Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos

Solicitations for religious purposes are not covered by Presidential Decree No. 1564, which requires a permit only for solicitations for “charitable or public welfare purposes.” Penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused, and the express enumeration of “charitable or public welfare purposes” excludes religious purposes under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

In the last quarter of 1985, officers of the civic organization Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive to renovate the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the group’s chairman, and Vicente Yco solicited a P1,500.00 contribution from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident, without having first secured a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Judge Angeles filed a complaint, leading to criminal prosecution for violation of the Solicitation Permit Law.

• The Fund Drive: In the last quarter of 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, a civic organization, launched a fund drive for the renovation of the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
• Solicitation from Complainant: Petitioner Martin Centeno, as chairman, and Vicente Yco approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited a contribution of P1,500.00. No prior permit was secured from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (then Department of Social Services and Development).
• Criminal Complaint and Motion to Quash: Based on Judge Angeles’ complaint, an Information was filed against Centeno and two others for violation of P.D. No. 1564. Centeno moved to quash, contending that the law covers only solicitations for charitable or public welfare purposes and not those for religious purposes like the construction of a chapel. The MTC denied the motion.
• MTC Judgment: After trial, the MTC found Centeno and Yco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing each to a fine of P200.00. However, the MTC expressly found that the accused acted in good faith and recommended executive clemency, opining that they would not be criminally liable were it not for the existence of P.D. No. 1564.
• RTC Decision: On appeal, the RTC affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty to six months’ imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.00, citing the perversity of the act and the damage and prejudice caused to the complainant, who was herself a judge.

• Coverage of P.D. No. 1564: Petitioner maintained that the term “religious purpose” is not included in the statute’s text, which refers only to “charitable or public welfare purposes”; thus, under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, what the law does not expressly include, it excludes.
• Strict Construction of Penal Laws: Petitioner argued that penal statutes must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused, and any ambiguity in the law’s scope must be resolved in his favor.
• Free Exercise of Religion: Petitioner contended that requiring a government permit for solicitations made for a religious purpose constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.

• Coverage of P.D. No. 1564: Whether solicitations for religious purposes fall within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564, which requires a permit only for solicitations for “charitable or public welfare purposes.”
• Constitutional Infringement: Whether requiring a permit for solicitations intended for a religious purpose contravenes the free exercise clause of the Constitution.

• Coverage of P.D. No. 1564: Solicitations for religious purposes are not covered by Presidential Decree No. 1564. Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express enumeration of “charitable or public welfare purposes” excludes religious purposes, which are not mentioned. The 1987 Constitution and various statutes—such as the National Internal Revenue Code, the Corporation Code, and the Local Government Code—consistently treat “charitable” and “religious” as distinct categories joined by the disjunctive “or,” signifying that the two terms are not interchangeable. Because P.D. No. 1564 is a penal law, it must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; any doubt as to its scope must be resolved in favor of non-coverage. To subsume “religious” under “charitable” would unjustly expand the statute’s penal reach.
• Constitutional Infringement: The constitutional question was not reached as a basis for the acquittal; the acquittal rested solely on the non-applicability of the statute. Nonetheless, the decision recognized that the free exercise of religion consists of two aspects: the absolute freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one’s beliefs, which may be subject to reasonable regulation under the police power to protect society from fraud and abuse. While the State may validly regulate the time, manner, and conditions of public solicitation, any such regulation must not impose a prior restraint or unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Because P.D. No. 1564 was held inapplicable, no unconstitutional application occurred in this case.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — Where a statute expressly limits its application to particular matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others not mentioned. The legislature’s specific enumeration implies the exclusion of all other subjects. This principle was applied to confine P.D. No. 1564 to “charitable or public welfare purposes,” thereby excluding religious purposes.
• Strict Construction of Penal Laws — Penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They cannot be enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies, or equitable considerations, and they must not be strained to create new offenses or multiply felonies. An act that is otherwise innocent and lawful cannot be penalized absent a clear and unequivocal legislative expression.
• Distinction Between “Charitable” and “Religious” Purposes — In legal contemplation, “charitable” and “religious” are not synonymous or interchangeable, particularly when statutes employ the disjunctive “or” to separate them. Although religious activities may depend on voluntary donations and thus be considered charitable in a broad sense, “charitable” is a wider term that includes non-religious matters. The distinction is reinforced by consistent usage in the Constitution and other statutes.
• Free Exercise Clause: Belief vs. Action — The constitutional guarantee of religious freedom has a dual aspect: (1) freedom to believe, which is absolute and cannot be restricted by law; and (2) freedom to act on that belief, which may be regulated for the protection of society. Any regulation must be exercised in a manner that does not unduly infringe on the protected freedom, must not impose a religious test, and must not unreasonably obstruct the collection of funds for religious purposes.

• “It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius.’”
• “Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies.”
• “The word ‘charitable’ is a matter of description rather than of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances.”
• “The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. … Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. … Freedom to believe is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”

• Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48886-88, July 21, 1993, 224 SCRA 665 — Cited as authority for the rule on expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
• Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 296 (1940) — Relied upon for the distinction between the absolute freedom to believe and the regulable freedom to act in the exercise of religion, and for the principle that the State may regulate solicitation to protect citizens from fraud without imposing a prohibited prior restraint.
• American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957) — Cited in Justice Mendoza’s concurring opinion for the proposition that imposing a license or permit requirement on purely religious activities, such as the sale of bibles, constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on free exercise.
• Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69809, October 16, 1986, 145 SCRA 112 — Cited for the principle that strict construction of penal laws aims to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts, not to enable the guilty to escape punishment through technicality.

• Presidential Decree No. 1564, Section 2 — The core provision requiring a permit for solicitations for “charitable or public welfare purposes” was strictly construed and held not to encompass solicitations for religious purposes.
• 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 28(3) — Cited as an example of a constitutional provision that distinguishes “religious, charitable, or educational purposes” using the disjunctive “or,” supporting the interpretation that “charitable” and “religious” are separate categories.
• National Internal Revenue Code, Sections 26(e) and 28(8)(E); Corporation Code, Section 88; Local Government Code, Section 234(b) — Mentioned as statutory illustrations where the legislature expressly distinguished between “charitable” and “religious.”
• 1987 Constitution, Free Exercise Clause (Bill of Rights) — Discussed in the context of the limits of state regulation over religious activities, though the acquittal was based on statutory construction, not on an express constitutional violation.

Chief Justice Narvasa and Justice Puno concurred. Justice Mendoza concurred in the result with a separate opinion, joined by Justice Padilla. Justice Mendoza’s concurrence emphasized three distinct grounds: (1) a solicitation for the construction or repair of a church is a religious purpose, not a charitable or public welfare purpose, as it engages religious fervor rather than philanthropy; (2) the Decree aims to protect the public from fraudulent fund drives for charity and civic projects, a need that is less acute for religious solicitations typically conducted among co-religionists; and (3) requiring a government permit for religious solicitation imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on the free exercise of religion, analogous to the ruling in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, and the statute must be construed to avoid such a constitutional infirmity.

None.