Carballo vs. Encarnacion

A judgment rendered by an inferior court after the defendant has made a written appearance through counsel is not a judgment by default but an ex parte judgment, and is therefore appealable to the Court of First Instance. In the justice of the peace (and municipal) courts, failure to appear — not failure to answer — is the sole ground for default.

Mariano Ang filed a collection complaint against Antonio Carballo in the Municipal Court of Manila for P1,860.84. Under the procedural framework governing inferior courts at the time, a judgment by default rendered by such courts was not appealable, whereas a judgment rendered after appearance — even if ex parte — remained subject to appeal to the Court of First Instance. The distinction between default and ex parte judgment in inferior courts was governed by the rule that failure to appear, not failure to answer, constitutes the sole ground for default in those tribunals.

Mariano Ang filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 8769) against Antonio Carballo for the collection of P1,860.84. Summons was served on Carballo for appearance and trial on October 10, 1949. On October 12, 1949, Atty. J. Gonzales entered his written appearance as counsel for Carballo and on the same day filed a motion for postponement of the hearing for one month on the ground that he was sick, attaching a medical certificate. The hearing was postponed to October 14, 1949, at which time the defendant sought another postponement on the ground that his counsel was still ill. The hearing was again reset to October 24, 1949. During these postponements, the municipal court warned the defendant that the hearing could not wait until his counsel recovered and that if counsel could not attend, he should obtain the services of another lawyer.

On October 24, 1949, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared, although counsel submitted a written manifestation requesting further postponement due to continued illness. At the request of plaintiff's counsel, the defendant was declared in default. The plaintiff's evidence was received, and judgment was rendered ordering Carballo to pay P1,860 with legal interest. Counsel for the defendant was notified of the decision and filed a motion for new trial on the ground that injustice had been done and that error was committed in the decision. The motion was denied. Through counsel, Carballo perfected his appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila and thereafter filed an answer.

When the case was called for hearing on March 18, 1952, plaintiff's counsel argued that the decision appealed from had become final and executory because, having been rendered by default, no appeal could validly be taken from it. Over the defendant's opposition, the Court of First Instance, in an order dated March 18, 1952, declared the decision final and unappealable on the ground that it had been rendered by default, and held that the only jurisdiction left to it was to order execution, directing the return of the records to the municipal court for that purpose. Carballo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by an order dated March 21, 1952, prompting him to file the present petition for certiorari, injunction, prohibition, and mandamus.

• Nullity of CFI Order: Petitioner contended that the order of respondent Judge Encarnacion declaring the municipal court judgment final and executory was null and void, because the judgment was not rendered by default — his counsel had made a written appearance and filed motions for postponement — and was therefore appealable.
• Right to Trial De Novo: Petitioner argued that he was entitled to a trial de novo in the Court of First Instance, and sought mandamus to compel the respondent judge to proceed with the trial.

• Finality of Default Judgment: Respondent argued that the decision appealed from had become final and executory because, having been rendered by default in the municipal court, no appeal could validly be taken from it, citing Lim Toco vs. Co. Fay.
• Limited Jurisdiction of CFI: Respondent maintained that the only jurisdiction left to the Court of First Instance was to order execution of the default judgment.

• Nature of the Judgment: Whether the judgment rendered by the municipal court was a judgment by default or an ex parte judgment, given that the defendant's counsel had filed a written appearance but neither the defendant nor counsel appeared on the trial date.
• Appealability: Whether the defendant had the right to appeal the municipal court judgment to the Court of First Instance.

• Nature of the Judgment: No, the judgment was not by default. Because the defendant's counsel had filed a written appearance and motions for postponement, the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court; the judgment rendered after his failure to appear at trial was ex parte, not by default.
• Appealability: Yes, the defendant had the right to appeal. Since the judgment was not by default but ex parte, it was appealable to the Court of First Instance, which should have proceeded with trial de novo.

• Nature of the Judgment: The Court acknowledged that a decision by default rendered by an inferior court is not appealable, citing Lim Toco vs. Co. Fay. However, the critical question was whether Carballo had actually defaulted in the municipal court. While he filed no answer, his counsel filed a written appearance and motions for postponement on the ground of illness. Under Flores vs. Zurbito, an appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person constitutes submission to the court's jurisdiction. Carballo therefore made an appearance. Under Quinzan vs. Arellano, in the justice of the peace court, failure to appear — not failure to answer — is the sole ground for default. What occurred was that Carballo, though he filed no answer, made a written appearance; because of his and his counsel's failure to appear on the trial date, an ex parte hearing was held and judgment was rendered. The judgment was thus not by default but ex parte.

• Appealability: Because the judgment was ex parte rather than by default, Carballo had the right to appeal, which he in fact exercised. The Court of First Instance erred in declaring the decision final and executory under the theory that it was unappealable as a default judgment. The CFI should have proceeded with the trial de novo.

• Appearance as Submission to Jurisdiction — An appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, constitutes submission to the court's jurisdiction. Applied here to establish that Carballo's counsel's written appearance and motions for postponement constituted a valid appearance, precluding a finding of default. (Citing Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746.)

• Default in Inferior Courts: Failure to Appear, Not Failure to Answer — In the justice of the peace (and municipal) courts, the sole ground for default is failure to appear, not failure to answer. Because Carballo had appeared through counsel, his failure to file an answer did not constitute default; his failure to appear on the trial date resulted in an ex parte hearing, not a default judgment. (Citing Quinzan vs. Arellano, G.R. No. 4461, December 28, 1951.)

• Non-Appealability of Default Judgments from Inferior Courts — A judgment by default rendered by an inferior court is not appealable. However, this rule applies only to true default judgments; an ex parte judgment rendered after the defendant has appeared remains appealable. (Citing Lim Toco vs. Co. Fay, 80 Phil. 166.)

• "In the case of Quinzan vs. Arellano, G.R. No. 4461, December 28, 1951, the Supreme Court said that in the justice of the peace court failure to appear, not failure to answer is the sole ground for default." — This passage articulates the controlling distinction between default and non-default in inferior courts, establishing that a written appearance precludes a finding of default even when no answer is filed.

• "What really happened in the municipal court was that the defendant tho he filed no answer to the complaint, nevertheless, he made his appearance and in writing at that, but because of his failure and that of his counsel to appear on the date of the trial, a hearing ex-parte was held and judgment was rendered thereafter. The judgment, therefore, was not by default." — This is the ratio decidendi: the characterization of the judgment as ex parte rather than by default, which determined its appealability.

• Lim Toco vs. Co. Fay, 80 Phil. 166 (45 Off. Gaz., No. 8, p. 3350) — Cited for the rule that a decision by default rendered by an inferior court is not appealable. The Court acknowledged this rule but distinguished it, finding that the judgment here was not by default.

• Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746 — Cited for the doctrine that an appearance in whatever form, without objecting to the court's jurisdiction, constitutes submission to the court's jurisdiction. Applied to establish that Carballo's counsel's written appearance was a valid appearance.

• Quinzan vs. Arellano, 90 Phil. 644 (G.R. No. 4461, December 28, 1951) — Cited for the rule that in the justice of the peace court, failure to appear — not failure to answer — is the sole ground for default. This was the decisive authority supporting the conclusion that Carballo was not in default.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Labrador, JJ., concurred.