court reiterated the elements from Go Chi Gun vs. Co Cho: (1) conduct by the defendant or one under whom he claims giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, with knowledge or notice and opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the defendant's part that the complainant would assert the right; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant if relief is granted or the suit is not barred. All were present.
• Prescription of Implied or Constructive Trust — An action based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the date of repudiation of the trust. The Court held that petitioner's implied-trust claim had prescribed because the trust was repudiated when the lot was included in the estate proceedings and adjudicated to Adoracion Quingco.
• Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt — Laws assist the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. The Court invoked this maxim to support the application of laches.

• "Exhibit "17" is not the best evidence and should have been rejected because the grounds for non-production of the original deed of sale under Section 3, in relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, were not duly established." — This states the Court's evidentiary ratio for rejecting the copy of the 1922 deed of sale.
• "This "conforme" could mean nothing more than her conformity to the sale of the usufructuary rights of Sinforosa. It cannot be legally construed as petitioner's sale of her rights in the lot, or of her conformity to the sale thereof by Sinforosa for the latter is not its owner; the conforme did not operate to vest on Sinforosa ownership over the lot since it can by no means be considered a mode of acquiring ownership." — This defines the limited legal effect of petitioner's signature of conformity on Exhibit "17."
• "Prescription does not operate against her as she is the registered co-owner of Lot No. 737. Per Section 46 of the Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Laches does." — This is the core ruling distinguishing prescription from laches and explaining why laches barred the registered co-owner's action.
• "'Laches' has been defined as 'such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.'" — This is the canonical definition of laches relied upon by the Court in barring petitioner's claim.

• Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 (1956) — The Court cited this as authority that possession for 37 years by a defendant and inaction and neglect by the owner of registered land calls for the application of the equitable defense of laches.
• Go Chi Gun, et al. vs. Co Cho, et al., 96 Phil. 622 — The Court cited this case for the elements of laches, which it found present.
• Miguel vs. Catalino, 26 SCRA 234 (1968) — The Court reiterated the elements of laches and quoted its pronouncement that courts cannot look with favor on parties who, by silence, delay, and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes, and making improvements for 30 years, only to claim title later.
• Heirs of Batiog Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan, 65 SCRA 605 (1975) — The Court cited this case for the definition of laches and its distinction from prescription: prescription is statutory and concerned with time, while laches is equitable and concerned with the effect of delay and inequity.
• Alzona vs. Capunitan, 4 SCRA 450; Bueno, et al. vs. Reyes, et al., 27 SCRA 1179 — The Court cited these cases for the rule that an action based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years.
• Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284; Carantes vs. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 514; Jaramil vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 420 — The Court cited these cases for the rule that the ten-year period is reckoned from the date of repudiation of the trust.
• Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 — The Court cited this case for the exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.

• Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in specified cases. The Court applied this to hold that Exhibit "17" was not the best evidence and should have been rejected.
• Section 5, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that when the original document has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the offeror must prove its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith, and may then prove its contents by a copy, recital in an authentic document, or testimony of witnesses in that order. The Court found that private respondents failed to comply with this requirement.
• Section 21 (formerly Section 22), Rule 132, Rules of Court — Defines an ancient document as a private document more than thirty years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion. The Court held that Exhibits "17" and "18" did not qualify.
• Articles 930 and 932, Civil Code of Spain — Provide for intestate succession in the descending direct line and equal shares among children. The Court applied these to hold that petitioner and Federico inherited Lot No. 737 from their father Cornelio Claverias.
• Articles 834 and 835, Civil Code of Spain — Provide for the widowed spouse's usufructuary right and the source of that usufruct from the third available for betterment. The Court applied these to hold that Sinforosa had only a usufruct over one-third of the lot.
• Articles 935 and 936, Civil Code of Spain — Provide that in default of legitimate children and descendants, ascendants inherit, and the surviving father or mother succeeds to the entire estate of the child. The Court applied these to hold that Sinforosa inherited Federico's one-half share when he died without issue.
• Section 46, Land Registration Act — Provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The Court applied this to hold that prescription did not bar petitioner as a registered co-owner, although laches did.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The petition was filed as a petition for review on certiorari under this Rule. The Court gave due course and reviewed the case under the exceptions to the conclusiveness of factual findings.

Gutierrez, Jr. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.