Capitle vs. Gaban

An action for partition among co-owners is imprescriptible only while the co-ownership is recognized; once a co-owner occupies the property openly and adversely as exclusive owner, repudiating the co-ownership, acquisitive prescription begins to run and may bar the action for partition after the statutory period has elapsed.

The case involves a dispute among descendants of Fabian Correjado, who died intestate in 1919, over two parcels of land he inherited from his father Santos Correjado. Fabian was survived by four children: Julian, Zacarias, Francisco, and Manuel, all surnamed Correjado. The applicable law governing inheritance rights was the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which was in force when Fabian died in 1919, before the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950. The petitioners are the heirs of Zacarias and Francisco, while the respondents are the children of Julian.

Fabian Correjado inherited from his father Santos Correjado two parcels of land: Lot No. 1782-B of the Pontevedra Cadastre and Lot No. 952 of the Hinigaran Cadastre, containing 26,728 sq. m. and 55,591 sq. m., respectively. Fabian died intestate in 1919, survived by four children: Julian, Zacarias, Francisco, and Manuel, all surnamed Correjado. After Fabian's death, his son Julian occupied and cultivated the two subject parcels of land until his death in 1950. Julian was survived by three children: respondents Julieta vda. de Gaban, Julia Correjado, and Hermegildo Correjado. Francisco died in 1960, survived by petitioners Manuel Correjado, Teresita C. Amarante, Juanita Correjado, Rodolfo Correjado, and Jileta Peregrino. Zacarias died in 1984, survived by the other petitioners.

On November 26, 1986, petitioners filed a complaint for partition of the property and damages before the RTC of La Carlota City against respondents. Petitioners alleged that Fabian contracted two marriages: the first with Brigida Salenda, mother of Julian, and the subsequent one with Maria Catahay, mother of Zacarias, Manuel, and Francisco. They claimed that the property remained undivided even after Julian's death in 1950, and that respondents had arrogated unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the property to the exclusion of petitioners, refusing to deliver petitioners' share despite demands.

In their Answer, respondents countered that in the proceedings in the intestate estate of their great grandfather Santos Correjado, petitioners were not adjudicated any share in the property because Maria was just a mistress of Fabian, making Francisco and Zacarias (as well as Manuel) illegitimate children who were not entitled to inherit under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. The trial court dismissed the complaint on grounds of prescription and laches. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that respondents failed to prove that Francisco and Zacarias were illegitimate, but also found that petitioners failed to prove they were legitimate. Applying the disputable presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, the appellate court presumed that Fabian and Maria were lawfully married, making their children legitimate and co-owners with Julian. Notwithstanding this finding of co-ownership, the appellate court held that prescription and laches had set in, citing the unrebutted testimony of respondent Julia that her brother Atilano introduced improvements on the property, the payment of realty taxes by respondents and their father Julian as exclusive owners, and petitioner Rogelia's admission that petitioners never possessed or benefited from the land since 1919.

• Article 19 of the Civil Code: Petitioners contended that "[t]here is such a thing as morality that comes into play," arguing that since the appellate court found the parties to be first cousins, petitioners should get their share in the property following Article 19 of the Civil Code.
• Laches and Near Relations: Petitioners contended that "laches is not strictly applied when it comes to close relations," citing Gallardo vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 248.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondents' arguments on appeal beyond their Answer before the trial court, which asserted that the petitioners' predecessors were illegitimate children not entitled to inherit under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889.

• Article 19 Applicability: Whether reliance on Article 19 of the Civil Code is misplaced.
• Morality of the Act: Whether in resolving cases, the issue of morality of the act does not come into play.
• Laches: Whether laches is applicable in the case at bar.

• Article 19 Applicability: Yes, reliance on Article 19 of the Civil Code is misplaced. Article 19 is a statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant a specific provision of law, and rights to inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity of the Civil Code are governed by the Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws.
• Morality of the Act: No. The issue of morality does not override the specific provisions of law governing inheritance and prescription, as Article 19 cannot supplant specific legal provisions.
• Laches: Yes, laches is applicable. Even assuming the petitioners' predecessors were legitimate co-owners, the adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest as exclusive owners for about 67 years vested ownership by prescription, and even an extremely liberal application of laches would bar the filing of the case.

• Article 19 Applicability: Article 19 of the Civil Code, found in Chapter 2 on Human Relations, is a statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant a specific provision of law. With respect to rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity on August 30, 1950 of the Civil Code, Article 2263 of the New Civil Code provides that such rights shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. Since Fabian died in 1919, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 governs. Under Articles 807 and 939 of the Spanish Civil Code, only legitimate children and descendants are forced heirs, and natural children legally acknowledged may succeed only in the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants. The Court found the invocation of Article 19 misplaced because it cannot supplant these specific provisions.

• Morality of the Act: The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that morality should come into play because the parties are first cousins. The specific provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and the law on prescription govern the case, and Article 19 cannot be used to override these specific legal provisions.

• Laches: Assuming arguendo that petitioners' respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias were legitimate and therefore co-owners of the property, the Court held that from the moment co-owner Julian occupied the property in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute and exclusive owner, denying his brothers any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950, the question involved was no longer one of partition but of ownership, in which case the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked. The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest as exclusive owner of the property, having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing of the case in 1986, ownership by prescription had vested in them under Article 1137 of the New Civil Code, which provides that ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith. As for estoppel by laches, since laches cannot interfere with the running of the period of prescription absent any conduct of the parties operating as estoppel, discussion thereof was dispensed with in light of the prescription of petitioners' action. The Court further noted that while laches may not be strictly applied between near relatives, under the facts and circumstances of the case — especially the uncontroverted claim of respondents that their father Julian, and the documented claim of respondent Julieta, had paid realty taxes on the property as exclusive owner, as well as the admission of petitioner Rogelia that she and her co-petitioners "never benefited" or were "deprived" of any benefits from the property since 1919 up to the time of the filing of the case in 1986, a period of 67 years, despite demands therefor — even an extremely liberal application of laches would bar the filing of the case.

• Adverse possession by a co-owner — A co-owner's possession of common property is generally not adverse to other co-owners, being likened to that of a trustee. However, acquisitive prescription may set in where one of the co-owners openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership. The elements constituting adverse possession by a co-owner against another co-owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that Julian's occupation of the property as exclusive owner since 1919, coupled with the payment of realty taxes as exclusive owner and the petitioners' admission that they never benefited from the property, constituted adverse possession sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.

• Imprescriptibility of action for partition — An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches while the co-ownership is recognized. However, once a co-owner openly and adversely occupies the property as exclusive owner, repudiating the co-ownership, the question becomes one of ownership rather than partition, and the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Julian's adverse claim of exclusive ownership since 1919 converted the action from one of partition to one of ownership, subject to prescription.

• Article 19 as a supplementary principle — Article 19 of the Civil Code, which requires every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and performance of his duties, is a statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant a specific provision of law. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the petitioners' invocation of Article 19 to override the specific provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 governing inheritance and the law on prescription.

• "Article 19 of the Civil Code in Chapter 2 on Human Relations is a statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant a specific provision of law." — This passage articulates the Court's rejection of the petitioners' reliance on Article 19 to override the specific provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 governing inheritance rights.

• "From the moment co-owner Julian occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute and exclusive owner of the property and denied his brothers any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership in which case imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked." — This passage states the controlling doctrine that adverse possession by a co-owner converts the action from partition to ownership, thereby subjecting it to prescription.

• "The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest- herein respondents as exclusive owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing of the case at bar in 1986, ownership by prescription had vested in them." — This passage states the Court's application of the thirty-year prescriptive period under Article 1137 of the New Civil Code to the facts of the case.

• "Suffice it to state that while laches may not be strictly applied between near relatives, under the facts and circumstances of the case, especially the uncontroverted claim of respondents that their father Julian, and the documented claim of respondent Julieta, had paid realty taxes on the property as exclusive owner, as well as the admission of petitioner Rogelia that, as quoted above, she and her co-petitioners 'never benefited' or were 'deprived' of any benefits from the property since 1919 up to the time of the filing of the case in 1986 before the RTC or for a period of 67 years, despite demands therefor, even an extremely liberal application of laches would bar the filing of the case." — This passage states the Court's alternative holding that even if prescription did not apply, laches would bar the action.

• Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 23 — Cited for the doctrine that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners, and that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.
• Cordova vs. Cordova, 102 Phil. 1182 — Cited for the doctrine that acquisitive prescription may set in where one of the co-owners openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership.
• Heirs of Segunda Manungding vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601 — Cited for the same doctrine that acquisitive prescription may set in where a co-owner openly and adversely occupies the property.
• Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362 — Cited for the rule that the statute of limitations operates from the moment adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.
• Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857 — Cited for the same rule regarding the operation of the statute of limitations from the moment adverse title is asserted.
• Dela Calzada-Cierras vs. CA, 212 SCRA 390 (1992) — Cited as authority for the proposition that ownership by prescription vests after the adverse possession period has elapsed.
• Delima vs. CA, 201 SCRA 641 (1991) — Cited for the same proposition regarding prescription of ownership.
• Arradaza vs. CA, 170 SCRA 12 (1989) — Cited for the same proposition regarding prescription of ownership.
• Central Azucarera de Danao vs. CA, 137 SCRA 295 (1985) — Cited for the doctrine that estoppel by laches is a creation of equity.
• Inton vs. Quintana, 81 Phil. 97 (1948) — Cited for the rule that laches cannot interfere with the running of the period of prescription absent any conduct of the parties operating as estoppel.
• Gallardo vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 248 — Cited by the petitioners for the proposition that laches is not strictly applied when it comes to close relations; the Court did not overturn this case but distinguished it based on the facts and circumstances of the case at bar.

• Article 19, New Civil Code — Requires every person, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The Court held that this provision is a statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant specific provisions of law, and thus cannot override the specific provisions governing inheritance and prescription.
• Article 2263, New Civil Code — Provides that rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity of the Civil Code shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The Court applied this provision to determine that the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 governs the inheritance rights in this case since Fabian died in 1919.
• Article 807, Spanish Civil Code of 1889 — Lists the forced heirs, including legitimate children and descendants with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants. The Court cited this provision to show that illegitimate children were not entitled to inherit under the old Civil Code.
• Article 939, Spanish Civil Code of 1889 — Provides that in the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, natural children legally acknowledged and those legitimated by royal concession shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. The Court cited this provision in the context of the inheritance rules under the old Civil Code.
• Article 1134, New Civil Code — Provides that ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. The Court cited this provision in the context of the prescriptive periods for acquiring ownership.
• Article 1137, New Civil Code — Provides that ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. The Court applied this provision in holding that the respondents' adverse possession for about 67 years vested ownership by prescription.
• Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court — Establishes the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Court of Appeals applied this presumption to find that Fabian and Maria were lawfully married, making their children legitimate.

• Justice Vitug (Chairman)
• Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez
• Justice Corona

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.