Central Mindanao University vs. The Executive Secretary

Lands of the public domain reserved and titled in the name of a state university for educational purposes become inalienable and may not be subsequently taken by presidential proclamation for distribution to other beneficiaries, and property rights vested prior to the enactment of the IPRA must be recognized and respected pursuant to Section 56 thereof.

Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered state educational institution in Musuan, Bukidnon, converted from Mindanao Agricultural College pursuant to Republic Act 4498. In 1958, President Garcia issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of public land as CMU's school site, conceived in the spirit of American land grant colleges provided with extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to support expanding educational programs. CMU eventually obtained title over 3,080 hectares under Original Certificates of Title 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162, while more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands were distributed to several tribes belonging to the area's cultural communities. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (Republic Act 8371) was enacted in 1997, nearly four decades after CMU's title had vested.

Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and operated by the State, located in Musuan, Bukidnon. In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain as school site for CMU. The reservation was conceived in the spirit of American land grant colleges, which were given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to support their expanding educational programs in agricultural technology and scientific research. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of Title 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162. During the land registration proceedings, the claims of several tribes belonging to the area's cultural communities were considered, and more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands were acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the claims of those tribes, which the government distributed to them.

Forty-five years later, on January 7, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310, which took 670 hectares from CMU's registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon. On April 3, 2003, CMU filed a petition for prohibition before the RTC of Malaybalay City (Branch 9) against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and the Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty Commission, seeking to enjoin implementation of the proclamation and have it declared unconstitutional.

The NCIP and co-respondents moved to dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction lay with the Manila RTC, since the act sought to be enjoined related to an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion and proceeded to hear CMU's application for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, respondents moved for partial reconsideration. On October 27, 2003, the RTC granted the motion and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, but simultaneously ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, reasoning that the State as ultimate owner of the lands had the right to dispose of them for purposes other than CMU's use. The RTC denied CMU's motion for reconsideration on April 19, 2004, prompting CMU to appeal to the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that it raised pure questions of law proper for direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that the RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action and simultaneously ruled on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310, an issue that had not yet been properly raised and heard, since respondents had filed only a motion to dismiss and had not yet filed an answer to join issue on the constitutionality question.
• Constitutionality of the Proclamation: Petitioner maintained that Presidential Proclamation 310 was unconstitutional, challenging the taking of its titled lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities.

• Jurisdiction and Venue: Respondents argued that the Malaybalay RTC lacked jurisdiction over the action, since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila, and that jurisdiction therefore lies with the Manila RTC.
• Validity of the Proclamation: Respondents maintained that Presidential Proclamation 310 was a valid State act, the State being the ultimate owner of the lands with CMU merely holding the same on its behalf, and that the State accordingly had the right to dispose of the lands for purposes other than CMU's use.

• Propriety of RTC Dismissal: Whether the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing CMU's action for prohibition for lack of jurisdiction while simultaneously ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.
• CA Jurisdiction over the Appeal: Whether the CA correctly dismissed CMU's appeal on the ground that it raised purely questions of law proper for a petition for review filed directly with the Supreme Court.
• Constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310: Whether Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.

• Propriety of RTC Dismissal: Academic. The propriety of the RTC using two incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic, the CA having dismissed CMU's appeal on a different technical ground.
• CA Jurisdiction over the Appeal: No. The CA erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it raised purely questions of law, because the due process issue — whether the RTC prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation — is a factual question proper for CA adjudication.
• Constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310: No. Presidential Proclamation 310 is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy, the subject lands having become inalienable upon dedication for educational use, and the transfer being inconsistent with Section 56 of the IPRA.

• Propriety of RTC Dismissal: The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissal: first, that jurisdiction lay with the Manila RTC because the act sought to be enjoined was an official act of the Executive done in Manila; and second, assuming jurisdiction was proper, that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional since the State as ultimate owner could dispose of the lands. There is nothing inherently wrong about a court holding both that it lacks jurisdiction and, on the assumption that it does have jurisdiction, deciding the case on the merits, where both result in dismissal. At any rate, the issue is academic because the CA dismissed CMU's appeal on a separate technical ground, rendering the propriety of the RTC's dual rationale moot.

• CA Jurisdiction over the Appeal: Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 vests the CA with appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or orders of the RTCs, but where an appeal raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by petition for review on certiorari directly with the Supreme Court. CMU raised two grounds on appeal: (1) denial of due process by the RTC, and (2) unconstitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. Regarding the first, the facts that the President issued the proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City were not in issue — they were alleged in the complaint and presumed true by the motion to dismiss. However, whether the RTC prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in denial of CMU's right to be heard, is a factual question that was proper for the CA to hear and ascertain from the parties, since NCIP et al. had filed only a motion to dismiss and had not yet filed an answer to join issue on the constitutionality question. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it raised pure questions of law.

• Constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310: Since the constitutionality of the proclamation had been raised and amply argued before the Supreme Court, remand would serve no useful purpose and would only cause delay and multiplicity of suits. The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU. In CMU vs. DARAB, the Court nullified a DARAB order segregating 400 hectares of CMU lands for agrarian reform distribution, recognizing the inalienable character of such lands as part of the long-term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution. The Court emphasized that CMU was conceived in the manner of American land grant colleges, which were given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to support expanding educational programs, and that the need for vast tracts of land for future expansion is obvious. It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples; the lands had become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMU's use in scientific and technological research in agriculture, having ceased to be alienable public lands. Furthermore, Section 56 of the IPRA provides that property rights within ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be recognized and respected. CMU's ownership vested as early as 1958, well before the IPRA's enactment in 1997, making the 2003 transfer inconsistent with the law. Finally, the land registration court had already considered the claims of the area's cultural communities during the titling proceedings, ultimately titling only 3,080 hectares in CMU's name and acknowledging more than 300 hectares as subject to the tribes' possession and claims.

• Inalienability of Lands Dedicated to Public Educational Use — Lands of the public domain reserved and titled in the name of a state university for educational purposes become inalienable from the moment they are dedicated for such use. They cease to be alienable public lands and may not be subsequently taken by the State — even by presidential proclamation — for distribution to other beneficiaries. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the 3,080 hectares titled in CMU's name under Presidential Proclamation 476 had become inalienable upon dedication for CMU's educational use in agricultural research, rendering Presidential Proclamation 310's taking of 670 hectares thereof null and void.

• Vested Rights Under the IPRA — Section 56 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (Republic Act 8371) provides that property rights within ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon the law's effectivity shall be recognized and respected. The Court applied this provision by holding that CMU's ownership over the subject lands had vested as early as 1958, decades before the IPRA's enactment in 1997, and that the 2003 transfer to indigenous peoples was therefore not in accord with the law.

• Pure Questions of Law vs. Factual Questions on Appeal — Where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law, the proper recourse is a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court, not an appeal to the Court of Appeals. However, where one of the grounds raised involves a factual determination — such as whether a lower court prematurely ruled on an issue resulting in denial of due process — the appeal presents a mixed question that is proper for CA adjudication.

• "As already stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMU's use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the inalienability of lands dedicated to educational use, forming the core basis for nullifying Presidential Proclamation 310.

• "Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that 'property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested' upon its effectivity 'shall be recognized and respected.' In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA." — This passage articulates the application of the vested-rights doctrine under the IPRA, reinforcing the nullification of the proclamation on an independent statutory ground.

• "Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMU's right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the parties. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions of law." — This passage defines the boundary between pure questions of law and factual questions on appeal, explaining why the CA's dismissal was erroneous.

• Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 86 — Controlling precedent. The Court nullified a DARAB order segregating 400 hectares of CMU lands for agrarian reform distribution, recognizing the inalienable character of such lands as part of the long-term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution. The Court relied on this case to establish that CMU's lands had become inalienable upon dedication for educational use, and that taking them for distribution to other beneficiaries constitutes a gross misinterpretation of authority.

• Section 9(3), Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Vests the Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. The Court applied this provision to determine that where an appeal raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by petition for review on certiorari directly with the Supreme Court, but found that CMU's appeal included a factual question proper for CA adjudication.

• Section 56, Republic Act 8371 (Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act) — Provides that property rights within ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon the law's effectivity shall be recognized and respected. The Court applied this provision to hold that CMU's ownership, vested in 1958, predated the IPRA's enactment in 1997, making the 2003 transfer of lands to indigenous peoples inconsistent with the law.

• Republic Act 4498 — An Act converting Mindanao Agricultural College into Central Mindanao University and authorizing the appropriation of additional funds therefor. Cited as the statutory basis for CMU's status as a chartered state educational institution.

Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Perez, JJ., concur. No separate concurring opinions were written.