CICL XXX vs. People of the Philippines

A child in conflict with the law who commits acts of lasciviousness upon a victim who is 12 years old and below 18 years old is guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, not Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, and the erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.

CICL XXX was a 15-year-old minor charged with Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code for an incident that occurred on August 30, 2012, against AAA, also 15 years old. The case implicates the interplay between the Revised Penal Code and R.A. No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), as well as R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), which governs the treatment of children in conflict with the law, including the suspension of sentence and the proper disposition of convicted minors.

CICL XXX was charged in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-15-06050-CR with Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that on or about August 30, 2012, in Quezon City, CICL XXX, 15 years of age, a minor, acting with discernment, armed with an icepick, with force and intimidation and with lewd design, committed acts of lasciviousness upon AAA, also 15 years of age, by pointing an icepick at her, embracing and kissing her lips down to her neck, and mashing both her breasts against her will and without her consent. Upon arraignment, CICL XXX pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.

According to the prosecution, at around 7:45 in the evening of August 30, 2012, AAA was inside the campus of her school when CICL XXX suddenly grabbed and pulled her towards a corner. He poked an icepick on the right side of her body and uttered, "Wag ka sisigaw." CICL XXX kissed AAA on the lips down to her neck while unbuttoning her blouse, took off her sando and bra, pulled down her panties, and mashed her breasts. When a teacher passed by, CICL XXX ran away, giving AAA the chance to escape. She immediately went home, and a week later, she confessed her ordeal to a priest who encouraged her to report the incident. She informed her aunt, BBB, and they reported the incident to the school authorities, who referred the matter to the barangay office, and they were then told to proceed to the Women's Desk of the Batasan Hills Police Station.

The defense presented a different version. CICL XXX denied the accusations and claimed that on the date of the incident, he was in school attending classes from 1:30 to 8:00 in the evening. From 6:45 to 8:00 in the evening, he was inside the classroom for his MAPEH class together with 50 other students, and the teacher dismissed them at 8:00 in the evening. After dismissal, along with CCC, DDD, and EEE, he immediately proceeded to their service vehicle and arrived home at 8:30 in the evening. He claimed he had no quarrel with or grudge against AAA or her family. The defense presented CICL XXX, his MAPEH teacher FFF, and classmates DDD and CCC, who corroborated his testimony.

The RTC found CICL XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness, holding that "AAA clearly stated the events that transpired and identified the person who abused her" and that her testimony was "direct, clear and straightforward." The RTC found that CICL XXX's acts of kissing AAA on her lips and neck, mashing her breasts, and removing her upper garments and panties were "morally inappropriate and indecent designed to abuse the latter." CICL XXX appealed to the CA, raising the sole ground that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but the CA denied the appeal. CICL XXX then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising two assignment of errors: that the CA erred in giving credence to the self-serving testimony of the lone prosecution witness, and that the CA erred in not acquitting him despite the overwhelming, uncontroverted evidence in his favor.

• Credibility of the Prosecution Witness: CICL XXX argued that the lower courts erred in giving credence to the self-serving testimony of the lone prosecution witness, AAA, and that the lower courts "totally ignored some of the key, material arguments of the defense and focused on alleged holes in the defense."
• Discrepancies in AAA's Testimony: CICL XXX pointed out that in her initiatory statement, AAA stated she was on her way home from school when she was pulled into a dark room and molested, but in her reply, she changed her story and alleged she was on her way to school because a math teacher summoned her to discuss her low grades.
• Improbability of the Incident: CICL XXX argued that the school was dark and empty at 7:45 p.m. was highly improbable, if not impossible, given that the afternoon shift had 70 sections of 45-50 students each, meaning thousands of students would have been at the school grounds at that time, and at least some would have seen the incident or its immediate aftermath.
• Alibi and Denial: CICL XXX raised the defense of denial and alibi, arguing that he was in his MAPEH class in full view of the defense witnesses at the time of the incident.
• Women's Honor Doctrine: CICL XXX alleged that the RTC essentially applied the Maria Clara doctrine in giving credence to AAA's testimony, which he argued has been abandoned in People vs. Amarela.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the respondent, People of the Philippines, beyond the prosecution's evidence as summarized in the CA decision.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness.
• Credibility of the Victim's Testimony: Whether the lower courts erred in giving credence to the testimony of complainant AAA despite the alleged discrepancies in her statements.
• Application of the Women's Honor Doctrine: Whether the RTC erred in applying the women's honor doctrine in giving credence to AAA's testimony, given the Court's ruling in People vs. Amarela.
• Defense of Denial and Alibi: Whether the lower courts erred in rejecting CICL XXX's defense of denial and alibi.
• Proper Nomenclature of the Crime: Whether the crime committed should be designated as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 rather than Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, given the victim's age.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed should be modified in light of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Proper Damages: Whether the damages awarded should be modified in accordance with the guidelines in People vs. Tulagan.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The petition was denied for lack of merit, the Court finding no reversible error in the lower courts' finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of the Victim's Testimony: No. The lower courts did not err in giving credence to AAA's testimony, as the alleged discrepancies referred only to minor details and collateral matters that did not affect the veracity of her declarations.
• Application of the Women's Honor Doctrine: No. The Court did not completely abandon the women's honor doctrine in People vs. Amarela, but tempered its application according to the times, and the RTC did not base its findings solely on those circumstances but on its finding that AAA's testimony was credible.
• Defense of Denial and Alibi: No. The defense of denial and alibi was rejected, as CICL XXX failed to establish the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.
• Proper Nomenclature of the Crime: The crime should be designated as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, because the victim was 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
• Proper Penalty: The penalty was modified to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium as the minimum term, to ten (10) years, two (2) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor maximum, applying the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Proper Damages: The damages were modified to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, in accordance with the guidelines in People vs. Tulagan.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court reiterated the settled rule that it is not a trier of facts, and the issue of whether the prosecution's evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is a question of fact. Factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded to trial judges to observe witnesses when placed on the stand, and this rule carries a more stringent application when the factual findings are sustained by the CA. The Court found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the lower courts.

• Credibility of the Victim's Testimony: The Court held that the number of students present at the school grounds, or other circumstances of time and place, have no bearing on the probability of the crime having been committed, emphasizing that "lust is no respecter of time and place" and that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate. The alleged discrepancies raised by CICL XXX referred only to minor details and collateral matters, which do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of AAA's declarations, as long as her testimony is coherent and intrinsically believable as a whole. The Court cited People vs. Tulagan for the principle that "what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same." The RTC found AAA to be a credible witness, and in the absence of any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight, the Court declined to disturb the RTC's findings.

• Application of the Women's Honor Doctrine: The Court clarified that it did not completely abandon the women's honor doctrine in People vs. Amarela, but tempered its application according to the times. The Court noted that People vs. Amarela was decided by the Third Division of the Supreme Court, and under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Thus, People vs. Amarela cannot be considered to have completely abandoned the women's honor doctrine introduced in People vs. Taño. The Court cited People vs. Nocido and People vs. Tulagan to show that the doctrine remains relevant, but the Court can evaluate the weight and credibility of a private complainant without gender bias or cultural misconception. The Court also noted that the RTC did not base its findings solely on those circumstances, but on its finding that AAA's testimony was credible, and that CICL XXX omitted the first sentence of the cited paragraph, which stated that "AAA clearly stated the events that transpired and identified the person who abused her."

• Defense of Denial and Alibi: The Court held that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility, and alibi is the weakest defense for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti or scene of the crime at the time the crime was committed, referring to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused. The Court adopted the CA's finding that the records were devoid of any indication of such physical impossibility, as CICL XXX's teacher categorically declared that they were dismissed from their MAPEH class at about 7:45 in the evening, and CICL XXX was in fact in the same area at the time the offense was committed.

• Proper Nomenclature of the Crime: The Court held that while it agreed with the lower courts that CICL XXX committed acts of lasciviousness, the nomenclature of the crime must be modified to align with prevailing law and jurisprudence. The Court emphasized that the erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged, and the actual facts recited in the information are controlling. Following the guidelines in People vs. Tulagan, when the victim of the lascivious conduct is 12 years old and under 18 years old, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Since AAA was 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, the crime should be designated as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

• Proper Penalty: The Court held that Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Since the penalties prescribed by a special penal law adopt the technical nomenclature of the penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code, mitigating circumstances can be appreciated and the imposable penalty can be graduated. Since CICL XXX was 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68 of the RPC. Thus, the imposable penalty should be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, which would be prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision correccional medium to prision mayor minimum, and the maximum term to be taken from the medium period of prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, there being no ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. The Court noted that while CICL XXX's sentence was properly suspended pursuant to Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, Section 40 limits the suspension until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21). Since CICL XXX is now beyond the age of 21, he can no longer avail of the suspension of sentence, but the Court has already extended the application of R.A. No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 to give meaning to the legislative intent of the law. The case was remanded to the RTC to effect CICL XXX's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility, following People vs. Sarcia.

• Proper Damages: The Court modified the damages awarded in light of the guidelines in People vs. Tulagan. For Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 when the victim is below eighteen (18) years old, the proper amount of damages is P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment until fully paid.

• Women's Honor Doctrine — The doctrine recognizes the "well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened, [because it is] their natural instinct to protect their honor." The Court clarified that while People vs. Amarela tempered the application of the doctrine and recognized that it borders on the fallacy of non-sequitur, the doctrine was not completely abandoned because Amarela was decided by a division, not en banc, and under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. The doctrine remains relevant in evaluating the testimony of victims of sexual offenses, but the Court must evaluate the weight and credibility of the complainant without gender bias or cultural misconception.

• Doctrine of Lascivious Conduct under R.A. No. 7610 — Based on the Caoili guidelines as clarified in People vs. Tulagan, when the victim of lascivious conduct is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above under special circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, without reference to the provisions of the RPC. It is only when the victim is 18 years old and above that the crime would be designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision correccional. The erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.

• Doctrine of Alibi — Alibi is the weakest defense for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and should be rejected. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti or scene of the crime at the time the crime was committed. "Physical impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed.

• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority — Under Article 68 of the RPC, a person who is under 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which lowers the imposable penalty by one degree. When the penalties prescribed by a special penal law adopt the technical nomenclature of the penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code, mitigating circumstances can be appreciated and the imposable penalty can be graduated.

• "It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We can not believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place." — This passage from People vs. Taño (1960) is the canonical formulation of the women's honor doctrine, which the Court in this case clarified was not completely abandoned but merely tempered in application.

• "It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things." — This passage from People vs. Amarela articulates the modern application of the women's honor doctrine, allowing conviction solely on the victim's testimony provided it is credible, while eliminating gender bias in evaluating the testimony.

• "The number of students present at the school grounds, or other circumstances of time and place have no bearing on the probability of the crime having been committed. The Court has emphasized that 'lust is no respecter of time and place.'" — This passage rejects the argument that the presence of many people at the scene makes the commission of the crime improbable, a principle frequently cited in sexual offense cases.

• "Based on the Caoili guidelines, it is only when the victim of the lascivious conduct is 18 years old and above that such crime would be designated as 'Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC' with the imposable penalty of prision correccional. Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above under special circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be 'Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610' with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, but it should not make any reference to the provisions of the RPC." — This passage from People vs. Tulagan establishes the controlling guidelines for designating the proper offense for lascivious conduct committed against minors, which the Court applied in this case.

• People vs. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019 — Controlling precedent that clarified the guidelines in designating the proper offense for lascivious conduct, identified when lascivious conduct is charged under R.A. No. 7610 or under Article 336 of the RPC, and established the guidelines for the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. The Court relied heavily on this case for the nomenclature of the crime, the penalty, and the damages.

• People vs. Amarela, 823 Phil. 1188 (2018) — Distinguished and clarified. The Court held that while this case tempered the application of the women's honor doctrine and recognized that it borders on the fallacy of non-sequitur, it did not completely abandon the doctrine because it was decided by the Third Division, not en banc, and under the Constitution, a doctrine laid down by the court in division may only be modified or reversed by the court sitting en banc.

• People vs. Nocido, G.R. No. 240229, June 17, 2020 — Followed. The Court cited this case for the proposition that the women's honor doctrine remains relevant, and that rape may be proven by the sole and uncorroborated testimony of the offended party, provided that her testimony is clear, positive, and probable. The Court also followed this case in modifying the nomenclature of the crime from Rape by Sexual Assault to Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

• People vs. Taño, 109 Phil. 912 (1960) — Cited as the origin of the women's honor doctrine, introduced by Justice Alejo Labrador, which recognizes that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless the abuse actually happened.

• People vs. Sarcia, 615 Phil. 97, 130 (2009) — Followed for the proposition that the case should be remanded to the RTC to effect the convicted child's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution.

• People vs. Ancajas, 772 Phil. 166, 189 (2015) — Cited for the proposition that the Court has extended the application of R.A. No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the law.

• Article 336, Revised Penal Code — The provision under which CICL XXX was originally charged and convicted for Acts of Lasciviousness. The Court held that this provision applies only when the victim of lascivious conduct is 18 years old and above.

• Section 5(b), Republic Act No. 7610 — The provision under which the Court re-designated the crime as Lascivious Conduct, because the victim was 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The Court held that R.A. No. 7610 is not only applicable to children exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, but provides special protection to children from all forms of abuse.

• Article 68, Revised Penal Code — The provision granting the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority to CICL XXX, who was 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, which lowered the imposable penalty by one degree.

• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — The provision applied in graduating the penalty, in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to determine the minimum and maximum terms of the penalty.

• Section 38, Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) — The provision on the automatic suspension of sentence for a child under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, which was applied to CICL XXX.

• Section 40, Republic Act No. 9344 — The provision limiting the suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21), and providing that if the child has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence.

• Section 51, Republic Act No. 9344 — The provision on the confinement of convicted children in agricultural camps and other training facilities, which the Court applied in remanding the case to the RTC.

• Article VIII, Section 4(3), 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision cited to explain why People vs. Amarela could not completely abandon the women's honor doctrine, since no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred in the decision.

• Caguioa, J. (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion) — Justice Caguioa filed a separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. The specific points of his concurrence and dissent are not detailed in the provided text, which only notes the existence of the separate opinion without reproducing its contents.