Chavez Miranda Aseoche vs. Lazaro

A lawyer who makes an unsubstantiated accusation of unethical or wrongful conduct against opposing counsel in a judicial pleading violates Canon 8 (courtesy, fairness, and candor towards professional colleagues) and Canon 10 (candor, fairness, and good faith to the court) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and may be subjected to disciplinary sanction even if the statement would be privileged for purposes of civil or criminal liability.

Attys. Restituto S. Lazaro and Rodel R. Morta served as counsel for the private complainant, Michael M. Sandoval, in a libel case filed against Eliseo F. Soriano before Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche represented the accused Soriano. Tensions arose when the defense moved to suspend Soriano’s arraignment on the ground that a Petition for Review had been filed with the Department of Justice questioning the finding of probable cause. When the RTC judge proceeded with the arraignment, the defense filed a Motion for Inhibition. Respondents opposed that motion with a pleading that contained the accusation that the defense lawyers had antedated the DOJ filing. That accusation became the subject of the disbarment complaint.

• Nature of the Administrative Case: The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche, through its founding partner Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Supreme Court on 8 February 2006, seeking the disbarment of Attys. Restituto S. Lazaro and Rodel R. Morta for alleged violations of Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• Underlying Libel Case: Respondents represented private complainant Michael M. Sandoval in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136678, a libel case against Eliseo F. Soriano pending before Branch 218 of the RTC of Quezon City. Complainant law firm served as counsel for accused Soriano.

• The Arraignment and the DOJ Petition: On 11 October 2005, during Soriano’s scheduled arraignment, Atty. Chavez informed the RTC that a Petition for Review had been filed with the Department of Justice on 10 October 2005, questioning the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. Atty. Chavez presented an extra copy of the Petition and explained that the original, stamped “received” by the DOJ, was still with the messenger. He moved for suspension of the arraignment pursuant to Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The RTC denied the motion and proceeded with the arraignment.

• Motion for Inhibition: Complainant subsequently filed a Motion for Inhibition on 18 October 2005, alleging that Presiding Judge Hilario Laqui exhibited bias against the accused.

• The Accusation of Antedating: In their “Vehement Opposition to the Motion for Inhibition” filed on 11 November 2005, respondents wrote: “Thus, we come to the conclusion that the accused was able to antedate the filing or mailing of the petition.” They reiterated the accusation in a Comment/Opposition to the Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration filed on 6 December 2006, stating: “It is our conclusion that the accused and his lawyers were able to antedate the filing or mailing of the petition.” No evidence was presented to support these statements. Complainant attached a copy of the Petition bearing the DOJ’s “received” stamp dated 10 October 2005 to disprove the accusation.

• Respondents’ Defense: Respondents argued that the disbarment complaint was harassment and that the public prosecutor who signed the pleadings with them, Nadine Jaban-Fama, was an indispensable party who should have been impleaded. They claimed that their statements were privileged communications, made in good faith, and entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

• Non-joinder of Indispensable Party: Respondents argued that Public Prosecutor Nadine Jaban-Fama, who signed the pleadings containing the objectionable statements, was an indispensable party to the disciplinary proceeding. Her non-joinder was asserted as a ground for dismissal of the complaint.

• Presumption of Regularity and Good Faith: Respondents contended that because the public prosecutor signed the pleadings, they were entitled to rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. They claimed to have acted in good faith under the review, supervision, and direction of the prosecutor.

• Privileged Communication: Respondents invoked the doctrine of absolute privilege for statements made in judicial pleadings, arguing that such statements could not be the basis of any administrative, civil, or criminal liability.

• Harassment and Selective Prosecution: Respondents characterized the disbarment complaint as a mere harassment tactic, pointing out that the public prosecutor was not included as a respondent despite being a signatory to the pleadings.

• Non-joinder of the Public Prosecutor: Whether the administrative complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the public prosecutor, who also signed the subject pleadings, was not impleaded as an indispensable party.

• Defense of Presumption of Regularity and Good Faith: Whether respondents may avoid administrative liability by invoking the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of the public prosecutor and their own claim of good-faith reliance on her review and approval.

• Privilege of Judicial Pleadings: Whether the doctrine of absolute privilege for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings shields a lawyer from disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• Violation of Canons 8 and 10: Whether respondents’ accusation that complainant and its lawyers antedated the DOJ petition, made without any proof, constitutes a violation of Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• Non-joinder of the Public Prosecutor: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis — neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but investigations by the Supreme Court into the conduct of its officers. Technical rules of procedure, including the rule on joinder of indispensable parties, are not strictly applied. The only indispensable party in a disbarment proceeding is the respondent lawyer called upon to account for his or her own conduct. The non-joinder of the public prosecutor, who also signed the pleadings, was therefore not a ground for dismissal, as the proceeding focused exclusively on the propriety of respondents’ own statements and conduct.

• Defense of Presumption of Regularity and Good Faith: The presumption of regularity accorded to the public prosecutor’s official acts could not excuse respondents’ own misconduct. The objectionable pleadings were prepared by respondents, not by the prosecutor, and any impropriety in the language or allegations originated from them. The prosecutor’s signature did not cure the violation. Respondents’ personal obligation to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility — including the duty of courtesy, fairness, and candor towards opposing counsel — could not be disregarded by simply invoking the prosecutor’s concurrence or pleading good faith.

• Privilege of Judicial Pleadings: Although statements in pleadings may be absolutely privileged against civil or criminal liability, the privilege does not bar the Supreme Court from exercising its supervisory and disciplinary power over members of the Bar. Indulging in offensive personalities or making unfounded accusations in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct that may be the subject of administrative discipline, independent of any immunity from tort or criminal prosecution.

• Violation of Canons 8 and 10: Respondents twice accused complainant of antedating a petition filed with the DOJ without offering any evidentiary support. The accusation was grave, tended to bring the opposing lawyers into disrepute, and was capable of misleading the courts. This conduct violated Canon 8 (which requires courtesy, fairness, and candor towards professional colleagues) and Canon 10 (which imposes the duty of candor, fairness, and good faith to the court). A lawyer must abstain from offensive personalities and must advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or counsel unless required by the justness of the cause. The offense warranted admonition but did not, in the circumstances, merit the penalty of disbarment.

• Disciplinary proceedings as sui generis — Disbarment proceedings are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they are investigations by the Supreme Court into the conduct of its officers. The sole indispensable party is the respondent lawyer. Technical rules of procedure, including those on joinder of parties, are not strictly applied but are construed to enable the Court to determine whether a lawyer remains fit to continue in the practice of law.

• Limited effect of absolute privilege in administrative discipline — While statements made in judicial pleadings are privileged against civil and criminal liability, that privilege does not exempt a lawyer from the Supreme Court’s disciplinary authority. Offensive, unfounded, or intemperate language in pleadings may constitute unprofessional conduct subject to administrative sanction.

• Duty to refrain from unfounded accusations against opposing counsel — Under Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer must treat professional colleagues with courtesy, fairness, and candor. Accusing opposing counsel of unethical conduct — such as antedating a pleading — without any proof is a violation of this duty, even if the accusation is framed as the lawyer’s “conclusion” or “truthful belief.” The duty extends to avoiding language that brings another lawyer into disrepute, unless strictly required by the justness of the cause.

• “We cannot countenance the dismissal of the case against respondents merely because the public prosecutor has not been joined as a party. We emphasize that in disbarment proceedings, the Court merely calls upon members of the bar to account for their actuations as officers of the Court. Consequently, only the lawyer who is the subject of the case is indispensable. No other party, not even a complainant, is needed.” — This passage articulates the sui generis nature of disciplinary proceedings and the limited relevance of procedural technicalities.

• “Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof is privileged. While lawyers may enjoy immunity from civil and criminal liability for privileged statements made in their pleadings, they remain subject to this Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of their duty as members of the legal profession.” — This excerpt encapsulates the crucial distinction between the privilege against civil/criminal suits and amenability to administrative discipline.

• “The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are charged.” (citing Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 & 145822) — This reinforces the high standard of restraint demanded of counsel in adversarial pleadings.

• Ylaya v. Gacott, 689 SCRA 452 (2013); Gonzalez v. Alcaraz, 534 Phil. 471 (2006); Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 481 Phil. 646 (2004) — Consistently cited to establish that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis and that technical procedural rules are not strictly observed.

• Asa v. Castillo, 532 Phil. 9 (2006) — Applied for the proposition that using offensive and improper language in pleadings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to administrative discipline, regardless of any privilege attached to judicial proceedings.

• Lubiano v. Gordolla, 201 Phil. 47 (1982) — Relied upon for the rule that immunity from civil or criminal liability for privileged statements in pleadings does not insulate a lawyer from this Court’s supervisory and disciplinary power.

• Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 & 145822 (A.C. No. 6332, 17 April 2012) — Quoted for the duty to abstain from offensive personality and to refrain from advancing facts prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or counsel unless required by the justness of the cause.

• Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility — “A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.” Respondents violated this duty by making an unfounded accusation that impugned the integrity of opposing counsel.

• Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility — “A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.” Rule 10.01 prohibits a lawyer from doing any falsehood or misleading the court. The unfounded allegation of antedating tended to mislead the court and was made despite the absence of any evidentiary support.

• Rule 139-B, Section 12, Rules of Court — Governs the procedure for review and recommendation by the IBP Board of Governors and the final action by the Supreme Court in disciplinary cases. The Court’s ultimate authority to decide the case, even absent a petition from the complainant, was anchored on this provision.

Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concurred. Bersamin, J., was on official leave.