Carredo vs. People of the Philippines

An accused who waives his right to be present at trial may still be compelled to appear for purposes of identification by prosecution witnesses, unless he unqualifiedly admits in open court after arraignment that he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial. A written waiver stating merely that the accused "could be identified" by witnesses in his absence is not such an unqualified admission and does not exempt him from compelled appearance for identification.

Petitioner was charged with malicious mischief before the Municipal Trial Court of Malabuyoc, Cebu City, and posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty. The case required interpretation of Section 19, Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution — the provision then in force governing the right of the accused to be present at trial and authorizing trial in absentia after arraignment upon due notice and unjustified failure to appear — and its counterpart, Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The dispute centered on the intersection between the accused's constitutional right to waive his presence at trial and the prosecution's right to require his appearance for identification by its witnesses.

On February 3, 1983, petitioner Elias Carredo was charged with malicious mischief before the Municipal Trial Court of Malabuyoc, Cebu City. He deposited a cash bond for his provisional liberty. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a written waiver of appearance dated May 14, 1984, stating that in compliance with Letter of Institution No. 40 dated November 10, 1972, he waived his appearance during the trial or any stage thereof, agreed that his absence despite due notice would be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present, and admitted that he could be identified by witnesses who were testifying at the time he was not present.

At the hearing on August 14, 1985, the prosecution moved for the recall of its principal witness for the purpose of identifying petitioner, who was not then present. The hearing was rescheduled to October 9, 1985, and a subpoena was issued to petitioner. Petitioner failed to appear on that date. His defense counsel justified the absence by arguing that petitioner's presence could no longer be required since he had already filed a written waiver of appearance. Notwithstanding this, the municipal judge issued an order dated May 27, 1986 directing the arrest of petitioner, the confiscation of the cash bond, and requiring the bondsman — who was petitioner himself — to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against the bondsman.

A motion for reconsideration of that order having been denied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In an order dated January 28, 1987, the trial court denied the petition. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising the question of whether he could be compelled, on pain of arrest and confiscation of his cash bond, to be present during trial for purposes of identification by prosecution witnesses despite his written waiver of appearance.

• Waiver of Appearance as Bar to Compelled Presence: Petitioner argued that he should not be ordered arrested for non-appearance since he had filed a written waiver of appearance in which he admitted that he could be identified by prosecution witnesses even in his absence, following the ruling of the Court in People vs. Presiding Judge.

• Compelled Appearance for Identification Despite Waiver: Whether an accused who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance during the trial can be ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of identification by prosecution witnesses.

• Compelled Appearance for Identification Despite Waiver: Yes. The accused may be compelled to appear for identification notwithstanding his written waiver, because his admission in the waiver — that he "could be identified" by witnesses in his absence — was not the unqualified admission contemplated in People vs. Presiding Judge, which requires that the accused explicitly admit in open court that he is the very person named as defendant in the case on trial.

• Compelled Appearance for Identification Despite Waiver: The Court traced the development of the rule from Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2, where six justices held that the accused may waive his right to be present at all stages of the proceedings, while five justices agreed he may waive such right except when he is to be identified. In People vs. Presiding Judge, the Court reiterated that the accused may waive his presence at trial but may be compelled to appear when he is to be identified, with an exception: when the accused "unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial." Petitioner's written waiver fell short of this standard. His statement that he "admits that he could be identified by witnesses who are testifying at the time that said accused was not present" was vague and far from unqualified; he did not admit that he was the very person named as defendant in the case on trial. The Court emphasized that the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia means the accused waives his right to meet witnesses face to face, but such waiver does not deprive the prosecution of its right to require the accused's presence for identification — which is vital for conviction. Nor does the waiver release the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right, but not his duty or obligation to the court.

• Right to Be Present vs. Duty to Appear — The accused's constitutional right to be present at trial may be waived, whether expressly through a written waiver or constructively through unjustified absence after arraignment and due notice. However, such waiver does not extinguish the prosecution's right to require the accused's presence for purposes of identification by its witnesses, nor does it release the accused from his obligation under his bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right, but not his duty or obligation to the court.
• Exception to Compelled Appearance for Identification — The accused need not be compelled to appear for identification when he "unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial." A mere written admission that the accused "could be identified" by witnesses in his absence is insufficient; the admission must be explicit, unequivocal, and made in open court, attesting that the accused is the very person named as defendant in the case on trial.

• "However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi: the distinction between the accused's waivable right to be present and his non-waivable duty to appear for identification and under his bond.
• "The accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court." — This concise formulation encapsulates the doctrinal principle that underpins the entire decision and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on trial in absentia and the accused's obligations.
• "The reason for requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal." — This passage explains the practical rationale for the identification requirement, safeguarding against the accused later invoking lack of identification as a ground for acquittal.

• Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546 (1975) — Foundational case on the right of the accused to waive presence at trial. Six justices held the accused may waive presence at all stages; five justices held he may waive except when he is to be identified. The Court relied on this split to establish that presence may be compelled for identification purposes.
• People vs. Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269 (1983) — Reiterated the Aquino rule that the accused may waive presence but may be compelled to appear for identification, with an exception when the accused unqualifiedly admits in open court after arraignment that he is the person named as defendant. The Court distinguished this case from petitioner's situation, finding his waiver fell short of the required unqualified admission.
• People vs. Prieto, Sr., 84 SCRA 198 — Cited for the principle that bail does not confer a right to ignore the terms of the bond; the accused must appear whenever required, and failure to do so justifies confinement. The Court used this to support the proposition that waiver does not release the accused from bond obligations.

• Section 19, Article 4, 1973 Constitution — Provided that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard, to be informed of the accusation, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process; however, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. The Court interpreted this provision as authorizing trial in absentia while preserving the prosecution's right to require the accused's presence for identification.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — The counterpart provision to Section 19, Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution, containing a similar authorization for trial in absentia after arraignment upon due notice and unjustified absence. Cited by the Court in a footnote as having a similar provision.
• Rule 114, Sections 1 and 2, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Cited to support the proposition that the accused's waiver of appearance does not release him from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.