City of Manila vs. Garcia

The Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits or executing leases; such permits are null and void and do not elevate squatters into lawful tenants.

The City of Manila owns parcels of land covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082, and 37558, bordering Kansas, Vermont, and Singalong streets in Malate. The Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close to the property. The Manila Charter requires courts sitting in Manila to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the Municipal Board.

The City of Manila owns parcels of land forming one compact area bordering Kansas, Vermont, and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082, and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without the city's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without the city's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits. There they lived through the years.

In November 1947, some defendants were given written permits labeled "lease contract" by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso to occupy specific areas upon conditions set forth therein. In 1948, two other defendants received similar permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente. The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited no permits. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals, amounting to a total of P7,580.69 due as of February 1962.

The need for the expansion of the nearby Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School became pressing. On September 14, 1961, the City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each defendant thirty days to vacate and remove their constructions. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand in February and March 1962 for the payment of the amount due and to vacate in fifteen days. Defendants refused, prompting the City of Manila to file a suit to recover possession.

• Legal Status as Tenants: Defendants insisted that they had acquired the legal status of tenants by virtue of the permits issued by the mayors.
• Need for School Purposes: Defendants challenged the trial court's finding that the city needs the premises for school purposes, pointing out that the certification (Exhibit E) was initially ruled inadmissible.
• Jurisdiction: Defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, arguing that the case should have been started in the municipal court under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, since notice to vacate was served in September 1961 and suit was filed in July 1962.

• Validity of Permits: Whether the permits issued by the mayors of Manila legalized the defendants' entry and conferred upon them the legal status of tenants.
• Public Nuisance: Whether the houses and constructions built by defendants on the premises constitute a public nuisance per se.
• Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, considering the one-year limitation in Rule 70.

• Validity of Permits: No. The Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits to defendants, and the permits granted are null and void.
• Public Nuisance: Yes. The houses and constructions constitute a public nuisance per se because they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building.
• Jurisdiction: Yes. The defendants' forcible entry dates back to 1945-1947, and their possession remained illegal from incipiency; the suit was filed long after the one-year limitation in Rule 70, giving the Court of First Instance jurisdiction.

• Validity of Permits: Defendants' entry was illegal and their constructions were built without permits, making them squatters. The city charter enjoins the mayor to safeguard all city lands, and permits labeled as lease contracts did not safeguard the land. The Mayor cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by giving permits or executing leases. Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence by city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. Official approval of squatting does not serve social justice but fosters moral decadence and abets disrespect for the law.
• Public Nuisance: The constructions hinder and impair the use of the property for school purposes, a perennial problem in the city. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount, and the defendants' selfish interests must yield to the general good. The constructions obstruct the government's constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education. Thus, they constitute a public nuisance per se that could be summarily abated even without the aid of the courts.
• Jurisdiction: Defendants argued that the case should have been filed in the municipal court under Section 1, Rule 70, which requires that a forcible entry suit be brought within one year from the date of the demand to vacate. However, their forcible entry dates back to 1945-1947. Because their entry was not legalized by the permits, their possession continued to remain illegal from the beginning. The suit was filed long after the one-year limitation, placing the case outside the coverage of the municipal court's summary ejectment proceedings and within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

• Public Nuisance Per Se — A public nuisance per se is one that affects the public generally and can be summarily abated without judicial proceedings. The Court applied this by holding that the squatters' houses on city property hindered the construction of a needed school building, thereby obstructing the government's constitutional duty to provide public education, making the constructions a public nuisance per se.
• Nullity of Mayoral Permits for Squatting — A mayor cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by issuing permits or executing leases. Such permits are null and void because they do not serve social justice or public welfare, but rather abet disrespect for the law. The Court applied this by invalidating the permits issued by Mayors Fugoso and de la Fuente, ruling that they did not elevate the defendants' status to lawful tenants.

• "The Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing leases." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi regarding the invalidity of mayoral permits for squatters on public land.
• "Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act." — This defines the doctrine that official tolerance cannot validate an otherwise illegal occupation of public property.
• "The public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts." — This establishes the authority to summarily abate the squatters' constructions as a public nuisance per se.

• Sitchon vs. Aquino, 98 Phil. 459 — Cited to support the proposition that a public nuisance per se could be summarily abated by city authorities even without the aid of the courts.
• Halili vs. Lacson, 98 Phil. 772 — Cited alongside Sitchon vs. Aquino regarding the summary abatement of public nuisance.
• J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, L-15539 — Cited to support the rule that harmless error in lower court findings does not justify reversal.

• Section 11(b), Manila Charter — Enjoins the mayor to safeguard all the lands of the City of Manila. The Court used this to show that issuing permits to squatters did not safeguard the city's land.
• Section 50, Manila Charter — Requires all courts sitting in Manila to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the Municipal Board. The Court used this to justify taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566, which appropriated funds for the school expansion.
• Article 694(5), Civil Code — Defines a public nuisance. The Court applied this to classify the squatters' constructions as a public nuisance per se because they hinder the use of property for a needed school building.
• Section 5, Article XIV, Constitution — Obliges the government to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education and provide at least free public primary instruction. The Court noted that the squatters' constructions obstructed this constitutional obligation.
• Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court — Governs forcible entry and detainer actions and sets a one-year limitation. The Court interpreted this to mean that since the defendants' illegal entry occurred in 1945-1947, the one-year period had long lapsed, making the summary ejectment rule inapplicable and vesting jurisdiction in the CFI.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Castro, JJ., concur.