Ceniza vs. Sebastian

The power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle; while offensive language in a pleading may constitute direct contempt in facie curiae, the penalty must not be imposed as an indulgence of the judge's sense of grievance.

Amado S. Ceniza was counsel for the defendant in a civil case pending before Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian in the CFI of Davao, Branch VIII. The legal backdrop is the inherent power of courts to punish contempt, including direct contempt for disrespect toward the court or judge, and the controlling principle that this power is exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle.

Amado S. Ceniza appeared as counsel for the defendant in a civil case then pending in the CFI of Davao, Branch VIII, presided over by Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian. In that case, Ceniza filed an ex-parte motion to have Judge Sebastian inhibit himself from trying the case. Paragraph 6 of the motion stated that because of certain personal acts or conduct displayed by the Presiding Judge in handling the case, which the defendant and her counsel deemed "highly irregular, corrupt and a gross misconduct for a Judge to do," counsel had filed an administrative case against the judge in the SC, docketed as Administrative Matter No. 846-CFI, Atty. Amado S. Ceniza vs. District Judge Alejandro Sebastian, CFI, Br. VIII, Tagum, DN; that the defendant was a material witness for the complainant in the administrative case; and that the judge's bias and prejudice against the defendant and her counsel were intensified, leaving him without the sense of justice, equanimity of emotion, detached and unaffected feeling, and disinterested and impartial compartment that judges ought to maintain.

According to the petition, respondent Judge then issued a "Warrant for the Arrest" of petitioner so that he would be locked up in jail for having committed, according to the judge, "Direct Contempt." Copies of the warrant were in the hands of several peace officers specifically ordered to arrest petitioner wherever found. Firmly believing the warrant was grossly unlawful and inspired by the judge's desire for vengeance, hatred, and yearning to persecute and destroy him, petitioner fled from his office and residence at Visayan Village, Tagum, Davao, dodged arrest by going to various places, and ultimately went to Manila to file the petition.

Respondent Judge's comment admitted that it was the allegation in paragraph 6 of the ex-parte motion that led to the warrant, petitioner being guilty of direct contempt. The comment stated that by an Order dated December 20, 1974, the CFI held petitioner guilty of direct contempt and sentenced him to 10 days imprisonment and a P200 fine; that a warrant for his arrest was issued on December 23, 1974; and that he could not be arrested because he went into hiding. The comment also narrated that after an injunction was issued in the civil case where Ceniza's client was the defendant, respondent Judge took steps to settle the case amicably; that the parties were close to the judge and his wife, whom they addressed as tatang and nanang; and that he convinced the defendant that if she no longer wanted to live with the plaintiff, who was legally married to another woman, she should at least agree to the division of their properties before they were lost in litigation.

According to the comment, before the amicable settlement could be signed, petitioner dissuaded the defendant from signing, telling her that all the real estate, businesses, trucks, and vehicles were hers because they were registered in her name. Petitioner was aware that the defendant had signed a document listing the properties that were to be her share as "agreed" upon between her and the plaintiff. To avoid the effect of that document, petitioner allegedly concocted a false story in the Answer that the defendant was forced to sign the document through intimidation of being killed and her honor exposed by the plaintiff, in the residence of respondent Judge and with the aid of one Col. Callejo and the judge. For this alleged shameless fabrication, derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent Judge, petitioner and his client were held guilty of direct contempt and sentenced to 10 days imprisonment and a P200 fine.

After petitioner was released from prison, an administrative case was filed against respondent Judge. That led to the ex-parte motion for inhibition in which the contemptuous language appeared. The SC noted that the deep-seated ill-will between petitioner and respondent Judge, made manifest by their voluminous pleadings, would make it most difficult for the judge to act with restraint and judiciousness. The CFI had found petitioner guilty of direct contempt, and the SC sustained that finding while modifying the penalty.

• Illegality of Contempt Order and Warrant: Petitioner argued that the warrant for his arrest issued by respondent Judge was grossly unlawful and inspired by the judge's desire for vengeance, hatred, and yearning to persecute and destroy him; the order and warrant were patently illegal, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
• Injunctive Relief: Petitioner prayed for immediate prohibition against the enforcement of the contempt order and warrant even before declaring them null and void.

• Inherent Contempt Power: Respondent countered that the punishment for contempt is inherent in all courts, and the only question is whether he committed grave abuse of discretion, which he denied; he merely exercised his right and power to punish petitioner for conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the administration of justice into disrepute.
• Direct Contempt by Offensive Pleading: Respondent argued that the use in pleadings of language disrespectful to the court or containing offensive words constitutes direct contempt, amounting to misbehaviour in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice; under Rule 71, contempt includes "disrespect toward the court or judge," and no self-respecting judge will tolerate such vile language.

• Direct Contempt: Whether the offensive language in petitioner's ex-parte motion for inhibition constituted direct contempt in facie curiae.
• Penalty for Contempt: Whether the ten-day imprisonment and P200 fine imposed by respondent Judge should be upheld or modified under the rule that the contempt power is exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle.

• Direct Contempt: Yes. The words were contumacious and constituted direct contempt in facie curiae; a lawyer, as an officer of the court, is not justified in using vile and disrespectful language in a pleading.
• Penalty for Contempt: The ten-day imprisonment is null and void and the warrant of arrest must be quashed; the fine is increased to P500. The contempt power is preservative, not vindictive, and the judge was not duly mindful of the exacting standard because of the deep-seated ill-will between him and petitioner.

• Direct Contempt: The SC began from the rule that a judge who is the victim of insulting and offensive epithets may avail of the contempt power, citing its consistent rulings from Carag vs. Warden of the Jail of Cagayan to Sulit vs. Tiangco. A member of the bar, as an officer of the court, is not justified in using vile and disrespectful language; if he does, he cannot complain when adjudged guilty of contempt. Where the words appear in a pleading submitted to a court, the contempt is in facie curiae and may be dealt with summarily. The paragraph in Ceniza's ex-parte motion called the judge's acts "highly irregular, corrupt and a gross misconduct" and used the word "corrupt"; respondent Judge admitted that this paragraph led to the warrant. The SC therefore sustained the finding that Ceniza committed direct contempt.
• Penalty for Contempt: The SC held that the ten-day imprisonment could not stand. The contempt power must be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle. The background showed deep-seated ill-will between petitioner and respondent Judge, evidenced by voluminous pleadings, and the judge's comment recounted a prior contempt order against petitioner and his client, the filing of an administrative case, and the ex-parte motion for inhibition containing the offensive language. Because of that ill-will, it would be most difficult for the judge to act with restraint and judiciousness, and the contempt power could become a manifestation of caprice, arbitrariness, or something analogous. While the words were contumacious, the judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting standard that the preservation of the dignity of his office, not the indulgence of his sense of grievance, sets the limits of his authority. The SC thus declared the ten-day sentence null and void, quashed the warrant, and increased the fine to P500.

• Preservative, Not Vindictive, Principle — The contempt power is exercised to preserve the dignity and authority of the court, not to vindicate a judge's personal grievance. The SC applied it by sustaining the direct contempt finding but striking the ten-day imprisonment and increasing the fine to P500 because the judge's penalty reflected his sense of grievance amid deep-seated ill-will.
• Direct Contempt in Facie Curiae — Offensive or disrespectful language in a pleading submitted to a court constitutes direct contempt in the presence of the court and may be summarily punished. The SC held that Ceniza's use of "corrupt" and similar language in his motion for inhibition was contumacious.
• Contempt Power Available to Judge as Victim — A judge who is the victim of insulting and offensive epithets may avail of the contempt power. The SC cited Carag vs. Warden of the Jail of Cagayan and Sulit vs. Tiangco and sustained the finding against Ceniza.
• Lawyer as Officer of the Court — A member of the bar, as an officer of the court, is not justified in using vile and disrespectful language; if he does, he cannot complain when adjudged guilty of contempt. The SC applied this to Ceniza's pleading.

• "This Court has been and continues to be committed to the authoritative doctrine that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle." — The opening ratio of the decision, framing the controlling principle that limits the contempt power.
• "Where the words appear in a pleading submitted to the Court, that is contempt in facie curiae and therefore may be dealt with in a summary manner." — The SC's statement of the rule on direct contempt for offensive language in a pleading.
• "Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting standard that preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise." — The SC's reason for striking the imprisonment while sustaining the contempt finding.
• "The power to punish for contempt could then be a manifestation of which caprice, or arbitrariness, or something analogous to it." — The SC's warning that the contempt power may become arbitrary when exercised amid deep-seated ill-will.

• Carag vs. Warden of the Jail of Cagayan, 53 Phil. 85 — Cited as early controlling precedent for the rule that a judge who is the victim of insulting and offensive epithets may avail of the contempt power.
• Sulit vs. Tiangco, L-35333, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 207 — Cited as continuing precedent for the same rule; the SC noted consistency from Carag to Sulit.
• People vs. Estenzo, L-24522, May 29, 1975, 64 SCRA 211 — Cited in support of the exacting standard limiting the contempt power and the preservative-not-vindictive principle.
• Entelera vs. Amores, L-41361, March 8, 1976, 70 SCRA 37 — Cited in footnote as supporting the preservative-not-vindictive doctrine.
• Blancaflor vs. Raya, L-31399, March 17, 1978, 82 SCRA 148 — Cited in footnote as supporting the preservative-not-vindictive doctrine.
• Calo Jr. vs. Tapucar, L-47244, January 16, 1979, 88 SCRA 78 — Cited in footnote as supporting the preservative-not-vindictive doctrine.
• Manalad vs. De Vega, L59866, February 22, 1983, 120 SCRA 749 — Cited in footnote as supporting the preservative-not-vindictive doctrine.
• Lipata vs. Tutaan, L-61643, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 877 — Cited in footnote as supporting the preservative-not-vindictive doctrine.

• Rule 71, Revised Rules of Court — Contempt includes "disrespect toward the court or judge"; the SC sustained the direct contempt finding for Ceniza's offensive language in a pleading but modified the penalty under the preservative-not-vindictive principle.

• Justice Aquino (Concurring) — He believed no fine should be imposed because petitioner already served 10 days imprisonment due to a prior contempt order of Judge Sebastian, and the charges filed by Judge Sebastian were dismissed.