Cariño vs. Cariño

In void marriages under Article 147 of the Family Code, wages and salaries earned by either party during cohabitation are owned in equal shares by the parties, whereas in void marriages under Article 148, only properties acquired through actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry are owned in common.

SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages: first with petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, and second with respondent Susan Yee on November 10, 1992, after cohabiting with her since 1982. Upon his death on November 23, 1992, both women claimed his death benefits. Petitioner collected P146,000.00 from various government agencies, while respondent collected P21,000.00. Respondent subsequently filed a collection suit to claim half of the P146,000.00 received by petitioner.

• First Marriage: Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, producing two children. Their marriage certificate bore no marriage license number, and the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan certified that their office had no record of a marriage license for the couple.
• Second Marriage: Cariño cohabited with Susan Yee starting in 1982 and married her on November 10, 1992, while his marriage to Nicdao subsisted. Yee claimed ignorance of the prior marriage until Cariño's funeral.
• Death and Benefits: Cariño died on November 23, 1992. Nicdao collected P146,000.00 in death benefits, while Yee collected P21,000.00. Yee shouldered medical and burial expenses.
• Lower Court Proceedings: Yee sued Nicdao for half of the P146,000.00. Nicdao was declared in default for failing to file an answer.

• Inapplicability of Consuegra: Petitioner argued that Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS is inapplicable to the present controversy.
• Supremacy of the Family Code over Equity: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in applying equity instead of the explicit provisions of the Family Code.
• Abandonment of Consuegra: Petitioner contended that Vda. de Consuegra was modified, amended, or abandoned by the enactment of the Family Code.

• Nullity of First Marriage: Respondent argued that the first marriage was void ab initio for lacking a marriage license, presenting the marriage certificate and a certification from the Local Civil Registrar as proof.
• Good Faith in Second Marriage: Respondent claimed she was unaware of the prior marriage until the funeral and thus contracted the second marriage in good faith.

• Validity of the First Marriage: Whether the first marriage is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
• Validity of the Second Marriage: Whether the second marriage is void ab initio despite the nullity of the first marriage.
• Entitlement to Death Benefits: Which property regime governs the respective marriages and who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.

• Validity of the First Marriage: The first marriage was declared void ab initio. A certification from the Local Civil Registrar of the non-issuance of a marriage license is adequate to prove the absence thereof, overcoming the presumption of validity. Petitioner failed to rebut this evidence.
• Validity of the Second Marriage: The second marriage was likewise void ab initio. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a prior judicial declaration of nullity is required before contracting a subsequent marriage; the absence of such a decree renders the second marriage void regardless of the first marriage's inherent nullity.
• Entitlement to Death Benefits: The first marriage is governed by Article 147, which applies to parties capacitated to marry but whose marriage is void for reasons other than those in Article 40. Under this regime, wages and salaries are owned in equal shares, entitling petitioner to one-half of the death benefits. The second marriage is governed by Article 148, applicable to bigamous relationships, which requires actual joint contribution. Since respondent did not contribute to the acquisition of the death benefits, she has no claim over them. The remaining half of the benefits passes by intestate succession to the deceased's legal heirs.

• Article 40 of the Family Code (Judicial Declaration of Nullity) — For purposes of remarriage, a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is indispensable, even if the previous marriage is patently void. However, for purposes other than remarriage (e.g., determination of heirship, settlement of estate, collection of sum of money), no prior judicial action is necessary; the court may pass upon the validity of the marriage if essential to the determination of the case.
• Article 147 of the Family Code (Property Regime of Void Marriages Without Legal Impediment) — Applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated to marry each other but whose marriage is void for other reasons. Wages and salaries earned by either party during cohabitation are owned by the parties in equal shares. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family are deemed contributions to the acquisition of property.
• Article 148 of the Family Code (Property Regime of Bigamous/Polygamous Unions) — Applies to bigamous, adulterous, or multiple alliances. Only properties acquired through actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry are owned in common in proportion to respective contributions. Wages and salaries belong exclusively to the earning party.

• "However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case."
• "In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto."

• Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 37 SCRA 316 (1971) — Distinguished. The ruling in Consuegra, which awarded shares to both the first and second wives based on existing property regimes, was premised on the rule requiring a prior judicial declaration of nullity. The Family Code, specifically Articles 147 and 148, now provides the substantive basis for determining property rights in void marriages.
• Republic v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 257 (1994) — Followed. A certification from the local civil registrar regarding the non-issuance of a marriage license is adequate proof of such non-issuance.
• Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 (1993) — Followed. A prior judicial declaration of nullity is a condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage, not for other purposes like filing a collection suit.
• Niñal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778 (March 14, 2000) — Followed. A court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same, provided it is essential to the determination of the case.

• Article 40, Family Code — Requires a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void before a party can contract a subsequent marriage. Applied to declare the second marriage void ab initio for lack of such prior judicial declaration.
• Article 147, Family Code — Governs the property regime of the first marriage (parties capacitated to marry but marriage void for lack of license). Applied to entitle the first wife to one-half of the death benefits as co-owner.
• Article 148, Family Code — Governs the property regime of the second marriage (bigamous). Applied to deny the second wife any share in the death benefits due to lack of actual joint contribution.
• Article 53, Civil Code — Enumerates the requisites of a valid marriage, including a marriage license. Cited to establish the requirement during the first marriage.
• Article 80, Civil Code — Declares marriages solemnized without a license void from the beginning. Cited as the basis for nullifying the first marriage.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ. Puno, J., was on official leave.