Central Mindanao University vs. Republic of the Philippines

A presidential directive authorizing the filing of compulsory registration proceedings over land reserved for public or quasi-public purposes is not equivalent to a declaration that such land is alienable and disposable, because reserved lands remain inalienable under Section 88 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 until they are again declared alienable by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President.

CMU is a state agricultural educational institution established under Republic Act No. 4498. The subject parcels of land in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon — Lot 1 (20,619,175 sq m) and Lot 2 (13,391,795 sq m) of Ir-1031-D — were reserved for CMU's school site purposes by President Carlos P. Garcia through Proclamation No. 476 issued on January 16, 1958, pursuant to Section 83 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act). The proclamation withdrew the land from sale or settlement "subject to private rights, if any there be." CMU took possession of the land in 1946 and began construction upon confirmation of the Secretary of Public Instruction, but a 1952 survey revealed several adverse claimants, holders, possessors, and occupants on portions identified as school sites. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, later sought annulment of the registration proceedings on the ground that the cadastral court lacked jurisdiction over inalienable public domain land.

Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a state-owned agricultural educational institution established by virtue of Republic Act No. 4498, situated at Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon. The subject of the controversy is two parcels of land identified as "Sheet 1, Lot 1 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of 20,619,175 square meters and "Sheet 2, Lot 2 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of 13,391,795 square meters. CMU took possession of the land in 1946 and began construction for its school site upon confirmation of the Secretary of Public Instruction. A final survey conducted in 1952, however, revealed several adverse claimants, holders, possessors, and occupants on portions of the lots identified as school sites.

On January 16, 1958, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to Section 83 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, reserving certain portions of the public domain in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon for CMU's (then Mindanao Agricultural College) school site purposes. The parcels were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for CMU, "subject to private rights, if any there be." Thereafter, the Director of Lands formally requested authorization to file an application for compulsory registration of the reserved parcels before the CFI of Bukidnon. This request was endorsed by the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and ultimately authorized by the Office of the President through a Second Indorsement dated December 12, 1960, signed by Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, directing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition.

On January 31, 1961, the Director of Lands filed the petition for settlement and adjudication of title before the CFI of Bukidnon. The cadastral court rendered its Decision on December 22, 1971, declaring the subject lots as public land included in the reservation for CMU and registrable in its name, except for specified portions adjudicated to six named private claimants. The court also recommended that 18 other claimants be given the opportunity to acquire ownership through homestead, free patent, or sales applications. Upon submission of a compromise agreement by the parties, the court issued an Amended Decision on October 7, 1972, adjudicating portions to 29 groups of claimants and the remaining portions to CMU. Sixteen of the grantees subsequently entered into an agreement with CMU to replace areas near the watershed with equivalent areas outside the watershed vicinity. The court then issued its Second Amended Decision on September 12, 1974, adjudicating specific portions to 33 claimants and awarding CMU Lot 1-S (18,531,671 sq m), Lot 2-A (10,001 sq m), and Lot 2-Q (12,266,524 sq m). On January 25, 1975, the court issued Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066, and N-154067 in favor of CMU, and OCT Nos. 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162 were registered in CMU's name on January 29, 1975.

On December 15, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the Second Amended Decision, arguing that the cadastral court should have summarily dismissed the proceedings because the Solicitor General did not sign or file the petition as required by Sections 53 and 87 of CA No. 141, and that the subject lands were inalienable public domain. The Republic maintained that the cadastral court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res. The CA granted the petition, ruling that CMU failed to prove the land had been declared alienable and disposable through a positive act of government, and that the subject land never ceased to have the status of a reservation. The CA clarified, however, that CMU remained the rightful possessor of the property by virtue of Proclamation No. 476. CMU elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

• Presidential Directive as Declaration of Alienability: CMU maintained that the CA completely misconstrued the facts of the cadastral proceedings, arguing that the documents it presented showed the subject property had already been declared, classified, and certified by the Office of the President as alienable and disposable. Specifically, CMU alleged that the Second Indorsement dated December 12, 1960 from the President, through Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition for compulsory registration, was equivalent to a declaration and certification that the subject parcels of land are alienable and disposable.
• Applicability of Republic vs. Judge De la Rosa: CMU cited Republic vs. Judge De la Rosa where a presidential directive authorizing the Director of Lands to file a petition for compulsory registration was held to be equivalent to a declaration and certification that the subject land was alienable and disposable, arguing the same principle should apply.
• OSG Authorization: CMU raised the issue that the filing of the petition for cadastral proceeding was pursuant to the written consent, authorization, and directive of the OSG.
• Selective Targeting: CMU argued that the titles in its name were singled out by the respondent.

• Procedural Defect: The Republic argued that the cadastral court should have summarily dismissed the registration proceedings since the Solicitor General did not sign or file the petition for compulsory registration as provided in Sections 53 and 87 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
• Inalienability of Subject Land: The Republic alleged that the subject parcels of land are inalienable lands of the public domain.
• Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Res: The Republic maintained that the cadastral court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res, rendering the entire proceedings null and void.

• Jurisdiction Over the Res: Whether the CA erred in granting the petition for annulment on the ground that the cadastral court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because the subject lands are inalienable and non-disposable lands of the public domain.
• Presidential Directive as Positive Act: Whether the presidential directive authorizing the Director of Lands to file compulsory registration proceedings is equivalent to a declaration that land reserved for public purpose is alienable and disposable.

• Jurisdiction Over the Res: No. The cadastral court lacked jurisdiction over the res because the subject lands remained inalienable public domain, never having been positively declared alienable and disposable by a positive act of government. Inalienable public domain lands are not registrable under the Torrens system.
• Presidential Directive as Positive Act: No. The presidential directive of December 12, 1960 cannot be considered a declaration that the reserved land is alienable and disposable, because the land was still reserved for public purpose at the time the directive was issued and had not ceased to be so. The ruling in Republic vs. Judge De la Rosa was distinguished on factual grounds and does not apply.

• Jurisdiction Over the Res: Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The burden of proof to overcome this presumption rests on the person applying for registration, who must establish through incontrovertible evidence that the land is alienable or disposable. A positive act of government — such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative act — is required to declare land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. CMU failed to present any such positive act beyond the series of indorsements and the presidential directive authorizing the filing of the registration petition. For lack of proof that the land reservations had been reclassified as alienable and disposable, the lands remain part of the inalienable public domain and are not registrable under the Torrens system. The cadastral court thus lacked jurisdiction over the res, and the entire proceedings were null and void.

• Presidential Directive as Positive Act: Proclamation No. 476 reserved the subject land for CMU's school site pursuant to Section 83 of CA No. 141, withdrawing it from sale or settlement. Under Section 88 of the same Act, reserved parcels of land are non-alienable and not subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition "until again declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President." The Court's ruling in Republic vs. Judge De la Rosa — that a presidential directive authorizing compulsory registration is equivalent to a declaration of alienability — was distinguished on four factual grounds: (a) in De la Rosa, the Mallig Plains Reservation was reserved for settlement purposes under NLSA/LASEDECO, while the subject lots were reserved for educational purposes under CMU's Board of Trustees; (b) the Mallig Plains Reservation eventually reverted to public agricultural land when NARRA excluded it from properties needed under RA No. 1160, whereas there was no evidence that CMU ceased to use the reserved lots as its school site or that the public purpose was abandoned; (c) at the time President Quirino issued the directive in De la Rosa, the Gamu Public Land Subdivision was not reserved for public or quasi-public purpose or had ceased to be so, while the subject lots in Bukidnon were still reserved for public purpose when the directive was issued; and (d) the private respondent in De la Rosa was a qualified private claimant with the requisite period of possession, while CMU is not a private claimant of the land so reserved. Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits lands open to disposition or concession to those not reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, or those which, having been reserved, have ceased to be so. Because the subject lots had not ceased to be reserved for public purpose, the presidential directive could not operate as a declaration of alienability. This conclusion was reinforced by prior rulings in CMU vs. DARAB and CMU vs. Executive Secretary, which had already established the inalienable character of the CMU land reservation as part of the long-term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution.

• Regalian Doctrine — All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The burden of proof to overcome this presumption rests on the applicant for registration, who must prove through incontrovertible evidence that the land is alienable or disposable. In this case, CMU failed to overcome the presumption because it did not present a positive act of government declaring the reserved land alienable and disposable.

• Positive Act Requirement for Alienability — To prove that land of the public domain is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government must be established, such as: (1) a presidential proclamation or executive order; (2) an administrative action; (3) investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or (4) a legislative act or statute. A public land remains part of the inalienable public domain unless it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed is alienable and disposable. In this case, CMU adduced only a series of indorsements and a presidential directive authorizing the filing of a registration petition — none of which constituted a positive act declaring the land alienable and disposable.

• Non-Alienability of Reserved Lands (Section 88, CA No. 141) — Tracts of land reserved under Section 83 of CA No. 141 are non-alienable and not subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of the Act or by proclamation of the President. Lands classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses remain public domain lands until they are actually disposed of in favor of private persons, and they remain property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or quasi-public use for which they were reserved by act of Congress, by proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property.

• "For lack of proof that the said land reservations have been reclassified as alienable and disposable, the said lands remain part of inalienable public domain, hence; they are not registrable under Torrens system." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the absence of a positive act reclassifying the reserved land as alienable and disposable means the land remains inalienable public domain, and the cadastral court's registration was void for lack of jurisdiction over the res.

• "Therefore, the said directive on December 12, 1960 cannot be considered as a declaration that said land is alienable and disposable. Unlike in De la Rosa, the lands, having been reserved for public purpose by virtue of Proclamation No. 476, have not ceased to be so at the time the said directive was made. Hence, the lots did not revert to and become public agricultural land for them to be the subject of a declaration by the President that the same are alienable and disposable." — This passage articulates why the De la Rosa precedent was distinguished and why the presidential directive did not operate as a declaration of alienability: the land remained reserved for public purpose and had not reverted to public agricultural land.

• "As can be gleaned from the above provision, the lands which can be declared open to disposition or concession are those which have been officially delimited and classified, or when practicable surveyed; those not reserved for public or quasi-public purpose; those not appropriated by the Government; those which have not become private property in any manner; those which have no private right authorized and recognized by C.A. No. 141 or any other valid law may be claimed; or those which have ceased to be reserved or appropriated." — This passage sets out the statutory framework of Section 8 of CA No. 141, enumerating the categories of land eligible for disposition and explaining why reserved land that has not ceased to be reserved falls outside those categories.

• Republic vs. Judge De la Rosa, 255 Phil. 11 (1989) — Distinguished. In that case, a presidential directive authorizing the Director of Lands to file compulsory registration proceedings was held equivalent to a declaration that the subject land was alienable and disposable. The Court distinguished it on four factual grounds: the nature of the reservation (settlement vs. educational), the reversion of the Mallig Plains Reservation to public agricultural land (vs. no evidence of cessation of CMU's school site use), the reservation status at the time of the directive (not reserved or had ceased vs. still reserved), and the status of the claimant (qualified private claimant vs. not a private claimant).

• Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. vs. Republic, G.R. No. 177168, August 3, 2015 — Followed. Held that parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are non-alienable and non-disposable under Section 88 (in relation to Section 8) of CA No. 141, and remain public domain lands until actually disposed of in favor of private persons.

• CMU vs. DARAB, G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992 — Cited. Held that the CMU land reservation is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain, is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress, and is exempt from CARP coverage because the lands are actually, directly, and exclusively used for school site and campus purposes. The Court clarified that the statement therein characterizing the land as "private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner" was merely an enumeration of reasons for CARP exemption and did not constitute a recognition that the land is alienable and disposable.

• CMU vs. Executive Secretary, 645 Phil. 282 (2010) — Cited. Reiterated the inalienable character of the CMU land reservation, holding that the lands became inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMU's use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture, and had ceased to be alienable public lands.

• Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. Yap, 589 Phil. 156 (2008) — Cited. Expounded on what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain, emphasizing the requirement of a positive act of government declaring land as alienable and disposable, and that the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership is on the person applying for registration.

• Section 83, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) — Authorizes the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, to designate by proclamation any tract of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses. Proclamation No. 476 was issued pursuant to this provision, reserving the subject land for CMU's school site purposes.

• Section 88, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Provides that tracts of land reserved under Section 83 are non-alienable and not subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of the Act or by proclamation of the President. Applied to hold that the subject land, having been reserved by Proclamation No. 476, remained inalienable because it was never again declared alienable.

• Section 8, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Limits lands open to disposition or concession to those officially delimited and classified, not reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, not become private property, or those which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. Applied to explain why the presidential directive could not operate as a declaration of alienability: the subject land was still reserved for public purpose and had not ceased to be so.

• Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Empowers the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, to declare what lands are open to disposition or concession. Cited in De la Rosa as the basis for the President's authority to issue directives equivalent to declarations of alienability, but held inapplicable to the present case because of Section 8's limitations.

• Section 53, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Authorizes the Director of Lands, when the public interest requires, to cause a petition to be filed in the proper CFI through the Solicitor General for the settlement and adjudication of title to land. The Republic argued the cadastral court should have dismissed the proceedings because the Solicitor General did not sign or file the petition as required by this section.

• Section 87, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Provides that if all lands included in a presidential proclamation are not registered under the Land Registration Act, the Solicitor General, if requested by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall proceed in accordance with Section 53. The Republic argued this provision was not complied with.

• Republic Act No. 4498 — The statute converting Mindanao Agricultural College into Central Mindanao University and authorizing appropriations therefor. Identified as the legal basis for CMU's establishment as a state educational institution.

• Republic Act No. 1160 — The statute further implementing the free distribution of agricultural lands, abolishing LASEDECO and creating NARRA. Relevant to the De la Rosa distinction because NARRA excluded the Mallig Plains Reservation from properties it needed, causing the reservation to revert to public agricultural land — a circumstance absent in the present case.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Jose Portugal Perez, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Francis H. Jardeleza concurred with the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.