Civil Service Commission vs. de la Cruz

Where a qualification standard uses “and/or,” the managerial and supervisory experience clauses are alternative, not cumulative; an appointee who satisfies either clause as of the date of appointment is qualified, and the appointing authority's choice should be respected.

Saturnino de la Cruz was an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC, where he held various positions before his promotional appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency with authority over civil service appointments, and the DOTC/ATO maintained qualification standards for the contested position. The case required the SC to construe those standards, particularly the four-year experience requirement.

On November 28, 1994, Saturnino de la Cruz was promotionally appointed as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division, Air Transportation Office, DOTC, and the CSC duly attested the appointment; before that, he was Check Pilot II in the ATO. In a letter dated February 9, 1995, Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the DOTC her protest against the promotional appointment, claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for the position. On July 20, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest without merit. Calamba appealed the DOTC Secretary's decision to the CSC-NCR. Under date of October 17, 1995, Director Nelson Acebedo of CSC-NCR requested ATO Executive Director Manuel Gilo to comment on the appeal and to submit the documents pertinent thereto; since the CSC-NCR received no action, it again wrote Director Gilo on May 5, 1997, and on October 14, 1997 reiterated its request for comment.

On November 18, 1997, the CSC-NCR rendered its decision upholding Calamba's protest and recalling the approval of respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. The CSC-NCR found that the only issue was whether the protestee met the minimum experience requirements as of the date of his appointment; taking into account his previous positions, he could not have exercised managerial or supervisory functions for the required number of years, and his work experience prior to his appointment did not concur with the approved ATO Qualification Standards. It concluded that experience-wise, he did not meet the requirements of the contested position as of the date of his appointment.

Under date of December 11, 1997, ATO Director Gilo wrote the CSC-NCR asking for the suspension of the order recalling respondent's appointment, citing several reasons. Subsequently, a Manifestation with Motion to Admit Addendum dated December 22, 1997 was filed by Director Gilo with the CSC-NCR; he argued that Calamba had no legal personality to file a protest because she was not a qualified next-in-rank and that the protest was filed out of time, and he asserted that respondent had fully met the qualifications required of the position. On January 5, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo ruled that there was no cogent reason to disturb earlier rulings and denied ATO Director Gilo's request for lack of merit. In a letter dated January 13, 1998, however, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo granted Director Gilo's request and affirmed the approval of respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer; he reviewed the documents, including Office Orders designating the protestee to supervisory positions issued during the latter part of 1993, and noted that a liberal consideration would come up with a little over one year of supervisory and managerial experience, short of the required number of years as of the date of issuance of the appointment, but that respondent had at least four years of continuous supervisory/managerial experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Division, supervened by his permanent appointment as Chief thereof on November 28, 1994, up to the present, and had substantially satisfied the four-year experience requirement.

In a letter dated January 26, 1998, Calamba requested the CSC to implement the January 5, 1998 ruling of the CSC-NCR. When asked by the CSC to clarify the conflicting rulings, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo explained that the January 5, 1998 ruling was unofficial and inexistent. The CSC treated Calamba's request as an appeal. On November 13, 1998, the CSC rendered Resolution No. 98-2970, granting Calamba's appeal, disapproving the appointment of Saturnino De la Cruz as Chief Aviation Regulation Officer, and reverting De la Cruz to his former position. Acting on respondent's request for reconsideration, the CSC rendered Resolution No. 99-1451 on July 6, 1999, denying the motion and holding that Resolution No. 98-2970 stands.

On August 11, 1999, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54088, seeking to nullify CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451.

• Qualification Standards: Petitioner contended that the appellate court erred in approving respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer despite his failure to meet the minimum four-year managerial and supervisory qualification for the position.
• Reckoning Point: Petitioner further contended that respondent's completion of the required experience during the pendency of the present case cannot be counted in his favor because compliance with the prescribed mandatory requirements should be as of the date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of approval by the CSC or the resolution of the protest against the appointment.

• Qualification Standards: Whether respondent sufficiently complied with the four-year managerial and supervisory experience requirement for Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer under the DOTC/ATO qualification standards.
• Reckoning Point: Whether the reckoning point for determining an appointee's qualifications is the date of issuance of the appointment, not the date of CSC approval or resolution of the protest.
• Appointing Authority's Discretion: Whether the CSC erred in disapproving respondent's appointment despite the appointing authority's choice and respondent's qualifications.

• Qualification Standards: Yes. The “and/or” standard allowed either the managerial or supervisory clause; respondent's more than 13 years of ATO work satisfied the supervisory clause.
• Reckoning Point: Yes. The reckoning point is the date of issuance of the appointment, not the date of CSC approval or resolution of the protest; respondent was qualified as of that date.
• Appointing Authority's Discretion: Yes. The appointing authority's choice should be respected where the appointee satisfies legal requirements; between the CSC and the appointing authority, the SC sustained the latter.

• Qualification Standards: The DOTC/ATO standard required four years of work experience in managerial position(s) per MC No. 46, s. 1993 and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools. The SC applied statutory construction: “and/or” means “and” and “or” are used interchangeably; “or” is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence. Thus either standard could be applied. Respondent had a little over one year of managerial experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division in late 1993, so he would lack the required years under the managerial clause. But his work in the ATO for more than 13 years prior to appointment—Supply Checker, Junior Aeronautical Engineer, Air Carrier Safety Inspector, Check Pilot I, and Check Pilot II—was within the supervisory clause because planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations were part of his work. These positions spanned four of the five sections of the Aviation Safety Division and met the minimum supervisory experience. Under Rapisora vs. Civil Service Commission, mandatory requirements cannot be strictly interpreted to curtail the agency's discretionary power to appoint as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications required by law. The CA was correct in considering respondent's total work experience sufficient under the second clause.
• Reckoning Point: The SC agreed with petitioner that the reckoning point is the date of issuance of the appointment, not the date of CSC approval or resolution of the protest. It did not need to rule on petitioner's assertion that respondent's subsequent compliance during the pendency of the case should not be counted because respondent was qualified at the time of his appointment. Even assuming he failed to meet the experience requirement, the SC was inclined to uphold the CA because the CSC itself had allowed appointments of personnel initially lacking experience but subsequently obtaining it, as in CSC Resolution No. 97-0191 dated January 9, 1997, where Josue had three years and eight months experience as Senior Inspector and was considered to have substantially satisfied the four-year experience requirement for Chief Inspector. Following petitioner's line of reasoning, respondent is deemed to have satisfactorily complied when he was designated Chief of the ATO Operations Center and Acting Chief of the ATO Aviation Safety Division; having held said positions from 1993 to the present, he may be considered to have acquired the necessary experience.
• Appointing Authority's Discretion: The power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority. In appointment or promotion, the appointing authority considers not only civil service eligibilities but also performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. It has the right of choice which it may exercise freely according to its best judgment, deciding who is best qualified among those with the necessary qualifications and eligibilities; the final choice should be respected and left undisturbed, and judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority. In appointments of division chiefs, the power rests on the head of the department, and sufficient if not plenary discretion should be granted to those responsible for administering the offices concerned. Respondent was the uncontested choice of the appointing authority: DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia dismissed the protest, ATO Executive Director Gilo noted respondent's full compliance, and CSC-NCR Director Acebedo later affirmed the appointment after re-evaluation and declared his previous ruling unofficial and inexistent. Between the Commission and the appointing authority, the SC sustained the latter.

• “And/or” in qualification standards — The term “and/or” means “and” and “or” are used interchangeably; “or” is disjunctive and signifies dissociation and independence. Applied: the DOTC/ATO standard allowed either the managerial experience clause or the supervisory experience clause, not both cumulatively.
• Appointing authority's discretion — The power to appoint is essentially discretionary; the appointing authority has the right of choice among qualified applicants and its final choice should be respected and left undisturbed. Applied: the SC upheld de la Cruz's appointment as the appointing authority's choice because he satisfied the legal requirements.
• Reckoning point for qualifications — An appointee's qualifications are determined as of the date of issuance of the appointment, not the date of CSC approval or resolution of the protest. Applied: respondent was qualified as of his November 28, 1994 appointment; the SC did not need to rule on his subsequent compliance.
• Mandatory qualification requirements — Under Rapisora vs. Civil Service Commission, prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly interpreted as to curtail the agency's discretionary power to appoint, as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications required by law. Applied: respondent's total work experience was sufficient under the supervisory clause.
• Promotions in the Civil Service — Promotions should be based on qualifications, including occupational competence, moral character, devotion to duty, and loyalty to the service; political patronage should not be necessary and the civil servant's record should be sufficient assurance for promotion. Applied: the SC considered respondent's credentials, trainings, and performance in upholding his appointment.

• “It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the use of the term "and/or" means that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably.” — This supports treating the two experience clauses as alternatives.
• “The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from another.” — This explains why the managerial and supervisory standards may be applied separately.
• “It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority.” — This underpins the SC's deference to the appointing authority's choice.
• “We, however, agree with petitioner that the reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of resolution of the protest against it.” — This fixes the date for measuring compliance with qualification standards.

• Rapisora vs. Civil Service Commission, 228 SCRA 622 [1993] — Controlling precedent relied on for the rule that mandatory qualification requirements cannot be strictly interpreted to curtail the appointing authority's discretion.
• Teologo vs. Civil Service Commission, 191 SCRA 238 [1990] — Relied on for the rule that promotions in the civil service should be based on qualifications, including occupational competence, moral character, devotion to duty, and loyalty.
• Salles vs. Francisco, et al., 206 SCRA 621 [1992] — Relied on for the rule that the appointing authority considers eligibilities, performance, education, work experience, trainings, seminars, agency examinations, and seniority, and has the right of choice.
• Central Bank of the Philippines and Jordan vs. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744 [1989] — Relied on for the rule that the power to appoint division chiefs rests on the head of the department and that sufficient if not plenary discretion should be granted to those administering offices.
• Medenilla vs. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 278 [1991] — Relied on for the rule that between the Commission and the appointing authority, the SC sustains the latter.
• Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home Development Mutual Fund, 333 SCRA 777 [2000] — Relied on for the statutory construction that “and/or” means “and” and “or” are used interchangeably.
• People vs. Martin, 39 SCRA 430 [1971] — Relied on for the rule that “or” is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence.
• Torio vs. Civil Service Commission, 209 SCRA 691 [1992] — Relied on for the rule that formal qualifications may be valuable but so are intangibles such as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best interest of the service; who can do the job best should be left to the head of the office concerned provided legal requirements are satisfied.

• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The CSC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 to review the CA decision and resolution; the SC denied the petition and affirmed the CA.
• MC No. 46, s. 1993 (Qualification Standards Manual) — Prescribed four years of work experience in managerial position(s) and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations; the SC construed “and/or” as allowing either standard.
• DOTC/ATO Qualification Standards for Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer — Required a bachelor's degree related to aviation, four years of specified experience, licenses, training, and eligibility; the SC applied the supervisory experience clause to respondent's work history.