China Banking Corporation vs. Co

A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is not justified when the petitioner's right is doubtful or disputed, particularly when the alleged statutory restriction designating a property as a road lot is not annotated on the current certificate of title.

Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold subdivision lots to petitioner-spouses Castro and Nogoy. These lots are bound on their southeastern side by Lot No. 3783-E, registered in the name of respondent Benjamin Co and his siblings. Co and his siblings, through respondent Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation and Engr. Dale Olea, began developing the Northwoods Estates subdivision on Lot No. 3783-E and adjacent lots, commencing the construction of a perimeter wall in 2003.

• The Properties and the Construction: Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold lots in St. Benedict Subdivision to petitioner-spouses Castro and Nogoy. These properties are bound on their southeastern side by Lot No. 3783-E, covered by TCT No. 269758-R in the names of respondent Benjamin Co and his siblings. Respondent Co and his siblings entered a joint venture with respondent Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation to develop Northwoods Estates, contracting respondent Engr. Dale Olea for the project. In 2003, respondents began constructing a perimeter wall on Lot No. 3783-E.
• The Demand: On November 28, 2003, petitioners, through counsel, demanded that respondents cease construction, remove the materials, and restore the lot to its former condition. Petitioners claimed Lot No. 3783-E was a road lot, the construction obstructed the only means of ingress and egress for the Nogoy spouses, and the wall impeded the ventilation and clearance of the Castro spouses' residence.
• The Trial Court's Ocular Findings: After petitioners filed an amended complaint seeking a preliminary mandatory injunction, the RTC conducted an ocular inspection. The trial court found that the subdivision plans presented by petitioners did not refer to Lot 3783-E and were thus inconclusive regarding its classification. The original subdivision plan (Psd-03-000577) did not indicate Lot 3783-E as a road lot. Physically, the lot had a PLDT box in front, no visible pathway, and was overgrown with wild plants; the Nogoy spouses had even built a coffin factory on it. The RTC further noted that petitioners would not lose access to their residences, as an existing secondary road within the subdivision served as the main access road to the highway, and the Castro spouses were not deprived of light and ventilation.

• Statutory Prohibition on Road Lot Closure: Petitioners argued that respondents violated Section 44 of Act No. 496 and Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which prohibit the closure or disposition of established road lots without court approval.
• Mischaracterization of the Action: Petitioners maintained that the lower courts erroneously treated their claim as a mere action for the establishment of an easement of right of way, when they were actually seeking the enforcement of a statutory prohibition against closing a road lot.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners contended that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in perfunctorily denying the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction despite the alleged statutory violations.

• Inconclusiveness of Subdivision Plans: Respondents argued that the subdivision plans presented by petitioners did not refer to Lot 3783-E and were thus not conclusive as to the status or classification of the lot.

• Propriety of Mandatory Injunction: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the denial of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction despite the alleged statutory prohibition against the closure of a road lot.

• Propriety of Mandatory Injunction: The petition was correctly denied. A preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act and does not preserve the status quo, warranting a stricter standard requiring a clear case free from doubt or dispute. Petitioners' right was doubtful because the current certificates of title (TCT Nos. 247778-R and 269758-R) lacked the memorandum restricting the lot's closure as a road lot, an annotation present in a prior cancelled title (TCT No. 185702-R). Current titles enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the removal of the prior memorandum is presumed to have followed legal requirements. Moreover, the trial court's ocular inspection findings—that the lot was not used as an access road, an alternative road existed, and petitioners were not deprived of light and ventilation—negated the requisite of an urgent and paramount need to prevent irreparable damage.

• Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction — A writ that commands the performance of an act rather than preserving the status quo, making it more cautiously regarded than a prohibitive injunction. It is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. The requisites for its issuance are: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The Court applied this doctrine to deny the petition, finding petitioners' right doubtful due to the lack of annotation on the current title and the trial court's factual findings.
• Presumption of Regularity of Certificates of Title — Current certificates of title enjoy a presumption of regularity, and the legal requirements for the discharge or removal of encumbrances or memoranda annotated on previous titles are presumed to have been complied with. The Court relied on this presumption to conclude that the removal of the road lot restriction from the prior title was legally executed, thereby casting doubt on petitioners' claim.

• "Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute."
• "The best evidence thus that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot would be a memorandum to that effect annotated on the certificate of title covering it."

• Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 167434, February 19, 2007, 516 SCRA 231 — Cited for the principle that the grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court, and interference is warranted only in cases of manifest abuse.
• Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Domingo Samut/Antonia Samut, G.R. No. 154407, February 14, 2005, 451 SCRA 275 — Cited for the principle that a court should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which would effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
• Gateway Electronics Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 155217 and 156393, July 30, 2003, 407 SCRA 454 — Cited for the three requisites of a preliminary injunction and the stricter standard applied to mandatory injunctions.

• Section 44, Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act), as amended by Republic Act No. 440 — Provides that no portion of any street or passageway delineated on a subdivision plan shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without court approval, subject to a memorandum noted on the certificate of title. Petitioners invoked this provision, but the Court noted the absence of the required memorandum on the current title.
• Section 50, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) — Requires the Register of Deeds to annotate a memorandum on the new certificate of title covering a street, passageway, or open space stating that it cannot be closed or disposed of without court approval. Applied similarly to Section 44 of Act 496 to defeat petitioners' claim due to lack of annotation.
• Rule 131, Section 2(m) and (ff), Rules of Court — Presumptions of regularity and compliance with legal requirements. Applied to presume that the legal requirements for removing the memorandum from the prior title were followed.

Quisumbing (Chairperson), Tinga, Velasco Jr., Brion