Capuno vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines

An action for damages based on a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years, and the prescriptive period runs from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. The filing of a criminal action against the alleged tortfeasor does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for a separate civil action based on quasi-delict, because such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

The appellants are the heirs of Cipriano Capuno, who died in a vehicular collision involving a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision also proved fatal to Capuno's passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. The case involves the interplay between the criminal action for reckless imprudence and the separate civil actions for damages arising from the same incident, particularly with respect to the prescriptive period for actions based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code.

On January 3, 1953, a vehicular collision occurred in Apalit, Pampanga, involving a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Cipriano Capuno. The collision proved fatal to Capuno and to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. On January 5, 1953, Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 1591), and the information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.

On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi (Civil Case No. 838). The complaint included a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the criminal case, both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors. In view of the filing of the civil action, the accused Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case, on the grounds that the Capuno heirs no longer had any interest to protect since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent, and that the Estate of Buan's right to intervene had been abated by the civil action. The Court disallowed the appearance and intervention of the Buan Estate's attorneys on September 23, 1953, and that of the Capuno heirs' attorney on October 23, 1954; no appeal was taken from either order.

On June 11, 1958, the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and Settlement," whereby the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for P290,000.00. The Court approved the compromise and dismissed the case on June 17, 1958. At that time, the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959, acquitting Elordi. Prior thereto, on September 26, 1958, the appellants commenced a civil action for damages against Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This action was dismissed by the Court a quo on February 29, 1960, upon appellees' motion, on the grounds that the action had already prescribed and that appellees had been released from appellants' claim by virtue of the payment of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

• Prescription Interrupted by Criminal Action: Appellants contended that the four-year period of prescription was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi, inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately.
• No Need for Reservation: Appellants argued that reservation of the right to institute a separate civil action was not necessary, as they could file a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case.

• Prescription: Appellees based their motion for dismissal on the ground that the action had already prescribed, the complaint having been filed more than four years after the collision.
• Release from Liability: Appellees also argued that they had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum was sought to be recovered by the Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.

• Prescription of Quasi-Delict Action: Whether the appellants' action for damages based on quasi-delict was barred by the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
• Interruption by Criminal Action: Whether the filing of the criminal action against Elordi interrupted the running of the prescriptive period for the separate civil action based on quasi-delict.

• Prescription of Quasi-Delict Action: Yes. The action was barred by prescription. The action for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, and the prescriptive period runs from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
• Interruption by Criminal Action: No. The filing of the criminal action did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for a separate civil action based on quasi-delict, because such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

• Prescription of Quasi-Delict Action: The Court found the question of prescription decisive. The present action was one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which must be instituted within four years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto when they intervened in the criminal case, but their intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal. When they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958, the criminal case was still pending, showing that they chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code. The Court cited Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al. (G.R. No. L-10542, July 31, 1958), which held that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. Since the collision occurred on January 3, 1953, and the complaint was filed only on September 26, 1958, more than five years had lapsed, and the action was barred.
• Interruption by Criminal Action: The Court rejected the appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action. The Court held that reservation of the right to institute a separate civil action was not necessary; without having made it, the appellants could file a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case. Consequently, as held in Paulan vs. Sarabia, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict." The Court declined to decide whether Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code, affects the question of prescription, as the said rule did not apply in the present case.

• Prescription of Quasi-Delict Actions — An action for damages based on a quasi-delict prescribes in four years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period runs from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed, pursuant to Article 1150 of the Civil Code, which provides that the period runs "from the day (the action) may be brought." The Court applied this doctrine to bar the appellants' action, which was filed more than five years after the collision.
• Independence of Civil Action Based on Quasi-Delict — Under Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action for damages based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the filing of the criminal action did not interrupt the prescriptive period for the separate civil action.
• Non-Interruption of Prescription by Criminal Action — The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. The Court relied on Paulan vs. Sarabia for this principle, which was applied to reject the appellants' argument that the criminal action interrupted the prescriptive period.

• "There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code)." — This passage identifies the nature of the action and the applicable prescriptive period, which is the central issue in the case.
• "In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, this Court held that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, 'from the day (the action) may be brought,' which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed." — This passage establishes the rule for determining when the prescriptive period for a quasi-delict action begins to run, which is the controlling doctrine in the case.
• "The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict." — This passage states the rule that the filing of a criminal action does not interrupt the prescriptive period for a separate civil action based on quasi-delict, which is the basis for rejecting the appellants' argument.

• Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L-10542, July 31, 1958 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the rule that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to when the prescriptive period of four years begins to run, which is from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
• Pacheco vs. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960 — Cited to support the proposition that a separate civil action could be filed even during the pendency of the criminal case without the need for reservation.
• Azucena vs. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962 — Cited to support the same proposition as Pacheco vs. Tumangday.
• Dyogi vs. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957 — Cited for the proposition that the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes bodily injuries causing death.

• Article 1146, Civil Code — Provides that an action based on quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. The Court applied this provision to bar the appellants' action, which was filed more than five years after the collision.
• Article 1150, Civil Code — Provides that the prescriptive period for an action runs "from the day (the action) may be brought." The Court, citing Paulan vs. Sarabia, interpreted this to mean from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
• Article 31, Civil Code — Provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. The Court applied this provision to hold that the civil action for damages could proceed independently of the criminal case.
• Article 33, Civil Code — Provides that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party, and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, requiring only a preponderance of evidence. The Court applied this provision, noting that "physical injuries" includes bodily injuries causing death.
• Rule 111, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court — The Court declined to decide whether this rule, which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code, affects the question of prescription, as the rule did not apply in the present case.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concurred.