Cardona vs. People of the Philippines

A violation of Section 195 of the Omnibus Election Code is mala in se, not mala prohibita, such that good faith and lack of criminal intent are valid defenses against conviction. The characterization turns on the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act — the deliberate placement of distinguishing marks to defeat ballot secrecy — not on whether the act is penalized by a special law or the Revised Penal Code. Conviction further requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of deliberate intent to identify the ballot, and the prosecution must present the corpus delicti.

Amalia G. Cardona served as chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) for Precinct No. 8A at Mahaplag Central School, Poblacion Mahaplag, Leyte, during the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections. The criminal complaint against her was initiated by Glenn H. Bartolini, a mayoral candidate in Mahaplag who lost in that election. The charges arose under Section 23(a) and (c) of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to Section 195 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (the Omnibus Election Code), provisions governing the form and manner of preparing official ballots and prohibiting the placement of distinguishing marks thereon.

On May 14, 2001, Amalia G. Cardona served as chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors for Precinct No. 8A at Mahaplag Central School in Poblacion Mahaplag, Leyte, during the National and Local Elections. Her precinct had the most number of voters in the area. Voting was delayed because Cardona waited for her poll clerk, who arrived at 7:30 a.m., and for the poll watcher of mayoral candidate Glenn H. Bartolini, so that all authorized persons would be present before voting commenced. By the time voting was about to start at approximately 8:45 a.m. — nearly two hours after the mandated 7:00 a.m. start — the voters in line were already angry. Cardona insisted on waiting to avoid complaints from candidates' representatives and to ensure fairness.

During the early hours of voting, Cardona instructed the first few batches of voters to affix their signatures on the dorsal portion of their official ballots. According to the prosecution witnesses, all voters of Precinct 8-A, some testified that Cardona told them it was "the new law," and others stated she instructed them to sign upon discovering they had voted for Bartolini. Cardona admitted allowing some voters to sign the back of their ballots but clarified that she instructed them to sign immediately upon receipt of the ballot, not after casting their votes. She explained that she experienced a "mental black-out" due to the delayed start and the pressure from the waiting voters.

Cardona realized her mistake before lunch break, at approximately 11 a.m. She immediately consulted Teresita Cartilla, a BEI chairperson in a nearby precinct, to clarify the proper procedure. Upon learning of her error, Cardona ordered the ballot box closed and directed the poll clerk to go to the Commission on Elections Registrar to ask how the situation could be rectified. The Registrar simply instructed her to record the incident in the minutes. Thereafter, Cardona resumed voting and did not permit any subsequent voter to sign the back of the ballot. Notably, the poll watchers did not protest the voters' act of signing the dorsal portion, and even Bartolini's counsel, who was inside the precinct observing, did not object. Despite the first batch of ballots bearing voters' signatures, Cardona counted every vote during canvassing — a fact the prosecution never disputed.

On February 27, 2002, an Information was filed against Cardona charging her with willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously requiring registered voters of Precinct 8A to sign the back of their official ballots against their will, thereby intentionally placing distinguishing marks and using means to identify the votes. The complaint originated from an Affidavit-Complaint filed by Bartolini. Cardona pleaded not guilty and stood trial. The prosecution presented eight witnesses, all voters of the precinct, while the defense rested solely on Cardona's testimony. Critically, although the trial court had possession of Precinct 8A's ballot boxes since July 22, 2002, the prosecution never presented or formally offered the allegedly marked ballots in evidence, submitting only the judicial affidavits of five witnesses as documentary exhibits.

• Verification and Certification: Cardona insisted that there was no defect in her Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
• Absence of Criminal Liability: Cardona argued that conviction was improper because (a) it was the voter who placed a distinguishing mark on the ballot, not her; (b) she did not induce the voters to affix their signatures; (c) the prosecution did not include the voters as principals by direct or active participation; and (d) none of the supposedly marked ballots were identified and presented during trial.
• Burden of Proof: Cardona maintained that the burden of proof did not shift to her because the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Procedural Defect: The OSG sought outright dismissal of the petition due to a defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The OSG argued that Cardona was convicted on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not solely because of her judicial admission.
• Characterization of the Offense: The OSG contended that Section 195 of the OEC is malum prohibitum where intent is immaterial, and that Cardona should have proven her defense of experiencing a mental blackout as a justifying circumstance.

• Procedural Defect: Whether the petition should be dismissed for a defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
• Private Prosecutor's Participation: Whether the private prosecutor's active participation during trial rendered the criminal proceedings void.
• Nature of the Offense: Whether a violation of Section 195 of the Omnibus Election Code is mala in se or mala prohibita, such that good faith and lack of criminal intent may be raised as valid defenses.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether Cardona is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of deliberately placing or causing the placement of distinguishing marks on the ballots.

• Procedural Defect: No. The procedural flaw was set aside in the interest of substantial justice, given the merits of the petition and Cardona's liberty at stake.
• Private Prosecutor's Participation: No defect found. The private prosecutor was validly deputized by the Assistant City Prosecutor pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC.
• Nature of the Offense: Section 195 of the OEC is mala in se. The applicable portion of the provision forbids the intentional tearing, defacing, or marking of the ballot, requiring proof of deliberate intent to identify the ballot.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. Cardona was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove deliberate intent to place distinguishing marks and failed to present the corpus delicti — the allegedly marked ballots.

• Procedural Defect: The OSG prayed for outright dismissal based on a defective verification and certification against forum shopping. The Court declined to dismiss on this ground, holding that rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Given the merits of the petition and the liberty at stake, the procedural flaw was set aside.

• Private Prosecutor's Participation: The CA incorrectly cited Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which pertains to the prosecution of election offenses via preliminary investigation before the COMELEC. The issue before the RTC concerned the private prosecutor's participation during trial, governed by Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC. Under that provision, a private prosecutor may prosecute upon written authority of the Chief of the Prosecution Office or Regional State Prosecutor, with the trial court's approval. Cardona herself admitted that the Assistant City Prosecutor deputized the private prosecutor. The criminal proceeding was therefore regularly conducted.

• Nature of the Offense: The RTC and CA erroneously treated the violation as malum prohibitum on the sole ground that the OEC is a special law. The Court rejected the misconception that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special laws. The proper test is the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. Section 195 forbids the intentional tearing or defacing of the ballot or the placement of a distinguishing mark — acts inherently directed at defeating the secrecy of the suffrage. A distinguishing mark is one placed with the deliberate intention to identify the ballot after the vote has been cast. Marks made unintentionally do not invalidate the ballot, nor do marks made by someone other than the voter. Because innocuous marks do not violate the constitutional duty to secure ballot secrecy, they do not constitute an election offense. The Court relied on Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, which held that an electoral offense under Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 is mala in se because it could not have been the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. The same logic applies to unintentional marks on a ballot. Dr. Domalanta vs. COMELEC further supported this reasoning, as the Court there considered the petitioners' claim of fatigue, demonstrating that intent was necessary to convict for an election offense under a special law.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: It was undisputed that Cardona instructed some voters to sign the dorsal portion of their ballots. However, her actions were not intended to identify the ballots after the votes were cast. She explained that she experienced a mental blackout due to the delayed voting, caused by her decision to wait for her poll clerk and Bartolini's poll watcher to ensure fairness. Her defense constituted a plea of confession and avoidance — she confessed to the act but set out circumstances that would defeat criminal liability. The absence of intent was further evidenced by her immediate closure of the ballot box upon realizing her mistake, her request for guidance from the COMELEC Registrar, her counting of every vote during canvassing despite the signatures, and the absence of any objection from poll watchers or Bartolini's counsel. Most critically, the prosecution failed to present the allegedly marked ballots — the corpus delicti — despite the trial court's possession of the ballot boxes since July 22, 2002. Without the physical evidence, the trial court could not appreciate the nature of the markings, and the prosecution could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the markings were deliberate and made for the purpose of identifying the ballots. A conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense.

• Mala in Se vs. Mala Prohibita — Inherent Immorality Test — The distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita does not depend on whether the act is penalized by the Revised Penal Code or a special law. The proper test is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se even if punished by a special law. Applied here, the Court ruled that Section 195 of the OEC is mala in se because it penalizes the intentional placement of distinguishing marks — acts inherently directed at defeating ballot secrecy and the integrity of the electoral process.

• Distinguishing Marks on Ballots — A distinguishing mark is one — whether a letter, figure, or character — which shows an intention on the part of the voter to distinguish his particular ballot from others of its class. To constitute a distinguishing mark, it must be placed on the ballot with the deliberate intention that it shall identify the ballot after the vote has been cast. Marks made unintentionally by the voter do not invalidate the ballot, nor do marks made by a person other than the voter. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Cardona's instruction to voters to sign the dorsal portion, made without intent to identify the ballots, did not constitute the prohibited act.

• Confession and Avoidance — Under this principle, the pleader confesses the allegations against him before being allowed to set out matters which, if true, would defeat the action. The Court recognized Cardona's defense as confession and avoidance: she admitted instructing voters to sign the back of their ballots but presented circumstances — mental blackout, immediate correction, good faith — that negated criminal intent.

• Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases — A conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove innocence. Applied here, the prosecution's failure to present the corpus delicti — the allegedly marked ballots — was fatal to its case.

• "An act prohibited by a special law does not automatically make it malum prohibitum. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the proper test for distinguishing mala in se from mala prohibita, rejecting the conventional assumption that all special-law offenses are mala prohibita.

• "To constitute a mark a distinguishing mark, it must be placed on a ballot with the deliberate intention that it shall identify the ballot after the vote has been cast, unless a statute enumerates certain marks as illegal or distinguishing regardless of the question of intent." — This defines the controlling doctrine on what constitutes a distinguishing mark, emphasizing the element of deliberate intent as essential to the election offense.

• "Without the physical evidence of the corpus delicti, i.e., the allegedly marked ballots, the trial court was not given the opportunity to appreciate the nature of the markings made. Thus, the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the markings were deliberate and made for the purpose of identifying the ballot." — This passage explains why the prosecution's failure to present the physical ballots was fatal to securing a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 591 (2006) — Controlling precedent on the mala in se characterization of election offenses under special laws. The Court there held that an electoral offense under Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 is mala in se because it could not have been the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. The same reasoning was applied to unintentional marks on ballots.

• Locsin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706 Phil. 590 (2013) — Followed for its definition of a distinguishing mark as one placed by the elector with the intention of facilitating identification of the ballot, defeating the secrecy of suffrage. Also cited for the principle that marks made unintentionally do not invalidate the ballot.

• Dr. Domalanta vs. COMELEC, 390 Phil. 46 (2000) — Distinguished in part but followed for the principle that intent is necessary to convict for an election offense under a special law. The Court's consideration of the petitioners' claim of fatigue demonstrated that unintentional mistakes do not necessarily constitute an election offense.

• Dungo vs. People, 762 Phil. 630 (2015) — Cited for the proposition that the better approach to distinguish mala in se from mala prohibita is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act.

• Daayata vs. People, 807 Phil. 102 (2017) — Cited for the doctrinal rule that a conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense, and that the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 23(a) and (c), Republic Act No. 7166 — Governs the form of official ballots, providing that nothing shall be printed or written on the back of the ballot except as provided in Section 24 of the Act. Cardona was charged with violating this provision in relation to Section 195 of the OEC.

• Section 195, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Prescribes the manner of preparing the ballot and prohibits, among other things, the intentional tearing or defacing of the ballot or the placement of any distinguishing mark, as well as the use of any means to identify the vote of the voter. The Court ruled this provision to be mala in se, requiring proof of deliberate intent.

• Section 262, Omnibus Election Code — Enumerates the provisions of the OEC whose violation constitutes an election offense, including Section 195.

• Section 264, Omnibus Election Code — Prescribes the penalty for election offenses: imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years, without probation, plus disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.

• Section 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC) — Governs who must prosecute criminal actions and authorizes a private prosecutor to prosecute upon written authority of the Chief of the Prosecution Office or Regional State Prosecutor, subject to the trial court's approval. Applied to uphold the validity of the private prosecutor's participation in Cardona's trial.

Leonen (Chairperson), Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred. Gesmundo, J., was on official leave.