City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Raymond S. Estrella, et al.

Only the Director of the Bureau of Corrections has the exclusive authority to grant good conduct time allowances under Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code, and this authority was not transferred to city, provincial, or municipal jail wardens by the enactment of R.A. No. 6975. A court may not order the release of prisoners by writ of habeas corpus based solely on certifications issued by a city warden as to good conduct time allowances.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) initiated a jail visitation program on Law Day, September 18, 1999, during which IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited various jails in Metro Manila. At the City Jail of Manila, they found thirty-four prisoners whom they believed were entitled to release after deducting time allowances for good conduct in the service of their respective sentences. The prisoners invoked Articles 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code, which provide for good conduct time allowances and designate the Director of Prisons as the authority to grant such allowances. The reorganization of the jail system under R.A. No. 6975 placed city, provincial, and municipal jails under the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, while the Director of the Bureau of Corrections remained under the Department of Justice.

On September 18, 1999, in celebration of Law Day, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Committee on Legal Aid initiated a jail visitation program. IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited various jails in Metro Manila, and at the City Jail of Manila, they found thirty-four prisoners whom they believed were entitled to be released after deducting time allowances for good conduct in the service of their respective sentences. The prisoners had been convicted of various offenses, including carnapping, serious physical injuries, illegal possession of drugs, illegal possession of firearms, theft, and violation of P.D. No. 9, with sentences ranging from three months to six years of imprisonment.

Respondents asked petitioner Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila City Jail, to effect their release on the ground that they had already served their sentences, less time allowances for good conduct, invoking Articles 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner City Warden denied respondents' request on the ground that only the Director of the Bureau of Corrections can grant them allowances for good conduct under Article 99. Nonetheless, on October 11, 1999, petitioner City Warden issued certifications of good behavior to respondents stating that had respondents been credited time allowances for good conduct, they should have been released on various dates between February 22, 1999 and November 29, 1999.

On October 15, 1999, respondents, represented by the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid, filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court, alleging that the City Warden had issued verified certifications to the effect that respondents had exhibited good behavior and exemplary conduct in the service of their sentences, which granted them an irrevocable good conduct time allowance pursuant to Article 99. Respondents argued that the provisions of Articles 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code, in the absence of a concurrent change in the designation of the officer authorized to grant the time allowance from the National Director to the Jail Wardens, were rendered ineffective and inapplicable as far as prisoners confined in city, provincial, and municipal jails were concerned. They contended that this interpretation would favor some prisoners to the detriment of others, violating the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws.

In the resolution of November 15, 1999, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, which it made returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Manila. In his return, petitioner City Warden, through the Solicitor General, opposed the release of respondents, arguing that while the Director of the Bureau of Corrections no longer exercises authority over city and municipal prisoners, he remains the sole authority under Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code who can grant time allowances for good conduct to prisoners. It turned out that 22 of the 34 respondents had already been released. On November 22, 1999, the trial court issued its challenged order directing petitioner City Warden to release from confinement respondents Raymond S. Estrella, Ronel N. Amparo, Alfred F. Lehner, Alfonso B. Relloso, Isagani R. Manzo, Marvin Q. Padrones, Eduardo E. Gineta, and Eduardo S. Martinez, while deferring the release of respondents Gerardo J. Maloga, Henry B. Mancilla, and Armando C. Buelas until November 26, 1999 and respondent Richard C. Magallon until November 29, 1999.

The trial court held that (1) the Director of the Bureau of Corrections no longer has jurisdiction over city and municipal jails, and it is thus legally impossible for him to grant time allowances for good conduct to respondents who are inmates of the Manila City Jail; (2) respondents had been denied the equal protection of the laws because national prisoners may be dispensed benefits by the Director under Article 97, whereas local prisoners are left with no one to dispense benefits; and (3) the certifications issued by petitioner City Warden constituted sufficient basis to grant respondents' release under Article 97. The trial court held that in the exercise of its "equity jurisdiction" under Article 9 of the Civil Code, it could fill in the hiatus or gap in the law on who is to grant local prisoners good conduct time allowance under Article 97.

• Timeliness of the Petition: The Solicitor General argued that the petition was timely filed on December 2, 1999, because although the period of appeal in habeas corpus cases is forty-eight hours from notice of the judgment under B.P. Blg. 129, §39, an extension of fifteen days was granted by the Court, making the petition timely.
• Authority to Grant Good Conduct Time Allowances: The Solicitor General contended that despite changes in the organizational structure of the prison system, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections remains the exclusive authority for granting good conduct time allowances, and therefore it was error for the lower court to order the release of respondents on the basis of certifications issued by the City Warden.
• No Implied Repeal: The Solicitor General argued that there is nothing in R.A. No. 6975 which repeals Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code, and that repeals by implication are not favored.

• Late Filing: Respondents contended that the petition was filed late on December 2, 1999, because both petitioner City Warden and the Office of the Solicitor General received the questioned release order on November 22, 1999.
• Lack of Authorization and Verification: Respondents contended that the City Warden did not authorize the filing of the present petition, and that the petition should be verified by the City Warden, who is the real party in interest, and not by the Solicitor General or the latter's assistants.
• Trial Court's Reliance on Certifications: Respondents argued that the trial court did not actually rule that the City Warden can grant good conduct time allowances under Article 97 but merely relied on the City Warden's certifications regarding the prison records of respondents, and that the Warden is in a better position than the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to determine who among the prisoners behaved well to be entitled under Article 97.

• Timeliness of the Petition: Whether the petition for review was timely filed.
• Authority of the Solicitor General: Whether the Solicitor General was authorized to file the petition and whether the verification complied with the rules.
• Authority to Grant Good Conduct Time Allowances: Whether the City Warden, rather than the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, may grant good conduct time allowances under Articles 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Reliance on City Warden's Certifications: Whether the trial court could rely on the certifications issued by the City Warden in ordering the release of prisoners by writ of habeas corpus.

• Timeliness of the Petition: No. The petition was timely filed. Under B.P. Blg. 129, §39, the period of appeal in habeas corpus cases is forty-eight hours from notice of the judgment appealed from, but the Solicitor General obtained an extension of fifteen days from the Court, making the December 2, 1999 filing timely.
• Authority of the Solicitor General: No. Under P.D. No. 78, §1, the Office of the Solicitor General is the legal representative of the Government and its agencies in any litigation, and the City Warden's acquiescence does not preclude the Solicitor General from appealing. The verification complied with Rule 7, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Authority to Grant Good Conduct Time Allowances: No. Only the Director of the Bureau of Corrections has the exclusive authority to grant good conduct time allowances under Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code, and this authority was not transferred to city wardens by R.A. No. 6975.
• Reliance on City Warden's Certifications: No. The trial court could not rely on the certifications issued by the City Warden in crediting respondents with time allowances for good conduct, as the certifications lacked data on when respondents started serving sentence and contained errors.

• Timeliness of the Petition: The Court held that under B.P. Blg. 129, §39, the period of appeal in habeas corpus cases is forty-eight hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from. Petitioner had until November 24, 1999 to appeal. However, on November 23, 1999, prior to the expiration of the period to appeal, the Solicitor General asked for an extension of fifteen days from November 24, 1999, or until December 9, 1999, within which to file the present petition. The Court having granted the motion, the instant petition was timely filed on December 2, 1999.

• Authority of the Solicitor General: The Court held that under P.D. No. 78, §1, the Office of the Solicitor General is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. That the City Warden appears to have acquiesced in the release order of the trial court by his compliance therewith does not preclude the Solicitor General from taking a contrary position and appealing the same. The Solicitor General's duty is to present what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the Government. With respect to the verification, the Court found that the verification by Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag complied with the requirement of Rule 7, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

• Authority to Grant Good Conduct Time Allowances: The Court held that the trial court erred in ordering the release of respondents before full service of their sentences without the certification at least of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections as to their good conduct time allowances. The trial court's argument was flawed because it assumed that the authority to grant good conduct time allowances flows from the grant of the power of supervision and control, so that only those vested with this power can grant good conduct time allowances to prisoners. The Court noted that under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409), the Director of Prisons did not have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila — it was the Chief of Police of Manila who under §34 of the Charter exercised supervision, administration, and control over the city jail and municipal prisoners — and yet, the Director of Prisons was acknowledged as the authority for granting good conduct time allowances to all prisoners regardless of their place of detention. The Court further held that there is no inconsistency between Article 99 and R.A. No. 6975, as repeals by implication are not favored, and for there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of repugnance. The Court cited Kabigting vs. Director of Prisons, where it was held that in habeas corpus proceedings, the trial court has no power to grant the petitioner time allowances for good conduct because in accordance with Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code it is the Director of Prisons who shall grant allowances for good conduct. In People vs. Tan, it was emphatically held that a provincial warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to a prisoner and order his release because Article 99 vests the authority to grant prisoners good conduct time allowances exclusively in the Director and in no one else.

• Reliance on City Warden's Certifications: The Court held that there are good reasons for holding that the trial court could not rely on the certifications issued by the City Warden in crediting respondents with time allowances for good conduct. In the first place, the certifications issued by the City Warden lacked data on the dates when respondents started serving sentence. Such data are important because good conduct time allowances under Article 97 may only be earned by prisoners while serving their sentence. While Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code provides that time spent in preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full or four-fifths in service of sentence, it does not say that the prisoners shall earn the credit for good behavior under Article 97 during such period of preventive detention. In the second place, the certifications issued by the City Warden contain errors. Some of the data stated therein are contrary to those stated in the documents submitted by respondents in support of their petition for habeas corpus. For example, in the case of respondent Alfred F. Lehner, the City Warden's certification states that he was sentenced on August 26, 1998 to imprisonment for "three (3) years to four (4) months and one (1) day" in Criminal Case Nos. 96-150703-04, but Lehner's sentence in each of those cases was actually a prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year of prision correccional, as maximum, and the decision was rendered on August 30, 1996, not August 26, 1998 as stated in the certification. In the case of Gary Zalde Velarde y Concepcion, the City Warden's certification erroneously states Velarde's sentence in Criminal Case No. 314691-SA to be for seven (7) months to two (2) months imprisonment when his sentence was actually two (2) months, and he was sentenced to seven (7) months for theft in another case, which fact was not disclosed in the certification. The Court held that the writ of habeas corpus remains available as a remedy against any abuse of the authority granted by Article 99 to the Director of Prisons, but the question in this case is whether a court may rely on the certification of the City Warden as to good conduct time allowances in ordering the release of prisoners by writ of habeas corpus, and it cannot, in view of Article 99 vesting the authority to grant good conduct time allowances solely in the Director of Prisons.

• Exclusive Authority to Grant Good Conduct Time Allowances — Under Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code, the authority to grant good conduct time allowances is vested exclusively in the Director of Prisons (now the Director of the Bureau of Corrections), and in no one else. This authority does not flow from the power of supervision and control over prisoners, and it was not transferred to city, provincial, or municipal jail wardens by the enactment of R.A. No. 6975. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the trial court erred in ordering the release of respondents based on certifications issued by the City Warden.

• Implied Repeal — Repeals by implication are not favored; every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. For there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of repugnance, and the language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that there is nothing in R.A. No. 6975 which repeals Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Good Conduct Time Allowances Earned Only While Serving Sentence — Good conduct time allowances under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code may only be earned by prisoners while serving their sentence. While Article 29 provides that time spent in preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full or four-fifths in service of sentence, it does not say that prisoners shall earn the credit for good behavior under Article 97 during such period of preventive detention. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the City Warden's certifications lacked essential data on when respondents started serving sentence.

• Re-incarceration Not Double Jeopardy — The re-arrest of prisoners who were released due to invalid crediting of good conduct time allowances does not place them in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense because their re-incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalties that they had not completely served due to the invalid crediting of good conduct time allowances in their favor.

• "The flaw in this argument is that it assumes that the authority to grant good conduct time allowances flows from the grant of the power of supervision and control, so that only those vested with this power can grant good conduct time allowances to prisoners. But this is not so." — This passage articulates the Court's rejection of the trial court's reasoning that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections lost authority over local prisoners because he no longer has supervision and control over them.

• "In People v. Tan, it was emphatically held that a provincial warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to a prisoner and order his release because Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests the authority to grant prisoners good conduct time allowances 'exclusively in the Director and [in] no one else.'" — This passage states the controlling precedent that establishes the exclusive authority of the Director of Prisons to grant good conduct time allowances.

• "Needless to say, the writ of habeas corpus remains available as a remedy against any abuse of the authority granted by Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code to the Director of Prisons, but that is altogether a different kettle of fish from the question posed in this case." — This passage distinguishes between the availability of habeas corpus as a remedy against abuse of authority and the question of whether a court may rely on the City Warden's certifications in ordering release.

• "This can be done without placing them in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense because their re-incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalties that they had not completely served due to the invalid crediting of good conduct time allowances in their favor." — This passage states the Court's holding that re-arrest of respondents does not constitute double jeopardy.

• Kabigting vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-12276, Aug. 26, 1958 — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that in habeas corpus proceedings, the trial court has no power to grant the petitioner time allowances for good conduct because under Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code, it is the Director of Prisons who shall grant allowances for good conduct.

• People vs. Tan, 19 SCRA 433 (1967) — Cited as controlling precedent for the emphatic holding that a provincial warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to a prisoner and order his release because Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests the authority to grant prisoners good conduct time allowances exclusively in the Director and in no one else. Also cited for the proposition that re-arrest does not constitute double jeopardy.

• Baking vs. Director of Prisons, 28 SCRA 851 (1969) — Cited for the proposition that good conduct time allowances under Article 97 may only be earned by prisoners while serving their sentence, and that detention prisoners can earn good conduct allowances under Act 1533, §5 if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Marcopper Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 137174, July 10, 2000 — Cited for the principle that repeals by implication are not favored and that every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

• Agujetas vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 17 (1996) — Cited for the principle that for there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of repugnance, and the language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted.

• Article 97, Revised Penal Code — Provides for allowances for good conduct, entitling a prisoner to deductions from the period of his sentence based on good behavior: five days for each month during the first two years; eight days for each month during the third to the fifth year; ten days for each month during the following years until the tenth year; and fifteen days for each month during the eleventh and successive years. The Court applied this provision in determining the good conduct time allowances to which respondents claimed entitlement.

• Article 99, Revised Penal Code — Provides that whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct, and such allowances once granted shall not be revoked. The Court applied this provision in holding that the authority to grant good conduct time allowances is vested exclusively in the Director of Prisons.

• Article 29, Revised Penal Code — Provides that time spent in preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full or four-fifths in service of sentence. The Court applied this provision in holding that it does not say that prisoners shall earn the credit for good behavior under Article 97 during such period of preventive detention.

• Article 9, New Civil Code — Provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. The Court addressed the trial court's reliance on this provision in exercising its "equity jurisdiction" to fill the hiatus in the law.

• Section 39, B.P. Blg. 129 — Provides that the period of appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from. The Court applied this provision in determining the timeliness of the petition.

• Section 1, P.D. No. 78 — Provides that the Office of the Solicitor General is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. The Court applied this provision in holding that the Solicitor General was authorized to file the petition.

• Section 4, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief. The Court applied this provision in finding that the verification of the petition complied with the rules.

• R.A. No. 6975, Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 — Places provincial, city, and municipal jails under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. The Court applied this provision in determining whether it repealed Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code, holding that it did not.

• R.A. No. 409, Revised Charter of the City of Manila — Provides under §34 that the Chief of Police of Manila shall exercise supervision, administration, and control over the city jail and municipal prisoners. The Court applied this provision to show that the Director of Prisons did not have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila, yet was still acknowledged as the authority for granting good conduct time allowances.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concurred.