Caram vs. Segui

The writ of amparo is available only in cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, and does not extend to disputes concerning parental authority and custody of minors, which must be resolved through the specific remedies provided in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.

Ma. Christina Yusay Caram maintained an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III without the benefit of marriage. Upon becoming pregnant, she intended to place the child for adoption through Sun and Moon Home for Children to avoid placing her family in an embarrassing situation, as she already had an illegitimate son. Following the birth of Baby Julian on July 26, 2009 at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, she voluntarily surrendered the infant to the DSWD via a Deed of Voluntary Commitment executed on August 13, 2009. Marcelino died on November 26, 2009 without knowledge of the birth; during his wake, Christina disclosed the child's existence to his family and expressed her desire to recover him. The DSWD subsequently declared the child legally available for adoption on November 27, 2009, and in early 2010 placed him with the Medina Spouses for supervised trial custody.

• Nature: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC dismissing a petition for the writ of amparo.
• The Relationship and Pregnancy: Ma. Christina Yusay Caram maintained an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III without the benefit of marriage. Upon becoming pregnant, she misled Marcelino into believing she had an abortion while actually intending to complete the pregnancy and place the child for adoption through Sun and Moon Home for Children to avoid familial embarrassment.
• Birth and Voluntary Surrender: On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, with Sun and Moon shouldering all expenses. On August 13, 2009, she voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian to the DSWD via a Deed of Voluntary Commitment.
• Death of Biological Father and Subsequent Revelation: Marcelino died of a heart attack on November 26, 2009 without knowing of the birth. During his wake, Christina disclosed to his family that she had given birth to his son and surrendered him for adoption; the family sympathized and vowed to help her recover the child.
• Adoption Proceedings: On November 27, 2009, the DSWD issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian "Legally Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010, and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was matched with the Medina Spouses of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation, with supervised trial custody commencing thereafter.
• Change of Heart: On May 5, 2010, Christina wrote the DSWD requesting suspension of the adoption proceedings and stating she wanted her family back together.
• DSWD Refusal: On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera stating that the certificate of availability had attained finality on November 13, 2009 (three months after the Deed of Voluntary Commitment), thereby terminating Christina's parental authority and making the child a ward of the State. On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera refused a request for DNA testing, informing Marcelino's brother that the DSWD could no longer stop the adoption process and advising that Christina should bring the matter to the regular courts as the three-month period to regain parental rights under Section 7 of RA 9523 had already lapsed.
• Amparo Proceedings: On July 27, 2010, Christina filed the petition for the writ of amparo, alleging that respondents "blackmailed" her into surrendering the child and utilized an invalid certificate to cause the "enforced disappearance" of the child, depriving her of custodial rights.

• Availability of Amparo for Custody Disputes: Christina maintained that the DSWD officers' actions constituted an "enforced separation" amounting to an "enforced disappearance" that violated her and Baby Julian's rights to life, liberty and security. She alleged that she was "blackmailed" through the Deed of Voluntary Commitment and that respondents acted beyond their authority by enforcing an invalid certificate of availability for adoption.
• Duty to Decide on the Merits: She argued that the RTC, having assumed jurisdiction over the amparo petition, was duty-bound to resolve the case on the merits rather than dismiss it for being the wrong remedy.
• Constitutional Challenge: She sought to declare RA 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC (the Rule on Adoption) and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

• Improper Remedy: Respondents countered that the writ of amparo is not the proper vehicle for a biological parent to regain custodial rights over a child; the proper remedies are a civil case for custody under the Family Code or a petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
• Scope of Amparo: They argued that the remedy is strictly limited to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, not to custody disputes.
• Absence of Concealment: Respondents demonstrated that they never concealed the child's whereabouts; the DSWD had explicitly disclosed in the May 28, 2010 memorandum that the child was in the custody of the Medina Spouses, and they produced the child at the RTC hearing on August 5, 2010.

• Propriety of Amparo in Custody Cases: Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.

• Propriety of Amparo in Custody Cases: The writ of amparo is not the proper remedy for custody disputes. The remedy is confined exclusively to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Here, no enforced disappearance was established because the DSWD never concealed the child's whereabouts; rather, respondents disclosed his location with the Medina Spouses and produced him at the RTC hearing. The petition in substance sought to assert parental authority and contest custody over a child who had become a ward of the State, matters properly cognizable through a civil case for custody under the Family Code or a petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. The Court declined to rule on the constitutional challenge to RA 9523, noting that Congress possesses plenary power to repeal, alter and modify existing laws.

• Scope of the Writ of Amparo — The writ is an extraordinary remedy intended to address the intractable problems of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances; its coverage, in its present form, does not extend to all violations of the right to life, liberty and security, but is strictly limited to these two categories of human rights violations or threats thereof.
• Elements of Enforced Disappearance — Pursuant to Section 3(g) of RA 9851, enforced disappearance requires: (a) an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and (d) the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The absence of elements (c) and (d) precludes the application of the amparo remedy.

• "The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof." — Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, defining the narrow scope of the remedy.
• "[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of 'extralegal killings' and 'enforced disappearances,' its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof." — From Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, as quoted by the Court to emphasize the limited application of the writ.
• "Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child... clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him." — Illustrating the distinction between an enforced disappearance case and a custody dispute.

• Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1 (2008) — Controlling precedent establishing that the Amparo Rule was designed specifically to address extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, not general violations of constitutional rights.
• Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012 — Followed for the proposition that the writ is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
• Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012 — Cited for the statutory definition and elements of enforced disappearance under RA 9851.

• Section 1, Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) — Defines the petition as a remedy for violations or threats to the right to life, liberty and security by unlawful acts or omissions, explicitly limiting coverage to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
• Section 3(g), RA 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity) — Defines enforced disappearance and enumerates its constituent elements.
• Section 7, RA 9523 — Prescribes the three-month period within which parents may file a petition to recover legal custody following the execution of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment.
• Articles 141, 142, and 154, Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) — Govern involuntary and voluntary commitment of children and the declaration of availability for adoption.

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice, on leave), Antonio T. Carpio (Acting Chief Justice), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen.