Chan Tee Ten vs. Tee Ten

A psychological evaluation report retains probative value even if the psychologist did not personally examine the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, provided the totality of evidence — including collateral interviews and corroborating witness testimonies — clearly and convincingly establishes the incapacity, especially where the spouse herself refused to undergo evaluation.

Nellie Y. Chan Tee Ten and Willy Q. Tee Ten were married on January 22, 1995, without an antenuptial agreement, placing their property relations under the regime of absolute community of property. The dispute centers on Willy's petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that a marriage may be declared void when either party is psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, was impleaded as a respondent pursuant to the Court's resolution dated July 27, 2022, as required in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.

Willy Q. Tee Ten and Nellie Y. Chan Tee Ten were married on January 22, 1995. They had no antenuptial agreement, and their property relations were governed by the regime of absolute community of property. According to Willy, even before the wedding, Nellie's psychological incapacity was already evident — manifested by her domineering attitude, coupled with lazy and poor study habits, rooted in a childhood marked by overindulgence during her family's period of wealth.

After the marriage, Nellie's incapacity to perform marital obligations allegedly became more apparent. Willy described her as continuing to be domineering and controlling, demanding that he always update her on his whereabouts. She displayed an arrogant and haughty attitude, especially toward Willy's mother, and exhibited an excessive sense of entitlement. She irrationally insisted that Willy was having an incestuous relationship with his mother, verbally abused him whenever he brought their children to visit his family, and physically abused him when he tried to take their daughter out to buy a bike. She also allegedly tried to deliberately alienate their son from his paternal grandmother. Willy began sleeping in his office due to these tensions. In October 2002, Nellie and the children moved to a condominium unit in Pioneer Highlands. Willy followed, hoping to fix the marital problems, but to no avail.

Willy further alleged that Nellie psychologically abused their children — physically attacking him in their presence while he was holding their daughter, excluding his relatives from their son's seventh birthday, teaching the children to say bad things about his mother, giving him a hard time whenever he tried to take the children to visit his family, and sneaking into his mother's house to take the children home without telling anyone. He also claimed that Nellie, without his consent and through intimidation, entered his place of employment and forcibly took documents, records, and other articles of value.

Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist, conducted a psychological assessment and concluded that Nellie suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with paranoid features. Dr. Dayan found Nellie's psychological incapacity to be grave, incurable, and with antecedents, and recommended termination of the marriage. Nellie, for her part, countered that it was Willy who abused their children — not only psychologically but also sexually — and that he physically and verbally abused her during disagreements. She questioned the reliability of Dr. Dayan's report, noting it was based only on Willy's clinical interview and psychological tests, plus collateral interviews with witnesses she claimed were biased against her. Nellie's own psychologist, Dr. Elias Adamos, opined that she was "not incapacitated" to comply with her marital obligations, but he admitted that Nellie had withheld pertinent information which, if timely disclosed, could have affected his findings — an admission that compromised both his conclusions and Nellie's credibility.

• Reliability of Psychological Report: Nellie argued that the CA erred in upholding the declaration of nullity on the basis of Dr. Dayan's psychological report despite the psychologist never having personally examined her.
• Disregard of Abuse Allegations: Nellie contended that the CA completely disregarded her narration of physical, sexual, emotional, financial, and psychological abuse suffered at Willy's hands, and erred in not ruling that Willy's acts constituted contracting marriage in bad faith.
• Willy's Psychological Incapacity: Assuming arguendo that the marriage is void, Nellie argued that the CA erroneously ruled that Willy was not psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
• Increase of Support Pendente Lite: Nellie sought an increase in support pendente lite from PHP 70,000.00 to PHP 300,000.00, effective until the property regime is dissolved, citing Willy's growth in financial stature since the RTC ordered payment of support in its Order dated June 17, 2013.
• Alternative Prayer: In the alternative, if the marriage is declared void, Nellie prayed that Willy be declared the psychologically incapacitated spouse who contracted marriage in bad faith, thereby forfeiting his share in their common properties in favor of their children pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.

• Factual Issues Beyond Review (OSG): The OSG asserted that the arguments raised in the Petition were factual matters that the Court could not review in a Rule 45 proceeding, especially since the RTC and CA were consistent in their findings regarding Nellie's psychological incapacity.
• Correctness of Lower Court Rulings (OSG): The OSG opined that the CA correctly upheld the RTC ruling that the marriage was void under Article 36, and that the psychological report retained credence despite Dr. Dayan not having personally interviewed Nellie.
• Rehash of Arguments (Willy): Willy argued that the Petition should be denied outright for raising factual issues and rehashing arguments already passed upon by the lower courts.
• Sufficiency of Evidence (Willy): Willy maintained that Nellie's psychological incapacity was sufficiently established by Dr. Dayan's findings and the testimony of Willy and other witnesses, as the RTC and CA aptly ruled.
• No Basis to Increase Support (Willy): Willy contended there was no reason to increase support pendente lite, as he continued to provide for the children beyond the PHP 70,000.00 monthly judicial mandate, and all children were of majority age with direct access to him for their needs sans Nellie's participation.

• Psychological Incapacity: Whether the lower courts correctly declared the marriage of the parties void on the ground of Nellie's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Reliability of Psychological Report: Whether the psychological report of Dr. Dayan retains probative value despite Nellie not having been personally examined by the psychologist.
• Support Pendente Lite and Property Liquidation: Whether the case should be remanded for determination of the proper amount of support pendente lite and the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' co-owned properties.

• Psychological Incapacity: Yes. The lower courts correctly declared the marriage void, the totality of evidence clearly and convincingly establishing Nellie's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, satisfying the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability under the Tan-Andal framework.
• Reliability of Psychological Report: Yes. The psychological report retains probative value despite Nellie not having been personally examined, as it was Nellie who refused to undergo evaluation, and collateral information from other sources is an accepted practice in psychiatry.
• Support Pendente Lite and Property Liquidation: The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the determination of the proper amount of support pendente lite, if still warranted, and the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the co-owned properties under Article 147 of the Family Code, as these matters require presentation of evidence outside the purview of a Rule 45 proceeding.

• Psychological Incapacity: The issues raised in the Petition — the finding of Nellie's psychological incapacity, Willy's alleged incapacity and bad faith, the proper amount of support pendente lite, and the liquidation of properties — were clearly factual in nature and beyond the Court's review in a Rule 45 proceeding, where jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. None of the recognized exceptions to this rule were present. At any rate, the consistent findings of the RTC and CA, supported by the evidence on record, furnished no cogent reason for reversal. Under Tan-Andal vs. Andal, psychological incapacity must satisfy three characteristics: (1) gravity — grave enough to cause inability, not mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty, to perform essential marital obligations; (2) juridical antecedence — the incapacity existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage, even if it manifested later; and (3) incurability — the party persistently fails to comply with essential marital obligations with respect to a specific partner. The quantum of proof is clear and convincing evidence, requiring more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of evidence — the testimonies of Willy, Jocelyn Arches (a disinterested third-party witness), Julieta Tobias (a court social worker), and even Nellie's own witness Winona Nadine Tee Ten — established that Nellie suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with paranoid features. Her behavioral manifestations included a grandiose sense of self, an arrogant and haughty attitude toward Willy's mother, and an excessive sense of entitlement. Dr. Dayan traced the root cause to childhood overindulgence, establishing juridical antecedence. The incapacity was severe, pervasive, and affected all areas of Nellie's life, rendering her unable to perform essential marital obligations. Even assuming arguando that Nellie's allegations of abuse by Willy were true, such abuse neither negated the evidence of her own psychological incapacity nor sufficiently proved that Willy was psychologically incapacitated. Even if Willy were declared the incapacitated spouse, the marriage would still be void under Article 36.

• Reliability of Psychological Report: Psychological incapacity need not be proven through expert opinion, as it is not an illness requiring medical or clinical identification. The psychological evaluation of either or both spouses is not indispensable, even where expert opinion is offered in evidence. It is enough that the totality of evidence establishes the psychological incapacity. Dr. Dayan's report, though based only on Willy's clinical interview, psychological tests, and collateral interviews with witnesses Therese and Jocelyn, did not lose probative value. Nellie herself refused to undergo evaluation despite being invited. Where a person refuses to participate, it is an accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from the person evaluated. Moreover, Nellie's own psychologist, Dr. Adamos, admitted that she had withheld pertinent information that could have affected his findings, compromising both his conclusions and Nellie's credibility.

• Support Pendente Lite and Property Liquidation: The trial court, which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage null, likewise has authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters, including support and the settlement of co-owned properties. The resolution of these matters requires presentation of evidence outside the purview of a Rule 45 proceeding, as the Court is not a trier of facts. The rules on co-ownership, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, govern the liquidation, partition, and distribution of common properties of spouses whose marriage is declared void under Article 36. While it is not necessary to liquidate common properties in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity, and settlement need not be done through a judicial proceeding, the Court deemed it proper to refer the matter back to the trial court as both parties raised issues regarding their property relations in their respective pleadings.

• Tan-Andal Doctrine on Psychological Incapacity — Psychological incapacity under Article 36 must satisfy three characteristics: (1) gravity — the incapacity must be grave enough to cause the party's inability, not mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty, to perform essential marital obligations; (2) juridical antecedence — the incapacity must have existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage, even if it only manifested later; and (3) incurability — the party, by reason of the incapacity, persistently fails to comply with essential marital obligations with respect to a specific partner. The quantum of proof is clear and convincing evidence, requiring more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Expert opinion is not indispensable, as psychological incapacity is not an illness requiring medical or clinical identification; the totality of evidence suffices. The Court applied this framework to find that Nellie's Narcissistic Personality Disorder with paranoid features, rooted in childhood overindulgence, satisfied all three elements, and that the evidence — though not including a personal examination of Nellie — met the clear and convincing standard.

• Collateral Information in Psychological Evaluation — Where a person refuses to participate in a psychological evaluation, it is an accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from the person evaluated. The Court applied this principle to uphold the probative value of Dr. Dayan's report despite Nellie not having been personally examined, as Nellie herself refused to undergo evaluation despite being invited.

• "It is enough that the totality of evidence establishes the psychological incapacity of one or both spouses." — This passage articulates the principle that expert opinion is not indispensable in Article 36 cases and that the totality of evidence standard governs the determination of psychological incapacity.

• "it is an accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from the person evaluated." — This passage justifies the use of collateral interviews when the subject refuses to participate in psychological evaluation, a principle frequently relevant in Article 36 proceedings where one spouse is uncooperative.

• "Even assuming arguendo that Nellie's allegations, i.e., that Willy had physically, sexually, emotionally, financially, and psychologically abused her and their children, are true, the finding of her psychological incapacity in the case stands." — This passage establishes that allegations of spousal abuse do not negate a finding of the other spouse's psychological incapacity, nor do they independently prove the alleged abuser's own incapacity.

• Tan-Andal vs. Andal, 902 Phil. 558 (2021) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied extensively on this landmark case for the three characteristics of psychological incapacity (gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability), the quantum of proof (clear and convincing evidence), the principle that expert opinion is not indispensable, and the definition of essential marital obligations under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code.
• Georfo vs. Republic of the Philippines, 937 Phil. 518 (2023) — Followed for the principle that the psychological evaluation of either or both allegedly incapacitated spouses is not indispensable, and that the totality of evidence suffices.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) — Cited within Tan-Andal for the essential marital obligations under the Family Code.
• Tanyag vs. Tanyag, 914 Phil. 150 (2021) — Cited for the principle that the trial court has authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters in nullity proceedings, including support and settlement of co-owned properties.
• Diño vs. Diño, 655 Phil. 175 (2011) — Cited for the rule that the rules on co-ownership in relation to Article 147 govern the liquidation of common properties of spouses whose marriage is declared void under Article 36, and that liquidation need not be done in the same proceeding.

• Article 36, Family Code — Provides that a marriage may be declared void when either party is psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. Applied as the substantive basis for declaring the marriage void.
• Article 68, Family Code — Provides that husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Cited as the most basic of the essential marital obligations that Nellie failed to perform.
• Articles 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Cited as essential marital obligations relating to the effects of parental authority upon the persons and properties of the children.
• Article 147, Family Code — Governs the property relations of spouses under a void marriage, providing that wages and salaries are owned in equal shares and property acquired through work or industry is governed by co-ownership rules. Applied in the remand for liquidation, partition, and distribution of co-owned properties, including the forfeiture provision where one party is in bad faith.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred. Singh, J., was on leave.