Chan-Tan vs. Tan

A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified, even to correct perceived errors of fact or law. Negligence of counsel resulting in loss of the right to appeal does not vacate a judgment valid and regular on its face, and a petitioner's belated motion to dismiss cannot disturb such finality.

Susie Chan-Tan and Jesse C. Tan were spouses married in June of 1989, with two minor sons born of the marriage. Their property relations involved residential lots in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City contracted with Megaworld Properties, Inc., a Richmore Town Homes unit, a View Master Town Homes property, a Cityland Shaw condominium interest, shares, bank accounts, and family corporations. Petitioner later sought judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Susie Chan-Tan and Jesse Tan were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in Intramuros, Manila. They had two sons, Justin, born in Canada in 1990 (October 12, 1990 per the compromise agreement), and Russel, born in the Philippines in 1993 (November 28, 1993 per the compromise agreement). In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, Susie filed a case for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code.

During the proceedings the parties submitted a compromise agreement addressing property and children. The two Corinthian Hills lots covered by the Contract to Sell with Megaworld Properties, Inc. were to be considered part of the presumptive legitimes of the two minors, with Susie to shoulder from her own funds the remaining balance until fully paid and to deal directly with Megaworld. The Richmore Town Homes Unit O covered by CCT No. 3754 was to be placed in co-ownership among Susie (1/3), Justin (1/3) and Russel (1/3) to the exclusion of Jesse; the View Master Town Homes property covered by TCT No. 48137 was to be exclusively owned by Jesse; the undivided interest in the Cityland Shaw condominium was to be exclusively owned by Jesse; shares, bank accounts and other properties under the respective names or possession of each spouse were to be exclusively owned by that spouse, except that Jesse was to transfer shares registered in his name in Susie's family corporations to Susie or the children; and each party was to turn over original documents and titles registered in the other's name. Upon approval, the property regime was to be dissolved and governed by complete separation of property, with representation of no known prejudiced creditors. Custody was to be joint but the children were to stay with Susie at 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon City, with specified visitation for Jesse on Sundays and Thursdays of each month, on his birthday, family birthdays and death anniversaries, Father's Day, Christmas arrangements, school activities, and the children's birthdays, under mutual obligations of civility and non-alienation. For support, existing educational plans were to be used for high school and college, with Jesse to shoulder any shortfall in tuition, miscellaneous fees, books, uniforms, bags, shoes, Xavier School summer workshops, and tutorial expenses, plus ₱10,000.00 monthly support pendente lite to Susie's ATM Account No. 3-189-53867-8 Boni Serrano Branch every 15th of the month and daily school meal money given directly to the sons every Sunday.

On 31 July 2003 the trial court issued a partial judgment approving the compromise agreement, and on 30 March 2004 it rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity, incorporating the compromise on support, custody, visitation, and property relations. Meanwhile, Susie cancelled the offer to purchase Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2 and authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate the ₱11,992,968.32 so far paid as (a) ₱3,656,250.04 to fully pay Lot 11, Block 2 in Corinthian Hills, (b) ₱7,783,297.56 to fully pay Unit 9H of the 8 Wack Wack Road Condominium project, and (c) ₱533,420.72 to be forfeited to Megaworld for marketing and administrative costs, and to offer Lot 12 to other buyers. She also left the country bringing the children with her. According to respondent's evidence on his omnibus motion, she did so without his knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court, failed to pay the ₱8,000,000 remaining balance for the Megaworld property risking forfeiture prejudicial to the children, and failed to turn over documents and titles in his name.

Thus the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution awarding custody to Jesse, ordering Susie to turn over documents and titles in his name, and allowing him to stay in the Mariposa dwelling. On 28 June 2004 Susie moved for reconsideration, alleging denial of due process by accident, mistake or excusable negligence, attributing non-presentation of evidence to counsel's negligence and her fear for her life and the children's future, claiming she was forced to leave due to alleged beating, gambling and womanizing, and praying for increase of monthly support to ₱150,000. The trial court found the motion filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, declared her in contempt for non-compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution, and denied increased support on the ground that she unilaterally enrolled the children in another school without respondent's knowledge. On 4 November 2004 she filed a motion to dismiss stating loss of interest and that withdrawal was for the children's best interest, praying that all prior orders be vacated and the parties restored to status quo ante, plus reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 resolution. The trial court denied both, ruling the decision and resolution final and executory, and denied further reconsideration on 15 February 2005.

• Due Process and Counsel Negligence: Petitioner argued that she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file pleadings and appear at hearings on respondent's omnibus motion to amend the partial judgment on custody and properties, with the 17 May 2004 resolution allegedly resting solely on respondent's testimony.
• Accident, Mistake, or Excusable Negligence: Petitioner maintained that inability to present evidence was due to counsel's negligence and her own fear for her life and the children's future, claiming she was forced to leave the country with the children because of alleged beating, gambling, and womanizing by respondent.
• Increased Support: Petitioner prayed for an increase in respondent's monthly support obligation to ₱150,000.
• Motion to Dismiss and Constitutionality: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in applying Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages to her motion to dismiss, and that if applicable, the provision is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to preservation of the family.

• Finality and Executory Character: Respondent maintained that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution are final and executory and could no longer be reviewed, modified, or vacated.
• Abuse of Process and Non-Appearance: Respondent alleged that petitioner is making a mockery of the justice system by disregarding lawful processes, stressing that neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioner's motion to dismiss.

• Finality and Due Process: Whether the 30 March 2004 Decision and the 17 May 2004 Resolution had attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process.
• Applicability and Constitutionality of Section 7: Whether Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages applies to petitioner's motion to dismiss, and whether it is unconstitutional as an obstacle to preservation of the family.

• Finality and Due Process: Yes. Finality had attached upon lapse of the reglementary period without timely appeal, and loss of the right to appeal through counsel's alleged negligence does not vacate a judgment valid and regular on its face.
• Applicability and Constitutionality of Section 7: No. Section 7 applies only to a respondent who files an answer, not to the petitioner-movant, so the constitutional challenge lacks basis; in any event, dismissal under Rule 17 was no longer available after finality.

• Finality and Due Process: Finality attached because petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, received on 28 June 2004, was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, leaving the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution final and executory. Reliance was placed on Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, where nullity was upheld although based solely on one party's evidence after the other failed to appear, and where notice to counsel of record was deemed binding with counsel's neglect not justifying setting aside a valid judgment. No denial of the day in court occurred here because petitioner, through counsel, actively participated by filing motion after motion, and counsel's 3 May 2004 manifestation showed inability to respond intelligently because petitioner had not been heard from since Holy Week despite attempts to call, indicating disinterest rather than counsel's negligence and leaving the judge no recourse but to rule on respondent's evidence.
• Applicability and Constitutionality of Section 7: Section 7, which bars a motion to dismiss except on lack of jurisdiction over subject matter or parties while allowing other dismissal grounds as affirmative defenses in an answer, was construed in light of its purpose to have the respondent ventilate defenses in an answer so judgment may be on the merits. By its letter, only a respondent files an answer raising affirmative defenses; hence it does not govern a motion to dismiss filed by the initiating petitioner. Because the provision was inapplicable, the claim that it unconstitutionally obstructs family preservation was without basis. Although Rule 17 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to allow dismissal upon plaintiff's notice or motion, invocation on 4 November 2004 came after the decision and resolution had long become final and executory, and immutable judgments may no longer be disturbed even to correct perceived factual or legal error, grounded on public policy requiring litigation to end at a definite date fixed by law.

• Immutability of Final and Executory Judgments — Once a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. Applied to deny petitioner's belated motion to dismiss and reconsideration seeking to vacate the nullity decree and amended custody-property orders.
• Binding Effect of Notice to Counsel; Negligence of Counsel — Notice sent to counsel of record binds the client, and neglect or failure of counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Applied to reject the claim that counsel's failure to plead or appear warranted vacatur, especially where the record indicated petitioner's own disinterest.
• Due Process as Opportunity to Be Heard — A party who actively participated through counsel and was given the opportunity to be heard, but failed to appear or present evidence, cannot successfully claim denial of due process when the court proceeds on the evidence presented. Applied where the trial court ruled on respondent's omnibus motion after petitioner's non-appearance.
• Construction of Section 7 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity and Annulment — Section 7's prohibition on motions to dismiss, save for lack of jurisdiction, with other grounds raisable as affirmative defenses in an answer, applies only to the respondent, not to the petitioner who initiates the action. Applied to hold the provision inapplicable to petitioner's motion to dismiss and to reject the derivative constitutional attack.
• Dismissal at Plaintiff's Instance under Rule 17 — A complaint may be dismissed by notice before service of answer or motion for summary judgment, and thereafter only upon court approval and proper terms. Applied to hold that such dismissal was no longer available because finality had already attached to the decision and resolution.

• "Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable." — States the controlling immutability rule that barred modification of the final nullity decree and custody-property resolution despite claims of error or supervening dismissal.
• "Once a judgment has become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest." — Expresses the public-policy rationale for finality at a definite date fixed by law, applied to deny belated reconsideration and dismissal.
• "SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer." — Reproduces the provision construed to apply only to a respondent who answers, not to a petitioner-movant seeking dismissal.

• Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169 (1996) — Followed as controlling on finality of an unappealed nullity judgment, validity of judgment based solely on one party's evidence after the other's non-appearance, and binding effect of notice to counsel with counsel's neglect not justifying vacatur.
• Perez vs. Zulueta, 106 Phil. 264 (1959) — Cited to support that the decision and resolution became final and executory upon lapse of the reglementary period to appeal.
• Nuñal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, 6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 26 — Cited for the rule that a final and executory judgment may no longer be modified even to correct perceived factual or legal error.
• Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83720, 4 October 1991, 202 SCRA 487 — Cited for the public-policy basis that judgments must become final at some definite date fixed by law.
• Philippine Sugar Central Agency vs. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131 (1927) — Cited for the statutory-construction principle that the purpose or object of the law is an important factor in interpreting Section 7.

• Article 36, Family Code — Governs declaration of nullity on ground of psychological incapacity; applied as the basis for declaring the parties' marriage void on ground of mutual psychological incapacity.
• Section 7, Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages — Bars motions to dismiss except for lack of jurisdiction, allowing other grounds as affirmative defenses in an answer; held applicable only to respondent, not to petitioner's motion to dismiss, defeating the constitutional challenge.
• Section 1, Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages — Makes the Rules of Court suppletorily applicable; invoked to consider Rule 17 dismissal at plaintiff's instance.
• Sections 1 and 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court — Allow dismissal upon plaintiff's notice before answer or summary-judgment motion, and thereafter only upon court approval and proper terms; held unavailable because finality had already attached when petitioner moved to dismiss.

Brion, J., Del Castillo, J., Abad, J., Perez, J.