Citizens for a Green and Peaceful Camiguin vs. King Energy Generation, Inc.

A petition for a writ of kalikasan must allege and substantiate environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces, and the precautionary principle cannot supply this missing jurisdictional allegation because it operates only in the evaluation of evidence where scientific certainty cannot be achieved, not to cure defects in pleadings.

Petitioners are environmental organizations, people's organizations, and individual residents of Camiguin who oppose the construction of a diesel power plant by respondent KEGI in Sitio Maubog, Barangay Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin. Respondent Camiguin Electric Cooperative (CAMELCO) entered into a Purchase Supply Agreement with KEGI to purchase power from the proposed plant. Public respondents — the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the local government units of Barangay Balbagon, Municipality of Mambajao, and Province of Camiguin — were impleaded for allegedly allowing the project in contravention of environmental laws. The dispute centers on whether the extraordinary remedies of a writ of kalikasan and a writ of continuing mandamus under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC) are available given the territorial scope of the alleged environmental damage and the nature of the relief sought.

Petitioners — a coalition of environmental organizations including Citizens for a Green and Peaceful Camiguin, Sulog, Inc., Save CDO Now Movement, Inc., and Task Force Macajalar, together with numerous individual residents of Camiguin — filed twin petitions before the Court of Appeals seeking the issuance of a writ of kalikasan and a writ of continuing mandamus, with a prayer for a Temporary Environmental Protection Order, against the establishment and construction of a diesel power plant by KEGI in Sitio Maubog, Barangay Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin. They alleged that the construction violated their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and various environmental laws.

Petitioners asserted several grounds for relief. First, they invoked the precautionary principle, arguing that the project should not have been approved given its "innumerable" health, safety, and environmental hazards. Second, they claimed that respondents failed to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) as required under Presidential Decree No. 1151 and PD No. 1586. Third, they contended that the project lacked the approval of the President upon recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority as required under Proclamation No. 1801. Fourth, they alleged non-compliance with the public consultation requirements under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code. Fifth, they charged that the Sangguniang Bayan violated Memorandum Circular No. 54 by reclassifying the area from agricultural to industrial land without conducting the necessary public hearings.

The CA dismissed both petitions outright on May 26, 2014. It found that the writ of kalikasan was unavailable because the perceived environmental damage from the diesel plant would affect only the island province of Camiguin, composed of municipalities, whereas the remedy requires damage of such magnitude as to prejudice inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The CA also dismissed the petition for continuing mandamus for failing to justify filing before the CA rather than the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on June 27, 2014, with the CA reminding them of adequate remedies before the RTCs.

In the proceedings, respondent CAMELCO clarified that it had not contracted with KEGI for the construction of the power plant but had only entered into a Purchase Supply Agreement to buy power from KEGI. Respondent KEGI disputed the claim that diesel power plant technology is unsafe, citing existing diesel power plants in Mindanao without reported environmental issues, and asserted that its project had complied with all licensing and permit requirements, including those under the Philippine Clean Water Act and the Philippine Clean Air Act. The EMB, for its part, maintained that the project — intended to produce only 4.4 megawatts of electricity — was not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System and thus required only a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC), not an ECC. The EMB had issued a CNC in favor of the project, and subsequently issued a Discharge Permit and Permit to Operate. The concerned local government units had issued Resolutions approving and endorsing the project, and the Department of Agrarian Reform had issued a Conversion Order over the land covering the subject property.

• Magnitude Requirement Unfairly Applied: Petitioners argued that although Camiguin is an isolated island province far from the nearest cities and provinces, it should not be denied the benefits of a law created to champion environmental protection, and that the pollutants from the power plant would contribute to threats causing natural calamities that took lives in northern Mindanao.
• Precautionary Principle: Petitioners claimed that the precautionary principle creates a bias in favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and should supply the missing allegation of magnitude.
• Environmental Law Violations: Petitioners maintained that respondents failed to secure an ECC, lacked presidential approval under Proclamation No. 1801, did not comply with public consultation requirements under the Local Government Code, and violated Memorandum Circular No. 54 in reclassifying the land without public hearings.

• Writ of Kalikasan Requirements Not Met: The EMB, joined by the Provincial and Local Governments of Camiguin, countered that the writ of kalikasan is not a general remedy available in every case of environmental damage but requires damage of such magnitude as to prejudice inhabitants in two or more cities or municipalities, which petitioners failed to allege or prove.
• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts: The EMB maintained that while the Supreme Court, CA, and RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of continuing mandamus, this does not grant petitioners unrestrained freedom of choice of court, lest they violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Precautionary Principle Misapplied: The EMB argued that the precautionary principle does not operate to avoid all human activity that speculatively causes environmental damage, noting operational diesel power plants in Iloilo and Bohol that have not been shut down.
• CNC Sufficient: The EMB insisted that the 4.4-megawatt project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System and requires only a CNC, not an ECC, though proponents must still secure permits under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.
• Purchase Supply Agreement Only: CAMELCO denied contracting with KEGI for construction, clarifying that it only entered into a Purchase Supply Agreement to buy power from KEGI.
• Compliance with All Requirements: KEGI disputed claims that diesel technology is unsafe, cited existing plants in Mindanao without environmental issues, and stressed compliance with all licensing and permit requirements including the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act.

• Writ of Kalikasan — Magnitude Requirement: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for a writ of kalikasan on the ground that the alleged environmental damage was confined to the island province of Camiguin and did not satisfy the requirement of damage affecting inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
• Precautionary Principle — Scope: Whether the precautionary principle can supply the missing allegation of magnitude required for a writ of kalikasan.
• Writ of Continuing Mandamus — Availability: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for a writ of continuing mandamus when the reliefs sought were essentially challenges to administrative agency issuances for which specific appellate remedies existed.

• Writ of Kalikasan — Magnitude Requirement: No. The CA did not err; the magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non for a writ of kalikasan, and petitioners failed to allege or prove that the construction would cause damage prejudicing inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
• Precautionary Principle — Scope: No. The precautionary principle finds direct application only in the evaluation of evidence where scientific certainty cannot be achieved; it does not supply allegations where there are none.
• Writ of Continuing Mandamus — Availability: No. The reliefs sought were essentially challenges to actions taken by political and administrative agencies for which specific administrative appellate remedies were available, and the writ should not be used to supplant executive or legislative functions.

• Writ of Kalikasan — Magnitude Requirement: Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the RPEC expressly provides that a writ of kalikasan is available only when environmental damage is of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. This magnitude requirement is a condition sine qua non that must be contained in the verified petition. The extraordinary nature of the remedy led the Court to reserve its issuance only for cases sufficiently grave in territorial scope. Here, petitioners listed "innumerable" safety, health, and environmental hazards but failed to allege how the construction would cause damage of such magnitude as to prejudice inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Their argument that it would be unfair to deny the writ to Camiguin solely because of its "unique" location underscored the defect rather than curing it. Moreover, petitioners failed to substantiate their entitlement to the writ, offering only a purported IARC press release and a Wikipedia article — insufficient evidence of the alleged environmental damage. The Court also noted that lack of sanggunian approval under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC, per Paje vs. Casiño, would not lead to or is not reasonably connected with environmental damage but is rather an affront to local autonomy.

• Precautionary Principle — Scope: The precautionary principle, as articulated in International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.), finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence and bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. It does not and should not be made to supply allegations where there are none. Petitioners attempted to use the precautionary principle to cure the jurisdictional defect in their petition — the absence of an allegation of magnitude — but the Court rejected this conflation of evidentiary doctrine with pleading requirements.

• Writ of Continuing Mandamus — Availability: The reliefs sought in the petition for continuing mandamus — directing respondents to undergo the environmental impact statement process, submit certifications on public consultation, and amend the reclassification order — were essentially challenges to actions taken by concerned political and administrative agencies. The EMB had already issued a CNC certifying that the project was not covered by the EIS System; local government units had issued Resolutions approving the project; the DAR had issued a Conversion Order; and the EMB had subsequently issued a Discharge Permit and Permit to Operate. Petitioners' disagreement with these agency findings did not justify ignoring the proper procedure for appeals. Under DENR Administrative Order No. 03-30, an aggrieved party may appeal an ECC/CNC decision within 15 days to the EMB Director or DENR Secretary. A DAR Conversion Order may be subject of a motion for reconsideration, appeal, or petition for revocation under Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2002. As held in Abogado vs. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the writ of continuing mandamus should not be used to supplant executive or legislative privileges or where the remedies required are clearly political or administrative in nature. Petitioners also failed to show a causal link or reasonable connection between the agencies' alleged lapses and environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the RPEC.

• Magnitude Requirement for Writ of Kalikasan — A petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must allege and prove environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. This is a condition sine qua non, and the extraordinary nature of the remedy warrants reservation only for cases sufficiently grave in terms of territorial scope. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that petitioners' allegations, confined to the island province of Camiguin, failed to meet the threshold.

• Scope of the Precautionary Principle — The precautionary principle finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence and bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. It does not supply allegations where there are none and cannot cure jurisdictional defects in pleadings. The Court refused to allow petitioners to use the precautionary principle to supply the missing magnitude allegation.

• Writ of Continuing Mandamus — Limitations — The writ of continuing mandamus should not be used to supplant executive or legislative privileges, nor where the remedies required are clearly political or administrative in nature. Where specific administrative appellate remedies exist for challenging agency issuances (e.g., ECC/CNC decisions, DAR Conversion Orders), parties must pursue those remedies rather than invoke the writ.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts in Environmental Cases — While the Supreme Court, CA, and RTC exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of continuing mandamus, this does not grant petitioners absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of court, lest they violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

• "It is settled that magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition." — This passage articulates the jurisdictional prerequisite for the writ of kalikasan, establishing that magnitude is not merely an evidentiary matter but a pleading requirement.

• "The precautionary principle, however, finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence and bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. [I]t does not and should not be made to supply allegations where there are none." — This defines the boundary of the precautionary principle's operation, distinguishing its evidentiary function from pleading requirements and preventing its misuse as a substitute for jurisdictional allegations.

• "the writ of continuing mandamus 'should not be used to supplant executive or legislative privileges. Neither should it be used where the remedies required are clearly political or administrative in nature.'" — This quotation, drawn from Abogado vs. DENR, defines the outer limits of the writ of continuing mandamus and explains why challenges to administrative agency issuances must proceed through the proper administrative appellate channels.

• LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. vs. Agham Party List, 784 Phil. 456 (2016) — Cited for the proposition that magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for a writ of kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.
• Paje vs. Casiño, 752 Phil. 498 (2015) — Cited to show that the writ of kalikasan is reserved only for cases sufficiently grave in territorial scope, and that lack of sanggunian approval under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC is not reasonably connected with environmental damage but is an affront to local autonomy.
• International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.), 774 Phil. 508 (2015) — Cited for the definition and scope of the precautionary principle as applying in the evaluation of evidence where scientific certainty cannot be achieved.
• Abogado vs. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019 — Cited for the principle that the writ of continuing mandamus should not supplant executive or legislative privileges or be used where remedies are political or administrative in nature, and that parties seeking a writ of kalikasan carry the burden of substantiating its elements.
• Cordillera Global Network vs. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019 — Cited in connection with substantial compliance with the verification requirement.

• Section 1, Rule 7, Part III, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) — Defines the nature of the writ of kalikasan, requiring environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Applied as the jurisdictional threshold that petitioners failed to satisfy.
• Sections 26 and 27, Local Government Code — Require prior consultation and approval of the sanggunians concerned for projects that may cause ecological or environmental damage. The Court noted that violation of these provisions, per Paje vs. Casiño, is not reasonably connected with environmental damage but is an affront to local autonomy.
• Presidential Decree No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and PD No. 1586 (Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System) — Cited by petitioners as requiring an ECC; the EMB countered that the 4.4-megawatt project was not covered by the EIS System and required only a CNC.
• DENR Administrative Order No. 03-30 (Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Philippine EIS System) — Provides that an aggrieved party may appeal a final decision on an ECC/CNC application within 15 days to the EMB Director or DENR Secretary. Cited as an available administrative remedy that petitioners failed to pursue.
• Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2002, DAR (2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Conversion) — Provides remedies of motion for reconsideration, appeal, or petition for revocation/withdrawal against a DAR Conversion Order. Cited as an available administrative remedy.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.