City of Iloilo vs. Legaspi

The issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation proceeding is a ministerial duty of the trial court upon compliance with two requisites: (1) the filing of a complaint sufficient in form and substance, and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property for LGUs under R.A. No. 7160. No prior hearing is required for the writ's issuance, as the sufficiency of the complaint is determined from its allegations, and any hearing required to establish compliance with socialized housing statutes pertains to the condemnation itself, not the right of immediate possession.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iloilo City enacted Regulation Ordinance No. 2001-037, authorizing the City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings over Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay, for an on-site relocation and housing development program. After the City's formal offer to purchase the property was rejected, an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain was filed. Private respondents assailed the complaint's sufficiency, arguing non-compliance with the mandatory requirements for socialized housing under R.A. No. 7279.

• Authority to Expropriate: On March 7, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iloilo City enacted Regulation Ordinance No. 2001-037, authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate Lot No. 935 for an on-site relocation program for the poor and landless.
• Failed Negotiations: On March 14, 2001, the City made a formal offer to purchase the property at P250 per square meter. The heirs of Manuela Yusay rejected the offer and made an unacceptable counter-proposal. The City terminated negotiations on June 26, 2001.
• Expropriation Complaint: The City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas, filed an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain against the heirs.
• Motion for Writ of Possession: On April 11, 2002, the City filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited P2,809,696.50 with the RTC, representing 15% of the fair market value of the property based on its current tax declaration, pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
• Open Court Agreement: On April 15, 2002, the trial court dictated an order in open court stating that the parties had agreed the motion for writ of possession would be resolved after the plaintiff rested its case.
• Motion for Reconsideration: On May 9, 2002, the City filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the issuance of the writ is ministerial and requires no hearing under prevailing jurisprudence. The trial court denied the motion on June 5, 2002, holding the resolution of the writ in abeyance.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the resolution of the motion for writ of possession until after trial, contrary to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence holding that no hearing is required.
• Sufficiency of the Complaint: Petitioner maintained that the Amended Complaint is sufficient in form and substance, having complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 1, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, a fact confirmed by the trial court's setting of the case for pre-trial.
• Ministerial Duty of the Court: Petitioner asserted that upon deposit of the required 15% of the fair market value, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court without the necessity of a hearing.
• No Estoppel or Waiver: Petitioner contended that it is not estopped from changing its position regarding the immediate issuance of the writ, as the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration immediately rectified the error. Neither was there a waiver, as there is no prescribed period within which to file a motion for a writ of possession.
• Inapplicability of Filstream: Petitioner argued that the Filstream case is inapplicable because the requirements of R.A. No. 7279 are not conditions precedent for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

• Finality of the April 15 Order: Respondent countered that the order dictated in open court on April 15, 2002, was already final when the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on May 9, 2002.
• Estoppel: Respondent argued that the City is estopped from changing its position regarding the immediate issuance of the writ of possession because it had agreed in open court to defer the resolution until after trial.
• Waiver: Respondent maintained that the City waived its right to immediate possession by taking over eight months from the filing of the Amended Complaint before moving for the writ.
• Insufficiency of the Complaint: Respondent asserted that a hearing is required before a writ of possession can be issued because the Amended Complaint is insufficient in form and substance, failing to allege compliance with the mandatory requirements for socialized housing under R.A. No. 7279.
• Non-Ministerial Duty: Respondent averred that the issuance of the writ ceases to be ministerial when the complaint fails to allege compliance with the mandatory requirements for socialized housing, as interpreted in Filstream International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

• Finality of the Order: Whether the trial court's order dictated in open court on April 15, 2002, was already final and executory when the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on May 9, 2002.
• Right to Writ of Possession: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding the resolution of the motion for a writ of possession in abeyance until after trial despite the City's deposit of the required amount.
• Sufficiency of the Complaint: Whether the Amended Complaint is sufficient in form and substance to warrant the immediate issuance of a writ of possession.
• Estoppel and Waiver: Whether the City is estopped from changing its position or has waived its right to seek the immediate issuance of a writ of possession.

• Finality of the Order: The Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time. An order dictated in open court has no juridical existence until it is set in writing, signed, promulgated, and served upon the parties. The period to file a motion for reconsideration is reckoned from receipt of the written order, not from the oral pronouncement. The City received the written order on April 26, 2002, making the May 9, 2002 filing timely.
• Right to Writ of Possession: The trial court gravely abused its discretion in deferring the resolution of the motion. Only two requisites must be met for a writ of possession to issue: (1) the filing of a complaint sufficient in form and substance, and (2) the deposit of the required provisional amount. No prior hearing is required. The sufficiency of the complaint is determined by mere examination of its allegations. Any hearing required to establish compliance with socialized housing statutes under R.A. No. 7279 pertains to the merits of the condemnation, not the issuance of the writ.
• Sufficiency of the Complaint: The Amended Complaint was sufficient in form and substance. It contained the necessary allegations, including those showing compliance with the requirements for socialized housing. The trial court's setting of the case for pre-trial further confirmed the complaint's sufficiency.
• Estoppel and Waiver: Estoppel does not apply. The City immediately filed a Motion for Reconsideration to rectify the error committed in open court, negating the element of delay. Furthermore, estoppel should not prevent a party from correcting its stance to conform with procedural rules and jurisprudence. Waiver was likewise absent, as Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 imposes no time limit for an LGU to move for immediate possession after filing the complaint and making the deposit.

• Juridical Existence of Judgments and Orders — No judgment or order has juridical existence until it is set in writing, signed, and promulgated, and notice thereof is served on the parties. An oral pronouncement in open court does not trigger the reglementary period for a motion for reconsideration.
• Requisites for Issuance of Writ of Possession in Eminent Domain (LGU) — A local government unit is entitled to the immediate issuance of a writ of possession upon: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on its current tax declaration. Compliance renders the issuance of the writ ministerial upon the court.
• Distinction Between Evidentiary Hearing for Condemnation and Issuance of Writ of Possession — While an evidentiary hearing is required to determine actual compliance with the mandatory requirements for socialized housing under R.A. No. 7279, this hearing pertains to the condemnation of the property and not to the issuance of a writ of possession. The latter requires no hearing and is determined solely from the face of the complaint and the fact of deposit.

• "Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment, or order, whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law."
• "For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession."

• Robern Development Corp. v. Judge Jesus V. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999 — Followed. Held that the duty to issue a writ of possession becomes ministerial upon the trial court without necessity of a hearing once the provisional deposit has been complied with.
• Biglang-awa v. Hon. Judge Marciano I. Bacalla, G.R. Nos. 139927-139936, November 22, 2000 — Followed. Reiterated that no prior hearing is required before a writ of possession can be issued.
• Filstream International Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 125218 and 128077, January 23, 1998 — Distinguished. While Filstream held that the issuance of a writ ceases to be ministerial when the complaint fails to allege compliance with mandatory requirements for socialized housing, the Amended Complaint in this case did contain such allegations. Actual compliance is a matter for trial on the merits, not a bar to the writ's issuance.
• City of Manila v. Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001 — Followed. Ruled that a hearing to determine compliance with R.A. No. 7279 is for the condemnation of the property, not for the issuance of the writ of possession.
• Echaus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57343, July 23, 1990 — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that an order has no juridical existence until set in writing, signed, and promulgated.
• Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128567, September 1, 2000 — Distinguished. Cited for the rule that estoppel may be invoked only if the party fails to raise the question in the early stages of proceedings; the City's immediate filing of an MR negated estoppel.

• Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Governs the exercise of eminent domain by local government units. Requires an ordinance, a valid and definite offer previously made to the owner, and a deposit of at least 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration for immediate possession. Applied as the statutory basis for the City's right to immediate entry upon deposit.
• Section 1, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Enumerates the required contents of a verified complaint for eminent domain. Applied to determine the sufficiency in form and substance of the City's Amended Complaint.
• Section 2, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the entry of the plaintiff upon depositing value with an authorized government depositary. Cited alongside Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, with the Court specifying that the 15% deposit requirement under the Local Government Code applies to LGUs rather than the assessed value under the Rules of Court.
• Sections 9 and 10, Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) — Prescribe the priorities in the acquisition of land and the modes of land acquisition for socialized housing, requiring expropriation to be resorted to only when other modes have been exhausted. Applied to clarify that while actual compliance with these provisions must be proven in a hearing on the merits, the mere allegation thereof in the complaint suffices for the issuance of a writ of possession.

Puno, Acting C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.