Cariño vs. Capulong

A writ of preliminary injunction cannot be issued to protect a right that does not exist, and a school operating without prior government authorization has no right to be protected from closure. The mere possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of an actually existing right, is no ground for injunction, being a mere damnum absque injuria.

The case involves the regulation of private educational institutions under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Act of 1982," which requires prior government authorization for the establishment and operation of schools. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) is empowered to prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of schools, and the Implementing Rules provide that no institution established as a school shall operate without prior government authorization. The DECS is authorized to impose total closure of a school operating without a permit or certificate of recognition.

AMA Computer College (AMA) took possession of the premises of Light Bringer School (LBS) at Marfori Heights, Davao City, by virtue of a "Contract of Lease with Option to Buy" entered into on 14 May 1990. LBS was a duly recognized and licensed elementary school that had transferred its operation elsewhere in Davao City. On 21 May 1990, Regional Director Venancio R. Nava of DECS Region IX received AMA's letter of intent to operate as an educational institution in Davao City.

The Regional Director reminded AMA of the provisions of the Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, specifically Article E, Section 7, Rule III, requiring that the filing of an application be at least one year before the opening of classes, and of the Private School Law provisions prohibiting the operation of unauthorized schools or courses. Nevertheless, AMA proceeded to announce its opening through news and print media and started to enroll students in elementary, secondary, and tertiary levels. The DECS Regional Director directed AMA to stop enrollment and to desist from operating without prior authorization.

AMA not only continued enrollment but also started to hold regular classes, and on 15 June 1990 filed a formal application to operate. The Regional Director reiterated the directive to stop operation with a warning that further failure to comply would constrain the office to invoke the Memorandum Agreement with the Defense Department to stop unlawful operation of the school. AMA again ignored the directive. On 22 June 1990, a DECS inspection team confirmed AMA's defiance, and military assistance was requested to effect closure. AMA's Officer-in-Charge requested a fifteen-day abeyance of the closure, which the Regional Director denied on the same day. On 25 June 1990, AMA asked that the parties await the decision of the Secretary of DECS on its application before the closure order was effected. On 27 June 1990, the Secretary of DECS denied AMA's application.

AMA then filed successive petitions in different courts. After the RTC of Manila dismissed its first petition and the Court of Appeals peremptorily dismissed its appeal, and after the RTC of Davao City dismissed a petition filed under the guise of the AMACC-PARENTS Organization, AMA filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC of Makati, Branch 134, to compel the DECS to approve its application for permit to operate retroactive to the commencement of school year 1990-1991 and to enjoin the closure and/or padlocking of AMA-Davao. The petitioners moved to dismiss on grounds including lack of entitlement to mandamus, failure to comply with the Education Act, forum shopping, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of territorial jurisdiction. On 15 November 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing of a P500,000.00 bond, and the writ was issued the following day.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners claimed that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated 15 November 1990 and the writ of preliminary injunction dated 16 November 1990, and that there was no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• No Existing Right: Petitioners argued that AMA, having been denied a permit to operate and lacking a certificate of recognition, had no existing right that needed protection during the pendency of the principal action for mandamus.
• Discretionary Duty: Petitioners, through the Solicitor General, argued that the authority to grant a permit is vested upon the judgment of the DECS, and whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty but a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed.
• Unlawful Operation: Petitioners maintained that AMA had been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation of law, and that the DECS had no ministerial duty to issue a permit before an application had been processed in accordance with the rules.

• Compromise Agreement: Private respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion for the Dismissal of the Petition, claiming that a compromise agreement had already been effected between AMA Computer College and the Department of Education, completely altering the factual situation, and that the grounds relied upon for the petition for certiorari no longer existed.
• Reiteration of Prior Allegations: In their comment on the petition, private respondents simply reiterated the allegations contained in their Manifestation and Motion for the dismissal of the petition.
• Irreparable Damage: The respondent Judge reasoned that the private respondents "need full protection for by law against irreparable damage that they may sustain by virtue of the closure order."

• Propriety of Preliminary Injunction: Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of 15 November 1990 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and in issuing the writ on 16 November 1990.
• Existence of a Right to Protect: Whether the private respondents had an existing right that needed protection during the pendency of their principal action for mandamus.
• Ministerial vs. Discretionary Duty: Whether the issuance of a permit to operate an educational institution is a ministerial duty of the DECS that can be compelled through mandamus.

• Propriety of Preliminary Injunction: Yes. The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of 15 November 1990 and the writ of preliminary injunction on 16 November 1990, and the petition was granted.
• Existence of a Right to Protect: No. The private respondents, having been denied a permit to operate and lacking a certificate of recognition, did not have any existing right that needed to be protected during the pendency of their principal action for mandamus.
• Ministerial vs. Discretionary Duty: No. The issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners but a discretionary duty or function, because it had to be exercised in accordance with the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

• Propriety of Preliminary Injunction: A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interest, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complainant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is directed are violative of said right. It is not the function of the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain a public officer from performing a duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared unlawful. In ordering the total closure of AMACC-Davao City, the petitioners were only performing their duties as public officers; hence, the respondent Judge should not have issued the writ of preliminary injunction. In issuing the writ, he allowed the private respondents to continue the operation of AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution without a permit or certificate of government recognition, thereby sanctioning the act which is unlawful.
• Existence of a Right to Protect: Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior authorization of the government and shall be effected by recognition. The Implementing Rules and Regulations provide that no institution established as a school shall operate without prior government authorization. The private respondents' application for a permit to operate AMACC-Davao City was denied by the petitioners; they did not have a permit to operate or a certificate of recognition from the government to undertake educational or school operations. Hence, the "closing" and/or "padlocking" of AMACC-Davao City would not and did not violate any right of the private respondents. The mere "possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of an actually existing right, is no ground for an injunction, being a mere damnum absque injuria."
• Ministerial vs. Discretionary Duty: Mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment. The issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners; it is a discretionary duty or function because it had to be exercised in accordance with — and not in violation of — the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The authority to grant a permit is vested upon the judgment of the DECS, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing the recognition of private schools under Section 27 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

• Requisites for Preliminary Injunction — Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complainant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is directed are violative of said right. The mere possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of an actually existing right, is no ground for an injunction, being a mere damnum absque injuria. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that AMA, lacking a permit or certificate of recognition, had no existing right to protect.
• Ministerial vs. Discretionary Duty — A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance; a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment. Mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the issuance of a school permit is a discretionary function of the DECS.
• Injunction Not to Restrain Public Officers — It is not the function of the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain a public officer from performing a duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared unlawful. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the DECS officers, in ordering the closure of AMACC-Davao City, were performing their duties as public officers.

• "Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complainant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is directed are violative of said right." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the requisites for a preliminary injunction and is the controlling rule applied to deny the writ in this case.
• "In fine, the private respondents do not have any existing right that needed to be protected during the pendency of their principal action for mandamus. Hence, the 'closing' and/or 'padlocking' of AMACC-Davao City would not and did not violate any right of the private respondents." — This passage articulates the Court's application of the right-to-protect requirement to the facts, forming the core of the ratio decidendi.
• "The mere 'possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of an actually existing right, is no ground for an injunction, being a mere damnum absque injuria.'" — This passage defines the damnum absque injuria principle in the context of preliminary injunctions and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.
• "A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment." — This passage provides the canonical distinction between ministerial and discretionary duties for purposes of mandamus.

• GSIS vs. Hon. Florendo, et al., G.R. No. L-48603, 20 September 1989, 178 SCRA 76 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that a writ of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interest during the pendency of the principal action.
• Wong Siu Tong vs. Aquino, 92 Phil. 545 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that it is not the function of the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain a public officer from performing a duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared unlawful.
• Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., et al. vs. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al., G.R. No. L-25887, 26 July 1966, 17 SCRA 731 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that the mere possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of an actually existing right, is no ground for an injunction, being a mere damnum absque injuria.
• Sy Ha vs. Galang, L-18513, 27 April 1963, 7 SCRA 797 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function.
• Symaco vs. Aquino, 106 Phil. 1130 — Cited as controlling precedent defining the distinction between a purely ministerial act and a discretionary act, quoted at length in the decision.

• Sections 25 and 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 (Education Act of 1982) — These provisions establish that the establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior authorization of the government and shall be effected by recognition, and empower the DECS to prescribe rules and regulations governing recognition. The Court applied these provisions to hold that AMA, lacking a permit, had no right to operate.
• Section 1, Rule III, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 — This provision states the policy that all educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State, and that no school shall be established or operate except pursuant to law. The Court applied this to emphasize the requirement of prior government authorization.
• Section 4(d), Rule III, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 — This provision requires prior approval of the Ministry for the establishment of a new private school, including a branch school or extension class. The Court applied this to show AMA's operation was unauthorized.
• Section 5, Rule III, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 — This provision states that no institution established as a school shall operate without prior government authorization. The Court applied this to establish that AMA's operation was unlawful.
• Section 11, Rule III, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 — This provision lists the effects of non-recognition, including total closure of the school for lack of authority to operate and disqualification of the school to confer titles or degrees. The Court applied this to show that the DECS was authorized to order closure of AMA.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and Quiason, JJ., concurred.