Cardoza vs. Singson

A final judgment may be enforced by writ of execution within five years from the date of its entry, not from the date of its promulgation; where no entry of judgment has been made because records were lost or destroyed, the trial court may order entry of judgment nunc pro tunc in the exercise of its equitable powers, and the period for execution begins to run only from such entry.

In Civil Case No. 1853 before the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, plaintiffs Juana Corollo and others sought partition of several parcels of land against defendants Juan Cardoza, Urbano Cadabos, and others. A decision dated February 7, 1938 declared the plaintiffs entitled to one-half of parcels A, B, C, and D and ordered the administrator to deliver the same; it also declared defendant Juan Cardoza the owner of parcels E, G, and H, and dismissed the complaint with respect to other parcels. The Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. No. 3545 promulgated on December 6, 1939, affirmed with the modification that defendant Urbano Cadabos was ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of parcel I. During the liberation of Manila in 1945, the records of the Court of Appeals in that case were burned. No entry of judgment was ever recorded in the appellate court or in the trial court. In 1979, the original plaintiffs or their successors moved for execution, alleging they only learned of the appellate decision in 1974 because their original counsel died in 1944 without informing them. Over petitioner’s opposition, the trial court ordered entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issued a writ of execution in 1981, leading to this petition.

• The Underlying Partition Case: In Civil Case No. 1853 before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, plaintiffs Juana Corollo, Silvestre Corollo, Severino Corollo, Ponciano Alvarez, Cirilo Alvarez, Candido Alvarez, Leon Ageroy, and Bustico Agero filed a complaint for partition against defendants Juan Cardoza (in his personal capacity and as administrator of the estate of Eulalia Cardoza), Urbano Cadabos, Magdalena Ordiz, and Miguel Galos. The dispute involved several parcels of land.

• The 1938 and 1939 Decisions: The trial court, in a decision dated February 7, 1938, declared the plaintiffs entitled to one-half of parcels A, B, C, and D and ordered the administrator to deliver that half to them; declared defendant Juan Cardoza the owner of parcels E, G, and H; and dismissed the complaint with respect to parcels F, I, and J, without costs. The Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. No. 3545 promulgated on December 6, 1939, affirmed the decision with the modification that defendant Urbano Cadabos was ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of parcel I. No pronouncement as to costs was made.

• Absence of Entry of Judgment and Lapse of Time: The records of CA G.R. No. 3545 were burned during the liberation of Manila in 1945. A certification from the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte dated January 9, 1979 stated that the record did not show that plaintiffs’ counsel or defendants’ counsel were furnished a copy of the appellate decision. The Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals issued a certification on August 23, 1979 affirming that the record of the case was destroyed. No entry of judgment was ever made in either court.

• Motion for Execution and the Nunc Pro Tunc Order: On August 29, 1979, the plaintiffs (the surviving original parties or their successors) moved for execution, claiming they learned of the Court of Appeals’ decision only on November 11, 1974 because their original counsel died in 1944 without informing them. After requiring memoranda and considering the lack of an entry of judgment, the trial court issued an Order dated July 6, 1981 directing that a nunc pro tunc entry of judgment be made and a writ of execution issued. The heirs of the original defendants later manifested no objection. The court reinstated the order on October 14, 1981 after a temporary hold, and an alias writ was implemented on November 11, 1981.

• Petitioner’s Claim of Ownership: Petitioner Juanito Cardoza claimed that the subject parcels A, B, C, and D had been bequeathed to him by Eulalia Cardoza under a last will and testament executed in 1935 and probated in 1936; he received the parcels from court-appointed administrator Juan Cardoza. He asserted ownership and possession for 45 years, payment of real property taxes, and the issuance of tax declarations in his name. He further alleged that after the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1853 learned of the judgment, they agreed to receive parcel D (the largest) in full satisfaction instead of taking one-half of the four parcels, and that he turned over parcel D pursuant to that compromise. Respondents countered that the tax declarations in petitioner’s name were obtained only in 1964 and 1965, contradicting the claim of long-standing possession.

• Lack of Jurisdiction to Order Entry of Judgment: Petitioner argued that the respondent judge usurped the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when he ordered the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc, because under Section 10, Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court, the issuance of an entry of judgment is the ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals, not of the trial court.

• Presumption of Regularity and Laches: Petitioner maintained that the plaintiffs’ inaction for over 40 years barred execution under the equitable principle of laches. He further contended that private respondents had not adduced evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions; thus, it must be presumed that the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals had already made the entry of judgment.

• Denial of Due Process and Ownership: Petitioner asserted that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion by depriving him of his property without due process of law. He claimed ownership of the lands as a legatee under a duly probated will, by virtue of delivery from the court-appointed administrator, and by payment of taxes. He also claimed that the original plaintiffs had agreed to accept parcel D in full satisfaction, thereby rendering the execution over the remaining parcels unwarranted. Even assuming that a writ of execution could validly issue, he insisted that it could not deprive him of the one-half portion of the four parcels that the judgment itself decreed in his favor.

• Jurisdiction to Order Nunc Pro Tunc Entry: Respondents countered that the respondent judge did not usurp the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals that decided CA G.R. No. 3545 was created under Commonwealth Act No. 3 and later abolished by Executive Order No. 37 dated March 10, 1945; its records were destroyed, leaving no entry of judgment. As the final repository of the transmitted decision and as a court of both law and equity, the trial court correctly ordered the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc.

• Timeliness of Execution: Respondents argued that the five-year period to enforce a judgment under Section 443 of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) commences from the date of entry of judgment, not from its promulgation. Since no entry of judgment had ever been made, the prescriptive period never started to run, and execution remained timely despite the lapse of about 40 years.

• Denial of Petitioner’s Ownership: Respondents disputed petitioner’s claim of long-term ownership and possession. They pointed out that the tax declarations covering parcels A, B, and C were transferred to petitioner’s name only in 1964 and 1965, contradicting his assertion of 45 years of continuous ownership. They prayed for dismissal of the petition.

• Enforceability: Whether the 1938 trial court decision as modified by the Court of Appeals in 1939 could still be enforced by writ of execution after approximately 40 years.

• Nunc Pro Tunc Entry: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issuing a writ of execution.

• Enforceability: The judgment could still be enforced. Under Section 443, Chapter IX of Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure), a prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution within five years from the date of its entry, not from the date of its promulgation. No entry of judgment was ever made in Civil Case No. 1853: the records of the Court of Appeals had been destroyed and the Clerk of Court of the trial court certified that there was no record of either party’s counsel having been furnished a copy of the appellate decision. No presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties could supply the missing entry, because presumptions cannot substitute for the records nor prejudice vested rights. Consequently, the five-year period never began to run, and execution remained timely.

• Nunc Pro Tunc Entry: The trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Acting not only as a court of law but also as a court of equity, the lower court properly ordered the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc. The issuance of such an order is a recognized remedy when a judgment actually rendered at a former time has not been entered of record, as held in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862; the entry operates to save proceedings had before it was made. The action was not arbitrary or capricious: petitioner was allowed to oppose the motions, was required to submit a memorandum, and was given the opportunity to adduce evidence. He failed to file a memorandum or present sufficient evidence to support his claims of ownership and compromise. Finally, a judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be amended except for clerical errors, and the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except to execute the final judgment, as ruled in Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, 165 SCRA 470. The lower court therefore merely performed its residual jurisdiction to execute a final and unaltered judgment.

• Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc — A court may order the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc when a judgment was actually rendered at an earlier time but was not entered of record. This equitable remedy supplies the missing record and preserves the validity of proceedings that occurred before the entry was made. It is available where the failure to make the entry resulted from loss, destruction, or oversight, and no entry of judgment ever existed. Here, the Court applied the doctrine because the Court of Appeals’ records were burned and no entry had been made, and the trial court’s order merely supplied what should have been recorded long before. (Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862, followed.)

• Commencement of Execution Period under Act No. 190 — Under Section 443 of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure), the five-year period within which a judgment may be enforced by writ of execution runs from the date of entry of judgment, not from the date of its promulgation. If no entry of judgment has been made, the prescriptive period does not begin to run, and execution may be sought even after a long lapse of time. In this case, the absence of any record of entry meant that the period had not started, and the judgment remained enforceable.

• “The counting of the five-year period starts from the entry of judgment and not from its promulgation.” — This passage distills the controlling rule on the prescriptive period for execution under Act No. 190 and forms the ratio for allowing enforcement despite decades of delay.

• “No presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals can apply to the instant case. ... Presumptions cannot substitute for the records much less prejudice vested rights.” — This repudiates the petitioner’s argument that the entry should be presumed to have been made simply because it was the clerk’s duty; the Court emphasized that a missing official act cannot be supplied by presumption when its absence would defeat substantive rights.

• “The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order was recognized by this Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862 where an order or judgment actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered. There is no doubt that such an entry operates to save proceedings had before it was made.” — This articulates the doctrinal basis for the nunc pro tunc remedy and confirms its applicability to the present facts.

• Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862 — Followed as controlling authority on the validity and purpose of a nunc pro tunc entry of judgment when a rendered judgment had not been recorded, supporting the trial court’s equitable power to supply the missing entry.

• Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, 165 SCRA 470 — Cited for the settled rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction except to execute the judgment; applied to underscore that the trial court was merely enforcing a final judgment and did not exceed its authority.

• Section 443, Chapter IX, Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) — Provides that the prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution of a final judgment within five years from the date of its entry. The Supreme Court interpreted “entry” as the operative event that triggers the prescriptive period, holding that where no entry had been made, the period never commenced, and execution could still issue.

• Section 10, Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court — Invoked by petitioner to assert that the entry of judgment was the ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals; the trial court’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction was not deemed to violate this rule because the appellate court no longer existed and its records had been destroyed, leaving the lower court as the proper forum to supply the missing entry.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were recorded.