Caro vs. Court of Appeals

A land registration court does not acquire jurisdiction over a subdivision petition unless notice is served upon all parties in interest in the manner prescribed by law; any order issued without such notice is void and may be impugned via certiorari at any time.

Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito, and Benjamin Benito were registered co-owners pro-indiviso of a tract of land in Castilla, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 610. Mario Benito died intestate on January 16, 1957, and his estate became the subject of Special Proceedings No. 506 before the CFI of Albay, with his widow Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito and his father Saturnino Benito appointed as co-administrators on April 12, 1957. On August 16, 1959, Benjamin Benito sold his one-third undivided share to petitioner Luz Caro. The subdivision proceedings and subsequent possession-order arose from Caro's attempt to segregate her newly acquired share from the commonly held property.

Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito, and Benjamin Benito were the registered co-owners pro-indiviso of a vast tract of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 610 of the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, located at Cumadcad, Castilla, Sorsogon. On January 16, 1957, Mario Benito died intestate, and his estate became the subject of Special Proceedings No. 506 before the CFI of Albay. The decedent's wife, Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito, and his father, Saturnino Benito, were appointed co-administrators of the estate on April 12, 1957.

On August 16, 1959, Benjamin Benito sold his one-third undivided share to petitioner Luz Caro. On September 15, 1960, Caro filed before the CFI of Sorsogon, acting as a land registration court, a petition to subdivide the land. She attached affidavits of consent from Alfredo Benito, co-owner; Saturnino Benito, co-administrator and principal heir of Mario Benito; and Josefina Duran, the mortgagee of Alfredo Benito's share. On September 27, 1960, upon Caro's verbal motion, the consideration of the subdivision petition was held in abeyance.

Eight years later, on July 5, 1968, Caro filed an ex-parte motion to set the case for hearing. Without notifying any other party, the trial court proceeded on August 23, 1968 to receive Caro's evidence ex-parte and issued an order directing the issuance of a separate title to her, while holding in abeyance the issuance of titles covering the shares of Mario and Alfredo Benito, both then deceased. In consonance with that order, the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4978 to Caro, covering her segregated one-third portion identified as Lot No. I-C, with an area of approximately 163 hectares.

On the strength of her separate title, Caro filed a motion before the CFI of Albay handling Special Proceedings No. 506 and obtained an order dated October 19, 1968 directing co-administratrix Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito to deliver possession of Lot No. I-C to Caro and enjoining the administratrix or her representatives from gathering the produce thereof. Private respondent sought reconsideration twice; both motions were denied. On August 16, 1969, she filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking annulment of both lower-court orders. The appellate court nullified both on the ground that the issuing courts acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

• Sufficiency of Consent: Petitioners maintained that formal notice was unnecessary because the parties affected by the subdivision — Alfredo Benito, Josefina Duran, and Saturnino Benito — had executed affidavits consenting to the subdivision, and that Saturnino Benito's affidavit of conformity was binding not only upon the estate of Mario Benito but also upon co-administratrix Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito.
• Inappropriateness of Certiorari: Petitioners argued that certiorari was not the proper remedy, implying that the appropriate recourse was appeal rather than a special civil action, since the lower court had jurisdiction over the subject matter.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Respondent countered that the CFI of Sorsogon never acquired jurisdiction over the subdivision petition because one indispensable party — co-administratrix Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito — was never notified and never gave her conformity to the partition.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Respondent argued that certiorari was the appropriate remedy to challenge orders rendered without jurisdiction, such orders being void and subject to attack at any time.

• Jurisdiction of the Lower Courts: Whether the Courts of First Instance of Sorsogon and Albay had jurisdiction to issue the orders subject matter of the petition.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari is the appropriate remedy to question the validity of the aforestated orders of the lower courts.

• Jurisdiction of the Lower Courts: No. The CFI of Sorsogon did not acquire jurisdiction over the subdivision petition because notice to all parties in interest, as required under Section 112 of Act No. 496, was not given; the co-administratrix Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito, an indispensable party, received no notice. The order of the CFI of Albay directing delivery of possession, being founded on the void Sorsogon order, was likewise void.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Yes. An order or judgment rendered without jurisdiction is without legal effect and may be impugned at any time and in any proceeding; certiorari is available both where appeal does not lie and where the court never acquired jurisdiction.

• Jurisdiction of the Lower Courts: Under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act), notice to all parties in interest is jurisdictional in subdivision proceedings. The mode and manner of service of notice is governed by Section 113 of the same Act, which requires that notices be sent by mail to the person to be notified at his residence and post-office address as stated in the certificate of title or any registered instrument. The records showed that Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito — co-administratrix of the estate of Mario Benito and an indispensable party — was never given notice, nor did she conform to the partition. The affidavits of consent from Alfredo Benito, Josefina Duran, and Saturnino Benito could not substitute for the statutory notice requirement, and Saturnino Benito's conformity could not bind the co-administratrix. Because the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction, its order of August 23, 1968 was void — it conferred no right, imposed no duty, and neither bound nor barred anyone. All acts performed under it, including the issuance of TCT No. 4978, were likewise void. A fortiori, the CFI of Albay's order of October 19, 1968, directing delivery of possession pursuant to the void Sorsogon order, was also void.
• Propriety of Certiorari: A void order is no order at all and produces no legal effect. Unlike errors of judgment or excesses of jurisdiction — where the court initially had jurisdiction and ordinary appeal is the proper remedy — a case where the court never acquired jurisdiction from the outset permits attack by certiorari at any time. As held in Crisostomo vs. Endencia, certiorari may be successfully invoked both where appeal does not lie and where the court had no jurisdiction to issue the challenged order. The distinction between grave abuse of discretion (where the court had jurisdiction but abused it) and total absence of jurisdiction (where the court never acquired authority) was critical: in the latter, certiorari is always available.

• Jurisdictional Notice in Land Registration Proceedings — Under Sections 112 and 113 of Act No. 496, notice to all parties in interest is jurisdictional in subdivision proceedings before a land registration court. The court cannot acquire jurisdiction without such notice, regardless of whether some parties have executed affidavits of consent. The mode and manner of service — by mail to the person's residence and post-office address as stated in the certificate of title — must be strictly followed.
• Void Orders Produce No Legal Effect — An order issued without jurisdiction is void, confers no right, imposes no duty, and neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under a void order and all claims flowing from it are likewise void. A void order cannot create a valid and legally enforceable right.
• Certiorari Against Void Orders — An order or judgment rendered without jurisdiction may be impugned at any time and in any proceeding by a party against whom it is sought to be enforced. Certiorari lies both where appeal is unavailable and where the issuing court never acquired jurisdiction, as distinguished from cases of mere errors of judgment or grave abuse of discretion where the court initially possessed jurisdiction.

• "The order of the CFI of Sorsogon being void is no order at all. It confers no right nor does it impose any duty. 'It neither binds nor bars any one.'" — This passage articulates the foundational principle that a void order is a nullity, producing no legal consequences, and underpins the Court's nullification of both lower-court orders and all derivative acts.
• "All acts performed under a void order or judgments and all claims flowing out of it are also void, for like the spring that cannot rise above its source, a void order cannot create a valid and legally enforceable right." — This metaphor encapsulates the doctrine that derivative rights from a void order are themselves void, explaining why the issuance of TCT No. 4978 and the possession-order of the CFI of Albay could not stand.
• "An order or judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is without legal effect, hence it may be impugned at any time and in any proceedings by a party against whom it is sought to be enforced." — This states the ratio decidendi on the second issue, establishing that certiorari is available against void orders without temporal limitation, distinguishing total absence of jurisdiction from mere errors reviewable by appeal.

• C.F. Yangco vs. CFI of Manila, 29 Phil. 183 — Cited as authority for the proposition that notice is jurisdictional in land registration proceedings under Act No. 496.
• Patingo vs. Pelayo, 101 Phil. 65 — Cited alongside Yangco for the jurisdictional-notice requirement in subdivision proceedings.
• Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717 — Cited for the principle that a void judgment neither binds nor bars anyone, drawing from Freeman on Judgments.
• Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa, 86 Phil. 447 — Cited for the proposition that an order rendered without jurisdiction may be impugned at any time and in any proceeding.
• Crisostomo vs. Endencia, 66 Phil. 1 — Cited as controlling authority that certiorari may be invoked both where appeal does not lie and where the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the challenged order.

• Section 112, Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — Requires notice to all parties in interest in subdivision proceedings before a land registration court. The Court held this notice requirement to be jurisdictional; without it, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the petition or the land sought to be subdivided.
• Section 113, Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — Governs the mode and manner of service of notices required under the Act, specifying that notices be sent by mail to the person's residence and post-office address as stated in the certificate of title or registered instrument. The Court applied this provision to determine that the statutory notice requirements were not satisfied, as the co-administratrix received no notice.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred.