Catores vs. Afidchao

A certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked; it may be altered, modified, or cancelled only in a direct proceeding filed for that purpose, and claims of errors in the technical description of a Torrens title raised as a defense in an accion publiciana constitute a prohibited collateral attack.

Respondent Mary D. Afidchao is the registered owner of a parcel of land measuring 8,383 square meters situated in Residence Section "J," Sto. Tomas, Barangay Dontogan, Baguio City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27839. She acquired the property from its previous registered owners, spouses Isidoro and Nellie Balinsat, on August 29, 1977, and thereafter declared it for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 23347 and paid realty taxes religiously. Petitioner Angeline Catores occupied a portion of the subject property in June 1984 by constructing a house and making improvements thereon. The dispute centers on whether petitioner's occupation encroached upon respondent's titled property and whether alleged defects in the technical description of respondent's Torrens title undermine her claim to possession.

Respondent Mary D. Afidchao is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 8,383 square meters situated in Residence Section "J," Sto. Tomas, Barangay Dontogan, Baguio City, covered by TCT No. T-27839. She purchased the property from its previous registered owners, spouses Isidoro and Nellie Balinsat, on August 29, 1977. Immediately thereafter, she declared the property for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 23347 and paid realty taxes religiously.

Sometime in June 1984, petitioner Angeline Catores entered and occupied a portion of the subject property by building a house thereon and making improvements such as levellings, riprapping, planting trees, and fencing. On August 2, 1984, respondent filed a case for forcible entry against petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio, which ordered a verification relocation survey on January 7, 1985. Without waiting for the survey results, the MTC dismissed the complaint on February 5, 1985, holding that the real issue was one of legal possession and that the proper remedy was accion publiciana.

The verification and relocation survey conducted by the Office of the Bureau of Lands of Baguio City confirmed respondent's allegation that petitioner had encroached on her titled property by constructing a house with a calculated size of 8' x 10' and by destroying some stonewallings. Respondent required petitioner to vacate and remove the improvements, but petitioner refused. Consequently, on August 13, 1985, respondent filed a complaint for accion publiciana. In her Answer, petitioner raised the defenses that she had been in possession of the land as early as 1977, that the land was not within the property of anybody including respondent, and that her possession was with color of title.

The RTC gave great weight to the findings of Edilberto R. Quiaoit, head of the survey team of the Bureau of Lands, who conducted the relocation verification survey, and found these corroborated by geodetic engineer Venancio Figueres, who conducted the subdivision survey of the property for respondent in December 1977. The RTC found that preponderance of evidence favored respondent, who held a title and tax declaration and had acquired the property by purchase, over petitioner, who had no title or tax declaration and was not shown to have acquired any title from the Sunrise Village Association. The RTC declared the approximately 2,138 square meters occupied by petitioner as part of respondent's titled property and ordered petitioner to vacate, restore possession to respondent, and remove her house and other structures. The CA affirmed this ruling, noting that despite a discrepancy in the technical description of respondent's title, the property could still be concretely identified by referring to the control map of the Bureau of Lands and existing monuments, and that both Quiaoit and Figueres arrived at the same conclusion that the lot occupied by petitioner was within respondent's property. The CA further noted admissions by petitioner's expert witness, Engr. Jose Fernandez, on cross-examination that the subject properties adjoin each other, that he failed to conduct an ocular inspection, and that he failed to account for the actual location of monuments.

• Conclusiveness of Certificate of Title: Petitioner asseverated that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership but also of the land's location, metes, and bounds, and that a discrepancy in the tie line in the technical description of respondent's title was fatal to the identification of the property and consequently to respondent's cause.
• Reliance on Precedent: Petitioner cited Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Misa vs. Court of Appeals to argue that errors in technical description and location impugn the integrity of Torrens titles and that a plaintiff in a recovery action must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
• Defects in Survey Evidence: Petitioner claimed that Quiaoit's survey and sketch plans were worthless because Quiaoit was not a geodetic engineer and did not use the Original Plan Psu 184580 of Nellie Balinsat, which was not presented before the RTC, but instead used the Projection Map of the Bureau of Lands-Baguio City, which did not show the tie points and tie lines of all properties in Baguio City.
• Unreliability of the Clerk of Court's Report: Petitioner argued that the Report made by the Clerk of Court was unreliable because no hearing was conducted thereon by the RTC and the parties were not able to interpose their respective objections.
• Integrity of Monuments: Petitioner maintained that the monuments referred to were unreliable due to discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses, such that the monuments in respondent's property had lost their integrity.
• Newly Discovered Evidence: Petitioner claimed that newly discovered evidence further strengthened her position that her lot was not within respondent's land and that this evidence could not have been discovered and produced before the RTC due to lack of cooperation from the Bureau of Lands-Baguio City.

• Conclusiveness of Factual Findings: Respondent argued that the findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, must be accorded respect and great weight, and that petitioner merely quoted portions of testimonies to suit her claims while disregarding the whole substance of said testimonies.
• Sufficiency of Identification: Respondent maintained that she concretely established that the subject property was well within her titled property, as the entire testimony of Quiaoit revealed that while there was an error in the tie line, the area occupied by petitioner was within her property, a finding corroborated by Engr. Figueres' testimony.
• Petitioner's Own Evidence: Respondent pointed out that petitioner herself and her witnesses established the same finding, because the names of the owners of adjoining properties as testified to by petitioner tallied with the names of the owners of the adjoining properties of respondent's titled property, and that petitioner's witness Medino Balusdan pointed out that the area claimed by petitioner was between the lot claimed by one R. Villena and Balinsat, from whom respondent undisputedly acquired the subject property.
• Ocular Inspection: Respondent added that the testimonies of Quiaoit and Figueres were confirmed during the ocular inspection conducted by the RTC, with the Clerk of Court as hearing officer, and that petitioner's counsel participated without objection.

• Applicability of Precedent: Whether the doctrines in Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Misa vs. Court of Appeals — involving actions for quieting of title — apply to an accion publiciana involving a registered Torrens title.
• Scope of Rule 45 Review: Whether the petition raises only questions of law or also invites the Court to re-examine and re-evaluate factual findings of the lower courts.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Whether petitioner's claims of errors in the technical description of respondent's Torrens title constitute a collateral attack on the certificate of title prohibited under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529.
• Reliance on the Clerk of Court's Report: Whether the CA erred in relying on the Report of the Clerk of Court on the ocular inspection, notwithstanding the RTC's failure to mention it in its decision.
• Right to Possession: Whether respondent, as the registered owner, is entitled to possession of the property covered by her Torrens title.

• Applicability of Precedent: No. The actions in Lorenzana and Misa were for quieting of title, while the present case is an accion publiciana involving a registered Torrens title; the facts are not similar, and petitioner is not even a holder of any title over the subject property.
• Scope of Rule 45 Review: No. The petition essentially asks the Court to re-examine and re-evaluate evidence, which is beyond the scope of Rule 45; jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law, and no exception to the conclusiveness of CA factual findings was established.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Yes, the claims constitute a collateral attack. A certificate of title cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding, and petitioner's allegations of errors in the technical description require a review of the registration decree, which cannot be done in an accion publiciana.
• Reliance on the Clerk of Court's Report: No error. The Clerk of Court was duly appointed as hearing officer for the ocular inspection upon agreement of all parties, petitioner's counsel participated without objection, and the Report forms part of the records properly considered by the CA in its review.
• Right to Possession: Yes. The registered owner is entitled to possession of the property from the time the title was issued in her favor, and preponderance of evidence was in favor of respondent.

• Applicability of Precedent: The Court distinguished Lorenzana and Misa on factual grounds. In Lorenzana, petitioners prayed that their error-filled titles be adjudged superior to regularly issued titles of private respondents. In Misa, the case involved unregistered properties which were partitioned but not particularly identified due to lack of evidence. In contrast, the subject property in the present case is covered by TCT No. T-27839 issued in respondent's name, and petitioner is not even a holder of any title. The doctrinal rule that a plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of the defendant's claim, was inapplicable because respondent did have a valid title and preponderance of evidence was in her favor.

• Scope of Rule 45 Review: Under Rule 45, the Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and correcting errors of law committed by the CA. The Court is not a trier of facts and cannot review factual issues or weigh the probative value of evidence. The doctrine that CA findings are conclusive on the parties carries even more weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. The Court enumerated ten recognized exceptions to this rule but found that petitioner failed to show the case falls within any of them. Petitioner's numerous grounds ultimately boiled down to a request for re-examination and re-evaluation of evidence, which the Court cannot undertake.

• Collateral Attack on Title: Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding filed in accordance with law. Citing De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation and Caraan vs. Court of Appeals, the Court defined a collateral attack as one where, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Petitioner's Answer did not directly impugn the validity of respondent's title but alleged that the area she occupied was not within respondent's titled property. However, her petition was replete with claims of errors in the technical description of respondent's title and that of her predecessors-in-interest, which would require a review of the registration decree — a collateral attack not allowed in an accion publiciana. The proper remedy would be a direct proceeding for correction of the title.

• Reliance on the Clerk of Court's Report: The Clerk of Court was duly appointed as hearing officer for the ocular inspection by virtue of an RTC Order dated November 10, 1989, upon agreement of all parties. Petitioner did not interpose any objection to the appointment or to the conduct of the inspection, and petitioner's counsel participated therein. When the Clerk of Court observed that the boundaries pointed to by petitioner were within respondent's property, petitioner's counsel did not object. The RTC's failure to mention the Report in its decision was of no moment because, on appeal, the case was thrown wide open for CA review, and the CA has authority to review factual matters. The Report forms part of the records properly considered by the CA.

• Right to Possession: As the registered owner, respondent is entitled to possession of the property from the time the title was issued in her favor. With preponderance of evidence in favor of respondent — who held a title and tax declaration, paid taxes, and acquired the property by purchase — the conclusion that respondent should be placed in possession was inescapable. The CA committed no reversible error.

• Incontrovertibility of Torrens Title (Section 48, P.D. No. 1529) — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding filed in accordance with law. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that petitioner's claims of errors in the technical description of respondent's title, raised as defenses in an accion publiciana, constituted a prohibited collateral attack because they would require a review of the registration decree issued in respondent's favor.

• Definition of Collateral Attack — An attack on a title is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside the judgment or enjoin its enforcement. The attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. The Court applied this definition to hold that petitioner's defense — that the area she occupied was not within respondent's titled property, supported by claims of errors in the technical description — partook of a collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title.

• Conclusiveness of CA Factual Findings Under Rule 45 — Under Rule 45, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law; it is not a trier of facts. Findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. The Court recognized ten exceptions: (1) findings grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) inference manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) grave abuse of discretion; (4) judgment based on misapprehension of facts; (5) conflicting findings of fact; (6) CA went beyond the issues and contrary to admissions of both parties; (7) findings contrary to those of the trial court; (8) findings without citation of specific evidence; (9) facts in the petition not disputed by respondent; (10) findings premised on supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. Petitioner failed to invoke any exception.

• Right of Registered Owner to Possession — The registered owner is entitled to possession of the property from the time the title was issued in his or her favor. The Court applied this principle to hold that respondent, as the registered owner of TCT No. T-27839, was entitled to possession of the portion encroached upon by petitioner.

• "a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack." — This quotation reproduces the statutory language of Section 48, P.D. No. 1529, which the Court invoked as the controlling rule barring petitioner's challenge to respondent's title in an accion publiciana.

• "the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof." — This passage provides the Court's canonical formulation of collateral attack, drawn from Caraan vs. Court of Appeals, and was applied to characterize petitioner's defense as a prohibited collateral attack on the Torrens title.

• "our jurisdiction over cases brought to us from the CA is limited to reviewing and correcting errors of law committed by said court. This Court is not a trier of facts." — This statement articulates the fundamental limitation on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under Rule 45, which the Court used to decline petitioner's invitation to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts.

• "the rectification of the title may be made only through a proper action filed for that purpose." — This pronouncement establishes that challenges to the accuracy of a Torrens title's technical description must be pursued in a direct proceeding, not as a defense in a recovery-of-possession action.

• Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 713 (1994) — Distinguished. The case involved an action for quieting of title where petitioners prayed that their error-filled titles be adjudged superior to regularly issued titles. The Court held it inapplicable because the present case is an accion publiciana involving a registered Torrens title, and petitioner holds no title at all.

• Misa vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 217 (1992) — Distinguished. The case involved unregistered properties that were partitioned but not particularly identified due to lack of evidence. The Court held it inapplicable because the subject property here is covered by a Torrens title.

• De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation, 452 SCRA 564 (2005) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the rule that a certificate of title cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding, and that a collateral attack on a Torrens title is not allowed.

• Caraan vs. Court of Appeals, 474 SCRA 543 (2005) — Followed. The Court adopted this case's definition of collateral attack — where, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is made as an incident thereof — and applied it to characterize petitioner's defense as a prohibited collateral attack.

• Ybañez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743 (1991) — Followed. The Court quoted this case for the proposition that questioning a Torrens certificate of title by invoking an affirmative defense in an action for recovery of possession partakes of a collateral attack, which is not allowed under the Torrens system.

• Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development Corporation, 476 SCRA 305 (2005) — Cited. The Court relied on this case for the Rule 45 principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.

• Sps. Casimiro vs. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 219 (2002) — Cited. The Court quoted this case for the enumeration of ten exceptions to the conclusiveness of CA factual findings under Rule 45.

• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding filed in accordance with law. The Court applied this provision to bar petitioner's challenge to the technical description of respondent's Torrens title in an accion publiciana, holding that such challenge constituted a prohibited collateral attack.

• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended — Governs petitions for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court and limits jurisdiction to reviewing and correcting errors of law committed by the CA. The Court invoked this rule to decline re-examination of the factual findings of the RTC and CA, which were conclusive on the parties in the absence of any recognized exception.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Conchita Carpio Morales, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, and Diosdado M. Peralta concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were rendered.