Carmelo vs. People of the Philippines

The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy does not bar a subsequent prosecution for a new and distinct offense where, after the first prosecution has commenced, a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, changing the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constituting a new and distinct offense. An offense may be deemed to necessarily include, or be necessarily included in, another for purposes of double jeopardy only where both offenses were already in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution.

The case called for the construction of the double jeopardy clause of Article III, section 1(20) of the 1935 Constitution against the second paragraph of section 13, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the court to dismiss the original information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant is not thereby placed in double jeopardy. The Court's prior jurisprudence was divided: Diaz vs. U.S. and People vs. Espino held that a supervening fact creating a new and distinct offense does not give rise to double jeopardy, while People vs. Tarok and People vs. Villasis held otherwise. The petition required the Court to resolve that conflict and to determine the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended at the time the Constitution was promulgated.

On December 27, 1949, Conrado Carmelo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with frustrated homicide, it being alleged that he had inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than thirty days and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time.

On December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. At 10:15 in the evening of that same day, Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of the death became available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950.

On the following day, January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The accused moved to quash the amended information on the ground of double jeopardy, contending that he could not again be prosecuted for the same offense after having already pleaded to the original charge. The respondent court denied the motion, and the accused thereupon commenced the present petition for prohibition to enjoin that court from further entertaining the amended information. The respondent court's denial of the motion to quash rested on its view that the amended information was properly admitted, the death of the victim having supervened after the first prosecution had begun.

• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner contended that the amended information charging consummated homicide placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense, having already pleaded not guilty to the original information for frustrated homicide, and he accordingly sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the filing of an amended information for consummated homicide, after the accused had already pleaded not guilty to an original information for frustrated homicide and after the victim had died from his wounds, placed the accused in second jeopardy for the same offense.

• Double Jeopardy: No. The amended information was rightly allowed to stand, because the death of the victim supervened after the first prosecution and, together with the facts then existing, constituted a new and distinct offense that was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution; the rule of identity of offenses does not apply where the second offense did not exist when the first prosecution was commenced.

• Double Jeopardy: The second paragraph of section 13, Rule 106 authorizes the court, at any time before judgment, to dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy. The constitutional guarantee in Article III, section 1(20) protects a person from being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. At the time the Constitution was promulgated, the rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction: when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction, or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. The principle, founded on the law of reason, justice, and conscience, is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem and in every system of jurisprudence.

The constitutional inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense. The phrase "same offense" has always been construed to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as that alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. Identity exists when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other — the so-called "same-evidence test," which the Rules of Court restated in clearer and more accurate form. Under the Rules, there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; conversely, an offense is necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute part of the elements constituting the latter. One who has been charged with an offense cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense, though the latter be lesser or greater than the former, for the Government cannot begin with the highest and then descend step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, nor begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with the same result.

This rule of identity, however, does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such a case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted of an offense that was then inexistent. Where the accused was charged with physical injuries and, after conviction, the injured person dies, a charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. Stated otherwise, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. This is the meaning of double jeopardy as intended by the Constitution, being the one prevailing in the jurisdiction at the time of its promulgation.

Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include, or to be necessarily included in, another offense for purposes of determining double jeopardy only when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution; if the second offense was then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach to it during the first prosecution, and a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. The Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a condition that in reality does not exist, and general terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence, it being always presumed that exceptions were intended which would avoid results of that character.

When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was no intention of abandoning the doctrine laid down in Diaz vs. U.S.; although the Rules were approved in December 1939, the Court decided People vs. Espino on January 30, 1940, reiterating the Diaz doctrine. Had that doctrine been deliberately abandoned by the Rules as unwise, unjust, or obnoxious, it would logically have been repudiated in the Espino case as well, and the accused therein should have been acquitted instead of being sentenced to a heavy penalty. The Court's continued adherence to the doctrine after the approval of the Rules demonstrated that the mind of the Court was in favor of, not against, it.

For these reasons, the ruling in People vs. Tarok, as followed in People vs. Villasis, was expressly repealed, being contrary to the real meaning of double jeopardy as intended by the Constitution and the Rules of Court and obnoxious to the administration of justice. Under the Tarok ruling, if the prosecuting officer files an information within six hours after arrest, the accused claims his constitutional right to a speedy trial and is immediately arraigned, and a new fact later supervenes which, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious offense, no way would be open by which the accused could be penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt; such a ruling could also open the way to suspicions or charges of collusion between the prosecuting officers and the accused, to the grave detriment of public interest and confidence in the administration of justice. Finally, where a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense is charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine, that penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.

• Double Jeopardy — Settled Meaning — When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction, or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. The principle is founded on the law of reason, justice, and conscience, is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem, and is now embodied in the Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen. The Court applied this settled meaning — the one prevailing at the time the Constitution was promulgated — in holding that the petitioner had not been placed in second jeopardy.

• Same Offense / Identity of Offenses — The constitutional protection is against a second jeopardy for the same offense. "Same offense" has always been construed to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. Identity exists when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other (the same-evidence test). Under the Rules of Court, identity exists not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.

• Necessarily Includes / Necessarily Included — An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; conversely, an offense is necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter. One who has been charged with an offense cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense, though the latter be lesser or greater than the former.

• Supervening Fact Doctrine (Diaz Doctrine) — The rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, because there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted of an offense that was then inexistent. Where, after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. The Court applied this doctrine in sustaining the amended information for consummated homicide.

• Limitation on the Rule of Identity — An offense may be said to necessarily include or be necessarily included in another, for purposes of determining double jeopardy, only when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution; if the second offense was then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach to it during the first prosecution. The Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a condition that in reality does not exist.

• Statutory Construction — Avoidance of Absurd Consequences — General terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence; it is always presumed that exceptions were intended which would avoid results of that character. The Court invoked this canon in construing the Rules of Court so as not to produce the unjust results that would follow under the Tarok ruling.

• Credit of Penalty Already Suffered — Where a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense is charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine, the penalty already suffered may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.

• "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense," according to article III, section 1 (20) of our constitution. — The Court quotes the constitutional text that anchors the entire analysis, identifying the specific provision against which the amended information was measured.

• "It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that 'if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.'" — This passage frames the scope of the constitutional guarantee and identifies the sole express exception, setting up the Court's construction of "same offense."

• "This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent." — This is the ratio decidendi: the exception to the identity rule that authorized the amended information for consummated homicide after the victim's supervening death.

• "Stating it in another form, the rule is that 'where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense' (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicated for the new offense." — The canonical formulation of the supervening-fact (Diaz) doctrine, quoted from American jurisprudence and applied to sustain the amended information.

• "For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil., 260, as followed in People vs. Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p. 268." — The express overruling of the contrary line of decisions, marking the doctrinal shift that this case is chiefly cited for.

• Diaz vs. U.S., 223 U.S. 442 — The controlling precedent relied upon and reiterated; the Court held that where the injured person dies after conviction for physical injuries, a subsequent charge for homicide does not place the accused twice in jeopardy, and declared that this ruling governs the instant case.
• People vs. Espino, G.R. No. 46123, 69 Phil. 471 — Followed; decided January 30, 1940, after the approval of the Rules of Court in December 1939, and cited as proof that the Court did not intend to abandon the Diaz doctrine when the Rules were drafted.
• People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260 — Expressly repealed as contrary to the real meaning of double jeopardy under the Constitution and the Rules of Court and as obnoxious to the administration of justice.
• People vs. Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p. 268 — Expressly repealed together with Tarok, whose ruling it had followed.
• U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil. 484 — Cited on the same-evidence test and for the proposition that the Government cannot begin with the highest offense and then descend step by step, nor begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with the same result.
• U.S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil. 431 — Cited together with Lim Suco on the rule of identity of offenses.
• People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil. 6 — Cited together with Lim Suco and Ledesma on the rule of identity of offenses.
• People vs. Cox, 107 Mich. 435 — Quoted with approval for the proposition that the Government cannot bring a man into jeopardy for every dereliction included in the highest offense, nor begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with the same result.
• In re Allen, 2 Phil. 641 — Cited for the canon that general terms of a statute or regulation should be limited so as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence, it being presumed that exceptions were intended.
• Moncado vs. Tribunal del Pueblo, 45 Off. Gaz., p. 2850 — Cited in Justice Bengzon's separate opinion in support of his view that the overruling of Tarok and Villasis should operate prospectively only.

• Article III, section 1(20), 1935 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Court construed the clause in accordance with its settled meaning at the time of the Constitution's promulgation and held that the amended information for consummated homicide did not violate it, the second offense not having existed at the time of the first prosecution.

• Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, Rules of Court — Authorizes the court, at any time before judgment, to dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy, and to require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. The Court held that the dismissal of the first information and the filing of a new one for the proper offense were proper under this provision.

• Rule 113, section 9, Rules of Court — Cited in connection with the rule on identity of offenses, restating the same-evidence test in clearer and more accurate form: identity exists not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when it is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.

• Rule 116, section 5, Rules of Court — Cited for the definition of a necessarily included offense: an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter, and vice versa.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ.

• Justice Bengzon (concurring and dissenting) — Justice Bengzon agreed that People vs. Tarok and People vs. Villasis should be overruled, but submitted that the effect of such overruling should be prospective only, in the sense that it should not affect the herein petitioner, who had relied upon those rulings in presenting his case. He cited Moncado vs. Tribunal del Pueblo, 45 Off. Gaz., p. 2850, in support of his position.