Causing vs. People

The crime of cyber libel under Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. 10175 prescribes in one year from its discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, pursuant to Article 90, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court abandoned its contrary ruling in Tolentino v. People, which had applied the 15-year prescriptive period for afflictive penalties.

Petitioner Berteni Cataluña Causing was charged with two counts of cyber libel for allegedly defamatory Facebook posts made in February and April 2019 against respondent Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez. The posts accused Hernandez of plunder and theft of public funds intended for Marawi siege victims. Hernandez filed his complaint-affidavit in December 2020. Causing moved to quash the informations, arguing the crime had prescribed under the one-year period for libel. The RTC denied the motion, leading to this petition for certiorari.

• Nature of the Case: Two separate Informations charged petitioner with Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 for Facebook posts made on February 4, 2019, and April 29, 2019.
• The Alleged Libel: The posts imputed to Representative Hernandez the crime of plunder and theft of P225-226 million from relief funds for Marawi siege victims, portraying him as a thief and part of a "gang of thieves."
• Motion to Quash: Petitioner moved to quash, arguing the one-year prescriptive period for libel under Article 90 of the RPC had lapsed before the complaint was filed in December 2020.
• RTC Ruling: The RTC denied the motion. It held that cyber libel is penalized by a special law (RA 10175), so Act No. 3326 applied, yielding a 12-year prescriptive period. Alternatively, it reasoned that even under the RPC, the penalty for cyber libel is afflictive (due to the one-degree increase under RA 10175), so the 15-year period under Article 90, paragraph 2 applied, citing Tolentino.
• Petition: Petitioner filed a certiorari petition, arguing the RTC gravely abused its discretion and reiterating that cyber libel prescribes in one year.

• Nature of Cyber Libel: Petitioner argued that RA 10175 did not create a new crime but merely recognized a computer system as another means of committing libel under Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC. Therefore, the RPC's prescriptive provisions apply.
• Applicable Prescriptive Period: Petitioner maintained that paragraph 4 of Article 90 of the RPC, which states "the crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year," is controlling.
• Challenge to Precedent: Petitioner contended that Tolentino v. People, which applied a 15-year period, is not a binding precedent because it is an unsigned resolution.

• Proper Remedy: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that certiorari is an improper remedy from the denial of a motion to quash; the proper recourse is to proceed to trial.
• Hierarchy of Courts: The OSG contended the petition violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by filing directly with the Supreme Court.
• Validity of Precedent: The OSG countered that Tolentino, though an unsigned resolution, is a binding precedent per Eizmendi v. Fernandez.
• Prescriptive Period: The OSG supported the RTC's application of a 12 or 15-year prescriptive period.

• Procedural: Whether the Petition for Certiorari should be dismissed for being an improper remedy and for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
• Statutory Interpretation: Whether Article 90 of the RPC or Section 1 of Act No. 3326 determines the prescriptive period of cyber libel.
• Prescription: Whether the two counts of cyber libel charged against petitioner have prescribed.

• Procedural: The petition was entertained despite procedural infirmities. Exceptional circumstances warranted direct resort to the Supreme Court because the petition raised purely legal issues regarding the interpretation of criminal laws on prescription and called for the Court to review and potentially overturn its prior ruling in Tolentino.
• Statutory Interpretation: The RPC, not Act No. 3326, governs the prescriptive period of cyber libel. Cyber libel is not a new crime but is the same felony of libel under Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, merely committed through a computer system. Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 itself references Article 355 of the RPC. Following People v. Terrado, when a crime is covered by both the RPC and a special law, the provision on prescription most favorable to the accused (i.e., the shorter period) must be applied.
• Prescription: Paragraph 4 of Article 90 of the RPC is the controlling provision, making cyber libel prescribe in one year. The Court abandoned the Tolentino doctrine. Paragraph 4 is a specific provision that prevails over the general provision in paragraph 2. The one-year period is reckoned from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, pursuant to Article 91 of the RPC. However, the denial of the motion to quash was affirmed because prescription is a matter of defense that requires evidence; the date of discovery was not apparent on the face of the informations, and petitioner failed to present evidence on this point. The issue of prescription remains a factual matter to be resolved during trial.

• Cyber Libel as Libel Under the RPC — The Court clarified that Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 did not create a new crime. It merely enforces the existing felony of libel under Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC when committed through a computer system, with the use of ICT acting as a qualifying circumstance that increases the penalty.
• Prescription of Crimes Covered by Both Special Law and RPC — When an offense is penalized under both a special law and the RPC, and the special law lacks its own prescriptive period, the court must compare the prescriptive periods under the special law (via Act No. 3326) and the RPC. The period most favorable to the accused—i.e., the shorter one—must be applied.
• Specific Prevails Over General (Generalia specialibus non derogant) — Within the same statute (Article 90 of the RPC), a specific provision (paragraph 4, prescribing libel in one year) prevails over a general provision (paragraph 2, prescribing crimes with afflictive penalties in fifteen years).
• Reckoning of Prescriptive Period for Libel — The prescriptive period for libel and cyber libel commences to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, as provided in Article 91 of the RPC. It may be reckoned from publication only if that coincides with the date of discovery.

• "Cyber Libel is not a new crime because Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, already punishes it. The offense under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 and felony under Article 355 of the RPC are one and the same crime with the same elements." — This passage from the Disini decision, reiterated by the Court, forms the core rationale for applying the RPC's prescriptive period.
• "Paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC must be given its literal and plain meaning: the crime of Libel shall prescribe in one year. This provision must therefore determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel..." — This states the Court's method of statutory interpretation, emphasizing the plain meaning of the specific provision on libel.
• "A prescriptive period of Cyber Libel longer than what is provided in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is something for the Legislature, not this Court, to address." — This underscores the principle of separation of powers and judicial restraint, limiting the Court's role to applying existing law.

• Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28 (2014) — Controlling precedent cited to establish that cyber libel is not a new crime but is the same as libel under the RPC.
• Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 240310 (2018) — The prior unsigned resolution holding cyber libel prescribes in 15 years was expressly abandoned by the Court in this decision.
• People v. Terrado, 211 Phil. 1 (1983) — Applied as analogous authority for the rule that when a crime is covered by both a special law and the RPC, the prescriptive period most favorable to the accused must be used.
• Eizmendi, Jr. v. Fernandez, 839 Phil. 902 (2019) — Cited by the OSG and acknowledged by the Court for the principle that an unsigned resolution can constitute a binding precedent if it states the facts and law clearly.
• Alcantara v. Amoranto, 107 Phil. 147 (1960) — Adopted as the correct authority for reckoning the prescriptive period of libel from the date of its discovery by the offended party, not necessarily from publication.

• Section 4(c)(4), Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) — Defines cyber libel as the unlawful acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the RPC committed through a computer system. The Court held this provision merely implements the RPC.
• Articles 353 and 355, Revised Penal Code — Define the felony of libel and its penalty. The Court found these provisions, not RA 10175, create the substantive crime.
• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides the prescriptive periods for crimes. The Court ruled that paragraph 4 ("The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year") is the controlling provision for cyber libel.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Governs the computation of the prescriptive period, stating it commences from the day the crime is discovered. The Court applied this to cyber libel.
• Section 1, Act No. 3326 — Provides prescriptive periods for violations of special laws. The Court held this law does not apply to cyber libel because the crime is defined by the RPC, or, alternatively, the RPC's one-year period is more favorable to the accused.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 10175 — Increases the penalty by one degree for crimes committed using ICT. The Court noted this increased penalty but held it did not alter the specific prescriptive period for libel.

• Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Chairperson)
• Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
• Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh (with a Separate Concurring Opinion)