Chua vs. Court of Appeals

The proper remedy against an RTC order canceling bail pending appeal is a motion for review in the same regular appeal, not a separate petition for certiorari; and a writ of preliminary injunction cannot issue absent a clear legal right, which an accused convicted of an offense punishable by more than six years and who failed to appear at promulgation does not have.

Rufina Chua and Wilfred N. Chiok were connected through a stock investment arrangement: Chiok held himself out as a licensed stockbroker and expert in the stock market, and Chua entrusted funds to him for stock transactions over several years. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure govern bail after conviction by the Regional Trial Court, review of bail-cancellation orders, and promulgation of judgment in absentia. The present dispute concerns the remedy for, and injunctive relief against, an order canceling bail pending appeal.

In 1989, Rufina Chua met Wilfred N. Chiok, who represented himself as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock market. He encouraged Chua to invest her money in stocks and requested that she designate him as her stockbroker. On his prodding, she agreed. For several years, Chiok acted as Chua's stockbroker, and she made profits from their transactions, prompting her to trust him in handling her stock investments.

In 1995, Chiok encouraged Chua to purchase shares in bulk to increase her earnings. In June 1995, she entrusted him ₱9,563,900.00 for the purpose of buying shares of stocks in bulk. She deposited ₱7,100,000.00 in his account and personally gave him the remaining ₱2,463,900.00. Chiok told her to wait for one week. A week elapsed, and he advised her to wait for another week. Thereafter, there was no more news from him. When Chua was able to contact him, Chiok admitted that he spent the money. He issued two checks as payment, but when Chua deposited them in the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for insufficient funds. In a letter dated October 25, 1995, Chua demanded payment, but this remained unheeded. Chua then learned that Chiok was not a licensed stockbroker but only a telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc. She caused the filing of an information for estafa against him with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 109927.

During arraignment, Chiok, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. Chiok denied the charge. He testified that he was not an employee of Bernard Securities, Inc.; that he buys and sells U.S. dollars and that Chua used to buy dollars from him; that what actually existed between them was an unregistered partnership; and that he received ₱9,563,900.00 as her investment in their partnership.

After the prosecution and defense presented their evidence, the trial court set the promulgation of judgment for January 26, 1999. Chiok and his counsel failed to appear on that date despite notice. The trial court reset the promulgation to February 1, 1999, with notice to Chiok. Again, Chiok failed to appear. The trial court then promulgated its Decision convicting Chiok of estafa and sentencing him to suffer 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He was also ordered to pay Chua ₱9,563,900.00 with interest at the legal rate computed from October 25, 1995, the date of demand, until fully paid. On the same day, the prosecution filed a motion for cancellation of bail on the ground that Chiok might flee or commit another crime. On February 13, 1999, Chiok filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction. On February 15, 1999, the motion for cancellation of bail was set for hearing. The prosecution presented a Record Check Routing Form issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Chiok had an Alien Certificate of Registration and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence. During that hearing, Chiok admitted using the names "Mark Tan" and "Tong Wai Fat" as aliases.

Consequently, on May 28, 1999, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order denying Chiok's motion for reconsideration, canceling his bail, and giving him five days from notice within which to appear before the trial court, otherwise he would be arrested. On June 18, 1999, Chiok appealed to the Court of Appeals from the trial court's judgment of conviction and from the Omnibus Order insofar as it denied his motion for reconsideration; the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23309. The following day, June 19, 1999, Chiok filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction assailing the trial court's Omnibus Order canceling his bail; the petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53340. On June 25, 1999, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against Chiok for his failure to appear despite the lapse of the five-day period; the warrant was returned unserved because he could not be found at his given address. On July 27, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the trial court from implementing its Omnibus Order. On September 20, 1999, after hearing Chiok's application for injunction, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining his arrest, holding that he should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal because the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense and the probability that he would flee during the pendency of his appeal was merely conjectural. Chua's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated November 16, 1999.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent.

• Lack of Merit: Private respondent countered that the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

• Propriety of Separate Certiorari: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing outright respondent's separate petition for certiorari assailing the RTC Omnibus Order canceling his bail, instead of requiring him to seek review of that order in his pending regular appeal.
• Clear Legal Right to Bail: Whether respondent had a clear legal right to be released on bail pending appeal, such that the Court of Appeals properly issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the Omnibus Order canceling his bail.
• Promulgation in Absentia: Whether the trial court should have promulgated judgment in absentia when respondent failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation despite notice, and whether resetting the promulgation was proper.

• Propriety of Separate Certiorari: Yes. The proper remedy was a motion to review the bail-cancellation order in the same regular appeal; a separate certiorari petition was proscribed and constituted forum shopping.
• Clear Legal Right to Bail: No. Respondent had no clear legal right to bail pending appeal because his penalty exceeded six years and he failed to appear at promulgation, justifying cancellation under Section 5, Rule 114.
• Promulgation in Absentia: Yes. Promulgation in absentia was mandatory under Section 6, Rule 120; the trial court should have promulgated on January 26, 1999, and resetting to February 1, 1999 was tantamount to condoning his absence.

• Propriety of Separate Certiorari: Section 5, Rule 114, last paragraph, provides that the appellate court may motu proprio or on motion of any party review the RTC resolution after notice to the adverse party in either case. The appropriate remedy against the May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling bail was a motion to review that order in the same regular appeal proceedings in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309, which Chiok himself initiated; such motion is an incident in his appeal. A separate petition via special civil action or special proceeding questioning the adverse order before the appellate court is proscribed. It contravenes the rule against multiplicity of suits and constitutes forum shopping. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in not dismissing outright Chiok's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 53340. Certiorari under Rule 65 is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Clear Legal Right to Bail: To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show (1) a clear existing right to be protected and (2) that the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such right. The first requisite is absent. Chiok had no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial court's judgment. His conviction carried a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years—12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum—which justified cancellation of his bail under the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d), and (e) of Rule 114. Moreover, he failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999. His inexcusable non-appearance violated the condition of his bail that he shall appear before the court whenever required and showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while released on bail. Because he had no right to be protected, the second requisite for injunctive relief was also absent. The Court of Appeals clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the September 20, 1999 Resolution granting the writ of preliminary injunction. The grant of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of a clear legal right on the part of the applicant constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

• Promulgation in Absentia: When Chiok did not appear during the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999 despite notice, and without offering any justification, the trial court should have immediately promulgated its Decision. Promulgation of judgment in absentia is mandatory pursuant to Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule authorizing promulgation in absentia is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. The rule is also intended to enable the offended party to enforce the civil liability ex delicto, which may only be possible after promulgation of the judgment. The trial court should have promulgated the judgment in absentia on January 26, 1999; resetting the promulgation to February 1, 1999 was tantamount to condoning Chiok's act of making a mockery of the judicial process and defeated the purpose of the Rule.

• Bail pending appeal after RTC conviction — Under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. If the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding six years, the accused shall be denied bail or his bail cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice, of circumstances such as probability of flight or undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The appellate court may motu proprio or on motion of any party review the RTC resolution. In this case, Chiok's penalty exceeded six years and he failed to appear at promulgation, justifying cancellation of bail.

• Proper remedy to challenge bail cancellation — The appropriate remedy against an RTC order canceling bail pending appeal is a motion to review the order in the same regular appeal proceedings, because such motion is an incident in the appeal. A separate petition for certiorari or special civil action is proscribed; it contravenes the rule against multiplicity of suits and constitutes forum shopping. Certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Requisites of preliminary injunction — An applicant for a writ of preliminary injunction must show (1) a clear existing right to be protected and (2) that the acts against which the injunction is directed are in violation of such right. The absence of a clear legal right renders the grant of the writ baseless. The grant of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of a clear legal right on the part of the applicant constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

• Promulgation of judgment in absentia — Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy at his last known address or through his counsel. If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available under the Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. The rule is intended to prevent the accused from subverting the judicial process by jumping bail to frustrate promulgation. The trial court should have promulgated judgment in absentia on January 26, 1999; resetting to February 1, 1999 was tantamount to condoning the accused's absence.

• "It is clear from the last paragraph of the above provision that private respondent’s appropriate remedy against the trial court’s May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same regular appeal proceedings in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 he himself initiated. Such motion is an incident in his appeal. The filing of a separate petition via a special civil action or special proceeding questioning such adverse order before the appellate court is proscribed." — States the ratio on the proper remedy and explains why the separate certiorari petition was improper and constituted forum shopping.

• "To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear existing right to be protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such right." — Canonical formulation of the requisites for a writ of preliminary injunction, which the Court applied to deny injunctive relief.

• "The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial court’s judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114, quoted above." — Applies the bail rule to the facts and establishes that no clear legal right to bail existed.

• "At this point, we stress that when respondent did not appear during the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999 despite notice, and without offering any justification therefor, the trial court should have immediately promulgated its Decision. The promulgation of judgment in absentia is mandatory pursuant to Section 6, Rule 120 of the same Rules, the relevant portions of which read:" — Declares the mandatory character of promulgation in absentia and supplies the basis for the Court's criticism of the trial court's resetting of the promulgation.

• Philippine National Bank vs. Timbol, G.R. No. 157535, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 163; Borbajo vs. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 315; Rualo vs. Pitargue, G.R. No. 140284, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 121 — Cited together as authority for the requisites of a preliminary injunction: a clear existing right and acts violating that right.

• People vs. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 411, 427, citing Florendo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110886, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 325 — Cited for the purpose of the rule on promulgation of judgment in absentia, including enabling the offended party to enforce the civil liability ex delicto after promulgation.

• Almeida vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159124, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 681; Philippine Ports Authority vs. Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No. 147861, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 426 — Cited for the rule that granting a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of a clear legal right on the part of the applicant constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

• Section 5, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs bail when discretionary after RTC conviction. It provides that if the penalty imposed exceeds six years, the accused shall be denied bail or bail cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution of circumstances including probability of flight or risk of committing another crime; the appellate court may motu proprio or on motion review the RTC resolution. Applied to justify cancellation of Chiok's bail and to require review by motion in the pending appeal.

• Section 6, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs promulgation of judgment. If the accused fails to appear despite notice, promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy; if conviction and absence without justifiable cause, the accused loses remedies and the court orders arrest. Applied to hold that the trial court should have promulgated judgment in absentia on January 26, 1999.

• Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended — Certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Applied to hold that the separate certiorari petition was improper because review could be had in the pending appeal.

• Section 2(b), Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Condition of bail that the accused shall appear before the court whenever required. Applied to hold that Chiok's non-appearance violated his bail condition.

• Article VIII, Section 13, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification accompanying the decision, confirming that the conclusions were reached in consultation before assignment of the opinion.

REYNATO S. PUNO (Chairperson), RENATO C. CORONA, ADOLFO S. AZCUNA, CANCIO C. GARCIA.