City of Cebu vs. Court of Appeals

A complaint for eminent domain states a cause of action if a valid and definite offer can be discerned from its allegations read with the attached documents and other pleadings; dismissal for ambiguity is improper when a bill of particulars would suffice. Procedural rules must be liberally construed to achieve substantial justice, and a rigid, technical application that overrides a party’s right to be heard will not be countenanced.

The City of Cebu, acting under Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No. 1418, sought to expropriate a 2,019-square-meter parcel owned by Merlita Cardeño in Sitio Sto. Niño, Alaska-Mambaling, for a socialized housing project for landless and low-income residents. The complaint alleged only that “repeated negotiations” to purchase the property had failed, without expressly stating that a “valid and definite offer” had been made, although the ordinance attached to and made integral part of the complaint contained a whereas clause declaring that the city had made such an offer and the owner had rejected it.

• Nature and Purpose: The City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain over a 2,019-square-meter lot owned by Merlita Cardeño, covered by TCT No. 116692, to establish a socialized housing project for landless and low-income city residents, pursuant to Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No. 1418 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
• The Complaint’s Allegations: Paragraph VII of the complaint stated: “That repeated negotiations had been made with the defendant to have the aforementioned property purchased by the plaintiff through negotiated sale without resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations failed.” Ordinance No. 1418 was expressly attached as Annex “A” and made an integral part of the complaint.
• The Ordinance: The second whereas clause of Ordinance No. 1418 recited: “WHEREAS, the city government has made a valid and definite offer to purchase subject lot(s) for the public use aforementioned but the registered owner Mrs. Merlita Cardeno has rejected such offer.”
• Motion to Dismiss: Cardeño moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, contending that paragraph VII fell short of the statutory condition precedent under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which requires that “a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted.”
• City’s Opposition: In its Comment and Opposition to the motion to dismiss, the City alleged that it had made a specific offer of P478,000.00 to Cardeño through her counsel, Atty. Omar Redula, on October 28, 1991, which she refused.
• RTC Ruling: The RTC dismissed the complaint, reasoning that “repeated negotiations” did not convey the meaning of a “valid and definite offer,” and invoked the rule that the ground of lack of cause of action must be resolved solely from the allegations of the complaint, disregarding the City’s opposition.
• CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that “negotiations” implies uncertainty and preparatory acts, and cannot by “any stretch of imagination” be equated to the specific statutory requirement. It rejected the argument that the City could present evidence of the offer at trial, maintaining that the complaint’s sufficiency could be determined only from its four corners.

• Sufficiency of Allegation: The City of Cebu maintained that the allegation of “repeated negotiations” substantially complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, as the complaint, read as a whole, sufficiently conveyed that a valid and definite offer had been made and rejected.
• Liberal Construction of Rules: Petitioner argued that any ambiguity or indefiniteness in the complaint’s language should have been met with a motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss, in keeping with the principle that procedural rules must be liberally interpreted to secure substantial justice.
• Right to Present Evidence: The City contended that, were it not for the premature dismissal, it could have presented evidence at trial to prove full compliance with the statutory condition precedent.

• Strict Compliance with Statute: Cardeño argued that “negotiations” is a broad term encompassing the entire range of preparatory acts prior to an agreement, and cannot automatically be deemed equivalent to a “valid and definite offer” as explicitly required by Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
• Exclusive Face-of-the-Complaint Rule: Respondent insisted that the existence of a cause of action must be determined solely from the allegations in the complaint itself; the City’s Comment and Opposition could not supply the missing essential averment.
• No Cause of Action: Respondent maintained that the complaint, on its face, failed to allege the mandatory condition precedent, thus warranting dismissal for lack of cause of action.

• Cause of Action: Whether the complaint for eminent domain stated a cause of action despite alleging only “repeated negotiations” instead of a “valid and definite offer” as required by Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
• Scope of Court’s Inquiry on Motion to Dismiss: Whether the lower courts erred in strictly confining their determination of cause of action to paragraph VII of the complaint and in refusing to consider the attached ordinance and the City’s Comment and Opposition.

• Cause of Action: The complaint was found to state a cause of action. Even assuming the allegation of “repeated negotiations” was ambiguous or indefinite, a complaint cannot be dismissed on that sole ground; the proper remedy is a motion for a bill of particulars. Dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action is warranted only when it clearly appears from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts that could be proved within the facts alleged. Because a cause of action could, in any manner, be made out from the complaint’s allegations, the motion to dismiss should have been denied.
• Scope of Court’s Inquiry on Motion to Dismiss: The lower courts’ rigid application of the rule that only the complaint’s allegations may be considered was erroneous and contrary to established exceptions. The City’s Comment and Opposition left no doubt that a definite offer had been made. Moreover, Ordinance No. 1418, which was attached to and made an integral part of the complaint, expressly stated that a valid and definite offer had been made and rejected. Under the Rules, all documents attached to a complaint whose due execution and genuineness are not denied under oath are deemed part of the complaint and are hypothetically admitted in a motion to dismiss. Thus, even confining the inquiry to the face of the complaint, compliance with Section 19 was adequately pleaded. The rigid enforcement of procedural rules to the prejudice of a party’s substantial right and the resultant delay in the proceedings could not be countenanced.

• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules — Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to secure substantial justice, not to override it. A rigid and technical enforcement that prejudices a party’s substantial right and defeats the ends of justice must yield. The aim of procedural rules is defeated when they are applied in a manner that subordinates substance to technicality.
• Ambiguity vs. Failure to State a Cause of Action — A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action on the ground of mere ambiguity, indefiniteness, or uncertainty. The proper remedy for an ambiguous or indefinite cause of action is a motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss. As long as a cause of action can in any manner be made out from the facts alleged, the motion to dismiss must be denied.
• Consideration of Attached Documents and Other Pleadings on Motion to Dismiss — While the general rule limits determination of a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action to the complaint’s allegations, exceptions exist. A court may consider other pleadings submitted by the parties when it has had the opportunity to examine the merits. Additionally, documents attached to a complaint, whose due execution and genuineness are not denied under oath, are considered part of the complaint and are deemed admitted by the movant without need of introducing evidence thereon.

• “The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced.”
• “A complaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of action stated therein for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but rather for a bill of particulars.”
• “All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not detained under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon.”

• Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302 — Followed. The Court departed from the strict face-of-the-complaint rule and allowed evidence adduced in the preliminary injunction hearing to be considered in resolving the motion to dismiss.
• Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia, 143 SCRA 178 — Followed. The trial court may, in addition to the complaint, consider other pleadings submitted by the parties in determining whether a cause of action exists, especially when it has examined the merits of those submissions.
• Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter Olser and Co., 43 Phil. 529 — Followed. Documents attached to a complaint, whose genuineness is not denied under oath, form part of the complaint.
• Sumulong et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 232 SCRA 372; Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680; Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, 204 SCRA 428 — Followed for the rule that ambiguity or uncertainty is not a ground for dismissal of a complaint for insufficiency of cause of action.

• Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Prescribes that a local government unit may exercise eminent domain only after a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted. Applied to the complaint, the Court held that the allegation of “repeated negotiations,” when read with the attached ordinance expressly declaring that a valid and definite offer had been made and rejected, sufficiently stated compliance with this condition precedent.
• Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Court — Declares that the Rules shall be liberally construed to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. The Court relied on this provision to reverse the lower courts’ rigid application of procedural technicalities.

Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.