Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

An appointment to a newly created confidential position, approved by the CSC under a coterminous temporary status despite the appointee's lack of the prescribed educational qualification, is valid; the appointee is a de jure officer entitled to salaries from actual assumption of duties, and the Attrition Law does not apply because no vacancy resulted from resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer.

The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency that approves or disapproves appointments in the civil service, while Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr. was the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Priscilla Ong was Joson's confidential assistant in the Office of the POEA Administrator. The legal backdrop includes the Civil Service Law and Omnibus Rules on appointments, MC No. 38, s. 1993 on confidential staff qualifications, and Rep. Act No. 7430, the Attrition Law, which restricts appointments to fill vacancies.

On July 1, 1995, Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr., then Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, appointed Priscilla Ong as Executive Assistant IV in his office under a contractual status. The appointment was made after the Department of Budget and Management, through Director Miguel B. Doctor, approved Joson's request for the creation of a contractual position of Executive Assistant IV at the Office of the POEA Administrator, effective not earlier than July 1, 1995. The position was intended for Ong as Joson's confidential assistant; she had 65 units leading to a Bachelor's degree but was not a college degree holder, while the educational requirement for the position was a "Bachelor's degree relevant to the job." Ong assumed the position and discharged her functions as Executive Assistant IV on July 1, 1995.

Because Ong did not meet the educational qualification, Joson wrote the CSC requesting exemption from the rule requiring appointees to confidential staff positions to meet the prescribed educational qualification. On November 2, 1995, the CSC issued Resolution No. 956978 approving Ong's appointment under a Coterminous Temporary status, noting that she had 65 units leading to a Bachelor's degree and that the position was coterminous with the appointing authority and belonged to his confidential/personal staff. The resolution stated that Ong's appointment "may be approved under Coterminous Temporary status."

On February 6, 1996, Director Nelson Acebedo of the CSC National Capital Region issued a post audit report on the issuance of Ong's appointment made on July 1, 1995, and invalidated the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed, stressing that the DBM allowed the POEA to create the position not earlier than July 1, 1995 and that the CSC itself had approved the appointment under a coterminous temporary status. Upon the instructions of Director Acebedo, the effectivity of Ong's appointment was changed from July 1, 1995 to November 2, 1995. Considering the adjustment in the effectivity date, Joson requested approval for the payment of Ong's salary for services rendered from July 1, 1995 to October 31, 1995.

The CSC denied the request in Resolution No. 974094 dated October 16, 1997, citing Rep. Act No. 7430, the Attrition Law, and ruling that the authority to fill the position was granted only on November 2, 1995, so the claim for salary for the prior period could not be allowed; it also concluded that Joson, as appointing authority, was personally liable under Item 5(a), Part I, CSC MC No. 38, s. 1993. Joson moved for reconsideration, averring that Ong was appointed to a newly created position that did not require CSC authority, that the DBM approved the creation of the position, and that if at all the POEA should be liable under the principle of quantum meruit because it was the one benefited. The CSC denied the motion in Resolution No. 981399 dated June 8, 1998, affirming that the effectivity date should be reckoned from November 2, 1995 and that Ong's appointment was not included in the POEA's July 1995 Report on Personnel Action, having been submitted only in the November 1995 ROPA. Joson sought clarification, pointing out that the POEA's failure to include the appointment in the July 1995 ROPA was justified because the appointment was still the subject of a request for exemption from MC No. 38, s. 1993; he received CSC Resolution No. 956978 only on November 5, 1995, and the preparation and submission of the monthly ROPA lay with the officials of the POEA Personnel Department. The CSC denied the motion in Resolution No. 991839 dated August 17, 1999, holding that Joson, as appointing authority, was accountable for all the appointments he issued and could not hide behind the mistakes of his subordinates, and reiterated that Ong's appointment violated the CSC Law and its rules; it ordered that payment of Ong's salaries, benefits, and other emoluments from July 1 to October 30, 1995 was Joson's personal liability. The CSC later denied Joson's second motion for reconsideration in Resolution No. 001956 dated August 30, 2000, and denied the motion seeking reconsideration of Resolution No. 991839 on the de facto officer theory in Resolution No. 002778 dated December 13, 2000.

• Qualification: Petitioner argued that Ong could not be entitled to payment of salary prior to November 2, 1995 because she did not possess the necessary qualification for the position.
• Civil Service Law and Rules: Petitioner maintained that Ong's appointment was made in violation of the Civil Service Law and its rules.
• Attrition Law and Prior Authority: Petitioner argued that there was no prior authority to appoint in violation of Rep. Act No. 7430, and that the authority to fill the position was granted only on November 2, 1995, so the claim for salary for the period prior to that date could not be allowed.
• ROPA Reporting: Petitioner contended that the appointment was not reported in the July 1995 ROPA, making the appointment ineffective.
• Personal Liability: Petitioner posited that, as appointing authority, Joson was personally liable for the payment of salaries under Item 5(a), Part I, CSC MC No. 38, s. 1993.
• Quantum Meruit: Petitioner concluded that the principle of quantum meruit invoked by the respondent was not applicable.

• Newly Created Position: Respondent countered that Ong was appointed to a newly created position, which did not require any authority from the CSC, and that the DBM approved the creation of the position.
• Quantum Meruit and Proper Liability: Respondent asserted that, if at all, the POEA should be liable under the principle of quantum meruit because the POEA was the one benefited, not him in his personal capacity; making him personally liable would amount to unjust enrichment on the part of the government at his expense.
• ROPA Reporting: Respondent pointed out that the POEA's failure to include Ong's appointment in the July 1995 ROPA was justified because the appointment was still the subject of a request for exemption from MC No. 38, s. 1993; he received CSC Resolution No. 956978 only on November 5, 1995, so the appointment was included only in the November ROPA.
• Subordinates' Duty: Respondent averred that the task and duty of preparing and submitting the monthly ROPA lies with the officials of the Personnel Department of the POEA, and that it would be unfair and unjust to order him to pay Ong's salary out of his personal funds for a failure to comply with CSC Circular No. 27, Series of 1994.

• Validity of Appointment: Whether Ong's appointment as Executive Assistant IV was valid despite her lack of the prescribed educational qualification and the CSC's approval under a coterminous temporary status.
• Attrition Law: Whether the appointment violated Rep. Act No. 7430 for lack of prior authority to fill, considering that the position was newly created.
• ROPA Reporting: Whether the failure to include Ong's appointment in the July 1995 ROPA rendered the appointment ineffective.
• De Jure or De Facto Status and Salary Entitlement: Whether Ong was a de jure officer entitled to salaries from July 1, 1995 to October 31, 1995, or only a de facto officer as held by the CA.

• Validity of Appointment: Yes. The appointment was valid because the CSC itself approved it under a coterminous temporary status after Joson requested exemption from the educational requirement; Ong's lack of a college degree did not render the appointment contrary to the Civil Service Law and rules.
• Attrition Law: No. Rep. Act No. 7430 applies only to appointments filling vacancies caused by resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer; Ong's position was newly created and approved by the DBM.
• ROPA Reporting: No. The failure to include the appointment in the July 1995 ROPA did not render it ineffective; the POEA did not include it because the request for exemption was pending, and it reported the appointment in the November 1995 ROPA after receiving the CSC resolution.
• De Jure or De Facto Status and Salary Entitlement: Yes, as a de jure officer. Ong was a de jure officer, not a de facto officer, and was entitled to salaries and emoluments from July 1, 1995, when she assumed and discharged her functions.

• Validity of Appointment: The SC found that the DBM approved the creation of the position on July 1, 1995 pursuant to Joson's request for a contractual position in his office. Joson intended the position for Ong as his confidential assistant, and he was aware of her lack of qualification, which was why he requested exemption from MC No. 38, s. 1993. The CSC granted the request in Resolution No. 956978, approving Ong's appointment under a coterminous temporary status. The SC explained that the CSC's task is to ensure that the appointee has all the qualifications for the position; otherwise, it disapproves the appointment. Here, the CSC approved the appointment under a coterminous temporary status: coterminous because the appointment shall only be during the tenure of the appointing power, and temporary because the appointee did not meet all the requirements for the position, so the appointment could be recalled anytime. The CSC took into account that Ong was enrolled in CAP College, Makati City, had 65 units credited leading to a four-year course in Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and needed 61 units more to complete the same. Under Section 4, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules, the appointment was in order: when immediate filling of a vacancy becomes necessary and a person with appropriate civil service eligibility is not actually and immediately available, a person without the appropriate eligibility but who meets the other requirements may be appointed, and the appointment shall be temporary for not more than twelve months and may be replaced at any time. The CSC also considered the exigency and urgency of filling the position as embodied in Joson's letter for exemption. The SC concluded that, for want of a college degree as required under MC No. 38, s. 1993 for confidential/personal positions, Ong's appointment was not in contravention of the CSC Law and its rules; while Joson intended the appointment to be contractual only, the CSC approved it under a coterminous temporary status, so the appointment on July 1, 1995 was valid.
• Attrition Law: The SC rejected the CSC's contention that Ong's appointment was invalid for lack of an "authority to fill" under the second to the last paragraph of Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7430. The SC read Section 3 as applying only to appointments to fill vacant positions in a government office as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer to another office of an officer or employee within five years from the approval of the law. Under the law, attrition is defined as the reduction of personnel as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal in accordance with existing laws, death, or transfer to another office. Ong was appointed to a newly created position as part of the confidential/personal staff of the respondent; the position was approved by the DBM, and the CSC attested the appointment as coterminous temporary. The position was not rendered vacant as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer. Thus, the CSC cannot argue that Joson violated the Attrition Law. The SC also applied the rule that the law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law, and a statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions but considered as a whole to produce a harmonious whole.
• ROPA Reporting: The SC found Joson's justification for the POEA's failure to include Ong's appointment in its July 1995 ROPA, as required by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1994, to be in order. The records showed that the POEA did not include the contractual appointment of Ong in its July ROPA because its request for exemption from the educational requisite for confidential staff members under MC No. 38 had not yet been resolved by the CSC. The resolution granting the request was received only in November 1995, and the POEA thereafter reported the appointment in its November 1995 ROPA. The SC therefore held that the delayed reporting did not render the appointment ineffective.
• De Jure or De Facto Status and Salary Entitlement: Having been validly appointed to the position of Executive Assistant IV, Ong was a de jure officer and not a de facto officer as held by the CA. The SC defined a de facto officer as one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a good officer in point of law, or one who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. Color of authority is derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation; it is the color of authority, not the color of title, that distinguishes a de facto officer from a usurper. Because Ong was a de jure officer, she was entitled to receive all the salaries and emoluments appertaining to the position. The SC noted that Ong assumed the position and discharged her functions as Executive Assistant IV on July 1, 1995; thenceforth, she was entitled to the payment of her salary under Section 10, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules, which provides that an appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once, without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission; the appointment remains effective until disapproved by the Commission, and in no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance. MC No. 38, s. 1993 likewise provides that the effectivity of an appointment shall be the date of actual assumption by the appointee but not earlier than the date of issuance of the appointment, which is the date of signing by the appointing authority. The SC also noted CSC Resolution No. 953263 dated May 23, 1995, which states that if the appointment was disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violation of the civil service law, such as the failure of the appointee to meet the Qualification Standards prescribed for the position, the same is considered effective until disapproved by the Commission or any of its regional or field offices, and the appointee is meanwhile entitled to payment of salaries from the government; if a motion for reconsideration or appeal from the disapproval is seasonably filed with the proper office, the appointment is still considered effective, and the disapproval becomes final only after the same is affirmed by the Commission. The SC concluded that Ong was entitled to salaries from July 1, 1995 to October 31, 1995.

• CSC Approval and Exemption from Qualification Standards — When the CSC grants an exemption from the educational requirement for a confidential/personal staff position and approves the appointment under a coterminous temporary status, the appointment is valid despite the appointee's lack of a college degree. The SC applied this to Ong, whose appointment was approved under Resolution No. 956978 despite her lack of a college degree.
• De Jure and De Facto Officers — A de jure officer holds office by right. A de facto officer is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a good officer in point of law, or one who (a) is in possession of the office, (b) discharges its duties, and (c) acts under color of authority. Color of authority is derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. The difference between the basis of authority is that one rests on right, the other on reputation; it is the color of authority, not the color of title, that distinguishes a de facto officer from a usurper. In this case, Ong was validly appointed, so she was a de jure officer entitled to all salaries and emoluments of the position.
• Attrition Law (Rep. Act No. 7430) Scope — The Attrition Law prohibits appointments to fill vacated positions in any government office when (a) the vacancy resulted from resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer to another office of an officer or employee, and (b) the appointment is made within five years from the approval of the law, subject to exemptions requiring CSC authorization. It does not apply to appointments to newly created positions. The SC applied this by holding that Ong's appointment to a newly created confidential position did not violate the Attrition Law.
• Effectivity of Appointment and Salary Entitlement — Under Section 10, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules, an appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules takes effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority; if the appointee assumes the duties of the position, he is entitled to receive salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission, and the appointment remains effective until disapproved. MC No. 38, s. 1993 fixes the effectivity at the date of actual assumption but not earlier than the date of issuance. The SC applied these rules to hold that Ong, who assumed her duties on July 1, 1995, was entitled to salary from that date.
• Coterminous Temporary Appointment — A coterminous appointment is one that lasts only during the tenure of the appointing power; a temporary appointment is one where the appointee does not meet all the requirements for the position and may be recalled anytime. The CSC approved Ong's appointment under a coterminous temporary status because the position was coterminous with the appointing authority and belonged to his confidential/personal staff, and Ong did not meet the educational requirement. The SC held that this status validated the appointment.
• Statutory Construction — Whole Statute — A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions; the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole, and every part must be interpreted with reference to the context and the general intent of the whole enactment. The SC applied this in reading Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7430 as limited to vacancies caused by the specified events, not to newly created positions.
• ROPA Reporting and Appointment Effectivity — The failure to include an appointment in the monthly Report on Personnel Action does not render the appointment ineffective where the delay is justified by a pending request for exemption from the CSC and the appointment is later reported. The SC applied this to Ong's appointment, which was not included in the July 1995 ROPA because the exemption request was pending but was reported in the November 1995 ROPA.

• "The appointment of Ong to the position of the Executive Assistant IV in the Office of the respondent is not covered by Rep. Act No. 7430 because Ong was appointed to a newly-created position as part of the confidential/personal staff of the respondent." — The SC limits the Attrition Law to vacancies caused by the specified events and excludes newly created positions.
• "Having been validly appointed to the position of Executive Assistant IV in the Office of the respondent, Ong is a de jure officer and not a de facto officer as held by the Court of Appeals." — The SC corrects the CA's de facto classification and establishes the basis for Ong's salary entitlement.
• "Being a de jure officer, Ong is entitled to receive all the salaries and emoluments appertaining to the position." — The SC states the consequence of de jure status on salary entitlement.
• "The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law." — The SC's statutory construction rule for interpreting Rep. Act No. 7430 as a whole.

• Mathay vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 703 (1999) — Cited in support of the CSC's task to ensure that an appointee has all the qualifications for the position; otherwise, it disapproves the appointment.
• Yamaoka vs. Pescarich Manufacturing Corp., 361 SCRA 672 (2001) — Cited for the rule that a statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions but considered as a whole.
• Paras vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49 (1996) — Cited for the rule that every part of a statute must be interpreted with reference to the context and the general intent of the whole enactment.
• Lecaros vs. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 407 (1999) — Cited for the rule that a de jure officer is entitled to receive all salaries and emoluments appertaining to the position.
• Parker vs. Kent, Ld. Raymond 652, 12 Mod. 467 — Cited for Lord Holt's broad definition of a de facto officer.
• Rex vs. Bedford Level, 6 East, 376 — Cited as reiterating the definition of a de facto officer.
• State vs. Oates, 57 N.W. 296 (1983) — Cited for the definition of a de facto officer as one in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority.
• Ridout vs. State, 30 S.W. 2d. 255 (1930) — Cited for the distinction between a de jure and a de facto officer, one resting on right and the other on reputation.

• Section 3, Rep. Act No. 7430 (Attrition Law) — Prohibits appointments to fill vacated positions in any government office as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer to another office within five years from approval, subject to exemptions requiring CSC authorization, and declares appointments in violation null and void. The SC applied it by holding that Ong's appointment to a newly created position was not covered because no vacancy from those causes existed.
• Section 4, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules — Allows a temporary appointment when immediate filling of a vacancy becomes necessary and a person with appropriate civil service eligibility is not actually and immediately available; a person without the appropriate eligibility but who meets the other requirements may be appointed, and the appointment shall be temporary for not more than twelve months and may be replaced at any time. The SC used this to support the validity of Ong's temporary appointment.
• Section 10, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules — Provides that an appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules takes effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission; the appointment remains effective until disapproved. The SC applied this to hold that Ong was entitled to salary from July 1, 1995.
• Item 9(c), Part II, Memorandum Circular No. 38, s. 1993 — Provides that appointees to confidential/personal staff must meet only the educational requirements prescribed under CSC MC #14, s. 1993, and that civil service eligibility, experience, training, and other requirements are dispensed with. The SC considered this in the context of Joson's request for exemption from the educational requirement.
• Item 7, Memorandum Circular No. 38, s. 1993 — Provides that the effectivity of an appointment shall be the date of actual assumption by the appointee but not earlier than the date of issuance of the appointment, which is the date of signing by the appointing authority. The SC applied this to Ong's appointment, which was issued and assumed on July 1, 1995.
• CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1994 — Requires the monthly Report on Personnel Action. The SC applied it by holding that the POEA's failure to include Ong's appointment in the July 1995 ROPA was justified because the exemption request was pending, and the appointment was reported in the November 1995 ROPA.