Choa vs. Choa

An order denying a demurrer to evidence, though interlocutory, may be assailed through certiorari when issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, particularly when the plaintiff's evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove the complaint; and grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court violates or ignores existing law and jurisprudence, such as by denying a demurrer despite evidence that fails to establish the essential elements of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner Leni O. Choa and respondent Alfonso C. Choa were married on March 15, 1981 and had two children, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the RTC of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a complaint for annulment of his marriage to petitioner, later amending it on November 8, 1993 to seek a declaration of nullity based on her alleged psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The case proceeded to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief, after which petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence instead of opposing his formal offer of exhibits.

Petitioner Leni O. Choa and respondent Alfonso C. Choa were married on March 15, 1981, and out of their union two children were born—Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a complaint for annulment of his marriage to petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098. He subsequently filed an amended complaint dated November 8, 1993, this time seeking a declaration of nullity of the marriage based on petitioner's alleged psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The case proceeded to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his formal offer of exhibits dated February 20, 1998. Rather than interposing any objection to the offer, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss in the nature of a demurrer to evidence dated May 11, 1998. The lower court allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter before finally issuing its December 2, 1998 Order denying the demurrer, on the ground that respondent had established a quantum of evidence that petitioner must controvert. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order, prompting her to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-GR SP No. 53100.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and that certiorari under Rule 65 was unavailable, the proper remedy being for the defense to present evidence and, if an unfavorable decision was later rendered, to appeal therefrom. The CA further found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, ruling that the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer rested on the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion and that petitioner had failed to show that the issues had been resolved arbitrarily or without basis. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Respondent's evidence consisted of three principal categories. First, he presented documents showing that petitioner had filed a series of criminal charges against him, including complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage, and deportation, which he contended demonstrated her psychological incapacity because a normal wife would protect rather than persecute her husband. Second, he testified that petitioner had been immature and carefree even before their marriage, had allegedly wanted to abort their first child by taking pills, lacked the intention of procreative sexuality, did not help with household chores, did not take care of the children, and would not consult a doctor even when the children were sick. Third, he presented Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon as an expert witness, whose professional opinion was based entirely on descriptions relayed by respondent, as the doctor never personally examined petitioner. Dr. Gauzon concluded that both parties had normal personalities but were incompatible "like oil and water," that their problems consisted of petty quarrels rather than major ones, and that the incompatibility could possibly be remedied through family therapy.

• Availability of Certiorari: Petitioner argued that the RTC denied her demurrer to evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of respondent's evidence, entitling her to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari rather than requiring her to present evidence and await an unfavorable verdict before appealing.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that in upholding the lower court's denial of the demurrer, the Court of Appeals wantonly violated, ignored, or disregarded in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Santos vs. CA and Republic vs. Molina, which defined the parameters of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

• Proper Remedy is Appeal: Respondent countered, echoing the Court of Appeals, that appeal in due course—not certiorari—was the proper remedy for an order denying a demurrer to evidence, as such an order is merely interlocutory.
• Waiver of Objection to Expert Testimony: Respondent argued that because Dr. Gauzon's testimony had never been objected to during trial, any objection raised thereafter was deemed waived.

• Availability of Certiorari: Whether certiorari under Rule 65 is available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence, or whether appeal in due course is the exclusive remedy.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence by violating or ignoring applicable law and jurisprudence on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

• Availability of Certiorari: Yes. Although an order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory and generally not appealable, certiorari lies when the denial is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and when appeal in due course is not a plain, adequate, or speedy remedy under the circumstances.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer because respondent's evidence was grossly insufficient to establish psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as it failed to show gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability, and instead demonstrated mere incompatibility and irreconcilable differences.

• Availability of Certiorari: The general rule that interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari is not absolute. Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize the exception: Rule 41 provides that where a judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, and Section 1 of Rule 65 allows certiorari when a tribunal has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A denial of a demurrer tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus falls within this exception. When the plaintiff's evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove the complaint, requiring the defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting case constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the court's docket and an assault on the defendant's resources. Appeal would not promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken orders; it would only compel her to go through a protracted trial that would further clog the court dockets with a futile case.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: A demurrer to evidence challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence to sustain a verdict; the court need only ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to support the claim. Respondent's evidence fell into three categories, all of which were grossly insufficient. First, the criminal complaints petitioner filed against respondent merely established the prosecution of those cases; to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated simply because she filed charges against her husband is absurd and inequitable. Second, respondent's own testimony complained of petitioner's alleged lack of attention to their children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality—none of which, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Under Santos vs. CA, psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, and must refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Under Republic vs. Molina, the incapacity must be more than a difficulty, refusal, or neglect; mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The allegation that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality was belied by the birth of two children, and there was no showing that any alleged defect existed at the time of the marriage celebration. Third, the expert testimony of Dr. Gauzon was unscientific and unreliable: he never personally examined petitioner, based his assessment entirely on descriptions relayed by respondent, and concluded that both parties were normal but incompatible—a condition he testified could be remedied through family therapy. His professional opinion even began with the conditional statement "[i]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true." Although a medical examination is not a condition sine qua non for a finding of psychological incapacity so long as the totality of evidence suffices, here the totality was completely insufficient. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence; any decision tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court is unmistakably grave abuse of discretion.

• Certiorari Against Interlocutory Orders — The general rule is that interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari. The exception, recognized by Rules 41 and 65, is that certiorari lies when the interlocutory order is issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and when appeal is not a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. Applied here: the denial of a demurrer to evidence was assailable via certiorari because the plaintiff's evidence was patently insufficient and requiring the defendant to proceed to trial would needlessly delay and effectively deny justice.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence. Any decision, order, or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion. Applied here: the RTC's denial of the demurrer contravened Santos vs. CA and Republic vs. Molina, which established the parameters of psychological incapacity.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code — Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It refers to no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants of mutual obligation to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. It must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The incapacity must be more than a mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations; mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. There should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from accepting and complying with the essential obligations of marriage. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Applied here: respondent's evidence showed only incompatibility, petty quarrels, and normal personality differences—none of the three requisites was established.

• Hearsay or Unreliable Evidence — Although the question of admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value. Applied here: Dr. Gauzon's expert testimony, based entirely on secondhand descriptions from respondent without any personal examination of petitioner, was unscientific and unreliable and could be disregarded despite the absence of a timely objection.

• "Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances." — This opening passage states the controlling rule on the availability of certiorari against interlocutory orders denying a demurrer to evidence, framing the exception that the Court applied to reverse the CA.

• "Indeed, when the plaintiff's evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting case." — This articulates the rationale for permitting certiorari in such circumstances: the futility and injustice of compelling a defendant to defend against a nonexisting case.

• "It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him." — This passage rejects respondent's argument that the criminal complaints filed by petitioner constituted evidence of psychological incapacity, illustrating the insufficiency standard applied to the demurrer.

• "The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage." — This quotation from Republic vs. Molina, adopted by the Court, provides the canonical formulation of the standard for psychological incapacity that the Court applied in finding the evidence grossly insufficient.

• Santos vs. CA, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995 — Controlling precedent on the elements of psychological incapacity. The Court relied on its formulation that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, and that the phrase does not comprehend immaturity, extremely low intelligence, and like circumstances.

• Republic vs. Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997 — Controlling precedent followed. The Court applied its ruling that psychological incapacity must be more than a difficulty, refusal, or neglect, and that mild characterological peculiarities and irreconcilable differences do not constitute incapacity. The RTC's denial of the demurrer was held to constitute grave abuse of discretion for ignoring this ruling.

• Tadeo vs. People, 300 SCRA 744, December 29, 1998 — Cited for the proposition that while appeal is generally the proper remedy for interlocutory orders, certiorari lies when there is grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction.

• Cruz vs. People, 303 SCRA 533, February 23, 1999 — Cited for the exception to the general rule that certiorari is unavailable against interlocutory orders: when the assailed orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari lies.

• Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000 — Cited for the rule that a medical examination is not a condition sine qua non for a finding of psychological incapacity, provided the totality of evidence is sufficient. The Court distinguished this case on the ground that here the totality of evidence was completely insufficient.

• Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that certiorari may be filed when a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this provision to hold that certiorari was available despite the interlocutory nature of the order denying the demurrer.

• Section 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order, but that in such instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The Court relied on this provision to confirm the statutory basis for the exception permitting certiorari against interlocutory orders.

• Article 36, Family Code — Governs declarations of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. The Court applied the interpretive framework established in Santos and Molina to determine that respondent's evidence failed to satisfy the requirements of this article.

• Article 68, Family Code — Enumerates the essential marital obligations that the parties must assume: mutual obligation to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. The Court referenced this article in defining the basic marital covenants of which a psychologically incapacitated party must be truly incognitive.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Corona, J., and Carpio-Morales, J. concurred. Puno, J. (Chairman), was abroad on official leave.