Claudio vs. COMELEC

The one-year prohibition in Section 74(b) of the Local Government Code applies only to the holding of the recall election, not to the preliminary proceedings such as the convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the adoption of a recall resolution, or the filing of a recall petition. The term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the election itself by which voters decide whether to retain or replace their local official, and the phrase "regular local election" refers to the date of such election, not the election period.

The case involves the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which imposes limitations on the power of recall. Section 69 of the same Code provides that the power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. The recall process may be initiated either by a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) composed of local elective officials, or by a petition signed by at least 25% of registered voters. The constitutional framework establishes recall as a mechanism for the people to hold their elected local officials accountable, and the statutory scheme provides for the composition and functions of the PRA under Section 70 of the Code.

Jovito O. Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections and assumed office on July 1, 1998. During the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr., several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA), and Richard Advincula was designated as its chair.

On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA, composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled "RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE." In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula invited the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal submission of the petition for recall to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999.

As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service. Copies of the petition were posted on bulletin boards in various public places in Pasay City pursuant to COMELEC rules. Subsequently, Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the COMELEC, conducted a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution.

Oppositions to the petition were filed by Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives sent to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case filed by Wenceslao Trinidad seeking annulment of Claudio's proclamation should first be decided; and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all PRA members, considering that 10 were double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.

In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, whether the total membership was 1,790 per its records or 1,876 per DILG statistics. Based on the verification made by election officer Salayon, the COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members sufficient. The COMELEC ruled that the pendency of the election protest was not a prejudicial question, and that the petition was filed on time since it was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption of office.

• Meaning of "Recall": Petitioner Claudio argued that the term "recall" in Section 74(b) refers to a process, in contrast to the term "recall election" found in Section 74(a). He claimed that when several barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and the PRA took votes on May 29, 1999 to adopt the recall resolution, the process of recall began, and since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and all proceedings held thereafter were null and void.

• Meaning of "Regular Local Election": Petitioner contended that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean the day of the regular local election, which for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well, which is normally at least forty-five days immediately before the day of the election. He argued that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held.

• Sufficiency of Signatures: Petitioner alleged that a majority of the signatures of the PRA members was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution, but merely signed their names on pages 94-104 to signify their attendance and not their concurrence, as shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page.

• Verification of Petition: Petitioner raised that the recall petition was not duly verified because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, was not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City.

• Meaning of "Recall": The COMELEC maintained that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that since the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.

• Meaning of "Recall": Whether the word "recall" in paragraph (b) of Section 74 of the Local Government Code covers a process which includes the convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.

• Meaning of "Regular Local Election": Whether the term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) of Section 74 includes the election period for that regular election or simply the date of such election.

• Sufficiency of Signatures: Whether the recall resolution was signed by a majority of the PRA and duly verified.

• Meaning of "Recall": No. The term "recall" in paragraph (b) of Section 74 refers to the recall election itself, not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall. Since the recall election in Pasay City was set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office, there was no bar to its holding on that date.

• Meaning of "Regular Local Election": No. The phrase "regular local election" refers to the date of such election, not the election period. The law is unambiguous in providing that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election, and had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, it could have expressly said so.

• Sufficiency of Signatures: Yes. The claim that 74 members signed only to signify attendance was raised for the first time on appeal and had no basis, as the word "Attendance" was crossed out by two parallel lines, indicating it was written by mistake. The issue of the notary's commission was also not raised before the COMELEC and could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Meaning of "Recall": The Court reasoned that Section 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall, and Section 69 provides that the power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in Section 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. The Court cited three reasons: (1) because Section 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to Section 69, is a power exercised by registered voters, and since voters do not exercise such right except in an election, the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period; (2) because the purpose of the first limitation is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and (3) because to construe the limitation as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution. The Court distinguished the holding in Garcia vs. COMELEC, which stated that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself, and that a recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people." The Court also rejected the argument that PRAs are not as politically unassailable as recalls initiated directly by the people, noting that recalls initiated directly by 25% of registered voters are just as vulnerable to political maneuverings as those composing PRAs.

• Meaning of "Regular Local Election": The Court held that the law is unambiguous in providing that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so. The Court noted that petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held, reducing the free period from nine months and fifteen days to eight months, which would devitalize the right of recall designed to make local government units more responsive and accountable. The Court distinguished between election period and campaign period under the Omnibus Election Code, noting that the election period commences ninety days before the day of the election and ends thirty days thereafter.

• Sufficiency of Signatures: The Court found that the claim regarding the 74 signatures was being raised for the first time in the case and was not raised before the COMELEC, where the claims made were that some names were double entries, some members had withdrawn their support, and that the pending election protest was a prejudicial question. The Court noted that although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it, apparently written by mistake. The Court found it absurd to believe that the 74 members signed the recall resolution to signify their attendance twice, and more probable that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence. The issue regarding the notary's commission was likewise not raised before the COMELEC and could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Recall as a Process vs. Recall Election — The term "recall" in Section 74(b) of the Local Government Code refers to the recall election itself, not to the preliminary proceedings such as the convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the adoption of a recall resolution, or the filing of a recall petition. The limitations in Section 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall vested in the registered voters, which is exercised through the election.

• Purpose of the One-Year Limitation — The purpose of the first limitation in Section 74(b) is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective local official. As long as the recall election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

• Freedom of Speech and Assembly in Recall Proceedings — To construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time, and such assemblies may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

• Election Period vs. Campaign Period — There is a distinction between election period and campaign period under the Omnibus Election Code. The election period commences ninety days before the day of the election and ends thirty days thereafter, while the campaign period for local officials is forty-five days before the day of the election. The phrase "regular local election" in Section 74(b) refers to the date of such election, not the election period.

• "However, as used in paragraph (b) of § 74, 'recall' refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi of the case, defining the term "recall" for purposes of the one-year limitation in Section 74(b) of the Local Government Code.

• "To sum up, the term 'recall' in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall - 1. Because §74 speaks of limitations on 'recall' which, according to §69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b); 2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and 3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution." — This passage summarizes the three reasons supporting the Court's interpretation of the term "recall" in Section 74(b), providing the complete ratio decidendi of the decision.

• "The law is unambiguous in providing that '[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.' Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so." — This passage articulates the Court's interpretation of the phrase "regular local election" in Section 74(b), applying the plain meaning rule of statutory construction.

• Garcia vs. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100 (1993) — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself, and that a recall resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people. The Court relied on this case to support its interpretation that the limitations in Section 74 apply only to the recall election.

• In Re Bower, 41 Ill. 777, 242 N.E. 2d 252 (1968) — Cited for the principle that the purpose of the one-year limitation is to prevent premature action in voting to remove a newly elected official before having sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions. The Court used this to support its holding that as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, preliminary proceedings can be held earlier.

• Angobung vs. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 245 (1997) — Cited for the articulation of the rationale of the right of recall and the purpose of the time bar provisions in recall statutes.

• Paras vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 48 (1996) — Cited for the proposition that paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when an elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office.

• Section 74, Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) — The provision at the center of the controversy, imposing limitations on recall: (a) any elective local official may be subject to a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence; and (b) no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. The Court interpreted the term "recall" in paragraph (b) to refer to the recall election itself, not the preliminary proceedings.

• Section 69, Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) — Provides that the power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs. The Court used this provision to support its reasoning that since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in Section 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings.

• Section 70, Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) — Provides for the initiation of the recall process, including the composition of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the requirement of a majority of all PRA members to convene and initiate recall proceedings. The Court cited this provision to describe the recall process as beginning with the convening of the PRA or the gathering of signatures of at least 25% of registered voters.

• Section 3, Omnibus Election Code — Defines the campaign periods for various elective positions. The Court distinguished between election period and campaign period, noting that the election period commences ninety days before the day of the election and ends thirty days thereafter, while the campaign period for local officials is forty-five days before the day of the election.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred. Melo and Purisima, JJ., were on leave. Vitug, J., reiterated his separate opinion in the resolution of April 5, 2000.

• Justice Puno — Dissented, arguing that the one-year waiting period in Section 74(b) should be interpreted to include the initiation of recall proceedings, not just the recall election itself. He reasoned that the purpose of the waiting period is to give the incumbent a fair chance to govern well without distractions from partisan politics, and that allowing recall initiatives right after Day One of an official's term would breed political evils. He cited the certification year rule in labor law as an analogous legal mechanism providing a period of repose, and argued that the majority's interpretation would deprive incumbents of a fair opportunity to prove themselves through the politics of performance.

• Justice Kapunan — Dissented, arguing that "recall" under Section 74(b) is a process which begins once the PRA makes its first affirmative acts towards the recall of the elective local official, i.e., the convening of the PRA and the passing of a recall resolution, and culminates with the holding of the recall election. He cited Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the main author of the Local Government Code, who stated that "the move to recall can only be done in the second year of the three year term of local elective officials." He also argued that the limitation in Section 74(b) is analogous to the prohibition under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period.

• Justice Panganiban — Joined the dissents of Justices Puno and Kapunan.

• Justices Pardo and De Leon, Jr. — Joined the dissent of Justice Puno.