Cariño vs. Ofilada

Intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the main action; it cannot be sustained once the principal case has been rendered moot and academic, and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued without the notice and hearing required by Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is void. Where the right of the original party has ceased to exist, there is nothing left for an intervenor to aid or oppose, and intervention must be denied; the possession of a separate, personal cause of action does not constitute the direct, immediate, and material legal interest in the pending litigation that Rule 12 demands.

On 21 September 1990, public school teachers in Bulacan staged a mass action to express solidarity with striking teachers in the National Capital Region. The DECS Regional Director for Region III issued return-to-work orders and subsequently charged the participating teachers administratively. In two decisions dated 6 February 1991, the Regional Director dismissed twenty-eight teachers (Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001) and suspended twelve others for one year (Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002); both decisions were confirmed by Secretary Isidro Cariño. A group of the dismissed teachers moved for reconsideration and, shortly thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, to compel the DECS officials to recall the dismissal decision. The mandamus case became the seedbed of the present controversy.

• The Administrative Cases: Following the 21 September 1990 mass action in Bulacan and the teachers’ failure to heed return-to-work orders, DECS Regional Director Bernardo Reyes filed administrative complaints and created an investigating committee. On 6 February 1991, he rendered two decisions: (a) in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001, twenty-eight teachers were found guilty and immediately dismissed from the service; (b) in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002, twelve teachers were suspended for one year effective upon receipt of the decision. Secretary Cariño confirmed both decisions.

• The Mandamus Petition (Civil Case No. 210-M-91): The dismissed teachers, led by Priscilla Ramos, filed a motion to recall or reconsider the dismissal decision. Without awaiting resolution of that motion, they filed a petition for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court, alleging that the decision was rendered without hearing and was unsupported by evidence, and that the DECS officials had failed to act on the motion for reconsideration within the period prescribed by P.D. No. 807. They prayed that the officials be compelled to recall or reconsider the dismissal decision. On 7 June 1991, respondent Judge Carlos Ofilada ordered the teachers’ reinstatement.

• Supreme Court Resolution in G.R. No. 100206: Petitioners challenged the 7 June 1991 order before the Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated 22 August 1991, the Court dismissed the petition and remanded the case to the trial court, observing that Director Reyes could re-examine and withdraw his 6 February 1991 decision so that the facts of the individual cases might be brought out in administrative proceedings, with any adverse decision being appealable to the Civil Service Commission. The Court further directed that the teachers be reinstated pending the trial court’s determination.

• Recall of the Dismissal, Reinstatement, and Payment: Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s suggestion, Director Reyes issued an order on 6 September 1991 setting aside and recalling his 6 February 1991 decision in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001 and directing that a formal investigation be conducted. The private respondents were reinstated, and a general payroll for their backwages was prepared and paid. Petitioners thereafter moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 210-M-91; the private respondents opposed.

• The Intervention: Despite the recall and the full satisfaction of the original petitioners’ demands, certain teachers who were respondents in either of the two administrative cases — including some who had been dismissed and others who had been suspended — filed a motion for leave to intervene and a petition-in-intervention dated 6 September 1991. They prayed for the nullification of the 6 February 1991 decision, exoneration, and reinstatement. Some of the named intervenors did not even appear in either administrative decision.

• The 15 October 1991 Hearing: During the hearing, respondent Judge stated that he was holding in abeyance the ruling on the motion to dismiss pending compliance with the Supreme Court resolution, which he interpreted to mean reinstatement and payment of backwages. He declared that if the teachers were paid and reinstated, he would dismiss the case. Petitioners orally moved for ten days to oppose the petition-in-intervention, which the court granted. The private respondents had, by then, received their backwages.

• The Assailed 29 October 1991 Order: Notwithstanding the mootness of the original petition and the pendency of the opposition period, respondent Judge issued an Order that (1) allowed the petition-in-intervention, invoking the equal protection clause, and (2) upon the intervenors’ posting of a bond of ₱20,000 each, issued a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Secretary Cariño and Director Reyes to reinstate the twenty-two intervenors, pay their back salaries from February 1991, and recall them from inactive duties. Two additional teachers, Isabelita Paguiligan and Aurelio Mariano, were included by a note to the order. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued the following day, 30 October 1991.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Allowing Intervention: Petitioners argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it allowed the petition-in-intervention, because the intervenors lacked the requisite legal interest in the original mandamus action and because the principal case had been rendered moot by the recall of the administrative decision and the full satisfaction of the original petitioners’ claims.

• Non-Dismissal of the Moot Mandamus Case: Petitioners maintained that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to dismiss Civil Case No. 210-M-91 after the reinstatement and payment of backwages of the original private respondents, since no justiciable controversy remained.

• Propriety of Intervention: The private respondents (original petitioners) and the intervenors contended that the trial court’s grant of intervention was a proper exercise of its discretion because the intervenors shared a common legal interest arising from the same administrative decisions and were entitled to protection under the equal protection clause. They argued that the mandamus case retained a live core since the intervenors’ claims had not been addressed.

• Necessity of the Injunction: Respondents argued that the preliminary mandatory injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable injury to the intervenors, who remained separated from the service despite the recall order and the lapse of the suspension period for some of them.

• Allowance of Intervention: Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for leave to intervene and admitting the petition-in-intervention.

• Non-Dismissal of the Principal Action: Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss Civil Case No. 210-M-91 after the original private respondents had been reinstated and paid their backwages and the challenged administrative decision had been recalled.

• Allowance of Intervention: The grant of intervention constituted grave abuse of discretion. Intervention is by nature ancillary and supplemental; it cannot exist independently of the principal action. With the recall of the 6 February 1991 dismissal decision and the subsequent reinstatement and payment of backwages to the original petitioners, the mandamus case had lost its reason for being and should have been dismissed. Where the right of the original party has ceased to exist, there is nothing left for an intervenor to aid or oppose, and the right of intervention perishes. Moreover, the intervenors did not possess the actual, material, direct, and immediate legal interest in the matter in litigation required by Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. Their causes of action — whether based on the recalled dismissal or the one-year suspension — were separate and personal to them, not dependent on the outcome of the original mandamus petition, and could be fully protected in independent proceedings. The trial court further compounded its error by issuing the preliminary mandatory injunction without the notice and hearing demanded by Section 5, Rule 58, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, considering that it had granted petitioners ten days to oppose the intervention and no separate hearing on the injunction was conducted.

• Non-Dismissal of the Principal Action: The failure to dismiss Civil Case No. 210-M-91 was a clear grave abuse of discretion. The sole object of the mandamus petition — the recall or reconsideration of the dismissal decision — had been attained on 6 September 1991, when Director Reyes set aside the decision, reinstated the teachers, and paid backwages. The trial judge himself acknowledged during the 15 October 1991 hearing that he would dismiss the case upon payment of backwages. After that condition was met, the court had no authority to keep the case alive or to entertain any further claims, including the intervention. The case had become functus officio. However, taking into account that Director Reyes had already recalled the dismissal decision in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001 and that the one-year suspension imposed in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002 had expired, the intervenors were entitled to reinstatement, without prejudice to the conduct of formal administrative investigations or the adoption of any new policy by the DECS.

• Nature and Requisites of Intervention — Intervention is never an independent action; it is a proceeding ancillary and supplemental to existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or delay the orderly administration of justice but to allow a third party with a direct legal interest to join the suit in aid of the right of an original party. For intervention to be allowed: (1) the principal action must be pending and justiciable; (2) the intervenor must have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either party, or an interest against both; (3) such interest must be actual, material, direct, and immediate — not merely contingent or expectant; (4) the intervenor must stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment; (5) the intervention must be sought before or during trial, “trial” referring to the period for the introduction of evidence and terminating when judgment begins; and (6) the claim of the intervenor must not be one that can be fully decided or protected in a separate proceeding. Where the principal action has been rendered moot and academic, the right of intervention ceases because there is no longer a right of the original party to be aided.

• Preliminary Mandatory Injunction; Notice and Hearing — Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may not be granted without prior notice to the adverse party and a hearing, except in cases of extreme urgency where irreparable injury would result before notice can be served. The issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction simultaneously with the resolution of a motion to intervene, without affording the adverse party the opportunity to be heard on the application for injunction, violates this rule.

• “Fundamentally, therefore, intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interest.”

• “The right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention ceases.”

• “The interest contemplated by law must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant; it must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.”

• “Since the trial court granted, during the hearing on 15 October 1991, a period of ten (10) days within which the petitioners could file an opposition to the motion to intervene, the subsequent application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be properly granted ex-parte and simultaneously with the ruling on the motion.”

• Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939) — Cited as the foundational authority on intervention in Philippine remedial law, tracing Section 2, Rule 12 to Section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure, itself copied from the California Code of Civil Procedure. The decision relied on this case for the definition, nature, and requisites of intervention, including the requirement of a direct and immediate interest.

• Clareza vs. Rosales, 2 SCRA 455 (1961) — Followed for the rule that an intervenor’s right ceases when the right of the original party has ceased to exist; an ancillary proceeding cannot outlive the main action.

• Magsaysay-Labrador vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266 (1989) — Cited for the doctrine that the intervenor’s interest must be direct and immediate, meaning the intervenor would gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment.

• Batama Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Rosal, 42 SCRA 408 (1971) and Pfleider vs. De Britanico, 12 SCRA 222 (1964)** — Invoked for the principle that intervention is improper where the intervenor’s claim can be fully adjudicated in a separate proceeding.

• Bool vs. Mendoza, 92 Phil. 892 (1933) and Felismino vs. Gloria, 47 Phil. 967 (1924)** — Cited for the restricted meaning of “trial” under Rule 12; intervention must be sought before the introduction of evidence terminates and judgment begins.

• Section 2, Rule 12, Rules of Court — The basic provision on intervention. The Court interpreted “legal interest” to require an actual, material, direct, and immediate stake in the matter in litigation, and held that the provision does not authorize intervention in a case that has become moot.

• Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of Court, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 224 — Mandates notice to the adverse party and a hearing before a preliminary injunction may issue. The trial court's simultaneous grant of intervention and a preliminary mandatory injunction, after allowing petitioners time to oppose the intervention, violated this procedural safeguard.

• Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) — Referred to by the original petitioners as the period within which their motion for reconsideration should have been resolved; not directly construed, but forms part of the administrative framework.

Chief Justice Narvasa and Justices Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and Campos, Jr. concurred.