Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corp. vs. Macroasia Corp.

The DENR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements, not the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board, the latter's jurisdiction under Section 77 of RA 7942 being confined to disputes involving rights to mining areas and mineral agreements at the application stage — i.e., adverse claims, protests, or oppositions to pending applications — and not to petitions for cancellation of subsisting agreements filed by third-party applicants who lack a material legal interest in the existing contract.

Macroasia Corporation, formerly Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation, held several mining lode and lease contracts covering areas in Brooke's Point, Palawan, the earliest dating to 1972 and the principal lease (MLC-V-1050) executed on September 24, 1973 for a 25-year term. Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation is the assignee of 144 mining claims contiguous to Macroasia's lode claims and holds its own MPSA covering 2,835 hectares in the same locality. Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation separately sought cancellation of mining lease contracts of Macroasia and Lebach Mining Corporation in the same area. The statutory framework governing the dispute spans PD 463 (the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974), its implementing Consolidated Mines Administrative Order (CMAO), Executive Orders 211 and 279, and RA 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995), which created the quasi-judicial Panel of Arbitrators and Mines Adjudication Board but was silent on which authority could cancel existing mineral agreements.

On September 24, 1973, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation entered into Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050 for a 25-year term expiring September 23, 1998, covering 216 hectares at Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brooke's Point, Palawan. Infanta held several other lode and lease contracts in the same area, issued between 1972 and 1978, collectively covering hundreds of hectares. Infanta's corporate name was changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation on January 26, 1994, and subsequently to Macroasia Corporation on November 6, 1995.

Sometime in 1997, Celestial filed a petition before the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB-DENR to cancel Macroasia's mining lease contracts and other mining claims, docketed as DENR Case No. 97-01. Celestial, as assignee of 144 mining claims contiguous to Macroasia's lode claims, grounded its petition on Macroasia's nonpayment of occupational fees and municipal taxes, non-filing of Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations, failure to provide improvements on the mining claims, concentration on logging, encroachment and extraction of nickel ore from Celestial's property, and Celestial's own willingness and ability to subject the areas to commercial production and to pay Macroasia's back taxes. Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, likewise sought cancellation of mining lease contracts and mining rights of Macroasia and Lebach Mining Corporation in Brooke's Point, docketed as DENR Case No. 97-02. Macroasia intervened and refuted the grounds for cancellation.

Based on Bureau of Mines records and field investigations, the POA found that Macroasia and Lebach had automatically abandoned their mining claims and lost all rights thereto. The POA cancelled Macroasia's seven mining lease contracts, awarded Celestial preferential rights over Macroasia's areas, and declared Lebach's leased areas abandoned with priority to Blue Ridge. Lebach did not appeal, rendering the resolution final as to it. Macroasia and Blue Ridge appealed to the MAB, docketed as MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97.

The MAB affirmed the POA's finding of abandonment, based on field verifications by MGB Region IV validated by a Special Team, but reversed the award of preferential rights, granting Blue Ridge — not Celestial — prior and preferential rights to file mining applications over the abandoned claims, with Celestial as secondary priority. Both Celestial and Macroasia moved for reconsideration. Before the MAB could resolve the motions, Macroasia filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on March 16, 2001, questioning the POA's jurisdiction to cancel mining lease contracts, arguing that such power was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary under RA 7942 and DENR AO 96-40.

On November 26, 2004, the MAB vacated its October 24, 2000 Decision, holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary, that the power to cancel was exclusively the DENR Secretary's, and that a petition for cancellation was not a mining dispute under Section 77 of RA 7942. The MAB further found no abandonment because the DENR Secretary had not decided to release Macroasia from its obligations. It declared Macroasia's seven lease contracts subsisting and awarded no preferential right to either Celestial or Blue Ridge.

Celestial and Blue Ridge thereafter pursued divergent paths. Celestial assailed the MAB Resolution before the CA Twelfth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931, which affirmed the MAB on April 15, 2005. Blue Ridge, after its motion for reconsideration was denied, questioned the MAB Resolutions before the CA Special Tenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828, which on May 18, 2006 reversed the MAB and reinstated the October 24, 2000 Decision granting Blue Ridge preferential rights. In the interim, Blue Ridge discovered that in December 2005, the DENR Secretary had approved and signed two MPSAs in favor of Macroasia, prompting Blue Ridge to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The two CA Divisions thus rendered diametrically opposing decisions on the same MAB Resolutions, precipitating the four consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court.

• Implied Jurisdiction of POA/MAB (Celestial): Petitioner Celestial maintained that while the jurisdiction to approve mining lease contracts or mineral agreements is conferred on the DENR Secretary, Section 77(a) of RA 7942 by implication granted to the POA and MAB the authority to cancel existing mining lease contracts or mineral agreements.
• Estoppel of Macroasia (Celestial): Petitioner Celestial argued that Macroasia was estopped from assailing the lack of jurisdiction of the POA and MAB, having raised the jurisdictional issue only in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration after receiving an adverse judgment.
• Preferential Right of Celestial (Celestial): Petitioner Celestial asserted that it had better rights than Blue Ridge over Macroasia's mining claims, having correctly filed its petition and its MPSA application after Macroasia's lease contract expired and after the POA's resolution was issued, and that priority was not an issue when the contested area had not yet been declared abandoned.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by DENR Secretary (Blue Ridge): Petitioner Blue Ridge argued that then Secretary Defensor committed grave abuse of discretion in approving and signing the two MPSAs in favor of Macroasia, because Macroasia had not complied with mandatory requirements under Section 35 of DENR AO 96-40, and because Blue Ridge held prior and preferential rights pursuant to the October 24, 2000 MAB Decision as affirmed by the CA.
• Exclusivity of DENR Secretary's Authority (Macroasia): Petitioner Macroasia strongly asserted that only the DENR Secretary had exclusive and primary jurisdiction to grant and cancel existing mining lease contracts, and that the POA and MAB had no jurisdiction to cancel much less to grant preferential rights to other mining firms.
• No Abandonment (Macroasia): Petitioner Macroasia reiterated that it did not abandon its mining claims, and that even if mining was not listed among its corporate purposes, its mining activities were merely ultra vires acts ratified by its stockholders in subsequent amendments to its Articles of Incorporation.
• Procedural Errors by CA Special Tenth Division (Macroasia): Petitioner Macroasia argued that the CA Special Tenth Division should have dismissed Blue Ridge's petition outright since the issues were identical to those already resolved by the CA Twelfth Division, and that the Special Tenth Division erred in denying Macroasia's Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice Carandang and in transferring Macroasia's lease agreements to Blue Ridge without observing required procedure.

• Exclusive DENR Secretary Jurisdiction (Macroasia, as respondent in G.R. Nos. 169080 and 176226): Respondent Macroasia strongly asserted that the DENR Secretary had exclusive and primary jurisdiction to grant and cancel existing mining lease contracts, and that the POA and MAB had no jurisdiction to cancel or to grant preferential rights to other mining firms.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion (DENR Secretary, as respondent in G.R. No. 172936): The DENR Secretary's approval of the MPSAs in favor of Macroasia was exercised within his administrative discretion and primary jurisdiction over mineral agreements, absent any showing of wanton, whimsical, or oppressive conduct.

• Jurisdiction over Cancellation: Whether the DENR Secretary, rather than the POA or MAB, has exclusive jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements under RA 7942 in relation to PD 463 and pertinent rules.
• Scope of POA Jurisdiction: Whether a petition for cancellation of an existing mining lease contract or mineral agreement constitutes a "dispute involving rights to mining areas" or a "dispute involving mineral agreements or permits" within the POA's jurisdiction under Section 77 of RA 7942.
• Estoppel: Whether Macroasia is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the POA and MAB, having raised the issue only in a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
• Abandonment: Whether Macroasia's mining lease contract areas were deemed abandoned, warranting cancellation of the lease contracts and opening of the areas to other qualified applicants.
• Preferential Rights: Whether Celestial or Blue Ridge has the preferential right to apply for the mining claims covered by Macroasia's expired or abandoned lease contracts.
• Validity of MPSAs: Whether the DENR Secretary gravely abused his discretion in approving and signing MPSA Nos. 220-2005-IVB and 221-2005-IVB in favor of Macroasia.
• Conflicting CA Decisions: Whether the CA Special Tenth Division should have consolidated Blue Ridge's petition with the earlier-filed CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 before the CA Twelfth Division to avoid conflicting decisions.

• Jurisdiction over Cancellation: Yes. The DENR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral agreements, the power emanating from his administrative authority under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, RA 7942, and the unrevoked Section 44 of the CMAO implementing PD 463.
• Scope of POA Jurisdiction: No. A petition for cancellation of an existing mineral agreement filed by a third-party applicant is not a "dispute" under Section 77 of RA 7942, because the applicant is not a real party-in-interest with a material legal interest in the subsisting agreement; the POA's jurisdiction is confined to adverse claims, protests, or oppositions relating to applications for mineral rights.
• Estoppel: No. The principle of estoppel does not apply, because Macroasia did not initiate the case before the POA and did not invoke its jurisdiction; jurisdiction may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
• Abandonment: No valid pronouncement of abandonment could be made. Since the POA and MAB lacked jurisdiction over the cancellation petitions, their findings of abandonment were without binding effect; the determination of abandonment is for the MGB to investigate and recommend to the DENR Secretary.
• Preferential Rights: Neither Celestial nor Blue Ridge was entitled to preferential rights. The October 24, 2000 MAB Decision granting Blue Ridge "prior and preferential rights to file" was nullified, and a preferential right is at most an inchoate right that has not ripened into a vested right absent MGB recommendation and DENR Secretary approval.
• Validity of MPSAs: No grave abuse of discretion was shown. The DENR Secretary acted within his primary jurisdiction and full discretion in granting mineral agreements, and Blue Ridge failed to demonstrate wanton, whimsical, or oppressive conduct; factual challenges raised for the first time on appeal were rejected.
• Conflicting CA Decisions: The CA Special Tenth Division should have ordered consolidation with the earlier-docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 pursuant to the Internal Rules of the CA to avoid the anathema of conflicting decisions on the same MAB Resolutions.

• Jurisdiction over Cancellation: The Court traced the historical evolution of mining laws from PD 463 through EO 211, EO 279, and RA 7942. Under PD 463 and its implementing CMAO, the DENR Secretary expressly approved mining lease contracts (Sec. 40) and could cancel them (Sec. 44, CMAO). EO 279 continued PD 463 and its implementing rules in force. RA 7942, while silent on cancellation, did not repeal Section 44 of the CMAO, which therefore remained in effect. The DENR Secretary's power also emanated from the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which vested the DENR with supervision, management, and control over mineral resources, and from Sections 8 and 29 of RA 7942, which conferred authority to enter into and approve mineral agreements. The power to approve necessarily implied the power to cancel. Applying the principle that a new statute may be construed as a continuation of existing legislative policy, RA 7942 was held to perpetuate the DENR Secretary's implied power to terminate mineral contracts. Furthermore, Section 7 of DENR AO 96-40 empowered the MGB Director to "cancel or recommend cancellation" of mining rights, and since the MGB operates under the DENR Secretary's supervision, the Secretary — not the POA — held cancellation authority. Paragraph 18 of the lease contracts themselves stipulated that the lessor (the government, represented by the Secretary) could declare the lease cancelled for violations, further confirming the Secretary's authority and estopping Celestial and Blue Ridge from challenging it.

• Scope of POA Jurisdiction: Section 77(a)'s phrase "disputes involving rights to mining areas" was construed, in light of Sections 38 and 41 of DENR AO 96-40, to refer only to adverse claims, protests, or oppositions to pending applications for mineral agreements — not to cancellation of subsisting agreements. Section 77(b)'s "disputes involving mineral agreements or permits" was analyzed through the definitions of "dispute" and "real party-in-interest." A dispute requires a conflict of claims or rights between parties with correlative legal obligations. A third-party applicant like Celestial or Blue Ridge has no material or substantial interest in an existing mineral agreement but only a prospective or expectant right in the mining area. Because the applicant has no legal right to the mining claim, no dispute can arise between the applicant and the parties to the agreement. A petition for cancellation based on breach of the agreement therefore falls within the DENR Secretary's jurisdiction, not the POA's, and is excluded from Section 77(b).

• Estoppel: The estoppel principle was held inapplicable because Macroasia did not initiate the proceedings before the POA and thus did not invoke its jurisdiction. A party who has not voluntarily submitted to a tribunal's jurisdiction may question it even on appeal. Celestial's reliance on Villela vs. Gozun was deemed misplaced, as that case was dismissed on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and contained no categorical ruling on the jurisdictional issue.

• Abandonment: The Court declined to make factual findings on Macroasia's compliance with work obligations, noting that it is not a trier of facts. The law does not impose automatic cancellation; abandonment is a question of fact to be determined by the MGB, which can recommend cancellation to the DENR Secretary. Because the POA and MAB lacked jurisdiction over the cancellation petitions, their pronouncements of abandonment were without binding effect. The DENR Secretary retains authority to cancel Macroasia's lease contracts on grounds of abandonment or any other valid ground.

• Preferential Rights: The October 24, 2000 MAB Decision — nullified by the November 26, 2004 Resolution — granted Blue Ridge only "prior and preferential rights to file its mining application," not an assurance of approval. A preferential right is at most an inchoate right to priority in the grant of a mining agreement, not a vested right unless approved by the MGB or DENR Secretary. Even with preferential status, the DENR Secretary retains discretion to grant mineral agreements to whomever he deems best. Moreover, a preferential right cannot dissolve pre-existing or subsisting mining lease contracts. Since the POA and MAB lacked jurisdiction, no valid preferential right could have been conferred on either Celestial or Blue Ridge.

• Validity of MPSAs: Blue Ridge's challenge to the DENR Secretary's approval of the MPSAs failed on multiple grounds. The argument that Macroasia failed to comply with mandatory requirements under Section 35 of DENR AO 96-40 was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court and was therefore barred. The factual issues involved would have relegated the Court to a trier of facts, proscribed under Rule 65. There was no exhaustion of administrative remedies before the MGB and DENR. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts defer to administrative agencies' expertise; absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion — wanton, whimsical, or oppressive conduct — the Court cannot review the wisdom of the Secretary's exercise of discretion. Macroasia's existing valid lease contracts gave it an administrative advantage over Blue Ridge and Celestial.

• Conflicting CA Decisions: The chronology showed that Blue Ridge's petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 90828) was filed three months after the CA Twelfth Division had already rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931. The CA Special Tenth Division should have ordered consolidation of the later petition with the earlier one pursuant to the Internal Rules of the CA. Citing Nacuray vs. NLRC, the Court emphasized that one division cannot review a case already passed upon by another division. The CA was directed to adopt or amend its rules to ensure consolidation of cases arising from the same challenged decision or resolution.

• Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction — Courts will defer to the decisions of administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. Applied here to uphold the DENR Secretary's discretion in granting mineral agreements, absent any showing of wanton, whimsical, or oppressive conduct.

• Implied Power to Cancel from Power to Approve — Where a statute confers upon an administrative officer the power to approve contracts or agreements, the power to cancel or terminate those agreements for violation of their terms is necessarily implied, especially when reinforced by implementing rules that expressly provide for cancellation by that officer. The DENR Secretary's power to cancel mineral agreements was derived from his express power to approve them under PD 463, the CMAO, and RA 7942, read against the backdrop of the Administrative Code of 1987.

• Real Party-in-Interest in Mining Disputes — A "dispute" under Section 77(b) of RA 7942 requires a conflict of claims or rights between parties with correlative legal obligations. A third-party applicant for a mining claim who seeks cancellation of an existing mineral agreement is not a real party-in-interest because he has no material or substantial interest in the agreement but only a prospective or expectant right. No dispute can arise between such an applicant and the parties to the existing agreement.

• Non-Applicability of Estoppel on Jurisdiction — A party who did not initiate proceedings before a tribunal and did not invoke its jurisdiction is not estopped from questioning that tribunal's jurisdiction, even if the question is raised for the first time on appeal. Jurisdiction may be challenged at any stage of the proceedings.

• Legislative History as Extrinsic Aid — In interpreting an ambiguous provision of law, the history of the enactment — including prior laws on the same subject matter — may be used as an extrinsic aid to determine legislative intent. A new statute may be construed as a continuation of existing legislative policy, particularly where the new law is silent on a matter addressed by its predecessors.

• "A petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral agreement covering an area applied for by an applicant based on the alleged violation of any of the terms thereof, is not a 'dispute' involving a mineral agreement under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942. It does not pertain to a violation by a party of the right of another. The applicant is not a real party-in-interest as he does not have a material or substantial interest in the mineral agreement but only a prospective or expectant right or interest in the mining area." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the scope of POA jurisdiction, defining why a cancellation petition by a third-party applicant falls outside Section 77(b) and within the DENR Secretary's exclusive authority.

• "Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements." — This establishes the doctrinal foundation for the DENR Secretary's implied power to cancel, linking the Administrative Code's grant of supervisory authority over mineral resources to the specific power over mineral agreements.

• "It is explicit from the foregoing provision that the DENR Secretary has the authority to cancel mineral agreements based on the recommendation of the MGB Director. As a matter of fact, the power to cancel mining rights can even be delegated by the DENR Secretary to the MGB Director. Clearly, it is the Secretary, not the POA, that has authority and jurisdiction over cancellation of existing mining contracts or mineral agreements." — This passage crystallizes the Court's conclusion on the allocation of cancellation authority, distinguishing the Secretary's power from the POA's limited adjudicative role.

• "Unless it is shown that the then DENR Secretary has acted in a wanton, whimsical, or oppressive manner, giving undue advantage to a party or for an illegal consideration and similar reasons, this Court cannot look into or review the wisdom of the exercise of such discretion." — This formulation of the standard for reviewing administrative discretion in mineral agreement grants is frequently cited in subsequent natural resources jurisprudence.

• Medrana vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 85904, August 21, 1990, 188 SCRA 818 — Cited by the MAB in affirming the POA's findings of abandonment under Section 51 of the CMAO implementing PD 463; provided the procedural framework for administrative appeals in mining disputes.
• Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. vs. MAB, G.R. No. 132475, September 11, 2000 — Explained that MAB decisions may first be appealed via petition for review to the CA before elevation to the Supreme Court, establishing the appellate chain for mining adjudication board rulings.
• Villela vs. Gozun, G.R. No. 158092, April 4, 2005 — Distinguished by the Court; Celestial relied on it to support POA jurisdiction over cancellation petitions, but the Court found no categorical pronouncement on the jurisdictional issue, as the case was dismissed on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• Nacuray vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 114924-27, March 18, 1997, 270 SCRA 9 — Followed for the proposition that one division of a collegial court cannot review a case already passed upon by another division; applied to criticize the CA Special Tenth Division for not consolidating Blue Ridge's petition with the earlier CA Twelfth Division case.
• Duero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11 — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction may be invoked and questioned at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, supporting the ruling that Macroasia was not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue.
• Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124261, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 285 — Cited for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, under which courts defer to administrative agencies' expertise absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Commissioner of Customs vs. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., No. L-28329, August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113 — Cited for the principle that legislative history may be used as an extrinsic aid in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions.

• Section 77, RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) — Defines the POA's exclusive and original jurisdiction over disputes involving rights to mining areas, mineral agreements or permits, surface owners/occupants/claimholders, and pending disputes. Construed to confine POA jurisdiction to adverse claims, protests, or oppositions at the application stage, excluding cancellation of subsisting agreements.
• Sections 78 and 79, RA 7942 — Establish the MAB's appellate jurisdiction over POA decisions and the composition of the MAB, with petition for review by certiorari to the Supreme Court on questions of law.
• Sections 8 and 29, RA 7942 — Confer on the DENR Secretary the authority to enter into and approve mineral agreements on behalf of the Government, upon recommendation of the MGB Director. Read as the statutory basis for the Secretary's implied power to cancel.
• Section 9, RA 7942 — Vests the MGB with direct charge over administration and disposition of mineral lands, and authorizes the Director to recommend granting of mineral agreements and monitor compliance. Correlated with the Secretary's supervisory authority.
• Section 40, PD 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974) — Provides that the Secretary shall approve and issue mining lease contracts where no adverse claim is filed. Served as the historical predecessor of the Secretary's approval authority under RA 7942.
• Section 44, CMAO (Consolidated Mines Administrative Order) — Prescribes the procedure for cancellation of mining lease contracts, authorizing the Secretary to warn, suspend, or cancel the lease upon finding the lessee in default. Held to remain in force as it was not repealed by RA 7942 or DENR AO 96-40.
• Section 7, DENR AO 96-40 — Empowers the MGB to "cancel or recommend cancellation, after due process, mining rights, mining applications and mining claims for non-compliance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations." Interpreted as confirming the DENR Secretary's cancellation authority, since the MGB operates under his supervision.
• Sections 38 and 41, DENR AO 96-40 — Govern the publication, posting, and evaluation of mineral agreement applications, and require POA certification that adverse claims are resolved before approval. Used to demonstrate that POA jurisdiction under Section 77(a) is confined to the application stage.
• Section 230, DENR AO 96-40 — Enumerates grounds for cancellation, revocation, and termination of mining permits, mineral agreements, and FTAAs. Though silent on who may order cancellation, correlated with Section 7 to conclude that the DENR Secretary holds that authority.
• Sections 1, 2, 4, and 8, Chapter I, Title XIV, Book IV, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 — Vest the DENR with primary responsibility for conservation, management, development, and use of mineral resources, and confer on the Secretary supervisory and control powers over the Department's functions. Held to be the constitutional-statutory source of the Secretary's power to approve and cancel mineral agreements.
• Paragraph 18, Mining Lease Contract Nos. V-1050 and MRD-52 — Stipulates that the lessor (the government, represented by the Secretary) may declare the lease cancelled for the lessee's failure to comply with laws, rules, or covenants, after 30 days' written notice. Relied upon to confirm the Secretary's cancellation authority and to estop Celestial and Blue Ridge from challenging it.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, and Minita V. Chico-Nazario concurred with the ponencia of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. No separate concurring opinions were written.