Carvajal vs. Court of Appeals and Solid Homes, Inc.

A land registration court may dismiss an application for registration when the property sought to be registered is already covered by an existing Torrens certificate of title, as such application constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred to but also its location, and a survey is not necessary to establish the identity of the property when the title itself sufficiently identifies it.

Petitioner Juan C. Carvajal filed an application for land registration under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) with the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Antipolo, Rizal, seeking to register a 96,470 square meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C, and 6846-D. Private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed an opposition claiming that the property applied for was almost identical to land already registered in its name under the Torrens System and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-7873. The case involves the interplay between the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), and the principle that Torrens titles are incontrovertible and cannot be collaterally attacked.

Petitioner Juan C. Carvajal filed an application for land registration with Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Antipolo, Rizal, seeking to register a 96,470 square meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C, and 6846-D under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496). Copies of the application were furnished to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA), which on March 18, 1987 submitted a report recommending that petitioner amend his petition by including the names and complete postal addresses of adjoining owners and correcting discrepancies regarding boundary lot numbers. The petition was accordingly amended.

After the NLTDRA was notified that the case was initially set for hearing on December 7, 1987, the Acting Chief of the Docket Division submitted another report recommending that petitioner refer to the Bureau of Lands for corrections of discrepancies in the directional bearing and area of Lot 6846-D. The technical descriptions as corrected by the Bureau of Lands were submitted, and the application was initially set for hearing on April 26, 1988. On June 1, 1988, an order of general default was issued, exempting one Annie Jimenez who had filed an opposition. On June 22, 1988, private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed its opposition stating that land registered in its name under the Torrens System and covered by TCT No. N-7873 was almost identical to the property subject of petitioner's application. The opposition was not admitted initially because no motion to set aside the order of general default was filed.

On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit its opposition. Acting on the motion and to avoid duplicity, the trial court directed the NLTDRA to make a plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N-7873. In an order dated July 1, 1988, the trial court set aside the order of general default insofar as private respondent was concerned and admitted its opposition. During hearings conducted from September 13, 1988 through December 6, 1988, petitioner presented his evidence on whether he had a registrable right over the land in question.

Pursuant to the court order directing the NLTDRA to make the plotting, the Land Registration Authority submitted a report dated December 22, 1988 recommending that, after due hearing, petitioner's application for registration be dismissed. The trial court issued an order dated January 10, 1989 setting the LRA report for hearing on January 24, 1989. The hearing proceeded on February 8, 1989, with Engr. Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Department on Registration of the Land Registration Authority, testifying in connection with the report recommending dismissal. On February 28, 1989, petitioner's application for registration was dismissed.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on March 4, 1989. He then filed a second motion for reconsideration on May 2, 1989. The trial court required the parties and engineers from the Land Registration Commission and the DENR to appear on June 5, 1989, and directed the engineer from the Land Registration Commission to inform the court whether the property applied for was indeed inside the titled property of private respondent. After the Land Registration Authority submitted a report showing that there was indeed an overlapping of the four parcels of land applied for by petitioner and the properties of Solid Homes under TCT 7873, and considering that the properties applied for were within the titled property and could not be the subject of an application for registration, the second motion for reconsideration was denied on July 5, 1989. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, and petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

• Identity of Property: Petitioner argued that the "table survey" made by the Land Registration Authority and the geodetic engineer of the Land Management Bureau could not serve as basis for identifying his land, and that he was able to establish the identity of the land he applied for by "actual ground survey" which was approved by the Director of Lands and reprocessed by the Land Registration Authority. He claimed that if the land were covered by private respondent's title, the Director of Lands and/or Regional Director would not have approved the survey.

• Location of Property: Petitioner argued that the land in question is situated in "Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal" while that of private respondent is in "Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal," and that Survey Plan "FP-1540," which served as basis of private respondent's certificate of title, could not be found, hence the "table survey" was anomalous.

• Ocular Inspection: Petitioner concluded that the trial court should have ordered "actual ocular inspection and ground verification survey" of the properties involved, as the "matter entirely wanting in this case (is) the identity or similarity of the realties."

• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner maintained that he was denied due process when he, as an applicant in a land registration case, was not able to take the witness stand, and that even his counsel hardly participated in the proceeding except to propound clarificatory questions during the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the Land Registration Authority.

• Land Already Registered: Public respondent justified the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration proceeding cannot again be subject of adjudication or settlement in a subsequent proceeding, citing Land Titles and Deeds by Noblejas.

• Overlapping of Properties: Public respondent noted that the "Report" submitted by the Land Registration Authority and the Survey Division of the DENR both indicated an overlapping of the lot applied for by petitioner and the lot covered by TCT N-7873 owned by private respondent Solid Homes, Inc.

• Futility of Further Proceedings: Public respondent argued that even if petitioner were allowed to continue with the presentation of his evidence, the end result would still be the dismissal of his application for registration, and the respondent judge was therefore justified in cutting short the proceeding.

• Counsel's Prerogative: Anent the allegation that private respondent Solid Homes did not actively participate in the trials, public respondent stated that it is counsel's prerogative to determine how he intends to pursue his case.

• Identity of the Property Applied For: Whether an actual ground verification survey is required to establish the identity of the two parcels of land, or whether TCT No. 7873 under Plan FP-1540 of Solid Homes, Inc. is identical or similar to Lots 6846-A to 6846-D inclusive applied for by petitioner.

• Denial of Due Process: Whether petitioner was given the chance and opportunity to be heard or allowed to fully introduce his evidence in the proceeding for land registration and to rest his case.

• Reversibility of the Court of Appeals Decision: Whether the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals is reversible.

• Identity of the Property Applied For: No. The land petitioner applied for was identical to private respondent's land already covered by a Torrens certificate of title. The two reports prepared by the Land Registration Authority and the DENR Survey Division clearly showed overlapping between the two properties, and because the futility of petitioner's application was apparent, the trial court deemed it unnecessary to hear further evidence.

• Denial of Due Process: No. Petitioner was not denied due process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and petitioner was afforded that opportunity when he presented three witnesses. He failed to invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the trial court ordered the submission of memoranda signifying termination of proceedings, thereby forfeiting that right.

• Reversibility of the Court of Appeals Decision: No. The Court of Appeals decision is not reversible. The land registration court did not err in relying on the certificate of title instead of the survey plan, and the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court's decision.

• Identity of the Property Applied For: The Court found nothing irregular in the trial court's order directing the Land Registration Authority and the Survey Division of the DENR to submit reports on the location of the land covered by petitioner's application and private respondent's certificate of title. This authority was based on Section 21 of PD 1529, which provides that the court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by the Decree, may require the filing of any additional papers, and may conduct an ocular inspection if necessary. The Court noted that ocular inspection was discretionary, not mandatory, and the land registration court was not obliged to order a survey of the contested lot, especially when another government agency had already submitted a report finding that the contested lot was identical with that described in private respondent's certificate of title. The Court emphasized that an application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, and a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked — it may be challenged only in a proceeding for that purpose. After one year from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and no longer open to review. The remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to institute an ordinary action for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, an action for damages. The Court also rejected petitioner's argument that the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey conducted on the land applied for proved that the land was not covered by any title, noting that it merely showed that the land had been surveyed and its boundaries determined. Regarding the alleged discrepancy in barangay location, the Court noted that petitioner himself admitted that "Barangay Mambogan is a part of Barangay Mayamot [which is] a bigger barrio in Antipolo, Rizal," and that whether the two lands are located in Mambogan or Mayamot or both is a factual question whose resolution by the trial and appellate courts is binding on the Supreme Court. As to the alleged anomaly regarding Survey Plan FP-1540, the Court held that the law does not require resorting to a survey plan to prove the true boundaries of a land covered by a valid certificate of title; the title itself is the conclusive proof of the realty's metes and bounds, citing Section 47 of Act No. 496.

• Denial of Due Process: The Court held that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and it is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. In this case, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the trial court ordered the submission of the parties' memoranda, which signified the termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the witness stand. The Court also rejected petitioner's allegation that his counsel hardly participated in the proceedings, noting that the records show that counsel did cross-examine Engineer Silverio Perez by propounding clarificatory questions. The Court stated that the client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel, and petitioner had not shown that his previous counsel had acted in such grossly negligent manner as to deprive him of effective representation or of due process. The Court distinguished the case of Tinora vs. Nañawa cited by petitioner, noting that in that case neither the applicant nor the oppositor was a holder of any certificate of title over the land intended for registration, unlike the present case where private respondent held a Torrens certificate of title.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title — An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. A Torrens title may be challenged only in a direct proceeding for that purpose, not in an application for registration of land already registered in the name of another person. After one year from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is no longer open to review. The remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to institute an ordinary action for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, an action for damages.

• Conclusiveness of Certificate of Title — A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred to but also its location. The law does not require resorting to a survey plan to prove the true boundaries of a land covered by a valid certificate of title; the title itself is the conclusive proof of the realty's metes and bounds. Section 47 of Act No. 496 provides that original certificates in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified, and the owner's duplicate certificate shall be received as evidence in all courts and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein.

• Essence of Due Process — The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. An applicant who fails to invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the trial court orders the submission of memoranda signifying termination of proceedings acquiesces to the termination and forfeits his right to testify.

• Discretionary Nature of Ocular Inspection — Under Section 21 of PD 1529, ocular inspection of the property applied for is discretionary, not mandatory. A land registration court is not obliged to order a survey of a contested lot, especially when another government agency has already submitted a report finding that the contested lot is identical with that described in a certificate of title and recommending dismissal of the application.

• "An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. It behooves a land registration court to determine the veracity of any and all adverse claims, bearing in mind Section 46 of Act No. 496 which provides that '(n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.'" — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi: that a land registration court must dismiss an application when the property is already covered by an existing Torrens title, as allowing the application would constitute a prohibited collateral attack.

• "The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process." — This is the canonical formulation of the due process standard applied by the Court in rejecting petitioner's claim of denial of due process.

• "For our purposes, a survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also its location." — Quoted from Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, this passage establishes that a certificate of title is sufficient to prove the identity and location of the property without need for a separate survey.

• "The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law." — Quoted from Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, this passage explains the nature and conclusiveness of a Torrens certificate of title and why it cannot be collaterally attacked.

• Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 (1994) — Followed; cited for the rule that a survey is not necessary to establish the identity of property when a certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership but also of location.

• Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915) — Followed; cited for the explanation of the nature of a Torrens certificate of title and the rule that a registered title cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law.

• Gonzales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 587 (1988) — Cited for the rule that the remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to institute an ordinary action for reconveyance or an action for damages.

• Tinora vs. Nañawa, 21 SCRA 395 (1967) — Distinguished; the Court held that this case finds no application because neither the applicant nor the oppositor in that case was a holder of any certificate of title over the land intended for registration, unlike the present case.

• Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 599 (1995) — Cited for the rule that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.

• San Miguel Corporation vs. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 595 (1994) — Cited for the rule that a client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel.

• Zuñiga vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 740 (1980) — Cited for the purposes of the land registration law: to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property, to make a certificate of title absolute proof of such title, to quiet title, and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title.

• Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388 — Cited for the rule that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.

• Section 21, PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that the court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by the Decree, may require the filing of any additional papers, and may conduct an ocular inspection if necessary. Applied to justify the trial court's order directing the LRA and DENR to submit reports on the location of the properties.

• Section 46, Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — Provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Applied to support the rule that an application for registration of already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title.

• Section 47, Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — Provides that original certificates in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified, and the owner's duplicate certificate shall be received as evidence in all courts and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein. Applied to hold that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and location of the land described therein.

• Section 37, Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — Provides that in a case where there is an adverse claim, the court shall determine the conflicting interests of the applicant and the adverse claimant, and after taking evidence shall dismiss the application if neither of them succeeds in showing that he has proper title for registration, or shall enter a decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto. Referenced in distinguishing Tinora vs. Nañawa.

Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Romero, Melo, and Francisco concurred in the decision.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.