Carvajal vs. Court of Appeals

A co-heir cannot validly claim title to a specific portion of an undivided estate and sell the same before partition; the effect of any disposition by a co-heir before partition is limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the dissolution of the communal estate. What a co-heir can validly dispose of is only his hereditary rights, subject to the co-heirs' right of subrogation under Article 1088 of the Civil Code.

The case involves a 754-square meter parcel of land in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan, originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and his wife, both deceased. Upon their death, their five children—Maria, Evaristo, Faustina, Estefanio, and Tropinia—succeeded to the ownership of the whole lot as co-heirs, forming a community of ownership over the undivided estate. A petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was pending before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. T-966, when the disputed sales occurred.

Private respondents Eutiquiano Camarillo and Liberata Cacabelos, husband and wife, filed a complaint for ejectment and recovery of possession against petitioner Sulpicio Carvajal before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. T-1163. They alleged that they were the owners in fee simple of a parcel of commercial land, pro-indiviso, consisting of 150.8 square meters, more or less, situated in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan, having bought the same from Evaristo G. Espique by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on April 15, 1964. They also demanded that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use of the property at the rate of P40.00 until the property is surrendered to them.

The property in question is a one-fifth portion of a 754-square meter land originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and his wife, both dead. After their death, their five children—Maria, Evaristo, Faustina, Estefanio, and Tropinia—succeeded them in the ownership of the whole lot. Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique children. Petitioner alleged that he purchased the northern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique and that the southern one-half portion is leased to him by Tropinia Espique.

The land subject of the controversy is the most southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique children, which petitioner claims he had bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967, and which respondents claim they had bought from Evaristo on April 15, 1964. Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. T-966.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment declaring respondents the lawful owners of the land in question and ordering petitioner to pay P30.00 monthly rentals until possession of the property is surrendered to respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto, ruling that the sale by Estefanio in favor of petitioner was not valid because of lack of notice to his co-heirs.

• Prematurity of Ejectment: Petitioner argued that the action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by respondents was premature, for what must be settled first is the action for partition.
• Validity of Sale: Petitioner maintained that the sale executed by Estefanio in his favor was valid, and that the appellate court's ruling that the sale was invalid due to lack of notice to co-heirs was erroneous.

• Ownership and Ejectment: Respondents alleged that they were the owners in fee simple of the disputed parcel of land, having bought it from Evaristo G. Espique by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, and demanded that petitioner pay monthly rentals for the use of the property until it is surrendered to them.

• Validity of Pre-Partition Sales: Whether the sales of specific portions of the undivided estate made by co-heirs before partition are valid.
• Prematurity of Ejectment: Whether the action for ejectment and recovery of possession is premature when the partition of the estate has not yet been effected.
• Right to Demand Rentals: Whether respondents have the right to eject petitioner and demand payment of rentals for the use of the property in dispute pending partition.

• Validity of Pre-Partition Sales: Yes. Both sales are valid. The fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. Espique in favor of respondents and the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition of the property among the co-heirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale.
• Prematurity of Ejectment: Yes, the ejectment action is premature. Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance, and the action for ejectment and recovery of possession must be preceded by the settlement of the partition action.
• Right to Demand Rentals: No. Respondents have no right to eject petitioner nor demand payment of rentals for the use of the property in dispute until the partition of the estate is ordered and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds.

• Validity of Pre-Partition Sales: Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner has full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it. However, the effect of the alienation or mortgage with respect to the co-owners is limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. A co-owner has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. The Court held that the lack of notice in writing to co-heirs is not a requisite for the validity of the sale; its purpose is merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale for them to exercise their preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code. There was nothing in the record to indicate that such right of subrogation was sought to be exercised.

• Prematurity of Ejectment: Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided. Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. The Court found that the ejectment action was premature because what must be settled first is the action for partition.

• Right to Demand Rentals: The interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate, subject to provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in dispute. Thus, respondents have no right to eject petitioner nor demand payment of rentals.

• Co-ownership of the Estate Before Partition — Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that neither party could claim title to a specific portion of the disputed land before partition.

• Limits on Alienation by a Co-Owner (Article 493) — While each co-owner has full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, the effect of the alienation or mortgage with respect to the co-owners is limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. A co-owner has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that both sales were valid but conveyed only the sellers' ideal shares.

• Right of Subrogation of Co-Heirs (Article 1088) — Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. The Court held that such notice in writing is not a requisite for the validity of the sale; its purpose is merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale for them to exercise their preferential right of subrogation.

• "Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate." — This passage states the core rule that pre-partition, co-heirs cannot claim or dispose of specific portions of the estate, which is the ratio decidendi of the case.

• "He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or ideal portion without any physical adjudication." — This passage defines the limitation on a co-owner's right to alienate property before partition, a frequently cited formulation in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Such notice in writing is not a requisite for the validity of the sale. Its purpose is merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale of a portion of the estate, for them to exercise their preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code." — This passage clarifies that the written notice requirement under Article 1088 pertains to the exercise of the right of subrogation, not to the validity of the sale itself.

• Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679 — Cited to support the doctrine that upon the death of a person, each heir becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate, forming a community of ownership among co-heirs.
• Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 73 Phil. 628 — Cited to support the doctrine of co-ownership of the estate before partition and the limitation of interests acquired by purchasers to the parts allotted upon partition.
• Santos vs. Buenconsejo, 14 SCRA 407 — Cited to support the rule that a co-owner has no right to sell a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common.
• Diversified Credit Corp. vs. Rosado, et al., 26 SCRA 474 — Cited to support the rule that an individual co-owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land until its actual partition.
• Liwanag vs. Doriano, 32 Phil. 66 — Cited to support the rule that what a co-owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share.
• Mercado vs. Liwanag, 5 SCRA 472 — Cited to support the rule that what a co-owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share.
• Broce vs. De la Vina, 20 Phil. 423 — Cited to support the rule that before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
• Wenceslao vs. Calimon, 46 Phil. 906 — Cited to support the rule that before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
• Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 32 Phil. 214 — Cited to support the rule that before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
• De Borja vs. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 — Cited to support the rule that before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
• Mercado vs. Viado, 5 SCRA 859 — Cited to support the limitation of interests acquired by purchasers to the parts allotted upon partition.

• Article 493, New Civil Code — Provides that each co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, but the effect of such alienation or mortgage with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. The Court applied this provision to hold that both sales were valid but limited to the sellers' ideal shares.
• Article 1078, New Civil Code — Provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. The Court applied this provision to hold that the estate remained in co-ownership pending partition.
• Article 1088, New Civil Code — Provides that should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. The Court applied this provision to hold that the written notice is not a requisite for the validity of the sale but merely serves to apprise co-heirs of their right of subrogation.

• Justice Makasiar
• Justice Guerrero
• Justice Melencio-Herrera
• Justice Plana

• Justice Fernandez took no part in the decision.