Chua vs. Court of Appeals

Where personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court. A replevin action will not lie for property in custodia legis, and a judge presiding over one branch of a court cannot modify or annul orders issued by another branch of the same court.

The petitioner, Romeo S. Chua, was the owner of an Isuzu dump truck that was seized by private respondent Dennis Canoy pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII. A carnapping complaint against Chua, docketed as I.S. No. 86-185, was pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City. The case was provisionally dismissed upon Chua's motion, with the reservation that it could be reopened once the issue of ownership was resolved.

On April 12, 1986, Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two other witnesses, issued a search warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-175. At twelve noon of the same date, respondent Canoy seized the vehicle and took custody thereof.

On April 14, 1986, petitioner Romeo S. Chua filed a civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump truck against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, presided by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 4384. The complaint alleged petitioner's lawful ownership and possession of the subject vehicle; that he had not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he had not stolen nor carnapped it; and that he had never been charged with carnapping or any other crime. Petitioner also questioned the validity of the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the vehicle. On the same date, Judge Cañares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). The writ was issued on the same date, and the vehicle was seized on April 15, 1986 by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes.

On April 16, 1986, respondent Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and for the quashal of the writ of replevin, which was opposed by petitioner. The motion was denied in an Order dated April 18, 1986. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an order dated May 19, 1986, which directed the delivery of the subject vehicle to petitioner. Private respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for the nullification of the orders dated April 18, 1986 and May 19, 1986.

Meanwhile, the carnapping case docketed as I.S. No. 86-185, entitled "Alex De Leon, Complainant, vs. Romeo Chua, Respondent," pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City, was provisionally dismissed upon motion of Romeo Chua with the reservation: "without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved." The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII and nullified the questioned orders, applying the ruling in Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez, which held that once a court has been informed that a search warrant has been issued by another court, it cannot require a sheriff to take property subject of a replevin action if it came into custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant, and that the validity of a search warrant may only be questioned in the same court that issued it.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: Petitioner argued that the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the subject vehicle were invalid, and that he was the lawful owner and possessor of the vehicle, having never sold, stolen, or carnapped it.
• Provisional Dismissal of Criminal Case: Petitioner maintained that because the carnapping case had been provisionally dismissed, the seizure would not be followed by the filing of a criminal action, and thus the replevin action was the appropriate remedy.

• Custodia Legis: Private respondents argued that the subject vehicle was in custodia legis, having been seized pursuant to a search warrant, and therefore could not be the subject of a replevin action.
• Co-equal Courts: Respondents contended that Branch VIII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City could not modify or annul orders issued by Branch XIII of the same court, as they are co-equal and act independently.

• Jurisdiction Over Seized Property: Whether the validity of a seizure made pursuant to a search warrant issued by one branch of a court can be questioned in another branch of the same court, where the criminal action filed in connection with which the search warrant was issued had been dismissed provisionally.

• Jurisdiction Over Seized Property: No. Where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred in ordering the transfer of possession of the property seized to petitioner.

• Jurisdiction Over Seized Property: The Court found no merit in the main issue presented. It applied the principle that a judge who presides in a branch of a court cannot modify or annul the orders issued by another branch of the same court, since the two courts are of the same rank and act independently but coordinately, citing Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Co. The Court also invoked the basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis, which exists when property has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, citing Bagalihog vs. Fernandez. The Court construed Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez together with Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, ruling that where personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal action, and there are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court. However, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the carnapping case was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant," the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it. The Court also noted that the Office of the City Fiscal's ruling was erroneous because a criminal prosecution for carnapping need not establish that the complainant is the absolute owner of the motor vehicle; what is material is the existence of evidence showing that the respondent took the motor vehicle belonging to another. Furthermore, since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial, the dismissal of a case by the fiscal will not constitute double jeopardy and hence there is no bar to the filing of another complaint for the same offense, citing People vs. Medted.

• Custodia Legis — A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the dump truck seized pursuant to the search warrant was beyond the reach of a replevin suit, as the provisional dismissal of the carnapping case left a probability that a criminal case would still be filed.
• Co-equal Court Rule — A judge who presides in a branch of a court cannot modify or annul the orders issued by another branch of the same court, since the two courts are of the same rank and act independently but coordinately. The Court applied this principle to hold that Branch VIII of the RTC of Cebu erred in taking cognizance of the replevin action and ordering the transfer of possession of the seized property.
• Recovery of Property Seized Under a Search Warrant — Where personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal action, and there are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant. However, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, or the criminal information has actually been commenced, filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court.

• "Once a Court of First Instance has been informed that a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court to take the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore it came into custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such a search warrant may order its release." — This passage from Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez, quoted by the Court, establishes the rule that property seized under a search warrant is in custodia legis and only the issuing court may order its release.
• "The proceeding for the seizure of the property in virtue of a search warrant does not end with the actual taking of the property . . . and its delivery . . ., to the court . . . . It is merely the first step in the process to determine the character of the seized property. That determination is done in the criminal action involving the crime or crimes in connection with which the search warrant was issued." — This passage from Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, quoted by the Court, explains that the disposition of seized property is dictated by the outcome of the criminal action connected to the search warrant.
• "Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons case, we rule that where personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal and there are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for carnapping was 'dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant,' or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court." — This is the Court's own restatement of the rule on recovery of property seized under a search warrant, which constitutes the ratio decidendi of the case.

• Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275 (1967) — Controlling precedent applied by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court; held that a court cannot require a sheriff to take property subject of a replevin action if it came into custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant, and that the validity of a search warrant may only be questioned in the same court that issued it.
• Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 155 SCRA 186 (1987) — Followed and distinguished from Pagkalinawan; held that where no criminal case would ensue subsequent to or in connection with the search warrant, an ordinary civil action or interpleader is the appropriate remedy, and another branch of the same court cannot order delivery of the property pendente lite.
• Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Co., 92 Phil. 25 (1952) — Cited for the principle that a judge who presides in a branch of a court cannot modify or annul orders issued by another branch of the same court, as they are co-equal and act independently.
• Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991) — Cited for the definition of custodia legis as property subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.
• People vs. Medted, 68 Phil. 435 — Cited for the principle that since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial, the dismissal of a case by the fiscal will not constitute double jeopardy and does not bar the filing of another complaint for the same offense.

• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The petition for review on certiorari was filed pursuant to this rule, which governs appeals to the Supreme Court from judgments of the Court of Appeals.
• Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law) — The Court cited this statute to explain that carnapping punishes the taking with intent to gain of a motor vehicle belonging to another person, without the latter's consent or by means of violence or intimidation, and that a criminal prosecution for carnapping need not establish that the complainant is the absolute owner of the motor vehicle.

Feliciano, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concurred.

• Davide, Jr., J. (concurring and dissenting) — Agreed with the majority that Branch VIII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu should not have taken cognizance of the civil case for replevin. However, he disagreed with the restatement of the rule on recovery of property seized by virtue of a search warrant. He submitted that regardless of the number of claimants to the property seized, the remedy should be obtained from the court which issued the warrant either by a motion to quash the search warrant or a motion to release the property. Replevin does not lie because regardless of the validity or invalidity of the search warrant, the property was effectively placed in custodia legis and, therefore, beyond the reach of a replevin suit. It would be entirely different if the seizure was unlawful, in which case replevin may prosper. The reasons why the application for recovery must be made with the court issuing the warrant are that it had acquired jurisdiction over the res, the pendency of the application could prod the Government to expedite the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case, and the parties should not be made to await indefinitely the outcome of the criminal action.