Cerezo vs. Tuazon

A party who has availed of the remedy of petition for relief from judgment, which was denied with finality, can no longer avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47, because annulment is available only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. Moreover, an employer's liability for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, not merely subsidiary, such that the negligent employee is not an indispensable party to an action for damages against the employer.

Petitioner Hermana R. Cerezo owned a passenger bus line operated under the name Country Bus Lines. Respondent David Tuazon was a tricycle driver who was injured when a Country Bus Lines bus collided with his tricycle. The case involves the interplay between the remedies available to a party declared in default under the Rules of Court and the distinction between civil liability arising from a delict under the Revised Penal Code and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under the Civil Code.

Around noontime of June 26, 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle bearing plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On October 1, 1993, tricycle driver David Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Hermana R. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda. The complaint alleged that Foronda operated the bus negligently, without due regard to traffic rules and regulations despite a "Slow Down" sign near the scene, resulting in severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to Tuazon, who became unable to walk and disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand cut.

On the same day, Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. The trial court issued summons against the Cerezo spouses at the Makati address stated in the complaint, but the summons was returned unserved on November 10, 1993, as the spouses no longer held office nor resided in Makati. On April 18, 1994, the trial court issued alias summons against the spouses at their address in Barangay Sta. Maria, Camiling, Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the complaint were served on April 20, 1994, at the office of Atty. Cerezo, who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. Atty. Cerezo reacted angrily, allegedly telling Sheriff William Canlas: "Punyeta, ano ang gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong hindi ka makalabas ng buhay dito? Teritoryo ko ito. Wala ka sa teritoryo mo."

The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the proceedings before the trial court. They filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars dated April 29, 1994, and a reply to opposition to comment with motion dated June 13, 1994. On August 1, 1994, the trial court issued an order directing the spouses to file a comment to the opposition to the bill of particulars. Atty. Elpidio B. Valera of Valera and Valera Law Offices appeared on behalf of the spouses. On August 29, 1994, Atty. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of Tuazon's motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons on the spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court.

On August 30, 1994, the trial court issued an order resolving Tuazon's motion to litigate as a pauper and the spouses' urgent ex-parte motion. The court granted the motion to litigate as a pauper, finding Tuazon unemployed, without real property, and dependent on occasional remittances from his son working in Malaysia. The court denied the prayer for new summons, stating that "any infirmity in the service of the summons to the defendant before plaintiff was allowed to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper has been cured by this Order." On September 27, 1994, the spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied.

On November 14, 1994, the trial court ordered the spouses to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. The spouses did not file an answer. On January 27, 1995, Tuazon filed a motion to declare the spouses in default. On February 6, 1995, the trial court issued an order declaring the spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his evidence. On May 30, 1995, after considering Tuazon's testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazon's favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda's liability because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo's business benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo's employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, ordering her to pay P69,485.35 for actual damages, P39,921.00 for loss of earnings, P43,300.00 for moral damages, and P20,000.00 for costs of suit.

Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on June 25, 1995. On July 10, 1995, she filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of "fraud, mistake or excusable negligence." Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court. Atty. Valera added that he received no notice before or during the May 8, 1995 elections, "when he was a senatorial candidate for the KBL Party, and very busy, using his office and residence as Party National Headquarters." Atty. Valera claimed that he was able to read the decision of the trial court only after Mrs. Cerezo sent him a copy. Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence, including the sheriff's return and summons, the alias summons, the comment with motion, minutes of hearings, the appearance and urgent ex-parte motion, orders of the court, postal certifications, court return slips, and the decision itself, to prove the participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case.

On March 4, 1998, the trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment, stating that having received the decision on June 25, 1995, the spouses should have filed a notice of appeal instead of resorting to a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court refused to grant relief because the spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal, failed to prove fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence by conclusive evidence, and failed to prove that they had a good and substantial defense. The trial court noted that the spouses failed to appeal because they relied on an expected settlement of the case.

The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48132, questioning whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom they claimed was an indispensable party. In a resolution dated January 21, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the trial court's order denying the petition for relief from judgment, declaring that the spouses' failure to file an answer was due to their own negligence, and that there was nothing in the records to show that they actually offered a reasonable settlement to Tuazon. The Court of Appeals also denied the motion for reconsideration.

The Cerezo spouses filed before the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 137593, signed by Atty. Cerezo himself. On April 13, 1999, the Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition to the Court of Appeals and to the adverse parties, noting that even if the petition complied with this requirement, it would still have been denied as the spouses failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. The resolution was entered in the Book of Entries and Judgments when it became final and executory on June 28, 1999.

Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals on July 6, 1999, a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 with prayer for restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53572, praying for the annulment of the May 30, 1995 decision of the trial court and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining execution of the decision pending resolution of the petition. The Court of Appeals denied the petition in a resolution dated October 21, 1999, holding that having previously availed of a petition for relief, the remedy of annulment of judgment was no longer available, and that the proper action was to appeal the order denying the petition for relief. On January 20, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, distinguishing between jurisdiction over the person, acquired by proper service of summons or voluntary appearance, and jurisdiction over the subject matter, conferred by law, and holding that the spouses waived any defect in the acquisition of jurisdiction over their persons by voluntarily appearing in the civil case.

• Ground for Annulment — Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner claimed that in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment, the Court of Appeals assumed that the issues raised were based on extrinsic fraud related to the denied petition for relief, notwithstanding that the grounds relied upon involved questions of lack of jurisdiction.
• Nullity of Findings Against Unsummoned Driver: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals disregarded the allegation that the lower court's findings of negligence against defendant-driver Danilo Foronda, whom the lower court did not summon, is null and void for want of due process, and consequently, such findings of negligence cannot become the basis of the lower court to adjudge petitioner-employer liable for civil damages.
• Indispensable Party: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals ignored the allegation that defendant-driver Danilo A. Foronda, whose negligence is the main issue, is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but whom the lower court did not summon.
• Lack of Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals ruled that assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve his right to institute a separate action for damages in the criminal action, the petitioner cannot now raise such issue and question the lower court's jurisdiction because petitioner has waived such right by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages, notwithstanding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondent's arguments in the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

• Availability of Annulment of Judgment: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 on the ground that petitioner had previously availed of the remedy of petition for relief from judgment.
• Jurisdiction Over the Person of the Employee: Whether the trial court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over defendant-driver Danilo Foronda, who was not served with summons, rendered the judgment against petitioner null and void for want of due process.
• Indispensable Party: Whether defendant-driver Danilo A. Foronda is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory, such that the trial court could not validly render judgment without acquiring jurisdiction over him.
• Waiver of Lack of Jurisdiction: Whether petitioner waived any defect in the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages, notwithstanding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived.

• Availability of Annulment of Judgment: No. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was no longer available to petitioner because she had previously availed of the remedy of petition for relief from judgment, which was denied with finality, and because she could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her own fault erroneously availed of a petition for relief.
• Jurisdiction Over the Person of the Employee: No. The trial court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda did not render the judgment against petitioner null and void, because an action based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code may proceed directly against the employer without including the employee, whose liability is not subsidiary but primary and direct.
• Indispensable Party: No. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the action for damages against petitioner, because where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
• Waiver of Lack of Jurisdiction: Yes. Any irregularity in the service of summons that might have vitiated the trial court's jurisdiction over the persons of the Cerezo spouses was deemed waived when the spouses filed a petition for relief from judgment, and estoppel or laches may bar lack of jurisdiction as a ground for nullity especially if raised for the first time on appeal by a party who participated in the proceedings before the trial court.

• Availability of Annulment of Judgment: The Court enumerated the remedies available to a party declared in default, citing Lina vs. Court of Appeals: (a) a motion under oath to set aside the order of default before judgment; (b) a motion for new trial if judgment has been rendered but before it becomes final and executory; (c) a petition for relief if the judgment has become final and executory; and (d) an appeal from the judgment. A petition for certiorari is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default or if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. Petitioner admitted receiving a copy of the decision on June 25, 1995, and thus had at least three remedies at her disposal: appeal under Rule 41 within 15 days from notice, a motion for new trial under Rule 37 within the period for taking an appeal, or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 within 60 days from notice of judgment. Instead, she filed a petition for relief from judgment, which is available only in exceptional cases. Citing Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, the Court noted that when a party has another remedy available, such as a motion for new trial or appeal, and was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail of the petition for relief. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and a party may avail of it only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. Because petitioner could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her own fault erroneously availed of a petition for relief, which was denied with finality, she may no longer avail of the remedy of annulment. The extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is restricted to the grounds specified in the rules to prevent it from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory.
• Jurisdiction Over the Person of the Employee: The Court held that petitioner's contention that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda betrays a faulty foundation, because it proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not of civil law. The basis of Tuazon's action is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code. The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, and an aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict, alleging that Mrs. Cerezo, "without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees and buses," hired Foronda as her driver, and that Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda's "recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence," aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo's "lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda." The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states in part: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry." In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and to hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are established. Because the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda, the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda was not necessary.
• Indispensable Party: The Court held that contrary to petitioner's assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, petitioner's liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and there is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone. Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The action can be brought directly against the person responsible for another, without including the author of the act. The Court quoted Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo vs. Garcia: "to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article [2180] of the Civil Code."
• Waiver of Lack of Jurisdiction: The Court held that the trial court clearly acquired jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo's person because she actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court, submitting herself to its jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction fails in light of her active participation. Estoppel or laches may also bar lack of jurisdiction as a ground for nullity especially if raised for the first time on appeal by a party who participated in the proceedings before the trial court. The Court further held that the Cerezo spouses' contention that summons be served anew on them is untenable in light of their participation in the trial court proceedings, as to uphold their contention would make a fetish of a technicality. Moreover, any irregularity in the service of summons that might have vitiated the trial court's jurisdiction over the persons of the Cerezo spouses was deemed waived when the spouses filed a petition for relief from judgment.

• Remedies Available to a Party Declared in Default — The Court, citing Lina vs. Court of Appeals, enumerated the remedies available to a party declared in default: (a) before judgment, a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that the party has a meritorious defense; (b) if judgment has been rendered but before it becomes final and executory, a motion for new trial; (c) if the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief; and (d) an appeal from the judgment. A petition for certiorari is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. In this case, petitioner had the remedies of appeal, motion for new trial, or petition for certiorari available but instead availed of a petition for relief from judgment, which is available only in exceptional cases.
• Annulment of Judgment Under Rule 47 — Annulment of judgment is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, a party must file the petition within four years from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or estoppel bars the petition. A party may avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. In this case, petitioner could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her own fault erroneously availed of a petition for relief, which was denied with finality, and thus she may no longer avail of the remedy of annulment.
• Primary and Direct Liability of the Employer in a Quasi-Delict — An employer's liability based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. The action can be brought directly against the person responsible for another, without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after judgment against the author of the act; the action for responsibility of the employer is in itself a principal action.
• Solidary Liability in Quasi-Delict — The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and there is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Thus, the negligent employee is not an indispensable party to an action for damages against the employer.

• "When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which has been lost thru inexcusable negligence." — This passage from Tuason v. Court of Appeals, quoted by the Court, defines the exceptional nature of the petition for relief from judgment and explains why petitioner's resort to this remedy was erroneous.
• "However, a party may avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party." — This statement articulates the controlling rule that annulment of judgment is a remedy of last resort, available only when the party is not at fault for losing the ordinary remedies.
• "The words 'primary and direct,' as contrasted with 'subsidiary,' refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation." — This passage clarifies the nature of the employer's liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, distinguishing it from the subsidiary liability under a delict.
• "to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article [2180] of the Civil Code." — This passage from Barredo v. Garcia, quoted by the Court, explains the policy rationale for allowing an action for damages to proceed directly against the employer without including the negligent employee.

• Lina vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-63397, April 9, 1985, 135 SCRA 637 — Cited as controlling authority enumerating the remedies available to a party declared in default, which the Court applied to determine that petitioner had the remedies of appeal, motion for new trial, or petition for certiorari available but failed to avail of them.
• Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169 (1996) — Cited to explain the nature of a petition for relief from judgment, which is available only in exceptional cases and cannot be used to revive the right to appeal lost through inexcusable negligence.
• Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that an employer's liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, and that an action for damages based on a quasi-delict may proceed directly against the employer without including the negligent employee.
• Poblete vs. Fabros, No. L-29803, September 14, 1979, 93 SCRA 200 — Cited to support the distinction that an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary.
• Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., 181 Phil. 556 (1968) — Cited to support the proposition that estoppel or laches may bar lack of jurisdiction as a ground for nullity, especially if raised for the first time on appeal by a party who participated in the proceedings before the trial court.
• Imson vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106436, December 8, 1994, 239 SCRA 59 — Cited to define an indispensable party as one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.
• Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78 — Cited to support the imposition of legal interest at 6% per annum from the date of the trial court's decision and 12% per annum upon finality of the judgment.

• Article 2180, Civil Code — Provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The Court applied this provision to hold Mrs. Cerezo liable for the negligence of her employee Foronda, and to establish that such liability is primary and direct.
• Article 2194, Civil Code — Provides that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. The Court applied this provision to hold that Foronda is not an indispensable party because Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
• Article 2177, Civil Code — Provides that the same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under the Revised Penal Code or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under the Civil Code, and that an aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. The Court applied this provision to determine that Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict.
• Article 103, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee in an action based on a delict. The Court distinguished this from the primary and direct liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
• Rule 38, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for relief from judgment, which must be filed within 60 days from knowledge of judgment and six months from entry of judgment, and is available only in exceptional cases. The Court held that petitioner erroneously availed of this remedy when she could have appealed or filed a motion for new trial.
• Rule 47, Rules of Court — Governs annulment of judgment, which is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that petitioner could no longer avail of this remedy because she had previously availed of, and lost with finality, the remedy of petition for relief from judgment.
• Section 19(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court of Appeals cited this provision to confirm that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case for damages.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred. Panganiban, J., was on official leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.