City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta

An ordinance requiring private cemetery owners to "donate" a portion of their property for public burial of paupers, without compensation, constitutes an unconstitutional taking without just compensation, not a valid exercise of police power. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate; when property is permanently appropriated for public use rather than merely regulated, the state must exercise eminent domain and pay just compensation.

Quezon City enacted an ordinance regulating private memorial cemeteries within its jurisdiction. Years after its enactment, the City Council sought to enforce a provision requiring private operators to set aside land for pauper burials, triggering a constitutional challenge on the grounds that the provision effectively confiscated private property without compensation.

• Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002), seeking to annul Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64.
• The parties submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings, waiving trial on factual issues.
• The CFI declared Section 9 null and void as an unconstitutional exercise of power.
• Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
• Petitioners filed a petition for review with the SC.

• Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 (1964), entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery or Burial Ground within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City," contained Section 9 requiring private memorial parks to set aside at least 6% of their total area for charity burial of deceased paupers who were Quezon City residents for at least 5 years prior to death.
• The designated area had to be developed and operational within six months from approval of the cemetery application.
• The ordinance remained unenforced for seven years after enactment.
• In 1971, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution directing the City Engineer to stop transactions of memorial park lots where owners failed to donate the required 6% space.
• The City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. of the enforcement of Section 9.
• Himlayang Pilipino had already incorporated, secured necessary licenses and permits, and commenced operations prior to the attempted enforcement of the ordinance against it.

• Section 9 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause of the Quezon City Charter (R.A. No. 537, Section 12(00)).
• The requirement serves a public use (providing burial grounds for paupers) and promotes public health, safety, and welfare.
• The Quezon City Charter grants the Council broad authority to enact ordinances necessary for the "health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city."
• The ordinance is a reasonable regulation, not a confiscation.

• Section 9 constitutes an outright confiscation of private property without due process and without just compensation, violating Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
• The ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property, depriving the owner of all beneficial use and possession of the 6% portion.
• The general welfare clause authorizes only the restraint and regulation of property use, not its confiscation; when property is taken outright for public use (rather than destroyed as a nuisance), the power is eminent domain, not police power.
• The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, and a fortiori, does not include the power to confiscate.
• The ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino had already commenced operations, making the "donation" requirement an ex post facto taking.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 is a valid exercise of police power under the Quezon City Charter.
  • Whether the ordinance constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • Section 9 is unconstitutional. The SC affirmed the CFI decision declaring the provision null and void.
  • The ordinance is not a valid police power measure but an outright confiscation masquerading as regulation.
  • There is no reasonable relation between the means (confiscating 6% of private cemetery land) and the ends (promoting health, morals, safety, or general welfare).
  • The ordinance effectively passes the burden of providing public burial grounds from the city government to private cemetery owners, constituting expropriation without compensation.
  • Section 12(t) of R.A. No. 537 (power to regulate burial places) does not authorize confiscation or "donation" of private property; it merely allows the city to designate proper burial places, which may be accomplished through purchase or expropriation with compensation.
  • The general welfare clause cannot be stretched to authorize uncompensated takings; it permits only reasonable regulation, not confiscation.

• Police Power Defined — The power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property (Freund). It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of government powers, coextensive with self-preservation, but bounded by the due process clause.
• Police Power vs. Eminent Domain Distinction —
• Police power regulates the use and enjoyment of property to promote general welfare; the owner receives no compensation for resulting injuries.
• Eminent domain takes private property for public use and requires just compensation.
• When property is deprived outright and appropriated for public use (not merely regulated or destroyed as a nuisance), the power exercised is eminent domain.
• Power to Regulate vs. Power to Confiscate — The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit; a fortiori, it does not include the power to confiscate. An ordinance that permanently deprives an owner of beneficial use and appropriates property for public purposes is a taking, not a regulation.
• Presumption of Validity — Courts resolve every presumption in favor of the validity of municipal ordinances, and the burden of proving invalidity rests on the challenger. However, this presumption is overcome by clear evidence of confiscation without compensation.
• General Welfare Clause Limitations — While broadly interpreted to authorize ordinances for health, safety, and prosperity, the clause cannot justify the taking of private property without compensation.

• "The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit... A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate."
• "Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare..."
• "Section 9... is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation."
• "There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people."

• People v. Esguerra (81 Phil. 33) — Cited for the principle that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit.
• Vega v. Municipal Board of Iloilo (L-6765, May 12, 1954) — Cited for the same principle regarding the limited scope of regulatory authority.
• Ichong v. Hernandez (L-7995, May 31, 1957) — Cited for the expansive scope of police power as coextensive with self-preservation and survival.
• Ruby v. Provincial Board (39 Phil. 660) — Cited for police power being the most essential, insistent, and least limitable of governmental powers.
• U.S. v. Linsuya Fan (10 Phil. 104) — Cited for the principle that police power embraces the whole system of public regulation.
• Case v. Board of Health (24 Phil. 250) — Established the presumption of validity in favor of municipal ordinances and the principle that property is held subject to reasonable regulations for the common good.
• Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) — Reaffirmed the presumption of validity and the deference due to local legislative bodies in promoting general welfare.
• U.S. v. Salaveria (39 Phil. 102) — Original source of the presumption of validity doctrine; emphasized that courts should not lightly set aside legislative action absent clear invasion of rights.
• Eboña v. Daet (85 Phil. 369) — Affirmed the Salaveria doctrine on presumption of validity.

• Article III, Section 1 (Constitution) — Due process clause ("no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law"). The ordinance violates this by confiscating property without compensation.
• Republic Act No. 537 (Quezon City Charter), Section 12(00) — The general welfare clause authorizing ordinances for health, safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience. The SC held this authorizes only regulation, not confiscation.
• Republic Act No. 537, Section 12(t) — Provision empowering the City Council to prohibit burial in population centers and provide for burial in proper places subject to general law. The SC held this does not authorize confiscation or "donation" of private land.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code), Section 177(q) — Provision allowing sanggunian to provide for burial of the dead. The SC interpreted this as authorizing the city to provide its own land or to purchase/expropriate private property with compensation, not to confiscate private property.

• N/A (Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, and Relova, JJ., concurred).