Ciron vs. Gutierrez

After a criminal case is dismissed without prejudice and the order of dismissal becomes final, the prosecution is not required to file a new complaint for preliminary investigation to revive the charges; the proper remedy is to file new Informations for the offense, and a new preliminary investigation is necessary only in specified exceptional instances. The Ombudsman’s discretion to determine the existence of probable cause is accorded great deference and will not be overturned absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Teresita A. Ciron was the Credit and Collection Officer of the University of Saint Anthony (USANT). Santiago D. Ortega, Jr., a private complainant, filed two criminal complaints for estafa against her in connection with her alleged failure to remit employee salary deductions totaling ₱239,542.22 and tuition and other fees totaling ₱2,656,117.37 collected during school year 2001–2002. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Iriga City (OCP-Iriga) found probable cause and caused the filing of two Informations before the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City. Following motions from Ciron attacking the sufficiency of the Informations, the trial court ordered amendments and re-investigation. When the OCP-Iriga insisted on the original Informations’ sufficiency, the trial court dismissed both criminal cases without prejudice. The dismissal attained finality. More than a year later, the OCP-Iriga issued supplemental resolutions, without requiring a new complaint from Ortega, recommending the filing of 21 Informations for estafa based on the same underlying transactions, broken down into separate instances. Ciron charged the prosecutors and Ortega with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman.

• The Initial Estafa Charges: Teresita A. Ciron, the Credit and Collection Officer of the University of Saint Anthony (USANT), was the subject of two criminal complaints for estafa filed by Santiago D. Ortega, Jr. before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iriga City (OCP-Iriga). The complaints concerned her alleged failure to remit (a) ₱239,542.22 in employee salary deductions (I.S. Case No. 2004-093), and (b) ₱2,656,117.37 in tuition and other fees collected during school year 2001–2002 (I.S. Case No. 2004-094). The OCP-Iriga found probable cause and filed two Informations for estafa with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. IR-6760 and IR-6759.

• Dismissal Without Prejudice: Ciron filed a motion for a bill of particulars and a supplement motion for re-investigation, asserting that the Informations merely stated that the estafa was committed “during the period from June, 2001 to May 31, 2002” without specifying when she received the monies. On January 17 and 27, 2005, the RTC ordered the prosecution to amend the Informations and to conduct a re-investigation. The OCP-Iriga, however, issued Resolutions dated June 30, 2006, maintaining its finding of probable cause and seeking to return the cases to the RTC. Because the prosecution insisted on the sufficiency of the Informations, the RTC issued an Order dated August 9, 2006 dismissing both criminal cases without prejudice. The order attained finality on September 2, 2006.

• Revival of Charges via Supplemental Resolutions: Following the dismissal without prejudice, the OCP-Iriga reviewed the evidence and, without requiring Ortega to file a new complaint, issued Supplemental Resolutions dated March 28, 2008 and June 10, 2008, penned by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Nonna O. Beltran and approved by City Prosecutor Raul E. Contreras. The resolutions recommended the filing of 21 separate Informations for estafa against Ciron, corresponding to 12 instances of accumulation of employee deductions (totaling ₱239,542.22) and nine instances of collection of tuition and fees (totaling ₱2,656,117.37).

• The Graft Complaint: Aggrieved, Ciron filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman on July 14, 2008, charging Beltran, Contreras, and Ortega with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). She contended that the August 9, 2006 order of dismissal without prejudice had attained finality and could no longer be modified; thus, the OCP-Iriga could no longer revive or reinstate the charges without Ortega filing a new complaint for preliminary investigation. She alleged that the issuance of the Supplemental Resolutions and the filing of the Informations were done with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross negligence, giving unwarranted preference to Ortega and causing her undue injury, as she had to post bail to secure temporary liberty.

• Respondents’ Defenses: In her counter-affidavit, Beltran maintained that she issued the Supplemental Resolutions after a circumspect review of all evidence. She argued that because the dismissal was without prejudice, the OCP-Iriga retained the authority to issue new resolutions and file new Informations without a new complaint. She also pointed out that Ciron failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not moving for reconsideration of the Supplemental Resolutions or elevating the matter to the Department of Justice via a petition for review. Ortega, for his part, denied conspiring with the prosecutors and contended that Ciron’s own motion for a bill of particulars led to the filing of multiple cases. Contreras did not submit a counter-affidavit.

• Ombudsman’s Findings: The Ombudsman, in its Joint Resolution dated February 16, 2009, dismissed Ciron’s complaint for lack of probable cause. It found no showing of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The issuance of the Supplemental Resolutions was based on a re-examination of records and voluminous evidence. The Ombudsman added that Ciron should have sought reconsideration of the Supplemental Resolutions or review before the DOJ instead of filing a graft complaint. Ciron’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated June 1, 2010.

• Effect of Final Dismissal Without Prejudice: Petitioner argued that the August 9, 2006 order dismissing the criminal cases without prejudice had become final and could no longer be modified. Relying on Bañares II v. Balising, she maintained that the only remedy to revive the charges was the filing of a new complaint for preliminary investigation, not the issuance of supplemental resolutions without a fresh complaint.

• Grave Abuse and Violation of RA 3019: Petitioner contended that Beltran and Contreras, by issuing the Supplemental Resolutions and filing 21 new Informations without a new complaint, acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Their acts gave unwarranted benefit to Ortega and caused her undue injury because she was compelled to post bail to secure her liberty.

• Authority to File New Informations Without a New Complaint: Respondent Beltran countered that the dismissal without prejudice allowed the OCP-Iriga to file new Informations directly, without the necessity of a new complaint for preliminary investigation. She emphasized that the Supplemental Resolutions were products of a thorough review of all evidence.

• Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: Beltran argued that petitioner should have sought reconsideration of the Supplemental Resolutions or elevated the matter to the Department of Justice via a petition for review before resorting to a graft complaint before the Ombudsman.

• Lack of Conspiracy and Self-Inflicted Harm: Respondent Ortega denied conspiring with the prosecutors. He maintained that petitioner’s predicament resulted from her own motion for a bill of particulars, which subdivided the transactions into multiple instances of failure to remit.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause. The Supreme Court’s consistent policy is to maintain non-interference with the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause, absent a showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s discretion is accorded wide latitude, and judicial review is limited to instances where the exercise of power is arbitrary or despotic.

  The essential elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such officer); (b) the officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) the action caused undue injury to any party or gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The Ombudsman correctly found that Beltran and Contreras’ issuance of the Supplemental Resolutions and filing of new Informations, without requiring Ortega to file a new complaint for preliminary investigation, was in accordance with prevailing rules and jurisprudence and therefore not tainted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.

  Petitioner’s reliance on Bañares II v. Balising was misplaced. That case, along with Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, stands only for the proposition that after an order dismissing a case without prejudice attains finality, the case can no longer be revived by mere motion; instead, the action must be instituted anew. In criminal cases, the proper vehicle to revive the charges is the filing of new Informations—not a new complaint for preliminary investigation—because “complaint” in criminal procedure refers to an Information filed before the court. A new preliminary investigation is required only in the following exceptional circumstances: (a) where the prosecution’s original witnesses have recanted, died, or become unavailable and new witnesses have emerged; (b) where persons other than the original accused are charged for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein; (c) if the original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from accessory to principal. None of these exceptions obtained. Therefore, the OCP-Iriga’s failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation before issuing the Supplemental Resolutions and filing the new Informations did not constitute a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

• Doctrine of Non-Interference with the Ombudsman’s Discretion in Probable Cause — The Supreme Court consistently refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman’s determination of the existence of probable cause and the decision whether to file an Information. This policy is grounded on respect for the constitutional investigatory and prosecutory powers of the Office of the Ombudsman and on practicality, lest the courts be inundated with petitions questioning the dismissal of investigatory proceedings. Judicial review is available only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion—a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Tetangco v. Ombudsman, 515 Phil. 230 (2006), applied.)

• Rule on Revival of Criminal Cases Dismissed Without Prejudice — Once an order dismissing a criminal case without prejudice attains finality, the case cannot be reinstated or revived by mere motion; the proper remedy is to institute the action anew. In criminal cases, this means filing new Informations before the court, not a new complaint for preliminary investigation. No new preliminary investigation is required unless any of the recognized exceptions applies: (a) original prosecution witnesses have recanted, died, or become unavailable and new witnesses have emerged; (b) persons other than the original accused are charged for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein; (c) the original charge has been upgraded; or (d) the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from accessory to principal. (Bañares II v. Balising, 384 Phil. 567 (2000); Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, July 25, 1994; Jaca v. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 (1950); Condrada v. People, 446 Phil. 635 (2003); People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317 (2003), harmonized and applied.)

• “Verily, the Court has, in several cases, held that criminal cases which have been dismissed without prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the order of dismissal becomes final, or thereafter, by filing a new Information for the offense.” — This passage clarifies the procedural options for reviving dismissed criminal cases depending on the finality of the dismissal order.

• “It must be clarified, however, that Bañares II and Ortigas merely state the rule that when an order dismissing a case without prejudice has attained finality, the case may no longer be revived by mere motion as it is no longer within the court’s power to modify or amend; instead, the action must be instituted anew. Bañares II and Ortigas did not require a new complaint for preliminary investigation in order to revive a criminal case. In this regard, it must be emphasized that ‘complaint’ in civil cases is different from a ‘complaint’ in criminal cases. In civil cases, the complaint is the initiatory pleading filed in court, whereas in criminal cases, what is filed in court is an Information and not a complaint, which is filed before the public prosecutor for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation. Thus, ‘complaint’ for purposes of reviving a case must then refer to Informations where what is involved is a criminal case.” — This piece of reasoning is the ratio decidendi, distinguishing the usage of the term “complaint” and establishing that the remedy for revival is the filing of new Informations.

• “[T]his Court’s consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman….” — A frequently cited statement of the Court’s deference to the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial discretion.

• Bañares II v. Balising, 384 Phil. 567 (2000) — Distinguished. The Court clarified that this case merely held that a case dismissed without prejudice, after finality, cannot be revived by mere motion; it did not require a new complaint for preliminary investigation to revive a criminal case.

• Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, July 25, 1994 — Cited with approval. Explained the nature of dismissals without prejudice in civil cases; the principle was harmonized to mean that in criminal cases, revival is by new Informations.

• Tetangco v. Ombudsman, 515 Phil. 230 (2006) — Followed. Reiterated the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause absent grave abuse of discretion.

• People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317 (2003) — Applied. Enumerated the four instances where a new preliminary investigation is required despite the filing of new Informations.

• Jaca v. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 (1950) and Condrada v. People, 446 Phil. 635 (2003) — Cited as authorities for the rule that criminal cases dismissed without prejudice may be revived by filing new Informations after the order of dismissal becomes final.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The provision penalizing public officers who cause undue injury to any party, or give unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court applied its elements and found that the prosecutors’ acts of issuing Supplemental Resolutions and filing new Informations without a new complaint for preliminary investigation did not satisfy the second element, as those acts conformed to prevailing rules and jurisprudence.

• Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (preliminary investigation) — The Court’s discussion of the exceptions requiring a new preliminary investigation when reviving a criminal case is anchored on the interpretation of this procedural rule and related jurisprudence.

• Section 3, Rule 6, Rules of Court — Cited to distinguish a “complaint” in civil cases (as the initiatory pleading) from an “Information” in criminal cases, thereby clarifying that the term “complaint” in the context of reviving a criminal case refers to the Information.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concurred.