Chan vs. People of the Philippines

A public officer who knowingly grants a permit to an entity not legally entitled to it violates Section 3(j) of RA 3019, and criminal intent is not required for conviction since the offense is malum prohibitum.

Petitioner Charita M. Chan was the Municipal Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte from June 2007 until 2016. The controversy involves the prohibition under Section 89(a)(2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) against local government officials holding interests in cockpits, and the prohibition under Presidential Decree No. 449 and Municipal Ordinance No. 281 against holding cockfights on Saturdays.

Two Informations were filed against Charita M. Chan on August 10, 2016, charging her with violation of Section 3(j) of RA 3019. The first case (SB-16-CRM-0511) stemmed from her alleged approval of a Mayor's Permit for the operation of the Babatngon Gallera in favor of Nicomedes Alde, a Sangguniang Bayan member and President of the Liga ng mga Barangay, who was prohibited from holding such interest under the Local Government Code. The second case (SB-16-CRM-0512) arose from her issuance of a Mayor's Permit on April 13, 2012, in favor of the Liga ng mga Barangay to hold cockfights every Saturday at Barangay District III, Babatngon, Leyte, despite the prohibition against Saturday cockfights under PD 449 and Municipal Ordinance No. 281.

During arraignment, Chan pleaded not guilty and the parties stipulated that she was the incumbent mayor during the material time and that Sangguniang Bayan members signed the resolution. The prosecution presented witnesses who testified that Chan endorsed the resolution for holding cockfights to the Sangguniang Bayan, which was approved as Resolution No. 2749-12. The resolution was then forwarded to Chan, who issued the Mayor's Permit. The defense presented no evidence and submitted the case based on a memorandum arguing insufficiency of evidence and lack of criminal intent.

The Sandiganbayan acquitted Chan in SB-16-CRM-0511 but convicted her in SB-16-CRM-0512, finding that the Mayor's Permit was prima facie evidence of her culpability that remained unrebutted. Chan filed a petition for review, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove all elements of the offense, that she was not positively identified as the perpetrator, and that she had no criminal intent since she merely adopted the Sangguniang Bayan's approval and had no discretionary power to issue the permit.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of the commission of the offense or that she was the perpetrator, as she was not positively identified in the stenographic notes.
• Lack of Discretionary Power: Petitioner maintained that the Sangguniang Bayan passed the resolution granting the operation of cockpits, and her act of issuing a business permit merely adopted the Sangguniang Bayan's approval.
• Absence of Criminal Intent: Petitioner argued that she had no intention to commit a wrong or evil motive in issuing the permit, negating criminal liability.

• Admission of Genuineness: Respondent countered that Chan admitted the genuineness and execution of the Mayor's Permit when the prosecution's exhibits were adopted as defense exhibits, making Exhibit "H" genuine and executed by Chan.
• Positive Identification: Respondent argued that Chan was positively identified as the party who issued the Mayor's Permit through Pulma's testimony.
• Presumption of Criminal Intent: Respondent maintained that criminal intent was presumed in the act of issuing the Mayor's Permit in violation of existing laws, and Chan failed to overcome this presumption with contrary evidence.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of Section 3(j) of RA 3019 and established Chan as the perpetrator.
• Criminal Intent: Whether lack of criminal intent exonerates Chan from liability for violation of Section 3(j) of RA 3019.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The prosecution proved all elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt, and Chan was established as the perpetrator through the stipulation of facts and the Mayor's Permit she issued.
• Criminal Intent: No. Lack of criminal intent does not exonerate the accused because violation of Section 3(j) of RA 3019 is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent is not necessary.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The elements of Section 3(j) of RA 3019 are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the officer knowingly approved or granted any license, permit, privilege, or benefit; and (3) the grant was in favor of a person not qualified or legally entitled to it. First, Chan's status as a public officer was undisputed and stipulated. Second, the Mayor's Permit (Exhibit "H") explicitly showed that Chan granted the Liga ng mga Barangay the permit to hold cockfights every Saturday, satisfying the second element. Third, the Liga ng mga Barangay, whose members are barangay officials, are not qualified for such a grant under Section 89(a)(2) of RA 7160, which prohibits local government officials from holding interests in cockpits. Thus, all elements were established with moral certainty.
• Criminal Intent: Violation of Section 3(j) of RA 3019 partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum. The commission of the act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, determines whether the provision has been violated. Therefore, criminal intent is not necessary for conviction. Chan's argument that she merely adopted the Sangguniang Bayan's resolution and lacked evil motive is unavailing.

• Elements of Section 3(j) of RA 3019 — The elements are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the officer knowingly approved or granted any license, permit, privilege, or benefit; and (3) the grant was in favor of a person not qualified or legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege, or advantage, or in favor of a mere representative or dummy. The Court found all elements present in Chan's issuance of the Mayor's Permit to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
• Malum Prohibitum in Anti-Graft Law — Violations of RA 3019 are malum prohibitum, meaning criminal intent is not necessary for conviction. The act itself, as defined and prohibited by law, determines the violation. The law aims to repress acts that may lead to graft and corruption, not just those inherently corrupt.

• "In this jurisdiction, no less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to support a judgment of conviction. While the law does not require absolute certainty, the evidence presented by the prosecution must produce in the mind of the Court a moral certainty of the accused's guilt." — This passage underscores the standard of proof required for conviction, which the Court found was met by the prosecution's evidence.
• "In other words, the act treated thereunder [Section 3(g), RA 3019] partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated." — This quotation from Luciano vs. Estrella explains why criminal intent is not required in offenses under RA 3019, effectively rejecting Chan's defense of lack of intent.

• People vs. Lumikid, G.R. No. 242695, June 23, 2020 — Cited to emphasize the constitutional requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt for a judgment of conviction.
• Luciano vs. Estrella, 145 Phil. 454 (1970) — Cited to establish that violations of RA 3019 are malum prohibitum, where the commission of the prohibited act, rather than criminal intent, determines liability.
• Agbayani vs. Lupa Realty Holding Corp., G.R. No. 201193, June 10, 2019 — Cited for the principle that admissions and stipulations of fact require no further proof.

• Section 3(j), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the corrupt practice of knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege, or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such. Chan was convicted for violating this provision.
• Section 89(a)(2), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Prohibits local government officials from holding interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit. This provision established that the Liga ng mga Barangay members were not legally entitled to the cockfighting permit.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 3019 — Prescribes the penalty for violations of the Act, which includes imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from public office. The Court affirmed the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan as it falls within this statutory range.
• Section 5(d) and (e), Presidential Decree No. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974) — Prohibits holding cockfights on Saturdays, which was the basis for the allegation that the permit was granted in violation of existing laws.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ.