Civil Service Commission vs. Cortes

The prohibition against nepotism under Section 59, Book V of the Administrative Code extends to appointments made by a collegial body when a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity of any member sits on that body, and the member’s abstention from voting does not cure the nepotic character of the appointment. The rule is aimed at natural persons who exercise appointing or recommending authority, and the mere presence of the relative during the body’s deliberations creates an impression of influence that undermines the impartiality and objectivity the prohibition seeks to protect.

On 19 February 2008, the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), acting as appointing authority, approved the appointment of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes to the position of Information Officer V. Respondent’s father, CHR Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, abstained from voting and simultaneously requested an opinion on the legality of the appointment under the rule on nepotism. The CHR’s own Legal Division Chief opined that the appointment was not covered by the prohibition because the appointing authority—the Commission En Banc—had a juridical personality distinct from its individual members. The CHR Chairperson, however, immediately instructed respondent not to assume office, and the Civil Service Commission Field Office commenced an investigation.

• The Appointment and Conflicting Opinions: On 19 February 2008, the CHR Commission En Banc issued Resolution A 2008-19 appointing respondent Maricelle M. Cortes as Information Officer V. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, respondent’s father, abstained from voting and requested a legal opinion on the appointment’s validity. The CHR Legal Division Chief opined that the appointment did not fall under the nepotism prohibition because the appointing authority was the Commission En Banc—a body distinct from its members. On the same day, CHR Chairperson Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing instructed respondent not to assume the position, asserting that her appointment was not yet complete.
• CSC Action: The CSC-NCR Field Office initiated an investigation. Director Velda E. Cornelio informed the CHR that the appointment was invalid, applying Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions; the CSC-NCR considered Commissioner Mallari an appointing authority despite being only a member of the collegial body. Respondent appealed to the CSC-NCR and later to the CSC proper, both of which affirmed the nepotic character of the appointment. The CSC held that the prohibition is addressed to natural persons and that the Commission En Banc, a mere legal fiction, could never have relatives.
• CA Reversal: Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which granted her petition. The CA nullified the CSC resolutions, ruling that the prohibition did not cover the appointment because the appointing authority was the Commission as a collegial entity, not Commissioner Mallari individually, and he had abstained.

• Scope of Nepotism Rule: The Civil Service Commission maintained that the prohibition against nepotism under Section 59 of the Administrative Code applies to all appointing authorities, including collegial bodies, because the rule targets the natural persons who exercise the power to appoint. To exempt a commission en banc would render the prohibition illusory, as a body corporate has no relatives.
• Effect of Abstention: The CSC argued that Commissioner Mallari’s abstention did not cure the defect. The evil sought to be avoided—the potential for influence and partiality—remained because his presence during the body’s deliberations could have swayed the other commissioners and cast doubt on the impartiality of the selection process.

• Distinct Personality of the Commission: Respondent Cortes contended that the appointing authority was the CHR Commission En Banc acting as a single collegial entity, distinct from its individual members. Because the prohibition lists an “appointing authority” and a “recommending authority” without expressly including individual members of a board, the rule did not capture her appointment.
• Abstention as a Cure: Respondent argued that Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting removed any nepotic taint. She relied on the CHR Legal Division’s opinion that the personality of the Commission En Banc was separate from its members, making the prohibition inapplicable.

• Nepotism — Applicability to Collegial Bodies: Whether the prohibition against nepotism under Section 59, Book V of the Administrative Code applies to an appointment made by a collegial body when one of its members is a relative within the prohibited degree of the appointee, and whether that member’s abstention from voting eliminates the violation.

• Nepotism — Applicability to Collegial Bodies: The prohibition against nepotism applies to appointments made by a collegial body whenever a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity of any member is appointed, and the relative’s abstention from voting does not remove the nepotic defect. Section 59 is directed at natural persons: the appointing authority, recommending authority, chief of bureau or office, and person exercising immediate supervision. A commission en banc is a legal fiction that can never have relatives; to limit the prohibition to the juridical entity alone would defeat the rule’s purpose. The purpose is to eliminate the discretion of appointing and recommending officials when a relative is involved, thereby ensuring objectivity and preventing the perception of favoritism. Commissioner Mallari’s mere presence during the deliberations created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the Commission’s impartiality and neutrality. The principle that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly forbids circumventing the nepotism rule by acting through a collegial body. Consequently, the appointment of respondent Cortes as Information Officer V was invalid.

• Nepotism under Section 59, Administrative Code of 1987 — The rule prohibits the appointment of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of (1) the appointing authority, (2) the recommending authority, (3) the chief of the bureau or office, or (4) the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Exceptions are persons employed in a confidential capacity, teachers, physicians, and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The doctrine extends the prohibition to collegial bodies: because the purpose is to insulate the appointing process from the influence of personal relationships, the rule applies to the natural persons who compose the board. A juridical entity has no relatives, so an interpretation that limits the prohibition to the entity itself would render the rule meaningless. The evil sought to be avoided persists even when the relative-member abstains, as his presence during deliberations may nonetheless sway the decision-making of the body and undermine public confidence in the impartiality of the appointment.

• “The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested.” — This articulation of the rule’s rationale, drawn from Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, underpins the extension of the prohibition to collegial bodies.
• “Basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that ‘we must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.’ To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never have relatives to speak of.”
• “What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.”
• “Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.”

• Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111471, 26 September 1994, 237 SCRA 184 — Followed. The decision quoted Debulgado for the purpose of the nepotism rule: to remove discretion from the appointing or recommending authority and ensure objectivity.
• Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 366 Phil. 86 (1999) — Followed. The Court cited Dacoycoy for the characterization of nepotism as a “pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel,” reinforcing the need for a broad reading of the prohibition.

• Section 59, Chapter 1, Title A, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987 — Defines nepotism as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the appointing authority, recommending authority, chief of bureau or office, or person exercising immediate supervision, and lists the exempt positions. The Supreme Court applied this provision by interpreting “appointing authority” to encompass the natural persons composing a collegial body, not merely the juridical entity, consistent with the statute’s object and policy.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concurred.