City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals

A judgment of the Regional Trial Court, rendered in its appellate capacity over a case from an inferior court, is not immediately executory and becomes "final and executory" only upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. Execution prior to this point constitutes premature execution pending appeal, which requires a specific, urgent justification under the Rules of Court.

The City of Manila filed an unlawful detainer complaint against the Army & Navy Club (ANC) for violation of a lease agreement over a Roxas Boulevard property. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) rendered a summary judgment in favor of the City. ANC appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MeTC judgment on June 7, 1991. To stay execution during appeal, ANC had filed a supersedeas bond.

• Nature of the Action: The case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the City of Manila against the Army & Navy Club (ANC) concerning a leased parcel of land on Roxas Boulevard.
• Judgment and Appeal: The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) rendered a summary judgment for the City. ANC appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MeTC judgment on June 7, 1991. ANC had filed a supersedeas bond to stay execution during the appeal.
• Premature Execution: On June 10, 1991, the City filed an ex parte motion for execution, alleging the RTC judgment had become final and executory under Republic Act No. 6031. The RTC granted the motion the same day, and the writ was immediately enforced by sheriffs who forcibly took possession of the premises, removed movables, and disconnected utilities.
• ANC's Response: ANC moved to quash the writ on June 11, 1991, and subsequently filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, challenging the execution as premature and issued with grave abuse of discretion.

• Finality Under R.A. 6031: The City of Manila argued that pursuant to Section 1 of R.A. 6031, decisions of the RTC in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts are "final" and therefore immediately executory.
• Propriety of Execution: The City maintained that the RTC correctly ordered execution because the judgment was already final.

• Appealability Under B.P. 129: ANC countered that under Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC's decision was appealable via a petition for review to the Court of Appeals and was not yet final and executory.
• Premature and Unjustified Execution: ANC argued that the execution was premature because the reglementary period to appeal (until June 25, 1991) had not yet expired. Furthermore, no urgent justification for execution pending appeal existed, and ANC had complied with the requirement to file a supersedeas bond.

• Finality vs. Finality and Executory: Whether the RTC's decision, being "final" under R.A. 6031, was also immediately "final and executory," thus warranting execution as a matter of right.
• Propriety of Execution Pending Appeal: Whether the RTC's issuance of the writ of execution before the period to appeal had expired constituted grave abuse of discretion, in the absence of the urgent reasons required for execution pending appeal under the Rules of Court.
• Adequacy of Remedy: Whether the special civil action for certiorari was the proper remedy for ANC to assail the order of execution.

• Finality vs. Finality and Executory: The distinction between a "final" judgment (one that disposes of the case entirely) and a "final and executory" judgment (one that is unappealable by operation of law) was affirmed. The RTC decision was "final" but not yet "final and executory" because the period to appeal had not lapsed. Execution was therefore premature.
• Propriety of Execution Pending Appeal: The execution was improper. Execution pending appeal under Rule 39, Section 2 is an exception that must be strictly construed and justified by urgent reasons outweighing potential damage to the losing party. No such justification was shown. Furthermore, ANC had filed a supersedeas bond, and its failure to make required rental deposits—which would be a ground for execution—had not been established.
• Adequacy of Remedy: The special civil action for certiorari was available because the ordinary remedy of appeal was not a speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances, given the immediate enforcement of the writ.

• Distinction Between "Final" and "Final and Executory" Judgments — A judgment is "final" when it finally disposes of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the trial court. It becomes "final and executory" upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal without an appeal being perfected, or after the appellate judgment becomes final. Only a "final and executory" judgment entitles the prevailing party to a writ of execution as a matter of right.
• Execution Pending Appeal — The allowance of execution pending appeal under Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is an exception to the general rule and must be strictly construed. The movant must demonstrate "good reasons" of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage the losing party may suffer should the judgment be reversed on appeal.

• "A judgment becomes 'final and executory' by operation of law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such a situation, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court."
• "The reason allowing this kind of execution must be of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should it secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent any such justification, the order of execution must be struck down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion."

• PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Free Telephone Workers Union, 97 Phil. 424 — Cited to define a "final" order or judgment as one that finally disposes of the pending action.
• Antonio v. Samonte, 1 SCRA 1072 — Elaborated that a final order adjudicates the rights of the parties and concludes them until reversed or set aside.
• Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 334 — Distinguished that a "final" judgment becomes "final and executory" after the period to appeal lapses or the appellate judgment becomes final.
• Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 561 — Cited for the rule that execution pending appeal requires strict construction and urgent justification.
• Reformina v. Adriano, 189 SCRA 723 — Cited for the procedural requirement that a sheriff must give the defendant notice and a reasonable period (3-5 days) to comply with a writ of ejectment before enforcing it bodily.

• Republic Act No. 6031, Section 1 — Provides that decisions of the RTC in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts are "final." The petitioner erroneously relied on this provision to claim immediate executory status.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 22 — Provides that decisions of the RTC in its appellate jurisdiction are appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals, indicating they are not immediately final and executory.
• Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 2 — Governs discretionary execution pending appeal, requiring "good reasons" stated in a special order after hearing.
• Rules of Court, Rule 70, Section 8 (as referenced in the Summary Procedure discussion) — Governs immediate execution in ejectment cases under the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was not applicable here.

Chief Justice Fernan was on leave. All other members of the En Banc concurred: Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ.

N/A — The decision was unanimous among the participating justices.