City of Caloocan vs. City of Malabon, et al.

A boundary dispute between two highly urbanized cities must first be jointly referred to their respective Sanggunians for amicable settlement under Section 118(d) of the Local Government Code before resort to the Regional Trial Court may be had pursuant to Section 119. A petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy for such disputes, and courts should refrain from passing upon constitutional questions when the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of existing laws providing the appropriate and adequate remedy.

The City of Caloocan and the City of Malabon are neighboring highly urbanized cities in Metro Manila. Caloocan was created by RA 3278, with its territory comprising the "present territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Caloocan in the Province of Rizal," later affirmed by RA 5502. On March 5, 2001, RA 9019 was enacted converting the then Municipality of Malabon into a highly urbanized city, with Section 2 thereof providing the technical description of Malabon's boundaries. Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution requires that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations provide the procedure for settling boundary disputes between LGUs.

On March 5, 2001, RA 9019 was enacted converting the then Municipality of Malabon into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Malabon, taking effect on even date. Pursuant to Section 54 of the law, the electorate of the Municipality of Malabon ratified its conversion to an HUC during a plebiscite conducted on April 21, 2001. Section 2 of RA 9019 defined the boundaries of the City of Malabon through a detailed technical description specifying geographic coordinates, rivers, roads, and streets as metes and bounds.

Henry P. Cammayo, a former member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan, along with former barangay chairpersons of Barangays 160 and 161 and former kagawads in Libis, Baesa, Caloocan City, filed on September 10, 2002 a Petition for declaratory relief against the City of Malabon and its officials. They alleged that Caloocan was created by RA 3278 with its territory comprising the "present territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Caloocan in the Province of Rizal," which included the subject barangays. They claimed that as early as 1961, the subject barangays were surveyed by the Land Registration Commission and officially declared as part of Caloocan's territorial jurisdiction; that owners of real properties therein declared them for taxation purposes in Caloocan and paid real estate taxes; and that Torrens Certificates of Title covering parcels of land in said barangays were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan. They averred that RA 9019 included within Malabon's territorial boundaries certain portions of the subject barangays, substantially altering Caloocan's territorial jurisdiction without the knowledge and consent of residents and without a plebiscite as required by the Constitution and the LGC. An Amended Petition additionally impleaded the Republic of the Philippines, and the RTC granted the application for preliminary injunction on October 10, 2002.

Caloocan filed a motion for intervention with attached complaint in intervention, which the RTC admitted on August 24, 2004. Caloocan asserted that Section 2 of RA 9019 violated Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution requiring a plebiscite in affected barangays, and that the Bureau of Lands had recognized the land where the subject barangays are situated as belonging to Caloocan.

During trial, Cammayo testified that he discovered a consolidated subdivision survey plan for the People's Homesite Housing Corporation made on December 8 to 23, 1961, created for the construction of the diversion road and housing projects in Barrio Baesa; that he secured a zoning map of the then Municipality of Malabon and the City of Caloocan duly approved in 1981 by the Metro Manila Commission showing the subject barangays as part of Caloocan; that a COMELEC certification confirmed no plebiscite was conducted in the subject barangays; and that verification with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan confirmed certain parcels of land within the subject barangays have titles registered in Caloocan. Payno testified that she had been a resident of Barangay 160 since 1979, was elected barangay kagawad in 1997 and 2002, and was a registered voter of precincts in Barangay 160 as part of the master list of voters of Caloocan, and that she and her co-petitioners learned they were already considered residents of Malabon after the passage of RA 9019 without any prior consultation or plebiscite.

Malabon presented Santiago, an employee of the City Assessor's Office of Malabon, who testified that he used maps issued in 1997 by NAMRIA for ocular inspections and discovered that the disputed areas had tax declarations bearing the signatures of the then Municipal Assessor's Office of Malabon. He confirmed on cross-examination that the area of Libis, Baesa had always been part of Malabon's territorial jurisdiction even prior to RA 9019, and that as early as 1998, the City Assessor's Office of Malabon had already issued tax declarations for certain properties within Libis, Baesa. Barraca, an employee of the DENR, testified that he issued a certification regarding the sketch plan of the boundaries of Malabon, Caloocan, and Quezon City based on the approved cadastral survey plan (MCadm 581) dated October 30, 1979, and clarified that "Cad-267" refers to the cadastral survey of Caloocan whose political boundary was approved in 1932.

Caloocan presented Ignacio, the incumbent barangay captain of Barangay 160, who testified that he had been a resident for 62 years, a registered voter of Caloocan, and that the barangay's annual budget came from Caloocan and the title to his property was issued by Caloocan. Gajudo, the incumbent barangay captain of Barangay 161, claimed that the master list of voters of Barangay 161 was issued by COMELEC, Caloocan North Jurisdiction, and that he was issued title and tax receipts by Caloocan. Buhain, a COMELEC employee, recalled that a plebiscite was conducted prior to Malabon's cityhood but stated that per her recollection, the subject barangays were not included in the plebiscite, though she could not produce documents since records were destroyed in a fire. Saavedra, an Election Assistant II of COMELEC, stated that based on records such as the Voter's List, Registration, and Project Precinct, the subject barangays form part of Caloocan's territorial jurisdiction and that no plebiscite involving said barangays took place.

• Unconstitutionality of Section 2 of RA 9019: Caloocan maintained that Section 2 of RA 9019 is unconstitutional for violating the requirement of conducting a plebiscite in the LGUs directly affected by a change in territorial boundaries as required by Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, highlighting the absence of any record in the COMELEC of the conduct of a plebiscite in the subject barangays.

• Inapplicability of LGC Amicable Settlement Procedure: Caloocan argued that the LGC provisions on the amicable settlement of boundary disputes do not apply considering the unconstitutionality of Section 2 of RA 9019.

• Propriety of Declaratory Relief: Caloocan maintained that the petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy in view of the patent nullity of Section 2 of RA 9019 for failure to comply with the plebiscite requirement for alteration of boundaries.

• Impropriety of Declaratory Relief: Malabon asserted that a petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy as the same may be commenced only before breach or violation of the assailed statute, underscoring that it had already started to exercise its jurisdiction and powers over the contested areas and that RA 9019 had been in effect for more than one year and six months before the declaratory petition was filed.

• No Alteration of Caloocan's Territory: Malabon maintained that RA 9019 did not alter the territorial boundary of Caloocan since the subject barangays have always been part of Malabon, citing the coordinates of the Provincial Boundaries Movement, Municipal Boundary Movements, and City Boundary Movements of Caloocan per records of the Geodetic Survey Division, Land Management Bureau, DENR, as well as the cadastral Survey of the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal dated December 30, 1930.

• Mandatory Referral to Sanggunians: Malabon argued that the boundary dispute in this case should have been referred to the concerned Sanggunians as required by Sections 118 and 119 of the LGC.

• Boundary Dispute Resolution: Whether the controversy between Caloocan and Malaban over the subject barangays constitutes a boundary dispute that must first be jointly referred to their respective Sanggunians for amicable settlement under Sections 118 and 119 of the Local Government Code before judicial recourse.

• Propriety of Declaratory Relief: Whether the petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of Section 2 of RA 9019.

• Constitutional Avoidance: Whether the Court should rule on the constitutionality of Section 2 of RA 9019 when the controversy can be resolved on other grounds.

• Boundary Dispute Resolution: Yes. The conflicting claims of Caloocan and Malabon over the same portions of the subject barangays constitute a boundary dispute that should have been jointly referred to their respective Sanggunians for amicable settlement pursuant to Section 118(d) of the LGC, with resort to the RTC only upon failure of that procedure under Section 119.

• Propriety of Declaratory Relief: No. The petition for declaratory relief was not the proper remedy since requisites (2), (5), and (6) for such action were not present — the terms of Section 2 of RA 9019 were not doubtful requiring construction, the issue was not yet ripe for judicial determination due to failure to exhaust the administrative remedy, and adequate relief was available through the LGC settlement procedure.

• Constitutional Avoidance: No. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 2 of RA 9019, applying the doctrine that courts are enjoined from passing upon questions of constitutionality when the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of existing laws providing the appropriate and adequate remedy.

• Boundary Dispute Resolution: The Court found that both Caloocan and Malabon were claiming that the contested areas or portions of the subject barangays are part of their respective territorial jurisdictions based on historical data and records issued by different government agencies and pursuant to their respective charters. Rule III, Article 15 of the IRR of the LGC provides that a boundary dispute involving different LGUs exists when "a portion or the whole of the territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs." Since both cities had already been converted to HUCs at the time the petition was filed, Section 118(d) of the LGC required that the dispute be jointly referred to their respective Sanggunians for amicable settlement. Citing Province of Antique vs. Calabocal, Municipality of Pateros vs. Court of Appeals, and Municipality of Pateros vs. City of Taguig, the Court emphasized that regardless of the denomination of the case, competing assertions over territorial jurisdiction constitute a boundary dispute that must be resolved pursuant to Sections 118 and 119 of the LGC. The task of settling boundary disputes, whether initially by joint referral to the Sanggunians or subsequently by the RTC on appeal, shall be limited to the factual determination of the boundary lines between the competing LGUs as specified by natural boundaries or metes and bounds in accordance with the laws creating them. The Sanggunians cannot fix the territories of the LGUs themselves without running afoul of the constitutional paradigm, as the creation of LGUs is an inherently legislative function.

• Propriety of Declaratory Relief: The Court enumerated the requisites for an action for declaratory relief to prosper: (1) the subject matter must be a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual judicial controversy or the "ripening of seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. The Court found that requisites (2), (5), and (6) were not present. The core issue was a boundary dispute that must first be referred to the Sanggunians under Section 118, making the petition premature and the issue not yet ripe. Moreover, Section 2 of RA 9019 explicitly identifies the metes and bounds — in longitudes and latitudes — of Malabon's territory, and Caloocan failed to specify any portion thereof that is unclear or requires clarification. In contrast, Caloocan's boundaries under RA 5502 are not readily identifiable without reference to auxiliary documents and records.

• Constitutional Avoidance: The Court applied the principle that in situations where a petition for declaratory relief is used to question the constitutionality of a legislative act, the petitioner must indispensably show that the issue of constitutionality is the lis mota of the case — that is, the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. When the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law, courts are enjoined from passing upon the question of constitutionality, although properly presented, pursuant to the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court reiterated its basic policy of staying its hand from ruling on constitutional issues if the controversy can be settled on other grounds, a principle that springs from the democratic character of constitutional interpretation and the principle of separation of powers.

• Boundary Dispute Doctrine — A boundary dispute between LGUs exists when "a portion or the whole of the territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs" (Rule III, Article 15, IRR of the LGC). Whether the dispute involves a mere portion or the entirety of the territorial area, there exists a boundary dispute so long as the same portion or area is claimed by a different LGU. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the competing claims of Caloocan and Malabon over the subject barangays constituted a boundary dispute that must be resolved through the LGC settlement procedure.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Boundary Disputes — Under Section 118 of the LGC, boundary disputes between two or more highly urbanized cities shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective Sanggunians of the parties. Only upon failure of these intermediary steps — including the issuance of a certification of failure to settle within sixty days and formal trial and decision by the Sanggunian within another sixty days — will resort to the RTC follow pursuant to Section 119. The Court held that direct resort to the RTC was improper and premature, warranting outright dismissal.

• Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance — Courts are enjoined from passing upon questions of constitutionality when the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case — that is, its resolution must be unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. This time-honored principle of according respect to co-equal branches of government springs from the democratic character of constitutional interpretation and the principle of separation of powers.

• Requisites for Declaratory Relief — For an action for declaratory relief to prosper, the following must be present: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual judicial controversy or the "ripening of seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. The Court found that requisites (2), (5), and (6) were not present in this case.

• "Under the LGC, boundary disputes between and among LGUs must, as much as possible, be settled amicably through joint referral to the appropriate Sanggunians of the LGUs concerned." — This passage states the mandatory procedure for resolving boundary disputes between local government units, which the Court held should have been followed before judicial recourse.

• "A petition for declaratory relief is a remedy to 'secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.'" — This defines the nature and purpose of declaratory relief, which the Court found to be an improper remedy for the boundary dispute at hand.

• "When the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law, as in this case where existing laws provide for the appropriate and adequate remedy for resolving the boundary dispute between Caloocan and Malabon, courts are enjoined from passing upon the question of constitutionality, although properly presented, pursuant to the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality." — This articulates the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as applied to the facts of this case, declining to rule on the constitutionality of Section 2 of RA 9019.

• Province of Antique vs. Calabocal, 786 Phil. 787 (2016) — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that regardless of the denomination of the case, competing assertions over territorial jurisdiction constitute a boundary dispute that should be resolved pursuant to Sections 118 and 119 of the LGC.

• Municipality of Pateros vs. Court of Appeals, 607 Phil. 104 (2009) — Cited for the rule that the specific provisions of the LGC must be complied with, and only upon failure of the intermediary steps of amicable settlement will resort to the RTC follow as provided in Section 119.

• Municipality of Pateros vs. City of Taguig, G.R. No. 220824, April 19, 2023 — Cited for the emphasis that it is the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units which have jurisdiction over their boundary disputes to settle the same by amicable settlement.

• Municipality of Isabel, Leyte vs. Municipality of Merida, Leyte, 892 Phil. 159 (2020) — Cited for the proposition that the task of settling or adjudicating boundary disputes shall be limited to the factual determination of the boundary lines between the competing LGUs as specified by natural boundaries or metes and bounds in accordance with the laws creating them.

• Municipality of Makati vs. Municipality of Taguig, 917 Phil. 191 (2021) — Cited for the principle that the power to create local government units necessarily includes the power to define their boundaries, a broad power limited only by constitutional restrictions.

• Ferrer vs. St. Mary's Publishing, G.R. No. 258486, August 2, 2023 — Cited for the definition of a petition for declaratory relief and the enumeration of the requisites for such action to prosper.

• City of Lapu-lapu vs. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 748 Phil. 473 (2014) — Cited for the rule that if adequate relief is available through another form of action or proceeding, the other action should be preferred over an action for declaratory relief.

• Francisco vs. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) — Cited for the requirement that the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

• Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64 (2009) — Cited for the rule that courts are enjoined from passing upon questions of constitutionality when the case can be disposed of on some other ground, pursuant to the presumption of constitutionality.

• Article X, Section 10, 1987 Constitution — Requires that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall be made through a law enacted by Congress, subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The Court noted this provision but declined to rule on its alleged violation due to the applicability of the LGC settlement procedure.

• Section 118, Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) — Provides the jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of boundary disputes, requiring that boundary disputes between two or more highly urbanized cities shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective Sanggunians of the parties. The Court held that this provision mandated the procedure that should have been followed before judicial recourse.

• Section 119, Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) — Provides that within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Court held that this provision applies only upon failure of the amicable settlement procedure.

• Rule III, Articles 15 and 17, IRR of the Local Government Code — Defines when a boundary dispute exists and prescribes the procedures for settling boundary disputes, including the filing of a petition, the issuance of a certification of failure to settle within sixty days, and the formal trial and decision by the Sanggunian within sixty days from certification.

• Rule 63, Section 1, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for declaratory relief, providing that any person whose rights are affected by a statute may bring an action before breach or violation thereof to determine any question of construction or validity. The Court held that this remedy was improper because the requisites for its availability were not present.

• Section 2, RA 9019 — Defines the boundaries of the City of Malabon through a detailed technical description. The Court found that the terms of this provision were not doubtful requiring construction, as the boundaries could readily be ascertained by following the measurements provided.

• Section 2, RA 5502 — Defines Caloocan's territory in general terms as comprising the "present territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Caloocan, in the Province of Rizal." The Court noted that these boundaries are not readily identifiable without reference to auxiliary documents and records.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred.