Charlon Fernando y Esma vs. People of the Philippines

The retraction of a witness constitutes ground for a new trial only when: (1) the testimony of the retracting witness during trial is essential to the judgment of conviction such that its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion; (2) special circumstances exist which, coupled with the retraction, raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by the retracting witness at trial; and (3) there is no other evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except said testimony. Where all three requisites concur, the grant of a new trial is justified notwithstanding the general rule that retractions of witnesses are unreliable and do not ordinarily constitute grounds for new trial.

Petitioner Charlon Fernando y Esma was charged with carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, for allegedly taking a blue Honda XRM motorcycle valued at PHP 102,816.00 belonging to Francisco V. Combate. The prosecution's case hinged on the testimony of Darius Santos, who claimed to have witnessed petitioner pushing the motorcycle on the night of the alleged taking. The defense presented an alibi, claiming petitioner was at a birthday celebration at the time of the incident.

Petitioner Charlon Fernando y Esma was charged with carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539 for allegedly taking, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of complainant Francisco V. Combate, a blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number ID 6829, valued at PHP 102,816.00, on or about October 28, 2013, in Olongapo City. Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, and trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: Francisco Combate, the complainant, and Darius Santos, the alleged eyewitness. Darius testified that at around 8:42 p.m. of October 28, 2013, he was outside his house with friends when he saw petitioner pushing a blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number IDX6829. Darius initially thought petitioner was Francisco's cousin bringing the motorcycle to a repair shop. When petitioner stopped underneath a lamp post, Darius and his friends told him, "Ikadyot mo na lang," to get the motorcycle started. After boarding the motorcycle without being able to start it, petitioner sped away. On October 30, 2013, Francisco's son Jason asked Darius if he had seen his father's motorcycle. Darius said he saw it being pushed by a male person. When Darius described the person to Francisco, Francisco immediately recognized the culprit as petitioner, and they proceeded to petitioner's location, where Darius confirmed the identification by pointing at him. Francisco and Darius then went to the police station to file a formal complaint.

The defense presented petitioner, James Mark Lopez, Dan Mark Fernando, Luz Garcia, and Danilo Fernando, Jr. Petitioner claimed that around 6:00 p.m. of October 28, 2013, he was with his cousin Dan Mark at the latter's parents' house in Purok 4, New Cabalan, Olongapo City, for Dan Mark's birthday. Petitioner brought a live duck as a gift and cooked it at the house of Dan Mark's parents-in-law in Purok 7, where the celebration was held. He stayed at the party until 12:00 a.m. of the next day, sitting beside James and only getting up to urinate several times. Petitioner and James left together aboard James's motorcycle, and James dropped petitioner off at Purok 2, Calapati, where petitioner boarded a jeepney home to Manggahan.

The RTC convicted petitioner, ruling that the prosecution proved all the elements of carnapping through Darius's testimony. The CA affirmed in toto. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial before the CA, alleging that Darius had executed a Salaysay ng Pag-urong (Affidavit of Retraction) dated March 2, 2020, wherein Darius declared that he did not see petitioner take the motorcycle, that his aunt and uncle Joan and Francisco Combate taught him what to say to the investigating officers and the court, that he was a minor at the time he testified, and that he was persuaded to lie. The CA denied the motion, ruling that the affidavit of recantation was insufficient ground for a new trial absent other newly discovered evidence, and that mere retraction does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible.

• Reasonable Doubt from Retraction: Petitioner argued that the retraction made by the primary witness, Darius Santos, casts reasonable doubt on petitioner's guilt, warranting a new trial.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his Motion for New Trial on account of the recantation.

• Procedural Non-Compliance: The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People, averred that the Petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, particularly for failing to attach material portions of the record and for raising factual issues beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition.
• Elements of Carnapping Established: The People argued that the prosecution established all the elements of carnapping.
• No Probative Value of Retraction: The People contended that the CA correctly denied the Motion for New Trial since the Affidavit of Retraction, executed after the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction, has no probative value and cannot be the basis for a new trial.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Whether the Court should relax the application of procedural rules under Rule 45 in the interest of substantial justice.
• New Trial Based on Witness Retraction: Whether the retraction made by the prosecution's primary witness, Darius Santos, constitutes a ground for a new trial under Rule 121, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Yes. Considering that petitioner stands to be deprived of his liberty for a considerable amount of time, and recognizing the merit in his Petition, the Court deemed it necessary to relax the application of procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice, citing the factors enumerated in Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals.
• New Trial Based on Witness Retraction: Yes. The retraction of Darius Santos constitutes a ground for new trial because his testimony was essential to the judgment of conviction, special circumstances exist that raise doubt as to the truth of his testimony, and there is no other evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except his testimony.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: The Court cited the factors for suspending the Rules to serve substantial justice: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Because petitioner faced deprivation of liberty for a considerable period and the Petition had merit, the Court relaxed the procedural rules.

• New Trial Based on Witness Retraction: Rule 121, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides two grounds for a new trial: (1) errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during trial; and (2) new and material evidence discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at trial and which, if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment. Petitioner anchored his Motion on the second ground. Citing Reyes vs. People, the Court reiterated that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. Evidence which merely seeks to impeach the evidence upon which the conviction was based, or retractions of witnesses, will not constitute grounds for new trial unless it is shown that there is no evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except the testimony of the retracting witness. Citing People vs. Manigbas, the Court acknowledged that affidavits of recantation after conviction are very unreliable, but recognized that a new trial based on retraction would be justified where special circumstances, coupled with the retraction, raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given at trial, and where such testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction such that its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion.

Applying these principles, the Court found that Darius's testimony was essential to the conviction since he identified petitioner as the offender; without it, the prosecution would have had no case. Private complainant Francisco Combate's testimony was not indispensable because he did not witness the taking and merely relied on information Darius provided. Thus, there was no other evidence sustaining the conviction other than Darius's testimony. Special circumstances existed raising doubt as to the truth of Darius's testimony: (1) Darius's Salaysay ng Pag-urong detailed how Joan and Francisco Combate coached him to identify petitioner, that the actual culprit was a certain "Balong Camisera," that he was a minor at the time and easily influenced, and that he did not know petitioner until he saw him in court; (2) private complainant himself testified that his basis for accusing petitioner was that petitioner "had bad intention," showing he surmised petitioner was the perpetrator even before Darius identified him, and that he brought Darius to petitioner's place to identify him, showing the suggestiveness of the identification; and (3) petitioner's uncle Danilo Fernando, Jr. testified that the Combate family had a long-time grudge against their family, which jibed with private complainant's December 13, 2013 affidavit before the City Prosecution Office. The Court concluded that these circumstances, taken together with the fact that Darius's material testimony, if eliminated, would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion, justified the grant of a new trial. Considering the gravity of the penalty for carnapping, granting a new trial would better serve the ends of justice since it is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. Under Rule VI, Section 3(c) of the 2009 Internal Rules of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in appeals in criminal cases where a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the Court remanded the case to the CA for proper disposition.

• Retraction as Ground for New Trial — For the retraction of a witness to constitute ground for new trial, it must be shown that: (1) the testimony of the retracting witness during trial is essential to the judgment of conviction such that its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion; (2) there exists special circumstances which, coupled with the retraction, raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by the retracting witness at the trial; and (3) there is no other evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except said testimony. The Court applied this three-part test and found all requisites present, justifying the grant of a new trial.

• Newly Discovered Evidence Requisites — Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (a) that the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such a weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. Evidence which merely seeks to impeach the evidence upon which the conviction was based, or retractions of witnesses, will not constitute grounds for new trial unless it is shown that there is no evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except the testimony of the retracting witness.

• Unreliability of Affidavits of Recantation — Affidavits of recantation after conviction are very unreliable, especially since they usually involve a confession of perjury. It is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony solemnly taken before a court of justice in an open and free trial simply because witnesses later changed their minds. Unless special circumstances, coupled with the retractions, raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given at trial and accepted by the trial judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction, a new trial based on such retraction would not be justified.

• "For the retraction of a witness to constitute ground for new trial, it must be shown that: (1) the testimony of the retracting witness during trial is essential to the judgment of conviction such that its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion; (2) there exists special circumstances which, coupled with the retraction, raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by the retracting witness at the trial; and (3) there is no other evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except said testimony." — This passage states the canonical three-part test for when a witness's retraction constitutes ground for a new trial, synthesizing the doctrines from Reyes vs. People and People vs. Manigbas.

• "Affidavits of recantation... after conviction are very unreliable, especially since they usually involve a confession of perjury. It is indeed a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions calculated to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their minds." — This passage from People vs. Manigbas articulates the general skepticism toward recantations and the policy rationale for requiring special circumstances before granting a new trial based on retraction.

• "Without a doubt, Darius's testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction since it was he who identified petitioner as the supposed offender. Without it, the prosecution would have had no leg to stand on, and the trial judge would have come to a different conclusion." — This passage applies the first requisite of the retraction test to the facts, establishing that the eyewitness testimony was the sole basis for the conviction.

• "Considering the gravity of the penalty for carnapping, granting a new trial would better serve the ends of justice since it is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence." — This passage states the policy rationale for granting a new trial in this case, invoking the principle that the State's interest in justice favors liberating the guilty over imprisoning one whose guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• Reyes vs. People, 71 Phil. 598 (1941) — Controlling precedent establishing the requisites for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, including the rule that retractions of witnesses will not constitute grounds for new trial unless there is no other evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except the testimony of the retracting witness.
• People vs. Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469 (1960) — Controlling precedent on the unreliability of affidavits of recantation after conviction, and the special circumstances exception that justifies a new trial based on retraction where the testimony is essential to the conviction.
• Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665 (2003) — Cited for the factors considered in suspending procedural rules to serve substantial justice, including matters of life, liberty, honor, or property and the merits of the case.
• People vs. Esmaquilan, 325 Phil. 576 (1996) — Cited for the principle that it is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural rule under which the Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed; the Court relaxed its application in the interest of substantial justice given the liberty interest at stake and the merit of the petition.
• Rule 121, Section 2, Rules of Court — Provides the two grounds for a new trial: (1) errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during trial; and (2) new and material evidence discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at trial and which, if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment. The Court applied the second ground to the retraction of the eyewitness.
• Rule 124, Section 12, Rules of Court — Authorizes the CA to receive evidence in appeals in criminal cases where a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence; the Court cited this provision in remanding the case to the CA for reception of evidence.
• Rule VI, Section 3(c), 2009 Internal Rules of the CA — Allows the CA to receive evidence in appeals in criminal cases where a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12 of the Rules of Court.
• Republic Act No. 6539 (1972), Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 — The statute under which petitioner was charged with and convicted of carnapping; the gravity of the penalty under this law informed the Court's decision to grant a new trial.

• Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson)
• Hernando, J.
• Zalameda, J.
• Marquez, J.

N/A — No dissenting opinion was noted in the provided case text.