Catalan, Jr. vs. Silvosa

A lawyer's final conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, such as direct bribery, is a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and the prohibition against representing conflicting interests under Rule 6.03 applies even if the lawyer acted in good faith. The Court will not review a final judgment of conviction in a disbarment case, and the crime of direct bribery inherently involves moral turpitude because it denotes malicious intent to renege on duties owed to society.

Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. was a private complainant in a criminal case that Silvosa prosecuted. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline investigated the administrative complaint against Silvosa, and the IBP Board of Governors reviewed and modified the recommended penalty. The case reached the Supreme Court as an administrative matter for the discipline of a member of the Bar.

Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa served as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and as Prosecutor in RTC, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. In that capacity, he appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al. (the Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. was one of the private complainants in that case. Catalan took issue with Silvosa's manner of prosecuting the case and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Silvosa. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Catalan's request and relieved Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005.

On 23 November 2005, Silvosa, now acting as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment in the Esperon case. In his defense, Silvosa claimed he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002, that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail, and that he had no relationship with the accused.

In his second cause of action, Catalan presented the affidavit of Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio. In a case for frustrated murder where Catalan's brother was a respondent, Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time, Silvosa offered her ₱30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. Silvosa dismissed the allegation as self-serving and purposely dug by Catalan and his "puppeteer" to pursue persecution.

In the third cause of action, Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan's decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse had filed a complaint against Silvosa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse's father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas, Cadinas remained in detention for more than two years. Silvosa demanded ₱15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation, which was videotaped and aired by GMA 7's television program Imbestigador; the footage was offered and admitted as evidence and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Silvosa's defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted him of direct bribery, sentencing him to imprisonment of one year, one month and eleven days of prision correccional as minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty days of prision correccional as maximum, and a fine of ₱10,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Silvosa admitted his conviction and that he was under probation, but asserted that conviction under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code did not involve moral turpitude since the act did not amount to a crime, and that it was not the lawyer in him that was convicted but his capacity as a public officer.

• Rule 6.03 Violation: Atty. Catalan relied on Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service," arguing that Silvosa's appearance as private counsel in the Esperon case after having prosecuted it constituted a violation.
• Bribery Attempt: Catalan presented the affidavit and testimony of Pros. Toribio, who testified that Silvosa offered her ₱30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
• Direct Bribery Conviction: Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan's decision in Criminal Case No. 27776 convicting Silvosa of direct bribery, arguing that this conviction was a ground for disbarment.

• Limited Appearance: Silvosa claimed that he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002, that his appearance as private counsel was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail, and that he had no relationship with the accused.
• Rule 2.01 and Canon 14: Silvosa invoked Rule 2.01, which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed," and Canon 14, which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy," to justify his appearance.
• Bribery Allegation as Persecution: Silvosa dismissed Pros. Toribio's allegations as self-serving and purposely dug by Catalan and his "puppeteer" to pursue persecution.
• No Moral Turpitude: Silvosa admitted his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and that he was under probation, but asserted that conviction under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code did not involve moral turpitude since the act did not amount to a crime, and that it was not the lawyer in him that was convicted but his capacity as a public officer.

• Conflict of Interest: Whether Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he appeared as private counsel in a case he previously prosecuted.
• Bribery Attempt: Whether Atty. Silvosa's attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio was established by the records.
• Direct Bribery Conviction as Ground for Disbarment: Whether Atty. Silvosa's final conviction for direct bribery constitutes a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

• Conflict of Interest: Yes. Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he entered his appearance as private counsel in the Esperon case, a matter in which he had intervened as public prosecutor, and also violated Rule 15.03 on representation of conflicting interests.
• Bribery Attempt: Yes. The records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed; his mere denial was insufficient to overcome the evidence against him.
• Direct Bribery Conviction as Ground for Disbarment: Yes. Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, and Silvosa's final conviction falls under the grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

• Conflict of Interest: The Court agreed with Comm. Funa's finding that Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. The wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 are clear, and Silvosa did intervene in the criminal case. His attempt to minimize his role was unavailing; he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the case and made himself familiar with the parties. Entering his appearance to file a Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal still constituted a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act was sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation. The Court also cited Rule 15.03, which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts." Citing Hilado vs. David, the Court emphasized that an attorney is employed when he is listening to a client's preliminary statement of his case or giving advice thereon, just as truly as when drawing pleadings or advocating in open court. The prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorney's intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.

• Bribery Attempt: Contrary to Comm. Funa's ruling, the records show that Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Toribio to make false testimonies against Silvosa. Silvosa merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. Silvosa failed in this respect. Mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint does not automatically exonerate a respondent, and administrative offenses do not prescribe.

• Direct Bribery Conviction as Ground for Disbarment: The Court disagreed with Comm. Funa's ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person, and Section 1, Rule 139-B allows the IBP to take proceedings upon the verified complaint of any person. It was of no moment that Catalan was not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776; the Sandiganbayan's judgment is a matter of public record and already final, and Silvosa himself admitted he was under probation. Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138. Moral turpitude is defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Citing Magno vs. COMELEC, the Court enumerated the elements of direct bribery: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; (3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element, as the offender's agreement to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commit an unjust act or refrain from performing an official duty in exchange for favors denotes malicious intent to renege on duties owed to fellowmen and society.

• Conflict of Interest (Rule 6.03, Code of Professional Responsibility) — A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. The Court applied this rule to Silvosa's appearance as private counsel in the Esperon case, holding that even a limited appearance to file a motion to reinstate bail constitutes sufficient intervention and establishes a lawyer-client relation.

• Representation of Conflicting Interests (Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility) — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts. The prohibition applies although the attorney's intentions were honest and he acted in good faith, as the rule is designed to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice.

• Moral Turpitude — Defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." The Court held that direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, as the offender's agreement to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commit an unjust act or refrain from performing an official duty in exchange for favors denotes malicious intent to renege on duties owed to fellowmen and society.

• Conclusive Effect of Final Conviction in Disbarment Proceedings — In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan's judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776, being a matter of public record and already final, was sufficient to support disbarment.

• "An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court." — This passage from Hilado vs. David, quoted by the Court, defines the scope of attorney employment and supports the finding that Silvosa's limited appearance still constituted a violation of Rule 6.03.

• "Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice." — This passage articulates the policy basis for the strict prohibition against conflicting interests, which the Court applied to Silvosa's conduct.

• "When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him." — This passage states the burden on a respondent lawyer in disciplinary proceedings, which Silvosa failed to meet regarding the bribery attempt.

• "Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general." — This passage from Magno vs. COMELEC, quoted by the Court, establishes why direct bribery involves moral turpitude.

• Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949) — Cited as controlling authority defining when an attorney is "employed" for purposes of testing incompatibility of interests, and for the principle that the bare relationship of attorney and client is the yardstick for testing conflicting interests.
• Pormento, Sr. vs. Atty. Pontevedra, 494 Phil. 164 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies even if the attorney's intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.
• Radjaie vs. Atty. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1 (2000) — Cited for the rule that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough to deny the charges; the lawyer must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.
• Heck vs. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798 (2004) — Cited for the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe and erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
• Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 1 — Cited for the rule that disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person.
• Magno vs. COMELEC, 439 Phil. 339 (2002) — Cited as controlling authority enumerating the elements of direct bribery and establishing that direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Dela Torre vs. COMELEC, 327 Phil. 1144 (1996) — Cited for the definition of moral turpitude.
• Moreno vs. Atty. Araneta, 496 Phil. 788 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction in a disbarment case.

• Rule 6.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. The Court found Silvosa violated this rule by appearing as private counsel in the Esperon case.
• Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts. The Court held Silvosa violated this rule when he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal.
• Rule 2.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed. Silvosa invoked this rule in his defense, but the Court did not find it applicable.
• Canon 14, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. Silvosa invoked this canon in his defense, but the Court did not find it applicable.
• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court found Silvosa's final conviction for direct bribery fell under this ground.
• Section 1, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — Provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the IBP upon the verified complaint of any person. The Court cited this provision to reject the argument that Catalan could not initiate the disbarment case.
• Article 210, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of direct bribery. Silvosa was convicted under the second paragraph of this article, and the Court held that direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Sereno, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred. Leonardo-De Castro and Peralta, JJ., were on official leave. Brion and Mendoza, JJ., were on leave.