Casimiro vs. Tandog

In administrative disciplinary proceedings, procedural due process is satisfied by notice and a real opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and it does not require strict application of technical rules of procedure and evidence or cross-examination absent a request; substantial evidence is sufficient to support dismissal for dishonesty, and bias or partiality cannot be presumed from kinship alone.

Haydee C. Casimiro served as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon, while Filipino T. Tandog was the Municipal Mayor. The dispute implicated the Mayor’s administrative disciplinary authority over a municipal employee and the Municipal Assessor’s statutory duties under the Local Government Code to maintain property assessment records and process tax declarations. The governing standards included the due process clause of the Bill of Rights and the Civil Service rules classifying dishonesty as a grave offense.

Haydee C. Casimiro began her government service as an assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon, and in August 1983 was appointed Municipal Assessor. Filipino T. Tandog was the Municipal Mayor of the same municipality. On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres submitted a report based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in Casimiro’s office. The report described the anomalous cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new tax declaration in the name of Casimiro’s brother, Ulysses Cawaling, as well as the cancellation of Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of Casimiro’s brother-in-law, Marcelo Molina.

Immediately after the report, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 13 dated 06 September 1996, placing Casimiro under preventive suspension for thirty days. Three days later, Memorandum Order No. 15 directed her to answer the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer, Casimiro denied the irregularities. She claimed that the cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption of office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molina’s favor.

On 23 October 1996, through Memorandum Order No. 17, Mayor Tandog extended Casimiro’s preventive suspension for another thirty days effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 18 directed Casimiro to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. Noraida alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of Marcelo Molina, Casimiro’s brother-in-law, without the necessary documents, and that Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the land. Teodulo claimed that he never executed a deed of absolute sale over the parcel covered by Tax Declaration No. 0236 in favor of Ulysses Cawaling, Casimiro’s brother. In a letter dated 29 October 1996, Casimiro stated that she had already explained her side regarding Noraida’s complaint in her letter dated 26 September 1996, and that, as to Teodulo’s complaint, a certain Lilia Barrientos had executed a deed of absolute sale over the parcel in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling.

Not satisfied, Mayor Tandog created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. After a series of hearings, the committee submitted its report on 22 November 1996 recommending Casimiro’s separation from service. The committee found her guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon. Based on that recommendation, Mayor Tandog issued Administrative Order No. 1 dated 25 November 1996 dismissing Casimiro and ordering her separated from service as Municipal Assessor effective upon request.

The findings later quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals were that Casimiro’s claim that she had nothing to do with the processing of the tax declarations in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was unacceptable. As municipal assessor, she was required to keep a correct record of all transfers, leases, and mortgages of real property within her jurisdiction. The annotation on her brother’s tax declaration that the same property was also declared in the name of another person and that all of them were paying realty taxes thereon should have cautioned her to set the records right. Under the applicable rule, municipal assessors are supposed to cancel assessments where several assessments have been made for the same property, except the one properly made, with preference to the person who has the best title or, in default thereof, possession. On this score alone, she was liable for gross neglect of duty. Her defense was further weakened by her vacillation on whether Teodulo Matillano or Leticia Barrientos Berbano executed the deed of absolute sale in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling.

With respect to the tax declarations of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina, the questioned tax declarations themselves showed that the declarations were subscribed to under oath by the declarant before Casimiro on August 15, 1996, in effect cancelling Antipaz San Sebastian’s tax declaration on even date. The taxes due thereon—land tax, transfer tax, and capital gain tax—were paid only in October of the same year, or two months after the tax declarations had already been issued in favor of Molina. Under Article 224[b] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, no tax declaration shall be cancelled and a new one issued in lieu thereof unless the transfer tax has first been paid. Article 299[c] required the previous property owner to surrender the tax declaration to the assessor for cancellation, but Casimiro failed to present the complainants’ cancelled tax declarations and did not even allege that they had been surrendered to her. Casimiro also admitted using the deed of sale allegedly executed by Lilia Barrientos in favor of Cawaling in transferring the tax declaration in her brother’s name, despite the property being still under litigation between Matillano and Barrientos.

• Procedural Due Process and Impartial Tribunal: Petitioner argued that she was denied procedural due process and fair and impartial treatment when she was terminated. She pointed to bias and partiality on the fact-finding committee because Lorna Tandog Vilasenor, a member, was the sister of respondent Mayor, and because committee chairman Nelson M. Andres had been appointed Administrative Officer II only on 01 August 1996 and was soon given the chairmanship. She further argued that the affiants-complainants were not presented for cross-examination.
• Substantive Due Process: Petitioner argued that she was denied substantive due process because the assailed decision was not supported by competent and credible evidence.

• Procedural Due Process: Whether petitioner was afforded procedural due process when she was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.
• Substantive Due Process: Whether petitioner was afforded substantive due process when she was terminated from her employment.
• Impartial and Fair Treatment: Whether petitioner was afforded impartial and fair treatment, particularly whether bias and partiality on the members of the fact-finding committee deprived her of due process.

• Procedural Due Process: Yes. Administrative due process requires notice and a real opportunity to be heard, which may be through pleadings; petitioner attended the 01 October 1996 hearing, filed her answer, and sought reconsideration. Cross-examination was not indispensable absent a request.
• Substantive Due Process: Yes. The dismissal was supported by substantial evidence, the quantum required in administrative cases, showing dishonesty and gross neglect in the cancellation and issuance of tax declarations.
• Impartial and Fair Treatment: Yes. Kinship alone does not establish bias, and petitioner failed to substantiate her allegations of partiality; the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevails.

• Procedural Due Process: The due process clause in Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights requires that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced; in administrative proceedings, it simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The Court cited the administrative due process requirements: (1) actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality; and (4) a finding supported by substantial evidence. The record showed that a hearing was conducted on 01 October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered questions propounded by the fact-finding committee. She filed her answer to the formal charge, submitted a letter-response, and filed a motion for reconsideration of the committee’s recommendation. On cross-examination, administrative proceedings do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure and evidence; nothing on record showed that she asked for cross-examination. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side or to move for reconsideration.
• Substantive Due Process: Petitioner’s substantive due process claim was that the assailed decision was not supported by competent and credible evidence. The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient for the imposition of disciplinary action. The standard is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and that participation therein renders the employee unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by the position. Substantial evidence existed as to two irregularities. First, the cancellation of Teodulo Matillano’s tax declaration and the issuance of a new one in favor of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling. As municipal assessor, petitioner had the duty under Section 159, Article VI, Chapter 3, Title II, Book II of the Local Government Code to keep a correct record of all transfers, leases, and mortgages of real property. Even if she had no hand in processing her brother’s tax declaration, she should have ensured that the records were in order. The annotation that the same property was also declared in the name of another person and that all of them were paying realty taxes should have cautioned her; under paragraph (4)(h), municipal assessors are supposed to cancel assessments where several assessments have been made for the same property, except the one properly made, with preference to the person with the best title or, in default, possession. This alone made her liable for gross neglect of duty, penalized by dismissal at the first offense under Section 22[b], Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules. Second, her vacillation on whether Teodulo Matillano or Leticia Barrientos Berbano executed the deed of absolute sale in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling weakened her defense. With respect to Marcelo Molina, the tax declarations indicated that they were subscribed to under oath by the declarant before petitioner on August 15, 1996, in effect cancelling Antipaz San Sebastian’s tax declaration on even date, but the taxes due—land tax, transfer tax, and capital gain tax—were paid only in October, two months after issuance. Article 224[b] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code prohibits cancellation of a tax declaration and issuance of a new one unless the transfer tax has first been paid. Article 299[c] requires the previous property owner to surrender the tax declaration for cancellation; petitioner failed to present the complainants’ cancelled tax declarations and did not allege surrender. Petitioner also admitted using the deed of sale allegedly executed by Lilia Barrientos in favor of Cawaling despite the property being still under litigation. Dishonesty was defined in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Rilloza as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. It is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. Petitioner’s acts displayed want of honesty.
• Impartial and Fair Treatment: Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed; in administrative proceedings, no less than substantial proof is required. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof, and mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There must be hard evidence to prove bias, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis. Petitioner had to show that the members of the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of one party over the other; in addition to palpable error inferable from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias. Petitioner failed to substantiate her allegations. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty therefore prevailed.

• Administrative Procedural Due Process — In administrative disciplinary proceedings, procedural due process does not require the strict judicial standard. Its essence is notice and a real opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The opportunity may be exercised through pleadings, and technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Cross-examination is not indispensable where the party did not request it. The Court applied this to uphold the dismissal because petitioner attended a hearing, filed an answer, and moved for reconsideration.
• Substantial Evidence as Quantum of Proof in Administrative Cases — A finding of guilt in administrative cases requires only substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is not necessary to prove guilt by clear and convincing evidence or beyond reasonable doubt. The standard is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and that participation renders the employee unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by the position. The Court applied this to the tax-declaration irregularities.
• Bias and Partiality Cannot Be Presumed — Bias and partiality cannot be presumed; in administrative proceedings, substantial proof is required. Kinship alone does not establish bias. Mere allegation is not proof, and mere suspicion of partiality is insufficient. There must be hard evidence and a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis; extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias. The Court applied this to reject petitioner’s claim based on the committee member’s relationship to the Mayor.
• Dishonesty as a Grave Offense — Dishonesty implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. It is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. The Court applied this to petitioner’s cancellation of tax declarations in favor of close relatives without complying with legal requirements.
• Municipal Assessor’s Duty to Maintain Assessment Records and Cancel Improper Assessments — Under Section 159, Article VI, Chapter 3, Title II, Book II of the Local Government Code, the municipal assessor must keep a correct record of all transfers, leases, and mortgages of real property. Where several assessments have been made for the same property, the assessor must cancel all but the one properly made, with preference to the person with the best title or, in default, possession. The Court applied this to find petitioner liable for gross neglect of duty for failing to correct records despite annotations showing the same property declared in another person’s name.
• Requirements for Cancellation of Tax Declarations — Under Article 224[b] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, no tax declaration shall be cancelled and a new one issued in lieu thereof unless the transfer tax has first been paid. Under Article 299[c], the previous property owner must surrender the tax declaration to the assessor for cancellation. The Court applied these provisions to find the issuance of new tax declarations in favor of petitioner’s brother-in-law irregular because taxes were paid only two months after issuance and the previous owners’ tax declarations were not shown to have been surrendered.

• "In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." — This passage states the controlling standard for administrative procedural due process and explains why petitioner’s participation through an answer and motion for reconsideration sufficed.
• "Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality." — The Court used this principle to reject petitioner’s claim that the fact-finding committee was partial because one member was the Mayor’s sister.
• "The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion." — This defines the substantial evidence standard applied to uphold petitioner’s dismissal.
• "Dishonesty is considered as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws." — This identifies the classification and penalty for dishonesty, supporting the dismissal from service.

• Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Rilloza, 412 Phil. 118, 133 (2001); G.R. No. 141141, 25 June 2001, 359 SCRA 525 — Cited for the definition of dishonesty as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. The Court relied on it to characterize petitioner’s acts as grave dishonesty.
• Fabella vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110379, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 256 — Cited for the essence of procedural due process as notice and a real opportunity to be heard, and for the four administrative due process requirements.
• Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111953, 12 December 1997, 283 SCRA 31 — Cited for the proposition that procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced.
• Delano T. Padilla vs. Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 109444, 31 March 1995, 243 SCRA 155 — Cited for the rule that administrative procedural due process means the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek reconsideration.
• Luzviminda De La Cruz vs. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera Administrative Region, et al., G.R. No. 146739, 16 January 2004, 420 SCRA 113 — Cited for the rule that kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality.
• Spouses Leopoldo Hizon and Perlita Dela Fuente vs. Spouses Gigi Dela Fuente, et al., G.R. No. 152328, 23 March 2004, 426 SCRA 211 — Cited for the rule that mere suspicion of partiality is not enough and that hard evidence is required.
• Aleria, Jr. vs. Velez, G.R. No. 127400, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 611 — Cited for the requirement of extrinsic evidence to establish bias.
• San Juan, Jr. vs. Sangalang, Adm. Matter No. P-00-1437, 06 February 2001, 351 SCRA 210 — Cited for the substantial evidence quantum in administrative cases.
• Francisco Reyno vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 148105, 22 July 2004 — Cited for the standard that substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe the employee responsible and the participation renders the employee unworthy of trust and confidence.
• Avancena vs. Liwanag, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1383, 17 July 2003, 406 SCRA 300; Emin vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 139794, 27 February 2002, 378 SCRA 143 — Cited for the non-strict application of technical rules of procedure and evidence in administrative proceedings.

• Section 1, Article III, Bill of Rights — Provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Court used it as the constitutional anchor for both procedural and substantive due process claims.
• Section 159, Article VI, Chapter 3, Title II, Book II, Local Government Code, paragraphs (4)(f) and (4)(h) — Paragraph (4)(f) requires the municipal assessor to keep a correct record of all transfers, leases, and mortgages of real property; paragraph (4)(h) requires cancellation of assessments where several assessments have been made for the same property, except the one properly made, with preference to the person with the best title or, in default, possession. The Court applied these duties to find petitioner liable for gross neglect.
• Article 224[b], Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code — Prohibits cancellation of a tax declaration and issuance of a new one unless the transfer tax has first been paid. The Court applied it because taxes were paid only in October, two months after the new tax declarations were issued on August 15, 1996.
• Article 299[c], Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code — Requires the previous property owner to surrender the tax declaration to the assessor for cancellation. The Court applied it because petitioner failed to present the complainants’ cancelled tax declarations and did not allege surrender.
• Section 23, Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws — Classifies dishonesty as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. The Court applied it to affirm petitioner’s dismissal.
• Section 22[b], Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules — Penalizes gross neglect of duty with dismissal at the first offense. The Court applied it to petitioner’s failure to maintain correct assessment records.
• Rule 131, Section 3(m), Revised Rules of Court — Establishes the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. The Court applied it because petitioner failed to substantiate her allegations of bias and partiality.

Austria-Martinez (Acting Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Puno (Chairman) was on official leave.